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SOCIOLOGY

THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN SOCIETY

BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES

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PREFACE

SOME years ago I published the *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. Since then I have laboured incessantly to prepare the Sociology itself. For this purpose, I used the libraries of Berlin, Paris, and London besides those of Boston and Cambridge, in order to obtain the results of the latest researches. These investigations might have been more fruitful if I could have followed the methods heretofore pursued. Much more material might, in that case, have been gathered and used from French, German, English, American, and other sources. From the time of Comte a rich and valuable sociological literature has been developed, which is indispensable for the social student. All who come after these authors must gratefully recognise them as pioneers and guides. But it would be an abuse of their authority to infer that they must be implicitly followed in order to build a solid and final structure. Still, even if a new course is found necessary, their labours are of great value, often even fundamental.

After long investigation along the old lines I became convinced that the hope of the sociologist consists in a critical use of the products of preceding investigations, in an original examination of society, and in constructing the system of sociology from the material thus gathered and according to its inherent demands. As a consequence, the material was not forced into a preconceived plan, but the system grew out of the material. In turning from the various theories of society to the inquiry what the social reality requires, it became evident that

traditional methods must be abandoned and a new start made by means of social analysis and synthesis. By pursuing this course I pass no judgment on others, but only claim the right of every investigator to follow the light and logic of his deepest convictions, while ever ready to learn from his fellow-workers and to criticise his own conclusions most severely. An estimate of the results attained in this work must be left to the reader and student.

Research in foreign libraries was especially helpful in determining the scope, the relations, and the method of sociology. Much diversity prevails respecting these fundamental themes among investigators. Frequently the most valuable suggestions were not obtained from works on sociology, but from such as treated of anthropology, ethnology, historiography, economics, political science, and logic. Little was found on the nature of society, but more in German than other authors. Social theories and interesting social discussions abound; but the scientific inquiry into the nature of society has received least attention among the fundamental problems, while it deserves the most. For the solution of this problem it became necessary to seek, through the analysis of society, to obtain the constituent elements. The most essential question pertained to the genesis of society from individuals. The result finally reached was a surprise; but it has stood the test of years, and after its firm establishment it seems strange that the old view of society should ever have been held by thinking men.

The stress placed on the Social Forces for the understanding of society is fully justified. They throw a flood of light on social phenomena and evolution, and give sociology the same solid basis as the other sciences which rest on force.

The chapters on Social Evolution direct especial attention to the three great eras in social development. That

we are gradually, but surely, moving into the third era is, I believe, well established, and interprets some of the deepest and most interesting tendencies of the times.

The introduction of Sociological Ethics is new. Not only is it allowable where sociology is treated as a human science in distinction from a natural science, but demanded. On all these subjects, however, an adequate conception of the aim can be learned only from the discussion itself.

Some points have been more fully elaborated than others because demanded by the present status of sociological inquiry. Much of the most valuable material has been put into the smaller print which follows the paragraphs. It is intended to explain and amplify the content of the paragraph, is a convenient place for notes and references, and the smaller type economises space.

Authors on sociology would be more frequently mentioned were it not for the fact that the course here pursued differs from theirs. Every social specialist owes more to others than he knows or can state. Whenever a direct quotation or justice to an author requires it, a reference to the work has been given. Numerous volumes are mentioned in which some of the subjects discussed can be farther investigated. In many cases my volume, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, considers a subject more elaborately than can here be undertaken. The references to it are indicated by *Introduction*.

Sociology enters the great laboratory of humanity in order to investigate the relations which human beings sustain in creating society. So vast are the subjects discussed that often the problems suggested outnumber the solutions. The thinker may find sociology as valuable for the promising field it opens up to future investigators as for the achievements already made. Whether we deal with problems or solutions, the study is of momentous importance and deepest interest because man and social

phenomena are the constant themes. At the same time, there is opposition to the effort to construct sociology, on account of the vastness of the subject, the wealth of the material, and the difficulties which are pronounced insuperable. This opposition will be considered later. Instead of checking sociological inquiries, the difficulties in the way ought to lead to the most profound and most persistent study of society. The human intellect must abdicate its supremacy before it can admit its inability to understand man and his associations. In view of the difficulties involved, however, no pains have been spared to make clear the discussion of the most intricate subjects.

I acknowledge my indebtedness to Mrs. Mary G. Stuckenberg for her efficient aid by repeatedly reviewing the manuscript.

J. H. W. STUCKENBERG.

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SOCIOLOGY

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CHAPTER I

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY

1. *Sociology is the science of society.*—This general definition of sociology, the one most commonly adopted, is the sense in which its inventor, Comte, used the term; it is involved in the etymology and confirmed by the deeper literature on the subject. It has often been objected that “sociology” is a barbarism, being compounded of a Latin and a Greek word. This, however, does not interfere with its appropriateness and use. The word has obtained currency in many languages, stands for a definite and valuable object of inquiry, and has not been supplanted by another which is equally satisfactory. The German language expresses the same idea by *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, society-science.

This definition makes *society* the subject-matter on which the entire investigation is to be concentrated. But society is as yet only a word whose rich content is to be discovered. The whole subject of our inquiry is presented by the definition in as undifferentiated a form as is a seed from which the plant is to be evolved. The development given in the following pages must establish what society means and involves, what peculiarities distinguish it from other objects, and why it requires separate treatment. It is enough at the outset to place definitely

before the mind the two problems for solution, *Society* and its *Science*, each of which will be more fully explained later.

Society exists and affirmations respecting it are made. The statement that society *is* leads to the query *what* it is. The predicates attached to this term are to exhaust its meaning. The specialist in sociology, just as in chemistry and botany, aims at full and valid knowledge in the best form.

How far this ideal can be realised remains to be seen; but it makes the purpose definite and serves as the guide in the investigation. Sociology sets before itself the problem of thinking society as it actually is, forming that intellectual conception which corresponds with the social reality.

To think society, or to think through it, is, of course, different from having isolated social thoughts, however valuable they may be. The total social thought, well established and properly correlated, is the aim.

I do not wish to anticipate the discussion of the nature of society, but clearness will be promoted by the statement that society always involves some kind of solidarity, a union of social factors, whatever the basis and degree of the union. All societies are alike in that they have certain elements in common, but unlike because each has peculiarities which are shared by no other society. The interpretation of society consists in discovering and explaining this likeness and unlikeness.

2. Society as the specific object of investigation distinguishes our science from the inquiries which pertain to isolated individuals. But the term "society" is applied to animals as well as men, and this makes it necessary to fix the limits of the subject-matter of sociology. That is done by making *the science of human society our aim*. This excludes what are called animal societies, such as flocks of birds, herds of cattle, schools of fishes, com-

munities of ants, and hives of bees. Sociology as used in this volume is consequently a *human* science in distinction from the natural sciences, and belongs to the *social* sciences in distinction from the sciences which treat of man merely as an individual.

As the discussion proceeds it will become evident how human society differs from isolated individuals, from individuals congregated but not associated, from animal associations, and from purely physical objects.

Animal societies are discussed in Letourneau's *Sociology*, Topinard's *Science and Faith*, and in numerous other works. We read of animal as well as human sociology, thus making a distinction between the two the more necessary. Topinard says, p. 141: "With the exception, perhaps, of the bees and the ants, science can establish the sociology proper of no animal"; and p. 258 he speaks of sociology proper as "the history (*a*) of animal societies, and (*b*) of human societies, of their development, and of the varied and complicated phenomena which they present from their origin to the present day." It is worthy of note that sociology is here defined as "history."

3. The term *science* designates the kind of interpretation aimed at by sociology. As a preliminary statement it will suffice that the science of society is intent on social knowledge obtained by means of the scientific method, and on putting this knowledge into a coherent system. We do not start with the theory that human society affords the same degree of exactness and certitude as the natural sciences. Indeed, it yet remains to be proved how far social phenomena and thought can be reduced to principles, causes, laws, and system. Even if at present only some of the causative factors can be discovered and but an imperfect system formed, the result may throw valuable light on society itself, and prepare the way for a more perfect science in the future. That all the social

facts have not yet been gathered is no reason for not attempting a system of the overwhelming number already at hand. To correlate facts and truths, and form them into unity, heightens their value and makes a place for the new ones as they are discovered. Even if a system must take account of possible emendations after further progress, the knowledge it correlates may rest on a firm basis and serve as a guide in future researches.

4. Words with deep and broad meaning usually contain unknown as well as known quantities, the former often being greater than the latter. With all the valuable interpretations of the past, in such terms as matter, mind, society, philosophy, and science, the profoundest problem consists in finding the unknown quantities. The scientific method seeks to substitute reality for the unmeaning phrases which are often taken for reality. When Aristotle pronounces man a political or social being, he states what he regards as a fact, but which really gives no interpretation of society. Whether it is really a fact requires investigation; and if this is established, then the fact itself needs explanation. Once it was customary to refer to human nature, to intuition or instinct, much that seemed inexplicable; now, however, it is demanded that human phenomena be carefully analysed, that their meaning be determined, and their source be sought, as far as possible, in known and explicable causes. Whatever conditions for phenomena exist in human nature, the actual manifestations of this nature must in part be explained by the natural and social environment and the experiences of life. In every instance a content of actuality is to take the place of fictions.

What a word stands for in our minds may be very different from the content put into it by the ages which used it and for which content it really stands. We acquire our mother tongue from those who speak it, and consequently endow a

word with that meaning only which is current in our surroundings. We may think that we have the sense of a word, when our very familiarity with it fails to recognise what problems it involves. The word "society" teems with problems. From its superficial and recognised features the sociologist aims to pass to its hidden meaning and unfathomed depths.

But suppose that he could appropriate all that has ever been put into the word "society,"—would that satisfy the sociologist? By no means. The word stands for a reality, an object; and from this object the meaning of the word must be learned. The word, therefore, gains in meaning in proportion as our knowledge of society is deepened and broadened. It is the reality we want, and words are of value only so far as they embody and convey that reality.

5. The interpretation sought by sociology is not confined to the societies now existing. These are effects and can be understood only in their genesis or through the causes which produced them. But its history does not exhaust the meaning of a society. It is itself a force, a cause, and its energy must be apprehended as pushing out into the future to mould the character and determine the course of coming society. The contemplation of society as both effect and cause, as wrought out and at the same time working, affords that comprehensive view of human association throughout all ages which constitutes the scope of sociological inquiry. Society as a chronological unit is a modern advance on the more limited and more isolated mode of thought among the ancients. This conception of society as a totality, including all times, has been promoted by modern researches, such as the development of history, the philosophy of history, and the theory of evolution. A specialisation which ignores history seeks to exploit a subject so as to exhaust its meaning in its chronological isolation; but the deep conviction of an ultimate unity as underlying the superficial diversity impels to the effort to discover the bonds between the

apparently disconnected phenomena. In a universe which is a cosmos the complete isolation of an object is unthinkable.

There are no detached threads in the social web, and the weaving goes on without breaks. No generation stands alone. As a culmination of past growths it clasps hands with every generation that preceded it. There is depth and richness in the thought of the past as it rests in the present. A century, we say, contains three generations. But if we take any thirty-three years we find in them all ages, some in life's prime, others aged or young. Those now living are composed of different generations, the aged being a survival of the past generation, the young a prophecy of the future of which they are to be a part, while the chief substance consists of those who are in the vigour of life. A family does not regard itself as a point in time, but as a chronological continuity. The state has a present existence, but likewise a past and a future. Perhaps its history is the main prop of a church. Thus every deeper inquiry connects with the problem what things are, the question how they became. In the light of this historical, causative, evolutionary conception we must conclude that sociology involves the society of all ages. What remains for ever the same in society and what continually undergoes change are among the weightiest inquiries. Sociological interpretation seeks to obtain a connected view of society, being concerned about the relation between what is, has been, and will be—a field of research so vast and profound that on every hand the mind becomes aware of its severe limitations.

6. Society exists in space as well as in time; and for this reason sociological interpretation must include the social phenomena *wherever*, as well as *whenever*, found. The spatial conditions of human association are no less important than the temporal. While all human societies must possess and reveal what is characteristic of human-

ity, they also reflect the influence of their localities. The social colouring due to place accounts for local peculiarities, but gives no idea of society at large. Even when we take such extensive social groupings as those found in Australia, Asia, Africa, or among the aborigines in America, they afford no complete picture of human association. Any such society followed throughout the ages of its existence might suggest a line rather than an all-inclusive sphere. There is causative contiguity as well as causative continuity; forces act on account of their spatial relations no less than on account of their nearness in time. The United States could not be what it is if its territory were a part of Asia or Africa. Owing to the causative factors found in locality, the scope of sociology includes society in its totality as found on earth and in time.

Already it becomes evident that sociology aims in a most important sense to be the interpreter of humanity. Of this grand conception the sociologist cannot afford to lose sight. Not that sociology has a monopoly of this aim. All the human sciences have a part in the task. But sociology, in dealing with men in their social relations, treats of the forces they exert on each other and of the results produced thereby. All that the other sciences teach respecting man, sociology applies to the intercourse, the co-operation, and the antagonism of men, and makes it the interpreter of the operations in society and humanity.

Three fundamental relations of the individual will help us to understand those of society. His heredity and his inheritance relate him to the past; his social and natural connections with the present are incalculable; and with the future he is connected because as a causative factor he has a part in shaping coming events.

7. Investigators absorbed by distracting details without penetrating to their underlying unity fail to grasp

this comprehensive conception of society. They do not understand how the conflicting phenomena can be treated scientifically or included in a single science. Where the synthesis effected by the unifying mind is absent, it is equally impossible to apprehend how the infinite variety in the substances of the material universe can be reduced to a few scores of chemical elements. The sociologist cannot investigate every society or consider all social details, just as the natural scientist cannot examine all material objects. Nor is this necessary. As in nature, so in society endless repetitions take place, and frequently a single fact explained interprets millions. Scientific social interpretation reduced to a system must be content with what is general, common to different kinds of association, emphasising characteristic, typical, and meaningful facts. Whatever has been established as characteristic of society must be found in all societies. The botanist who analyses an edelweiss found at the foot of a glacier need not fear that it lacks any essential quality of the same flower which blooms in an inaccessible crevice.

It is due to the variety in the large field before him that the sociologist is obliged to discriminate between the general and special, the typical and peculiar, the essential and accidental factors. He aims first to discover society in the societies, or the fundamental idea of society. Those who think this idea an empty abstraction fail to grasp its meaning. The idea of a flower reveals to me a content found in every flower that blooms; so if I learn what society is I have a knowledge of something found in all societies. How can the mind extract from societies the idea of society unless it actually exists in them? Therefore the idea we seek, instead of being an empty abstraction, possesses a content that is rich and of universal social application. But in every actual or concrete society this universal idea exists in a differentiated form; and this differentiation stamps each association

with distinctive marks. If I know what a rose is I know every rose; but that which makes a rose peculiar, or this particular rose, presents another problem. When the essence of society is known we have the nucleus of all social interpretation, the centre from which the entire social sphere of every place and every time can be drawn.

8. A proper classification overcomes much of the confusion arising from a survey of the multiplicity and heterogeneity found in societies. If first we determine what is common to all societies we get what may be called the genus society. Of this genus all existing societies are species or differentiations. Thus under the genus society we have such species as the family, the church, the state, each of which contains a large number of specific or concrete societies. The species are not so numerous as to cause confusion; they can easily be classified, at least in a general way. From the genus society we can pass to the species; each species has numerous differentiations; and through these differentiations we pass to the concrete or individual societies.

Let us pass from the genus society to the species the state. There are differentiations of the state into monarchies, oligarchies, and republics, each of which is again subject to differentiation. We take the monarchy as an illustration. There are absolute and constitutional monarchies. From the constitutional monarchies we take a particular one, as England. This will serve to make the purpose of sociology more clear. England is a state, a definite, concrete, individual organisation. It is a constitutional monarchy, which is a more general and more abstract idea than the idea of England as an individual state. England is a monarchy, an idea more general and more abstract than that of a constitutional monarchy. A still more general idea is the statement that it is a state. But for sociology the most general conception is that England is a society.

It is important to know just what is involved in this process of passing from the general to the particular, and *vice versa*. Every concept is comprehensive in proportion as it is general or abstract, but at the same time it is poor in definite content. Every concrete object contains all included in the general terms by which it is designated and much more besides. So important is this for future progress that it is here illustrated.

The term "society" is the most general social term and includes all societies; but so abstract is it that it gives nothing that is specific, nothing that designates any society in particular. Society simply stands for what is common to all societies. "State" is less general than society. There are societies which are not states, but all states belong to society. The term "society" includes more societies than the term "state," for the very reason that state is more specific than society, more concrete, excluding all societies which have not the characteristics of statehood. The term "monarchy" does not include all states, still less all societies; but it is more specific than either, it gives a particular qualification, and therefore limitation, to the term "state." When at last we come to England we have but a single state; but in actual, specific, concrete content it is richer than all the general terms under which it is included. England is a monarchy, a state, a society, so that it involves all included in these general ideas. But it contains more; it has a rich actuality, a certain territory, a particular kind of government, institutions, and people, with certain religious, intellectual, æsthetic, and industrial factors. What is peculiar to England is found nowhere else—that peculiarity makes it England; but what it has in common with other societies makes it a monarchy, a state, a society.

Sociology does not propose to describe England; that function it leaves to the geology and history of England. Nor does it propose to discuss England as a monarchy or

a state; that it leaves to political science. But sociology takes the most general idea, society, which is found in all societies, and makes that the subject of its investigations. This idea, however, becomes clearer by showing how the general notion of society is differentiated into various social species, and into individual, concrete societies. Sociology, therefore, does not ignore the actual societies, but considers them whenever their discussion throws light on society itself. We can only understand human society by studying the ever-recurring, characteristic combinations of men in the present and in history. It is from the actual associations of men that sociology gets the facts from which to draw its inferences and establish its principles and laws. But sociology would find its task endless if it attempted to make a specialty of individual societies and social details.

Individual societies may readily be recognised, while the definition of society, the genus, is difficult. But the above makes it clear what sociology aims at when the statement is made that it seeks to discover society in the societies. Call the general notion or the genus the *idea* of society, society in itself or *per se*, the meaning always is that the most general purpose of sociology is to find what must be in order that societies may be.

Valuable discussions on the important process of generalisation are found in an article by Huxley in *The Nineteenth Century*, February, 1887, and in a volume by Ribot, *The Evolution of General Ideas*.

9. A little reflection will now explain how, with the same definition of sociology as "the science of society," so much confusion can prevail in sociological literature respecting the object and method of investigation. What else could be expected when both "society" and "science" are used differently? Mr. Herbert Spencer

has a "Descriptive Sociology," which, if sociology is the science of society, means a descriptive science of society, which really involves a contradiction. Science uses description and may also serve as a basis for description; but its purpose is not description, but rational interpretation, principles, laws, and system. Natural history is descriptive, but it is distinct from natural science. Mr. Spencer's work, however, contains much valuable material for which the sociologist is grateful.

Sometimes sociology is not defined, but used vaguely for all kinds of social facts and thoughts. But aside from attempts which have no claim to science, "society" is used so variously as to stand for entirely different objects. Society as the generic term, the genus, is not distinguished from the more concrete use of the term, namely, the species under this genus. The state is a society; why not, then, make sociology synonymous with political science? Sociology is called social science, but political economy is also a social science; why not, then, identify sociology with economic science?

These points will be considered more fully in the next chapter; here the sole aim is to separate sociology from allied subjects in order to make its meaning and scope clear. A common mistake arises from overlooking the fact that, while there may be a number of subjects of which each is called *a* social science, there may also be one subject which is the most general and can be called *the* social science. Much of the prevalent confusion will be overcome by making society *per se*, the genus society and not a species, the subject-matter of sociological inquiry. This fixes definitely human society in its deepest and broadest meaning as the object of scientific interpretation. How far the species under the genus shall be considered depends on how much they are needed for the interpretation sought, and on mental limitations and convenience.

There is much social discussion which does not hint at the idea of society involved in the discussion. A literary club, a scientific association, a labour organisation, a church, and a state are considered; but what they have in common, that general element which makes each a society, is overlooked. This element sociology emphasises.

An example will illustrate how a society can be elaborately discussed without reference to the idea of society *per se*. The Academy of Sciences in Berlin is a society founded by Leibnitz and reorganised by Frederick II.; its members are scholars who meet for the discussion of scientific subjects; it promotes scholarly investigations and publishes the results. Let us suppose that an elaborate account is given of the Academy from its origin till the present. That would be a history of the society and a description of its status; but what society *per se* is would not be included. Perhaps the concrete historical account and description of the Academy do not give the features common to other societies—societies which may not be scientific academies, nor located in Berlin, nor have the names of Leibnitz and Frederick associated with them, nor have scholars as their members. In other words, what is peculiar to a society gives no idea of society *per se*, the very thing aimed at by sociology. The ordinary discussions respecting society pertain to social history and social description, in which the meaning of society is taken for granted, but is not interpreted. For this reason “society” is so often a mere word whose significant content is not grasped. Sociology finds the term “society” and demands an explanation of what it stands for and involves.

We find this explanation by comparing the Berlin Academy of Sciences with other societies and determining what is common to all. This common element is the fact of *association*. Such a relation of human beings, then, as to form of them an association is the generic factor or constituent element of all societies. Societies are recognised by their peculiarities; but society in the most general sense consists of what remains in all societies after their peculiarities have been eliminated.

10. To take a part for the whole is one of the most

common errors. The evolution which produced sociology has also made society so varied and rich in content as to present a strong temptation to the mind to become absorbed by some dominant social characteristic and movement, without penetrating to the notion of society itself. A particular class of social phenomena is easily grasped, while a comprehension of the total sociality is difficult. What is prominent and striking, as the social problem or socialism, is thus made the subject-matter of sociology. A fixed idea is formed by what interests a person, and nothing else is seen. In this way words with a general meaning are limited to a particular case and lose their generic sense. By religion men mean their sect. By politics they do not mean the great and important science of politics, but the politics, however petty, of their faction or country. In politics, in the true sense, they probably take no interest. In the same way the "society" of a place is limited to a prominent social circle or the aristocracy. It is not recognised that the entire community, including the poor no less than the rich, constitutes a society. For the same reason formal associations are recognised as societies, while the social element in groups not formally organised is overlooked.

The tendency to take a striking or obvious part of a subject for the whole has been a serious barrier in the way of sociological study. Sociology is obliged to test the popular social notions and nomenclature in order to discover society in its deepest and broadest sense, and make that the subject-matter of its investigation.

Everywhere we see evidences of the tendency to abstract some prominent phase from a subject and then treat that phase as if it exhausted all the contents. Socialism is the opposite of individualism, aiming at the social instead of the individual control of public interests; yet in every country the popular notion of socialism is taken from the dominant socialistic trend.

Germany has socialists of the chair, likewise Protestant socialists and Catholic socialists, all of which oppose the social democracy; yet so strong is the latter that when socialism without other qualification is named, the social democracy is always meant. Philosophy really stands for the investigation of the ultimate problems of the human mind; but sometimes it is used for all deeper knowledge or is viewed as but an aspect of theology; at others it means metaphysics or speculation in general, a theory of knowledge, rationalism, empiricism, or is made synonymous with science. It is apt to stand for the critical philosophy while Kantism prevails, and for Hegelianism during the dominance of Hegel's system. Science and many other terms have a similar history. Society and sociology belong to the same category. Instead of the specific treatment of society itself, we find that a pet social theory or a particular aspect of society is discussed, and the comprehensive aim of sociology defeated under the very name of sociology.

11. Social phenomena are too prominent and too important to have escaped scholarly research in the past. Significant phases of social life have been investigated by thinkers and subjected to systematic treatment. As a consequence, certain social sciences have become historical and occupy a place in liberal education. Sociology comes as a new claimant for recognition, and complications arise from the effort to determine its exact place in the various social studies. Every thinker in a particular line of thought is tempted to follow the links which lead from his specialty to other subjects; and every thinker who devotes himself to a general and comprehensive subject is tempted to trace the large thoughts to the details they involve. Hence the difficulty for the constructive mind to distinguish sharply between allied subjects. We are in a universe in which each thing involves, more or less remotely, every other thing. Clearness, however, requires careful distinctions between objects allied yet not alike. Various problems are presented by the fact

that sociology enters the social sphere which is in part already occupied by other sciences. Do the older sciences occupy the place which sociology proposes to take? If not, can they be so expanded as to accomplish what sociology proposes to do? Is sociology altogether a new science, and can it claim a peculiar place among the older social sciences? Does sociology perhaps propose to absorb them so that they can henceforth be dispensed with? Or is sociology only an encyclopædia of the various social sciences, arranging them in systematic order?

Conflicting answers to these questions have resulted in a war of contradictions which has been a serious barrier to sociological development. The points involved are so vital as to demand thorough investigation. When fully explained, sociology will gain in distinctness and receive a firm basis for progressive evolution.

12. From the older social sciences, which claimed the right of way, specialists came to the study of society in the largest sense with a bias in favour of their specialty. From their particular standpoint they attempted to interpret the total social organism. Prominent among these were specialists in political economy. The economic was recognised as a social science; it acquired great prominence in an industrial age, and had attained considerable development when sociology appeared; its importance for social welfare was admitted; why not, then, expand it to sociology?

Economic science has, in fact, been treated as if it contained the key to all social interpretation, and there are still regions where a sociologist is thought to be a specialist in economics. Where this one-sided emphasis on economics prevailed the economic factor became so dominant in social inquiry as to treat lightly, or even ignore, other factors. The extreme in this respect is found in Carl Marx and his school of socialists, who regard economics as the social substance rather than as the basis on which

society depends for its subsistence. The economic condition is viewed as determining the social status, and social evolution becomes essentially economic evolution. Some German historians place so much stress on the material conditions of society that they are designated "the materialistic school of history." One of the results produced by a genuine sociology consists in reducing extravagant claims of limited specialties to proper proportions. (See Appendix A.)

13. Hardly less marked is the tendency to regard political science as the essence of sociology. Especially has this been the case with Continental specialists in the science of politics. We can readily see how the science of the State comes to be identified with sociology when society is viewed as limited to formal organisations, when free association is little developed, and the State regarded as not only supreme, but as also inclusive of all societies within its borders. A despotism jealous of voluntary organisations is inclined to suppress them. Only in modern times has a special demand arisen for a science of society more comprehensive than the State. Where the State is based on the principle of a paternalism which regulates all societies, the social institutions can be included in political science. Even the religious institutions receive a political colouring where Church and State are united. Non-political society has gained prominence and power in modern times; nevertheless, the theory that political science is the essence of sociology has been promoted by the growing appreciation of the State, by the development of political science, and by specialists in this science who entered sociology. The emphasis on the State in Continental Europe explains why this view has become more prevalent there than in the United States.

With the present social status, particularly where free institutions prevail and voluntary organisations are a power, it is self-evident that political science cannot

include the whole of society. In the advanced states we find organisations and social groups of which the State takes no notice, while other societies extend beyond the borders of the State, such as ecclesiastical organisations, international socialism, and various learned associations. Not only is it, therefore, impossible to put all society under the head of political science, but by making politics the social essence the distinguishing characteristics of societies are overlooked.

In ancient despotisms there was no room for free societies. The people counted for more in Greece so far as citizens; but the State they constituted overshadowed all other social relations, so that Aristotle could regard it as society *par excellence*. The individual was estimated according to his relation to the State, as if in other respects he had no significance. Socrates drinks the hemlock because his obligation to the State seems to be the sole consideration. "Among the Greeks the State absorbs society." Treitschke states that in the early part of this century the Hegelians held a similar view. "In the days of the greatest prevalence of the Hegelian philosophy a number of gifted men attempted to show that the State, like a leviathan, ought to devour everything."

The relation of the State to non-political society is among the most profitable studies of social history. At first the autocratic State alone rises into view, and those who have charge of its management are the lights of history. With human advance other than political concerns multiply, and thus prominence is gained by non-political institutions. Men learn to take care of themselves and insist on doing so, and a process of emancipation from the despotism of the State takes place. Free men organise voluntary societies. These sometimes go their own way; sometimes they co-operate with the State; at others they antagonise it, and a conflict for supremacy ensues. The growth of other than political interests, of personal free-

dom and voluntary organisations, is characteristic of modern development. The increase of non-political society did not necessarily decrease the value and functions of the State; but the State became less absorbing, and instead of unconditional dominion it had to take voluntary organisations and the general social status into account and shape its policy accordingly. Russia and Turkey try to dominate non-political society; they are the two states of Europe which have no parliament. In the United States voluntary society creates the State and makes government the expression and organ of its demands. Turkey and Russia are as their governments,—chiefly as the Sultan and Czar; but the United States is as its people, and hence they receive the emphasis. One Continental writer complains that the State has so completely absorbed the social functions as to destroy other societies, and urges the reconstruction of these societies as a demand of the age; but another, who greatly exalts the importance of the State, laments that non-political society has so developed as to detract from the significance of the State.

The science of the State could more easily take the place of sociology if the State were really an expression of the society within its borders. But we know that instead of this it has generally been a creation of the ruling classes and an embodiment of their wishes. In such cases the State is only an exponent of the aristocracy or of the reigning family. There are social factors in the State which are ignored. Much of the social progress of humanity consists in the development of this ignored and non-political society until it becomes strong enough to assert itself and make the State an expression of itself and the organ of its purposes.

Gumplowicz, in his *Grundriss der Sociologie*, views sociology from the standpoint of political science. Schmidt-Warneck

does the same in his work, *Die Sociologie*. H. von Treitschke looks on the State as "an organisation by means of which society is unified," and he denies the possibility of a science of society which is distinct from political science. *Politik*, i., p. 56: "It is very evident that society consists of an endless multiplicity, and from this it follows, as a matter of course, that there can be no science of society separated from political science. . . . It is only playing with words to speak of a science of the State *and* a science of society."

Our investigation proves that it is not a play with words to speak of the science of society which includes the State as an association, as well as all other societies.

The "endless multiplicity" of society is perplexing, and there is a strong temptation to make the State the unity of which the multiplicity is but a differentiation or at least an integral part of the State. But since society existed before the State, and since all that now exists cannot be claimed as political, we are obliged to look for another bond of union than that of the State in order to interpret non-political associations.

Palgrave's *Dictionary of Political Economy*, article "Social Science," says: "Social science is a new word for the old Greek science of politics—which included every kind of human association. *Politics* was the title of Aristotle's great work on "social science." It is the enlarged conception of society which has substituted social science for the Greek "politics." Yet when Freeman, in *Methods of Historical Study*, says that "history is past politics, and politics are present history," we see how strong a tendency still exists to absorb all society in politics.

14. The attempt to find a substitute for sociology by emphasising some particular social feature has not been confined to economics and political science. Particularly in Germany has *the history of culture* become prominent as a special department of scholarly research, and the claim been made that it covers the sphere of sociological inquiry. Human movement is said to have significance

in proportion as it is related to the advance of culture and civilisation. Not the individual, but society, being the object investigated by history, the tendency of society toward culture is pronounced the supreme concern of social study.

In social investigation the substitution of the history of culture for sociology has a decided advantage over economics and politics in that it takes all the progressive social forces into account and studies their character, their correlations, and their interactions. The right place in culture is thus assigned to economics and the State, but as co-ordinated with other factors, influencing them and influenced by them. In this culture-history certain valuable but much-neglected social factors have received attention, such as folk-lore, including myths and superstitions, songs, maxims, proverbs, popular tradition; and their influence has been considered in connection with religion, ethics, art, economics, and the State. The broad view taken is similar to that of the *Voelkerpsychologie*, or psychology of peoples, which regards an investigation of all the national characteristics essential for the interpretation of a people. History thus does not appear as an economic or political thread, but as a web woven by the working of all the social energies. But does the cultural aspect exhaust society? It considers an important phase, but not the social totality.

The history of culture can never be a substitute for the science of society. Mere history, as shown above, gives no science, but at best only materials for the same. But the emphasis on culture, instead of society itself, diverts attention from the very object which requires a concentration of effort, namely, society. Where, for instance, in this history of culture, is the place for the interpretation of society *per se*? A science of culture is not synonymous with the science of society, and therefore cannot take the place of sociology.

The impulse given to culture-history in Germany is due chiefly to Herder's *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*, a work of much research and great brilliancy, in which a vivid imagination interweaves philosophical ideas with fact and fiction. Lotze regarded his *Microcosm* as an undertaking similar to that of Herder; but his attempt to interpret man and his history is more strictly philosophical, and he brings to bear on his task the results of scholarship since Herder's day.

Outside of Germany numerous works have appeared on the history of culture and civilisation which furnish valuable material to the sociologist. They cannot, however, take the place of sociology. Not only has the science of society other than cultural factors to consider, but it also views society in other aspects than its history.

Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Anthropology": "Under the names of sociology and the science of culture, are considered the origin and development of arts and sciences, opinions, beliefs, customs, laws, and institutions generally among mankind." It is worthy of note that here, as so often, society itself seems to be no problem, while its products are regarded as furnishing problems for solution.

15. A recent work, *The Philosophy of History as Sociology*, is indicative of still another attempt to dispense with sociology as a special department of thought. The philosophy of history is said to inquire into the causes of social movement and to search for the laws of social development. The growth of history and of the appreciation of its value has inspired investigations into its deeper meaning or philosophy. For centuries the conviction has been cherished that history cannot be the sport of blind chance, but that law and order reign in the apparent irregularity and haphazard, and are discoverable. Vico, Herder, and Comte were prominent in the movement to fathom the thought of history. Many modern thinkers have asked, Why not make a science

of historical development? The success in formulating historical laws has not been commensurate with the efforts, but important generalisations are the result. The limit in the history of humanity, both in respect to time and space, excites doubt whether we have the data for a philosophy of what has transpired in mankind. Hegel's *Philosophy of History* exerted much influence over German scholars during the first half of the nineteenth century; but many now view the whole subject with suspicion, for the reason that they regard its problem unsolvable, or because *a priori* theories and hasty generalisations have been proclaimed historical laws. But even if such laws were discovered they could not occupy the whole realm of sociology. For constructing the science of society history is indispensable, but only one of many factors.

The original title of the book named above is *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, by Paul Barth. It treats human societies and their changes as the subject-matter of history. "History is the science of the development of men in their activity as social beings." The author claims that the philosophy of history aims at what is common to all departments of humanity, at a generalisation of all human affairs. But just as we distinguish between psychology, which gives the laws of the mental operations, and the products of these operations, such as science, philosophy, literature, and art, so we distinguish between society as the subject-matter of sociology, and the products of society which are investigated by history. Failing to make this distinction, the author says: "A perfect sociology would correspond entirely with the philosophy of history; in the end they differ only in name." We are indeed dependent on the manifestations of society for our knowledge of society; but an investigation of what happens to society or of the laws of history is entirely different from making society itself the subject-matter of inquiry.

Barth quotes Vanni, an Italian writer, as also holding that

sociology generalises the phenomena of social life, taking its material from history, by which the nature of society is revealed. Much of the best sociological material is, however, not to be obtained from history, but from an examination of existing savage and barbarian peoples and prehistoric remains. Not only is the sphere of sociological research much broader than history, but there are also many things in history which do not help the sociologist in his scientific constructions.

History affords valuable aid to rational inquiry, without limiting this inquiry to historic researches. What Huxley says regarding the ethnologist in *Method and Results of Ethnology* applies equally to the sociologist: "Respecting five-sixths of the persistent modifications of mankind history and archæology are absolutely silent. For half of the rest they might as well be silent, for anything that is to be made of their testimony." He thinks that history and archæology tell us little of the conditions of humanity more than two or three thousand years ago. "While thankfully accepting what history has to give him, therefore, the ethnologist must not look for too much from her."

Gumplowicz gives, from his standpoint, a discussion of the relation of sociology to the history of culture, to economics, political science, and the philosophy of history in his volume on *Sociologie und Politik*.

16. Closely allied to the last two conceptions is that which treats sociology as synonymous with social evolution. The historical aspect of society is dominant in all three. The prominence of the last can be explained by the general emphasis now placed on evolution and the really valuable results it furnishes. Social evolution seeks to discover the character of the transformations of society, the causes at work in them, and the effects they produce. Besides the hope of prevision, stress is laid on the evolutionary laws with the expectation of using them for social ends. Progress is an attractive theme; and if its laws are understood why should it not in some measure be subject to our control? Especially to reformers is this

an inviting field, who look to the evolution of society for suggestions on the best method of social regeneration. But evolution no more than any other historical study of society covers the entire field of sociological inquiry. Society itself, inclusive of all it involves, presents the subject-matter as very different from social evolution as the subject-matter. The latter is included in the former, just as a chapter in a volume. We must know what society means before we can comprehend its evolution. It is true that society cannot be understood exhaustively unless its evolution is taken into account; to obtain the concept, or idea, of society, however, we are not confined to the past movements of society, but it can be learned, likewise, from existing societies.

Evolution often becomes a fetish which magically solves problems otherwise unsolvable. But to show that a thing has been evolved does not explain its nature. What it was when the evolution began and how it became what it was are also important questions. The evolution of the pear and the pumpkin does not explain the difference of the seeds with which the evolution begins. If in the same school one young man becomes a philosopher and another a fool, original endowment may have played a prominent part. When we speak of race, whose genesis we do not know, as a powerful factor in determining the result of evolution, we admit an element different from the known evolutionary process. A chemical compound can be analysed and its elements distinguished—perhaps a new element discovered—without knowing how the compound became what it is. Every deeper and broader view thus proves that the evolution of an object presents only one of its problems and but one of the methods of its study. How impracticable language would become if the use of every word involved a knowledge of its origin and entire development!

17. The idea of evolution is not new; but it has recently become more definite than formerly, is better

established, and has received greater emphasis. The revelations expected from it have made it so absorbing that other aspects, especially the deeper philosophical ones, have often been overlooked. Religion, ethics, language, the State, economics, literature, science, philosophy, art, all are now studied in the light of their evolution. Professors of philosophy in Europe complain that their students learn the history of philosophy, and yet have no philosophical system and do not become philosophers. The mere history of science does not evolve the scientist; this may be done directly by experiments in the laboratory, while the history of his specialty comes later. Kant was a great philosopher, but he was not eminent as an historian of philosophy; he, in fact, eventually became so absorbed in his own speculations that he could not enter fully into the thoughts of other philosophers. Perhaps the process of evolution is itself so emphasised that the *kind* of evolution is not carefully discriminated. Evolution is evolution; why not, then, make that of nature, or some phase of it, the law of social evolution? This method has actually become common. The peculiarity of what was evolved being overlooked, the whole movement is vitiated. Evolution is thus regarded as an abstraction; the object evolved has not been treated as essential to the investigation, and for this reason the evolution of society has been made to conform to the evolution of something else.

From the time of Comte social evolution has absorbed a large part of sociological inquiry. One need but examine the sociology of Spencer to see how the theory of evolution dominates everything. Frequently writers take the supposed laws of the process from biology, thus predetermining the entire course, instead of going to society itself for them. With physical and biological laws as the essence, it is natural that the lowest forms of social evolution, those nearest the animal creation, should

become objects of special investigation. The higher forms of evolution are liable to neglect or else to be misinterpreted because assimilated to the lower. Still less satisfactory is the evolutionary sociology when it fails to take the whole of society into account, but concentrates the attention entirely on institutions.

Sociology inquires into what is *involved* in society, not merely what is evolved from it. Even when we pass from what society is to the processes at work in it, we find that they are not all evolutionary in the usual sense. Evolution is chronological; but even if Europe does not develop beyond its present civilisation, it may spread that civilisation to Asia and Africa. It is one thing to develop Darwinism itself, another to teach it to the world. This diffusive process may, of course, be partly included in evolution; but it is in danger of being overlooked. Evolution treats certain peoples as stagnant, and they are therefore dropped; but is there no social life there? China and India are intensely interesting aside from the question of their evolution. Often factors are found in a people which are significant, though their evolution is obscure. A new Mahdi arises in Mohammedanism whose genesis we cannot trace, but whose social influence is evident.

When social study is confined to movement or change it is overlooked that something remains the same amid the transformations, namely, society according to its essence. The first human society had something which every one since has had, and which is as eternal as society itself. The failure to apprehend this identical element is the failure to understand what is fundamental in society.

Cassell's *English Dictionary* comes nearer the truth when it defines sociology as "the science of the constitution and evolution of society."

In *Collected Essays*, by W. G. Sumner, there is a valuable

one on "Sociology," with this definition: "Sociology is the science of the life of society. It investigates the forces which come into action wherever a human society exists. It studies the structures and functions of the organs of human society, and its aim is to find out the laws in subordination to which human society takes its various forms, and social institutions grow and change. Its practical utility consists in deriving the rules of right social living from the facts and laws which prevail by nature in the constitution and functions of society."

18. The defective conceptions of sociology, thus far considered, prevail among scholarly investigators and are characteristic of learned works. For this reason they have most deeply affected sociological investigation. The many vague notions on the subject in the popular mind cannot here be discussed. One of these, however, has not only gained favour with the public but also affects scholarly inquiries. Dominant social interests and movements are telling on the definition of sociology. Certain practical social problems have attained such an unprecedented prominence that their solution is deemed of first importance. The scientific study of society is regarded as diverting attention from them and therefore looked on with impatience. For these practical aims the term "sociology" is appropriated. Its subject-matter thus becomes the burning social questions of the day, such as the situation of labourers and the poorer members of society in general; the inequality and injustice in the social relations; crime, disease, insanity, suicide, charity, political corruption, and kindred themes. The recent development of the social consciousness and social movement has produced a mania for the exposure of ills and the discovery of their causes; and so appalling is the revelation of the reality that a passion for its transformation has been aroused. Social study is valued in proportion as it promises a remedy. Sociology, being appropriated for

what is deemed most valuable in social inquiry, thus receives as its subject-matter *social pathology and hygiene*.

The practical character of the age and the urgent needs of society make this use of sociology natural for the public. The deeper meaning requires keener insight and scientific interest. Therefore sociology is so frequently treated in the press, on the platform, and even in literature as the repository of all kinds of theories for the immediate redemption of society. Socialistic panaceas are announced as the essence of sociological science. Sociology is thought to stand for something of value, and so the favour it has gained makes it a coveted name for doubtful experiments. There are colleges, even, which do not treat it as the science of society, but as a study of social disease and its cure. It is admitted that for the diagnosis of the body and the healing of its diseases anatomy and physiology are necessary; but it is overlooked that the structure and functions of society must be mastered before its ills can be understood, even, to say nothing of their removal. This throws light on the superficial, disconnected, and actually injurious methods often adopted in reformatory movements. (Appendix B.)

19. Endless confusion results from this lack of unity in the conception and discussion of sociology. Under the same name altogether different subjects are considered. As a consequence, students are embarrassed by the bewildering heterogeneity, and no progressive continuity in sociological inquiry is possible. The differences among investigators pertain both to the subject and the method of investigation. Profitable and lasting work can be expected neither by a continuance of the present confusion nor by ignoring the results of past inquiries. Valuable contributions to the knowledge of society have been made by France, Germany, England, America, and other countries; and these ought to be conserved when the effort is made to get a new basis for a solid sociological

structure. The results of sociological study from the time of Comte must be critically examined for the purpose of their reduction to a consistent unity from which the science of human society may be constructed. This attempt is here made, though all the processes through which the conclusions are reached cannot be given in detail. From the great social world teeming with infinite phenomena, pregnant with the most momentous problems of humanity, each of which can be made the object of absorbing specialisation, is to be extracted the essence of all socialisation and the fundamental thought of sociology. It has generally been overlooked that in this world of social problems, of social distraction, and of social specialisation, the *nature* of society is the profound problem whose solution is the key to all other solutions. We must know what society is, in order to learn which of its factors and processes deserve special study for the purpose of constructing the social science. This method examines the seed and follows its growth. By seizing society itself as the essence we avoid moving amid shadows and mistaking them for the substance. Society, correctly apprehended, becomes the nucleus and interpreter of social phenomena, social institutions, and social evolution. Every deeper consideration reveals society as the focus of attention, and makes it evident that the science of society—not the science of something that merely pertains to society—must be the aim of sociology. This science will assign to their proper places the social abstractions which are so often mistaken for the social substance.

Sociology simply requires that social thought be fundamental, touching the bottom on which all society rests. We can treat as a popular prejudice the notion which no true scientist ever held, that somehow science adheres so closely to facts as to be in danger of losing its essential character by thinking through them. Facts are regarded as evident, while the nature of things is supposed to be

beyond reach. But, by the nature of society I mean nothing metaphysical, such as is involved in inquiries respecting the ultimate nature of matter and mind. It is true that we know things only through their manifestations, but from those manifestations we infer what the things are. When I insist on learning what society is, I mean that the inquiry is to be the same as in investigating what a chemical element or an institution is. If society is a compound the problem involves the component parts and the manner of their union. The demand here made is that what is interpretable in society be interpreted. If the society involved in all social affairs is a mystery, then we deal with unknown quantities whenever we use the word "social." How can we know what pertains to society if society is unknowable? We do not know the ultimate essence of matter and mind; but we must have a clear conception of what we designate matter in order to use intelligently references to material and mental phenomena.

The vagueness of the term and the heterogeneous subjects discussed under it have prevented the official recognition of sociology in German universities. The same interfere with its introduction into other institutions of learning.

So clear a social thinker as Lorenz von Stein stated that he had always found it impossible to form an idea of sociology, "since, according to the French and English confusion of words, nothing any longer exists which is not in some sense sociology, electricity and bacteria included." What shall be included in the term has heretofore been left to individual preference, instead of being determined by fixing the scope of sociology in harmony with its subject-matter.

The fact that the definition and scope are so often dismissed without careful discussion proves that their deeper meaning is not appreciated. On the nature of the definition, see *Introduction*, Chapter II.; also my *Introduction to the Study of Philosophy*, Chapter I.

This chapter had been written before the excellent article "Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie," by Dr. Ludwig Stein, in *An der Wende des Jahrhunderts*, came into my hands. In a number of points it agrees with the views given above.

20. Sociology has been treated too much as if intended to be a science of human life. This is due to the failure to define society and discriminate between its phenomena and those which are human but not social. Thus, vital statistics are treated as social, without indicating the distinction between their biological, individual, and social factors. In the statistics of deaths, suicides, insanity, and the like we deal with physical causes, with individual acts and happenings, and with social influences; therefore to treat the matter as if solely social is misleading. It may be an important problem how far society is responsible for disease and death, suicide, crime, and insanity, and such statistics may give valuable hints respecting processes in society; but it is evident that no distinct sphere is left for sociology, if all vital phenomena which are somehow related to society, even though they be individual, are treated as sociological.

In language, laws, manners, and customs, we have products which are possible only because there are individuals. At the same time, they are social products, the result of the co-operation of individuals with one another, and possible only because society exists. But death, suicide, insanity, require no such social action, however society may be involved. The causes which lead to a murder may be partly in society, while the murder itself is an individual act. This discriminates the language and law, made by society, as social products from all acts which are merely individual products. For the science of human life in distinction from sociology, the science of society, the name "human biology" has been proposed.

“ Human Biology ” as including all the vital phenomena of humanity, now so often treated indiscriminately by writers on sociology, is suggested by Sulzer in *Zeitschrift fuer Volkswirthschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung*, vol. v., p. 550.

Insanity is a medical problem; then it is an individual problem involving physical and mental conditions; and it is a social problem so far as society is involved in establishing conditions which lead to insanity or so far as it is affected by the insanity. If a thousand individuals commit suicide, each separated from the others, it does not seem clear why the number one thousand should make the individual suicides purely social phenomena. In each case the social factor involved may have been different from the other cases.

CHAPTER II

RELATION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCES. DIVISION OF SOCIOLOGY

21. The preceding chapter has shown that sociology as *the* science of society cannot be identified with economics, politics, or any other special social science. But the relation between the general social science and a particular social science remains to be explained. If this can be made clear many of the difficulties which have heretofore beset sociology will be removed. We need but concentrate what has been said and draw the logical inferences, in order to make the peculiarity of the science of society stand out in bold relief.

Society as the focus of attention presents a subject which is entirely different from the themes discussed by sciences which take merely some phases of society as their specialty. In economics a certain function is abstracted from society, and its laws are sought. Political science abstracts the State from all other organisations and makes that the object of specialisation. The same is true of linguistics, ethics, jurisprudence, folk-lore, and the like. But not one of these sciences inquires what society is, a problem which is the basis and source of all the specific processes which they investigate. How can the economist or the politician determine from his specialty what the nature, the relations, the movements, of society are? The economist, as shown above, makes sociology political economy; the politician, political science. They have not the data in their specialties for the large generalisations

required; each takes his island for the world and describes that world by means of his island. This larger work, the interpretation of all society and not merely a particular society, is the task of the more inclusive or general science, namely, sociology. The scholar can inquire what England is, what Germany, Russia, or any other particular state; but, by doing this, the calling of the writer on political science is not exhausted; he also wants to know what the State itself is, whatever specific form it may take here or there. So the sociologist is interested in societies wherever found, in the past and present, in their peculiarities and development, but he also wants to learn what society itself is,—that something which is found in every society and therefore peculiar to none. This gives to sociology a distinct sphere shared by no other science. A specific social science can describe its own specialty; but how can it enter another social sphere and, at the same time, remain in its own, or how can it determine what is common to all societies while limited to its own particular society, or indicate the relations of all associations so long as confined to a particular kind of association? The problem is as simple as that a man cannot be in two places at the same time.

The *Introduction*, Chapter III., pp. 72-101, contains a full discussion of the relation of sociology to the other social sciences.

22. But why cannot the general science include all the particular social sciences, as some have attempted to do? Sociology might, indeed, be regarded as a tree whose tap-root is the nature of society, from which there spring, as separate branches, economics, politics, and the other particular social sciences. Why not, then, discuss in sociology these specific social sciences, as well as the general characteristics of society? So biology might

discuss what pertains to life in general, then evolve botany and zoölogy, and afterwards develop a knowledge of the different kinds of flora and fauna even to their details. From beginning to end, from what is general to what is particular, the connection is unbroken, and the whole might form but one system. Much might favour this method of procedure; but is it expedient? If the principles of biology present a definite sphere, clearness may be promoted by specialising on them, leaving their application and more specific development to botany and zoölogy. Wherever nature draws distinct lines, as between botany and zoölogy, or between different families and species of plants and animals, science may find it advantageous to respect these lines and treat them as the limits of particular fields of inquiry. Sociology has a definite, wide, and most important sphere in the general principles of society. While specialising on these it can leave to the special social sciences the development of particular factors, phases, and functions. They will, by means of this specialisation, become more distinct, receive fuller treatment, and enter more into details, than can be done by merging them into the one general science. A specialist in political science has enough to do with the science of the State, and by confining himself to this can do more for his specialty and for sociology than by drawing all social affairs within the sphere of his inquiry. It is a question of the division of labour. Sociology has quite enough to do with its large sphere and can afford to leave it to the economist to specialise on the economic functions of society, to describe them, to follow their development, and to formulate their laws.

Distinctions are thus recognised which by no means imply absolute separation. The general social science and the specific social sciences are intimately connected, which is implied by the fact that "social" is applied equally to them. The sociologist sees society in economics, but not

the whole of society; and the fact that he is intent on the study of what is general in society may make it impossible for him to become a specialist in economics. On the other hand, the economic student may be too much absorbed by the specific laws of his specialty to behold society in them. Even if he does behold society in them it can be only economic society. Sociology cannot adhere to society in general as its subject-matter and, at the same time, develop political economy. Were it to attempt this it would have to add to its subject-matter, society in general, the particular social developments. So long as economics confines itself to economic laws it cannot inquire whether society has other than economic functions; in other words, it does not encroach on the sphere of sociology. Political science does not make society *per se* its aim while considering the structure, functions, and organs of the State.

Clearly, then, sociology and the particular social sciences can exist side by side without encroaching on each other; and, owing to human limitation and the necessity for a division of labour, it is advisable to mark off the sphere of each for specialisation.

The older sciences furnish illustrations and justification for the above relation between the general social science and the special social sciences. The science of language makes the properties common to all languages its sphere. In the different languages it seeks language or what belongs to language *per se*, just as in societies sociology seeks society. But large and important as is the sphere of the science of language or philology, each particular language, such as the Sanscrit, Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, German, English, can be made the subject of special treatment. A man may understand many languages and not be a philologist; and he may be a philologist without making a specialty of a particular language. At the same time, it is a knowledge of

languages which enables a man to become a philologist; and a philologist has advantages for the study of the different languages.

This applies to sociology also. It throws light on all societies, just as philology does on all languages. The sociologist may classify societies and indicate their distinctive marks, just as the philologist classifies languages and gives the leading characteristic of each class. But the man who specialises on English enters details which the philologist may omit; so the economist or specialist in politics must consider details which the sociologist need not discuss, or from which he aims to extract only the social essence.

The intrinsic value of human affairs and the growing interest of man in man increase the importance of clear division in what modern times include in the humanities. The above aids in this by indicating both the distinctness and the close relation of sociology and the specific social sciences. From all societies—economic, political, artistic, religious—the sociologist infers the nature and general principles of society, just as from languages the philologist constructs the science of language. But abundant room is left for the independent existence of theology, ethics, economics, politics, and æsthetics, and for specialisation in these departments. If a sociologist inquires into the society of nations, that does not interfere with the economic inquiry of Adam Smith into the wealth of nations. Where the one is intent on sociological laws, the other seeks economic laws. The point of view, the subject-matter of investigation, and the resulting systems are different. Sociology is the only science which makes society in the societies the focus of attention.

The subject is illuminated by making society, the object of sociological inquiry, the substantive; while the objects of the special social sciences are indicated by the adjectives attached to the substantive. Thus we have economic, political, æsthetic, ethical, and religious society.

23. Since sociology has a definite sphere which differentiates it from the older and more limited social sciences, it is evident that by adding the latter together we obtain neither sociology itself nor a substitute for it. Sociology is not, as some have claimed, a mosaic of the special social sciences. Hebrew plus Greek, Latin, and the other languages does not produce linguistic science. This science does not inquire what the languages become by massing them, but what is common to all, what principles they involve. Botany plus zoölogy is not biology. So economics plus politics and the other specific social sciences cannot create sociology. As well try to get physiology by adding together the interpretations of the various organs of the human body. We can study separately each organ, just as we isolate economics and politics for their more thorough investigation; but physiology likewise has general questions which involve all the organs and their relations so as to constitute an organism. It investigates every part for the sake of the whole, and yet leaves room for specialists such as oculists and aurists. Different sociological investigators may vary in the stress they place on specific societies and their functions, for the purpose of understanding society itself; but the aim must always be the interpretation of society without losing one's self in specific societies.

A totally false conception would be formed of society by making it consist of politics plus economics, plus ethics, plus religion, and plus the other factors which work in it as constituent and dynamic forces. These factors are not separated like letters of the alphabet, so that each can be taken as abstracted from the rest. All are interwoven; they interact, and are indissolubly connected, as will become more evident in later chapters.

24. It will avoid confusion if we emphasise the fact that sociology, while in no danger of being confounded with the special social sciences, has an important function

respecting their relation to each other. That specialisation is apt to mean narrowness has become a common complaint; the single mine in which a man works hides from him all other objects. How to combine the thoroughness of specialisation with the comprehensiveness of generalisation is a weighty problem. The temptation seems almost irresistible to construct the universe and estimate all objects from the standpoint of one's specialty. The results are necessarily one-sided and contradictory, and from these sociology has suffered. As knowledge and specialisation both increase, there is likewise greater difficulty in obtaining that comprehensiveness which takes a rational view of the totality, whether in nature or in society. A fact is made the interpreter of the world, when the fact itself can be understood only in its relation to other facts. A principle which includes all the facts involved is the only interpreter of a system.

For some time the relation of ethics to economics has been in dispute. Are economic laws self-sufficient or ought they to be supplemented by ethics? Ethical writers and many economists subject economics to ethics; but this is rejected by other economists. Naturally, the writer who confines his attention to economic laws cannot take into account rules drawn from another specialty, such as ethics, just, as from the purely economic standpoint, he has no regard for metaphysical theories. And his attitude would be correct if economics were the only human concern. Limited to his specialty, how can the economist determine the relation of economics to the other social sciences? It is as reasonable to expect one who knows only the English language to determine its relation to German, Gothic, and Sanscrit.

This confirms the inference drawn above, that no special social science can arrogate unto itself the right to determine the places, the correlations, and the functions

of all the social sciences in the social system. That can be done only on the basis of society in its totality, and thus becomes the function of the general science which contains the principles of all society, which takes a survey of the whole field, and which has no special interest to prejudice it respecting the value of any particular social science. The relation of sociology to the special social sciences is similar to that of science to the sciences, of philosophy to the philosophies, of history to the histories, of language to the languages, of literature to the literatures, and of art to the arts.

While it is thus established that these general and special social spheres and principles demand, for the most complete development, both a general science and special sciences, it can readily be seen how sociology, on the one hand, and economics, politics, ethics, theology, history, on the other, can help each other and be co-operative. Sociology needs the particular spheres of the special social sciences in order to obtain its material; but they need its general principles and comprehensive view of society in order to understand in what sense they are social as well as economic or political; how they are correlated with one another, and what their share in constituting the great social organism and the science of society.

No state in the United States can determine its own relation to the other states or the relation of all the states to one another. Just because the principles involved are general they cannot become the monopoly of a particular state, but belong to the solidarity or union formed by all the states. The mind which apprehends the fact that each state has functions peculiar to itself with which the general government does not interfere, and that there is a distinct sphere for the general government with which no particular state has a right to interfere, ought to have no difficulty in understanding how the special social sciences have distinct functions, while at the same time they leave an important and definite sphere to sociology as the general

social science. Each of two litigants may understand his own case better than anyone else can; but the dispute between them requires a judge who represents the law which transcends the one-sided and prejudiced positions of the disputants.

Division of Sociology

25. In that organism of social thought which we designate sociology each division is complete in itself, but its value consists in that it is but a part of the whole. Division is analysis for the sake of the ultimate synthesis; it is specialisation for the concentration of energy in the interest of thoroughness. We discover the parts to get the mastery of them, to find their connections, and thus by means of the constituent factors to comprehend the totality. We divide to unite and command.

Following the rule that each part is to be distinct and yet essential, we exclude, for reasons already given, Mr. Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology*. Social facts, descriptions, and classifications are valuable preparations for scientific construction, without forming a distinct department of sociology. *Comparative Sociology* treats of the relation between human and animal associations. It presupposes the development of human and animal sociologies, in order that they may be compared so as to determine their common elements and differences. In the present status of sociological inquiry each department should be developed by itself, with such reference to the other as is promotive of clearness. Animal association often presents striking analogies to human society; but to include both in the same sociology at present would produce confusion. Our experience of what is human enables us in many respects to understand human society much better than animal association.

26. It was natural for Comte, with his definition of sociology as "social physics," to divide the subject into

social statics and social dynamics. The former is regarded by him as designating society in the state of order, while social dynamics views it in progress. But does order mean stability as distinct from progress? Progress may be the highest form of order, and order may involve the most vigorous social dynamics, all of which Comte recognises. Society at rest is an abstraction to which nothing real corresponds, and social dynamics may be destructive as well as progressive. Sociology as a discussion of society at rest and in motion assimilates it too much to mechanics, and fails to seize and interpret what is peculiar and characteristic in social phenomena. For these reasons the division into static and dynamic sociology is here rejected. Its use from Comte till the present has proved far from being satisfactory, and its inadequacy becomes apparent in proportion as the peculiarities of human society are apprehended and sociology is differentiated from physics.

“Under the head of social statics Comte set out a number of ‘social instincts’ — sociability, benevolence, labour (of muscle and mind), family life, and co-operative activity—the action and reaction, or equilibrating functioning of which results in what he termed ‘the spontaneous order of human society.’ Under social dynamics he treated of ‘the theory of the natural progress of human society,’ finding that the disturbances in social equilibrium made on the whole for improvement, and analysing this progressive tendency into the three stages, theological, metaphysical, and positive.” (“Statics,” in Palgrave’s *Dictionary of Political Economy*.) In political economy “these mechanical concepts have not in the way of method proved useful,” and for that reason are being abandoned.

The full title of Mr. Spencer’s book on “Social Statics” is *Social Statics; or, The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of them Developed*. He treats social statics as pertaining to the equilibrium of a perfect society,

and social dynamics as pertaining to the forces by which society is advanced toward perfection. It is thus evident that the definiteness of statics and dynamics in mechanics is not retained when these terms are adopted by different writers on sociology. The social forces do not work as the forces in a mechanism.

27. Every intelligent social discussion implies that the idea of society has been made definite. We must find its meaning before we can do anything with the term "society." It may require long search among what are called societies before we can fix exactly the meaning of the subject-matter of sociology; but when once found it becomes our guide in the investigation of all human association. The demands of logical procedure, no less than of clearness and the hope of successful inquiry, make our first division *The Nature of Society*. Recognising society as a reality, we want so to fathom its meaning as to attain that concept which corresponds with this reality. Truth consists in the correspondence between our conception of an object and the object itself, or in the harmony between our subjective notion and the objective reality. While seeking the general conception of society we, at the same time, aim at such knowledge of the concrete societies as will enable us to seize them according to their essential features. It is therefore our first problem to learn what differentiates society from every other object. This differentiating factor constitutes its essence, marks its peculiarity, and makes it distinct.

In this first division we do not study ideal society, but real society—the nature of the actually existing human association. This directs our attention to the material world as its home. Society must be investigated and interpreted amid its natural surroundings. For this reason we consider briefly under this division the physical basis of society. On the one hand, it is important to distinguish

between society and the conditions on which its life depends, and, on the other, to determine the influence of these conditions on society. Not only is society constantly subject to physical influences, but its energies are exercised and developed in using and transforming nature. There can be no doubt that the character and evolution of society are greatly affected by natural conditions. In modern times the physical basis has received much attention through the development of natural science and geography. It is now generally recognised that only in its natural environment can society be understood; but it is also true that the aspect of nature depends on the society which inhabits the region.

The process for finding the general idea or nature of society in the societies can be illustrated by what the Romans called *jus gentium*. The *jus civile* applied to Roman citizens; but the jurists considered the laws of other peoples as well as those of the Romans. "When the jurists came to examine different systems of laws, they found much in each that was common to all. This common part they termed the *jus gentium*; and the residue, the part peculiar to each state, they called *jus civile*." (T. C. Sanders, *The Institutes of Justinian*, p. 81.) So closely is the idea of society connected with all societies that the one cannot be thoroughly studied without the other. All that pertains to society involves its nature; but in the first division this nature is made the object of special inquiry.

It is necessary to distinguish between the nature and the laws of society. The nature pertains to what society is,—what inheres in it as essential to its very being. Social laws, on the other hand, refer not to what is permanent in society, but to social changes. If society undergoes a definite process, the law gives what is common to this process. If, for instance, society in the process of development always passes from the simple to the complex, we say it is a social law that society as it develops increases in complexity.

One need but study Mr. Spencer's sociological works to

learn the fundamental need of a clear and full exposition of the nature of society. His eminent services to sociology make me hesitate to dissent so often from his conclusions. Their chief fault is, I think, due to his failure to grasp the true meaning of society. Especially evident is this in some of the chapters of his book on *The Study of Sociology*.

28. That great world which we designate "society" gives rise to many momentous problems. What this society is, or its nature, has just been relegated to a special sociological division. The kinds of societies, as shown above, furnish subjects for specialisation to economists, artists, theologians, and others. The endless social details belong to history and life. Sociology, however, also has an interest in the manifestations and movements of society, beholding in them revelations of its character. Deep problems are involved in the fact that society is everywhere and always the same, and yet not the same in different places and times.

In turning from society *per se* to its manifestations, the variety seems infinite. In order not to be lost amid details it becomes necessary to seize some essential and comprehensive feature whose discussion is specially calculated to reveal the characteristics of society. Evolution, or development, is that feature which offers the most significant interpretation of social phenomena and their source. Not only are all advanced societies the product of evolution, but even the crudest we know have become what they are through evolutionary processes. We therefore make *The Evolution of Society* our second division, the aim being to learn how society develops and what is produced by means of the development. If we wished to adopt the old terms we might call the Nature of Society "Social Statics," and the Evolution of Society "Social Dynamics."

29. Are all inquiries exhausted and all interpretations

completed by means of the determination of the nature and evolution of society? When the science of society is reduced to a natural science the answer must be in the affirmative. But the preceding investigation shows that human society is *sui generis*. Sociology cannot ignore the peculiarities of the personality and at the same time hope to explain society. In particular must ethics be considered as one of the most prominent characteristics of man. Even with prevision, in the strict sense, out of the question, sociological inquiry cannot be indifferent to the future of society. If what society will be is beyond our knowledge, the more attention should be concentrated on what it *ought* to be, which has the force of an imperative. We, consequently, designate *Sociological Ethics* as the third division. What ought to be is a consideration which involves the character and the means of social progress. Rational social movement has an ideal as its aim and seeks to adapt the forces at its command to the attainment of the ideal. Many investigators will value sociology in proportion as sociological ethics, the culmination of the entire investigation, can be established. The fuller explanation and the justification of the third division will be given when it is taken up for discussion.

The division adopted is, therefore, as follows:

I. *The Nature of Society.*

II. *The Evolution of Society.*

III. *Sociological Ethics.*

(Appendix C.—Method of Sociology.)

FIRST DIVISION
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

CHAPTER III

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

30. No elaborate discussion is required to establish the general relation of nature to society. Numerous works, prominent among them those on physical geography, make a specialty of the subject. Montesquieu, Herder, and others, emphasised the influence of physical conditions on the social relations; and through Darwin and Spencer natural selection, the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest, and the adaptation to the environment have become common expressions and indicate what importance is attached to the surroundings in which society lives. Even in historical works the physical conditions are frequently discussed as an introduction to the life of nations. Under these circumstances it is required here to present only some general characteristics of the physical basis of society and to remove prevalent errors on the subject.

Society depends on nature for its livelihood and all its movements. What concerns us most, however, is the influence exerted by nature on the character and development of society, and the use of natural objects by society in order to accomplish its ends.

The bearing of Darwinism on the subject of this chapter is evident. The theories of Darwin which especially concern us are given in a lucid form by Ammon, *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen*, pp. 13-14.

1. *Heredity*.—"In every species parents transmit their forms

and qualities in all essentials, and in many cases also individual peculiarities, with extraordinary definiteness to their descendants."

2. *Variability*.—"In spite of the faithful reproduction in most cases of the parental forms and qualities, there are nevertheless, in many particulars, always small variations."

3. *The Struggle for Existence*.—"All individuals of a species enter into competition for the possession of the existing means of subsistence." This does not apply universally to man. Some obtain the means of existence without struggling for them.

4. *Natural Selection*.—"In the struggle for existence the strongest individuals and those best adapted to their environment have more chance of being preserved than the weaker ones and such as are less adapted to their environment; therefore the latter die and leave no descendants." In human life there is intellectual and social as well as natural selection.

5. *Theory of Descent*.—"The forms and qualities advantageous to the preservation of individuals, which forms and qualities are the result of variability, are preserved and transmitted by means of natural selection, while the less favourable are destroyed. By means of the increase of advantageous possessions which deviate from the original types new varieties and species may arise." This has been much controverted. Like the theory of natural selection, it has only a limited application to society.

Some of these points will be developed and applied later.

31. The character of society is determined by its soul, which must, therefore, be regarded as constituting the most essential factor in our investigation. But this soul is deeply affected by natural conditions, and it requires a body through which to express itself. By this body we mean all those physical agencies which society requires for the accomplishment of its purposes. It is regarded by some as a problem whether in this world mind can communicate with mind without physical means. So

far as we know, however, thought, feeling, and purpose must use physical signs in order to be transmitted from person to person. In speech, in gesture, in writing, in every form of art, the physical agency is apparent. We cannot conceive how otherwise society can express itself than by embodying its sentiments and wishes in an objective and physical form. The buildings for social purposes; the numerous institutions founded by society; the post-office, the roads, the ships, the tools, the implements of war, and all similar social creations, are here viewed as the body of society. Indispensable as they are for social intercourse and aims, by designating them *means* it is indicated that they are not ultimate. What the social mind thinks, feels, and wills it seeks to body forth and make effective by word and deed and institutions. The physical agencies used by society might be called its organs. For clearness it is essential to distinguish between the soul and body of society, the subjective and the objective factors. Mentally they ought to be discriminated; but no more in society than in the individual can there be an absolute separation of soul and body.

They sustain to each other the relation of interaction, of interdependence.

Indispensable as psychology is for sociology and all human affairs, we must resort to physiological psychology in order to account fully for social phenomena. If sociology emphasises the psychical rather than the physical factors, it is because they are the most characteristic and the supreme social elements. It is self-evident that the bodies of individuals are among the chief physical agencies of society.

While the psychical factors are the most distinguishing marks of human society as compared with animal association, the manner in which the social mind expresses itself in the use of the physical agencies also marks it as peculiar. To make this apparent it is only necessary

to compare the works of man with those of animals. So far as man is known, in continued isolation he does not make striking advances above the rest of the animal creation; but in his power of association, in the qualities he thereby develops, and in his co-operation with his fellows to subdue nature to his purposes, his superiority becomes manifest.

Carlyle, speaking of the hero as a man of letters, says: "It is the *Thought* of man, the true thaumaturgic virtue, by which man works all things whatsoever. All that he does, and brings to pass, is the vesture of a Thought. This London City, with all its houses, palaces, steam-engines, cathedrals, and huge, immeasurable traffic and tumult, what is it but a Thought, but millions of Thoughts made into One;—a huge immeasurable Spirit of a Thought, embodied in brick, in iron, smoke, dust, Palaces, Parliaments, Hackney Coaches, Katherine Docks, and the rest of it! Not a brick was made but some man had to *think* of the making of that brick.—The thing we called 'bits of paper with traces of black ink,' is the purest embodiment a Thought of man can have."

32. Much misunderstanding respecting society and perversion of sociology prevail because a clear distinction is not drawn between society itself and the conditions for its existence and operations. Neighbourhood does not constitute society, but gives opportunities for social intercourse. Persons can be neighbours without being on speaking terms. It has been questioned whether the family is to be considered as a society, some answering affirmatively, others negatively. The family can be viewed under two aspects: namely, as a biological product simply, or as a social group. In its biological aspect the family is only the condition for sociality; but so important is this condition that it becomes the basis for the most intimate social relations. The fact, however, that one belongs biologically to a family does not make him a

member of the same social group; indeed, it need not involve sociality. Caspar Hauser, like "the man with the iron mask," was removed from his family and had no social connection with the same; but nothing could separate him biologically from that family. Numerous similar instances prove the mistake of identifying the biological and the social factors, and bring out the distinction between the physical and the psychical bonds. The European who emigrates to America or Australia remains in the same biological relation with his family as if he had never left his father's house; but the social separation may be complete. The closest consanguine tie, as the filial and fraternal relations, by no means necessarily involves the closest social intimacy. Persons who can trace no blood relationship are often more intimate socially. Consanguinity and sociality are, consequently, distinct. All the social ties between Robinson Crusoe and his family are severed, but his social relation with Friday, with neither blood nor race tie, is intimate.

In judging a state similar discrimination is required. Much that is regarded as essential to it cannot be pronounced social, but is merely a condition for discharging the social functions. The territory, the governmental buildings, the whole material machinery (forts, arms, etc.) are not themselves social, but the means of political society. On and among these the State, as a society, consists of psychical functions. The same is true of all institutions which have a physical and psychical side (orphan asylums, hospitals); the psychical is always the social factor, while the physical is but the means for executing the purposes of society. An army has been said not to be a society, and in part this is true. Much included in it is not social, but rather an instrument of society. In exact proportion, however, as an army is a psychical solidarity is it a society in the true sense. The rule here laid down applies to all societies; the psychical is the

associative factor, while all that is physical is but the means of the psychical. No mere physical union is a social union; but it may be either the basis or the product of a social union. Two men can be tied together in a bag and yet have no social intercourse. But if a number of men agree socially to fight a common enemy, they may present a united front in battle. Whatever influences may have wrought to institute a society, the initiative of its action must always be sought in its psychical factors, its mental resolutions.

Just as we distinguish between science and the instruments it uses in its investigations, so we distinguish between society and its instrumentalities.

33. It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the various physical conditions amid which society lives, and the agencies it uses to accomplish its end. We have seen that they are not social in their essence, but only through the use (by society) to which they are put. The deliberations of an association are social because the actual intercourse of a society; the building used could be called social only because used by a society. In itself the building is not social. The social tools or instrumentalities of a physical nature form a subject of enormous extent and cannot receive adequate treatment here. A human instrument always has the impress of an idea or purpose whose agent it is. Much attention is given to the social instrumentalities by special sciences, such as mechanics, architecture and æsthetics in general, the science of war, and linguistics. Here the inquiry must be limited to general considerations of nature so far as it forms a basis for the life and activity of society.

Society is in the world, in constant contact with nature, and dependent on the material which nature furnishes to give revelations of itself. That nature tends to produce

a naturalistic influence on society is self-evident. Indeed, social history can be divided according to the direct dominance of nature over man or the dominance of the human and social purposes over nature. Nature's influence, when analysed, can be shown to be exerted on society through individuals. These receive their livelihood from nature; their health and character are affected, perhaps determined, by natural conditions: their occupations and relations, their thoughts, feelings, and volitions, depend largely on the physical environment: and all these natural effects tell on society so far as individuals are its constituent factors. The natural influences may be so general as to affect an entire country or even continent, by affecting all the individuals and through them the social totality. It is also to be considered that nature is a permanent factor, while the society which rests on it as a basis is subject to constant changes.

Man's remarkable adaptability to natural conditions is an important factor. He can exist in the tropics and in the arctic regions; and wherever he goes he adapts himself to his conditions and maintains his existence. This possible variability is an evidence of his superiority. In his struggle for existence the whole globe is at his service more than in the case of any other creature.

34. Two abstractions respecting the relation of society to nature are misleading. The one, a false spiritualism, emphasises one-sidedly the mental qualities, and abstracts man from his physical conditions, while the other, a false materialism, emphasises the physical factors to the neglect of the mental. The former, starting with man as mental or spiritual, views him as a psychical force, determining his own course, making his ideas and aims the dominant factors, and so shaping things as to suit his purposes. With this emphasis on the spiritual the life in this world

is often deemed valuable in proportion as it prepares for another life. The dignity of the personality is thought to exalt the mind above dependence on natural influence. This spiritualistic conception has found favour among certain classes of religionists, among ascetics, mystics, idealists, romanticists, and poets; it is the basis of what is called Christian Science; and its influence has been felt in philosophy as well as religion.

Sometimes the existence of matter was denied; or it was regarded as an embodiment of evil and therefore to be violently suppressed; or the body was held to be entirely subject to man's spirit. As a theory, at least, spiritualism has dominated some individual minds, societies, and ages, from Plato till the present time. Nevertheless, those who forgot that they had bodies as well as minds, have, outside of religion, never gained an extensive and permanent influence in society. They were more numerous formerly than now, and more powerful in times of speculation than in periods of realism. An abstract idealism is perhaps most frequently a species of subjectivism which does not reject the material world, but seeks to ignore its power, being absorbed by the mental and spiritual states, and attributing to the mind much that really has its source in nature.

The older and even some of the more modern philosophers discussed the mental faculties without regard to their physical basis. This explains the late origin of physiological psychology. The idealistic philosophy which culminated in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, constructed its system of nature according to subjective theories, not by means of inductions from the facts of nature. Even Hume fails to grasp the influence of nature on society, and in this respect is in marked contrast with Buckle. In *Essays*, vol. i., essay xxi., Hume says he does not think "that men owe anything of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate. . . . If we run over the globe, or revolve the annals of history, we shall dis-

cover everywhere signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners, none of the influence of air or climate." For this conclusion he gives nine reasons with a number of illustrations. He, however, lays much stress on the influence of man on man. "The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues."

The idealism of Bishop Berkeley has been specially powerful among English-speaking peoples.

India has been the home of such speculations as seemed to be most remote from the physical basis. Some notion, perhaps a myth or fiction, became the foundation on which was reared a metaphysical structure of man and the universe, of time and eternity. Lippert, *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit*, vol. i., p. 35, says of Buddhism: "Nature with her forces does not exist for it, and offers no explanation of its phenomena."

35. The other theory is far more common now, having been promoted by natural science and the growth of material interests. Such an emphasis has been placed on the natural environment, on the physical basis of life and the struggle for existence, that man is regarded as the subject rather than the lord of nature. The claim of superiority to nature is treated by the materialistic tendency as unpardonable arrogance and vain self-glorification. This is to be expected if man is so interwoven in the physical processes as to be but a part of them and wholly dependent on them. Repeatedly an attempt has been made to reduce psychology to physiology, or else to regard mind as but an effervescence or product of nervous action. This tendency has deeply affected sociology by emphasising the physical and physiological conditions of society. "Man is what he eats," is its dictum; another is that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." Efforts are made to interpret the individual, society, national life, and racial characteristics by means

of soil, climate, and geographical position, without taking into account human reaction to these influences and human initiative. That man depends on nature is interpreted to mean the dominion of nature over him. It is overlooked that, however much the mind may be subject to natural influences, it can develop such a degree of independence as to use nature for its own purposes, instead of being dominated by nature. Man would cease to be man in the highest sense if he could not choose an end for himself—intellectual, idealistic, spiritual—and make nature but the minister to its attainment.

A serious difficulty in estimating the effect of physical conditions on society arises from the fact that peoples have been subject to a great variety of influences in their migrations, influences which it is impossible now to trace. Probably no people inhabits the same locality as all its ancestors. We should have to know the cradle of the human race, and estimate all the natural influences exerted from that time, in order to determine the exact effect wrought on man by natural conditions. But we do know that he may be so developed into independence as to shape nature to his purposes. The very products of nature which he pervades with his thought and aim aid him in subduing nature. However the American Indians and the Australians may have been controlled by their habitat, when the white man comes he makes his ideas the norms which nature obeys.

Prussia is one of the newer kingdoms of Europe, having arisen since the Thirty Years' War. Neither its climate, nor its sandy and often-barren soil, nor its geographical position seemed prophetic of an eminent career. But the very hardships of the people promoted the exercise and augmenting of their powers. Wise and ambitious leaders have also done their part to make Prussia the ruling power in the German Empire and to place it in the front rank of national influence.

Iceland, through its soil, climate and isolation, is naturally regarded as unfavourably situated for culture. Yet for a time in the Middle Ages its culture surpassed that of many more advantageously situated peoples on the Continent, and Iceland has preserved for modern times valuable relics of literature.

It is significant that in our day the need of adaptation to the physical environment has become commonplace, but the possibility of adapting this environment to human aims is rarely mentioned. Men are treated as conditioned, but not as conditioning.

Numerous efforts have in recent times been made to subject society to nature or to make its course but a part of natural evolution. They have been most common among materialists of Continental Europe, but have also been found in England and America. Some instances are given by Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 36-37. Sometimes history was viewed as "a problem of mechanics." Taine regarded it as a sort of chemistry, the so-called virtues and vices being only "natural products like sugar and vitriol." Dr. Draper treated history as a "department of physiology, intellectual development being a physiological process, and the epochs of history stages of physiological growth. Some, like Bagehot, would explain history by biological laws."

Illustrations, however, abound to prove that natural conditions are not the only factors which determine the character and course of peoples. With their views, habits, and course of life fixed, peoples may use nature for their purposes instead of being controlled by the physical conditions. The Turk on the territory of the ancient Greeks is not a Greek. And how different the modern from the ancient Greek! The geographical location of Greece respecting Europe, Asia, and Africa may have had more to do with its culture than its immediate physical condition. It was the receptacle of Oriental culture and the distributor to the Occident of what it made of this culture.

For excellent accounts of the relation between the people and the land, see the *History of Greece*, by such authors as G. Grote and E. Curtius, the former, part ii., chap. i., the latter, vol. i., chap. i. Grote says: "General propositions respecting the working of climate and physical agencies upon character are indeed treacherous; for our knowledge of the globe is now sufficient to teach us that heat and cold, mountain and plain, sea and land, moist and dry atmosphere, are all consistent with the greatest diversities of resident men; moreover, the contrast between the population of Greece itself for the seven centuries preceding the Christian era, and the Greeks of more modern times, is alone enough to inculcate reserve in such speculations." The same healthy view is found in Curtius. "The history of a nation is by no means to be regarded solely as a consequence of the natural condition of its local habitations. But thus much it is easy to perceive; a formation of soil as peculiar as that commanding the basin of the Archipelago may well give a peculiar direction to the development of the history of its inhabitants."

As the modern Greek is not the same as the Greek of the age of Pericles, so amid essentially the same physical conditions the modern Italian differs from his countrymen at the times of the Cæsars and the Medici.

36. The effect of nature is not the same in all departments and pursuits of life. The farmer is more directly under its influence than the poet; Kant kept nearer it in his natural philosophy than in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Economics adheres more closely to physics than ethics and religion. At the same time, nature tells through economics, to some degree, on all the social forces. Different situations, occupations, callings, investigations, place men in different relations to nature. Later we shall see that in general the power of nature prevails over society according to the nearness of man to his primitive state. So long as his mind is undeveloped and his experience meagre he is completely subject to physical con-

ditions, being both the child and pupil of nature. This is simply saying that so long as he is chiefly physical himself he is under physical dominion. Nature itself is subject to evolution, during which it develops new forms; in this change of natural conditions human agency is a potent cause. The natural changes, however, seem slight during the period in which society passes from the savage to the civilised state. Within historic times vast changes have occurred in social conditions, while physical conditions have remained essentially the same. This more rapid social evolution has resulted in giving society, progressively, the ascendancy over nature. Man has become more intellectual, and this has increased the intellectual régime in the world. Nature, once forbidding and "horrid," is made to yield the materials for states and schools and churches and science and other institutions of humanity. The growing independence of society under the tutelage of nature is similar to that of a child in relation to its parents as its age increases. The very necessities imposed by natural conditions create the impulse to human invention and social progress. Man adapts himself to physical laws which he then adapts to himself. In the beginning he can exist only where food is provided spontaneously; then he determines what the soil shall produce, and navigates the seas to carry the food where he wants it. The winds that destroy him at first afterwards propel his ships. Thus not only does man become more truly man and grow in power, while nature remains essentially the same, but he himself enters nature, becomes the directive power behind natural law, and makes the physical forces the embodiment of human thought and will.

At the same time that man makes advances and learns to control physical conditions, nature becomes more to man than while he was in the primitive state. He understands its resources better and knows how to use them.

The savage moves on the surface and lives on the immediate products of nature or on what it can easily be induced to produce. But when the highest social culture is reached a greater extent of the earth's surface is utilised, impassable barriers are overcome and even turned into advantages, and the richness of the soil and the buried mineral treasures are exploited. Natural science makes man the master of the laws of nature which once controlled him. Thus in the evolutionary race between man and nature the fact that the former is progressively gaining the ascendancy over the latter is significant.

There are fine specimens of physical development among savages, though it seems that civilised life is required for evolving the most perfect physique. Still, the ascent of man is mental rather than physical, and his growing dominion over nature is mainly due to the increase in intellectual powers. In some respects the savage may even have a physical advantage over civilised man, but mentally he is greatly inferior. The development of the intellect and the substitution of tools for bodily strength render some of man's physical forces less necessary, thus leading to their becoming stationary or even decadent. See Lippert, *l. c.*, vol. i., pp. 10-11.

"The brain is the part of man which develops and changes as races reach a higher level, while the body remains practically constant through ages. To expect the brain to make sudden changes of ability would be as reasonable as to expect a cart-horse to breed racers, or a greyhound to tend sheep. Man mainly develops by internal differences in his brain structure, as other animals develop by external differences in bones and muscles."—Professor F. Petrie, in an address before the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1895.

In the beginning of his *History of Civilisation in England*, especially in the second chapter, Buckle discusses the relation of society to the physical conditions on which it rests. He does not always take all the causes into account which influence

human action: to some that he discusses he attributes too much influence; his political economy as well as some of his historical statements require revision; but it is not true that in principle he ignores the action of the mental laws as distinct from the physical. In some cases he emphatically asserts the dominance of the former over the latter. In Europe, he thinks, the tendency has been to subordinate nature to man. "If we would understand the history of a country like France or England, we must make man our principal study, because, nature being comparatively weak, every step in the great progress has increased the dominion of the human mind over the agencies of the external world." After adducing various parts of this dominion, he says: "From these facts it may be fairly inferred, that the advance of European civilisation is characterised by a diminishing influence of physical laws, and an increasing influence of mental laws." How far his general course harmonises with these statements is another question.

37. Nature directly affects the body; through the body it influences the mind, and it gives stimuli and opportunities to arouse and exercise the mental powers. The body is affected by heredity, by the soil, the climate, the flora, and the fauna. The latter two are to be considered mainly as the conditions of life in the form of food.

Heredity becomes a weighty problem in proportion to the relative prominence given to man as compared with his environment. What he shall become under all the influences exerted upon him depends very essentially on what he himself is. But heredity, a product of the parents, being due to natural and social conditions acting in a long series of processes which are beyond our observation, cannot at present be fully explained. Both in their nature and working many of the factors are mysterious. In numerous cases characteristics of the parents are visible in the child. But we do not know how heredity is determined, what each parent contributes, what is due to the mingling of the properties of the parents, or how

any particular characteristic can be transmitted or eliminated. Only in a general way, therefore, can the social influence of heredity be treated. This influence is unquestionably great, determining the character of the powers at the beginning of life. We look for the qualities of the parents in the child, but prevision and scientific determination are not possible. From weak and small parents we expect weak and small children, and large and strong ones from large and strong parents. Often minor characteristics are likewise transmitted. In large masses, such as a state or community, the effects of the heredity become very marked in the course of time. If for ages the strong and virtuous have large families and the weak and vicious small ones, it must, of course, tell on the character of the population. Frequently, however, it cannot be told what is due to heredity, what to environment. Especially is this the case in respect to mind, where the variations are often great and unaccountable. Who can tell whether, amid other surroundings, a musician would not have become a painter, the sculptor a poet, the philosopher a statesman? The endowment with which men start is due to heredity, but the direction it takes seems due chiefly to environment. It is not surprising, therefore, that some investigators emphasise the influence of heredity on the course of life, others that of environment. (Appendix D.)

38. Starting with his heredity as man's only inherent capital, we find his physical development largely determined by the soil, the climate, and food. He is not the same on the plain as in a hilly region, in a rich as in a barren soil, near the sea as inland. The climate, whether hot or cold or temperate, whether humid or dry, steady or changeable, has a marked effect on his condition and development. It is evident that man could begin only in a region where food was spontaneously produced in sufficient quantity for his support. But if the region failed

to arouse his energies and exert his powers it would also tend to retard his development. The equatorial regions are not favourable to the highest evolution. On the other hand, in the arctic zone his energies are exhausted in the effort to secure a livelihood. Where nature does everything for man and fails to draw out his powers, or where all his strength is required to wrest a living from his unfavourable surroundings, the conditions are averse to progress. After he has been started on his career the temperate zone presents the most advantages for physical and mental development. When nature no longer spontaneously supplies his food, but puts its attainment within the reach of reasonable effort, he is obliged to labour and encouraged to become provident. What man is necessitated to do for nature and himself may be as important for his culture as what nature does directly for him. As a rule, the great civilisations of the world have been north of the Mediterranean, or at least near its latitude, and north of the Gulf of Mexico, with the exception of Peru.

The character of the economic pursuits depends largely on the development attained, but is also much influenced by physical conditions. The nature of a region may invite to hunting or fishing, to a pastoral life or agricultural pursuits, to manufacture or commerce. Where the last two prevail the conditions are favourable to the development of the division of labour, which has an important bearing on social progress.

Philip Delbert, in *Social Evolution*, is an illustration of those who attribute an excessive influence to heredity and natural environment. He makes even refinement a matter of heredity, not an achievement. "The Cossack still adheres to his repulsive food because he has never inherited the refinement of any epicurean ancestors" (P. 72). With the same ancestors, but different social surroundings, would he not have acquired

a taste for other food? The following is also surprising, and we wonder how such knowledge was obtained. "The judicious taste of Montaigne and Montesquieu was due to the grape of Bordeaux; the strong and generous vintage of Burgundy inspired the genius of Proudhon. Wine is, as it were, the blood of France, and imparts to her children the qualities of their native soil" (p. 54). But why not make the taste of Montaigne and Montesquieu depend, like that of the Cossack, on heredity? The difference between the standpoint of Lamarck and that of Darwin is attributed chiefly to the fact that the one was French and the other English! He is disposed to believe "that, had Lamarck been English, he would have taken the Darwinian view, and that Darwin would have reasoned as Lamarck has done had he been a native of France" (pp. 24, 25). So logic and science, which depend on unvarying laws, also depend on nationality!

Spencer is also inclined to attribute an excessive influence to heredity and natural environment, perhaps because he considers society chiefly in its lower rather than its higher stages of development.

39. There is a more direct influence of nature on the mind than through the health, vigour, and the exercise of the body. This is due to the impression made by natural phenomena on the senses, particularly the eye and the ear. The mountain, the valley, and the sea, the vegetation and the animals, the quieting impression of calm scenery and the startling effect of storms, earthquakes, and volcanoes must have a deep and lasting, even if imperceptible, influence on the character and development of the mind. The imagination and the emotions are most affected so long as man is in a state of nature, without reflection, with small mental substance, and but little guided by the social content. But so long as reason slumbers and the necessities of the present moment absorb the attention too much to consider the past or the future, the causes and consequences, the savage mind

with its poor possessions soon moves along worn grooves or gets into ruts. Superstition supplies demons and gods which solve all mysteries and prevent the exercise of the progressive agencies of curiosity and wonder and doubt. A broader outlook and deeper insight are given when a higher stage of development produces a taste for natural scenery and encourages a study of natural forces. In a lower stage the occupations likely have a deeper and more abiding effect than the observed natural phenomena. The mind of the hunter and fisherman differs from that of the shepherd; and the settled life of agriculture has advantages over the nomadic life in that it admits of accumulations of past results, promotes industry, regularity, order, and demands foresight and providence.

The natural conditions affect the religion as well as the occupations. The familiar objects determine the religious symbolism—the totems. The water, the land, the plains, the mountains, the occupations, the most striking phenomena have their deities. The heavens as well as the earth tell on the minds of many peoples. Those who behold only the northern heavens, with Ursa Major year after year moving around the pole star, do not receive the same impressions as those who behold the heavens with the Southern Cross. Deep effects, largely superstitious, are produced by eclipses, comets, and meteors. People with the same physical and mental character, but subjected to different physical influences, differ respecting their views and use of nature.

The physical influence on the mind of primitive peoples is largely unconscious. Some natural phenomena are more effective than others. Lippert, *l. c.*, pp. 4-9, says that the Indians of Brazil inquire into the spirit behind thunder and hail, but make no inquiries respecting the sun, its light, its rising, and setting. What is occasional is naturally more striking than what is constant. Lippert says that it requires a trained mind to be aroused by the grandeur of nature.

40. Frequently the geographical situation is a powerful factor in social life. Its importance grows with the increase of the earth's population and the advance of civilisation. It affects especially the economic status, the political condition, the mingling of peoples, and the social environment. The advantages of ancient Egypt were not limited to its rich soil irrigated by the overflowing Nile, its favourable climate and abundant crops. Its location put it in close relation with three continents, receiving influences from them and in turn influencing them. Its inherent natural advantages may have had less to do with its early civilisation than its relation to other countries. Later we shall see that the mingling of peoples, each stimulating the other, all learning from one another, is among the most powerful agencies in social evolution. Rivers, navigable seas, and great thoroughfares have offered peculiar advantages for development. By its very situation Phœnicia was solicited to become a maritime power and carry its commerce and civilisation westward to the inhabitants along the Mediterranean. A sea-coast like the western shore of Africa, with few indentations for harbours, offered small inducement to primitive man to try his powers of navigation. With no islands near, without craft for stormy seas and distant voyages, in danger of being driven into the hands of hostile tribes, he would hardly be induced to try his fortune on the ocean, except for fishing near the shore. But it was different with an inland sea which abounded in islands and safe harbours. Such a sea is destined to become a highway of communication and commerce even more than the land. The situation of Greece and Rome was a dominant factor in determining their development and power. The maritime situation of England was prophetic of its maritime function. In proportion as humanity becomes a social unit is it necessary to take into account the geographical situation of a country, in

order to understand the conditions of its power and its social character.

While the earth was sparsely settled, nomadic tribes could change their localities without seriously affecting the social surroundings. Each individual lived in and for the tribe, with which he likely wandered, while there was little contact with foreign peoples. How much more is involved in a change of locality in civilised countries, as in the migration of individuals and families to a colony or a foreign land! It involves the severing of old bonds and the forming of new ones, a change in traditions, manners, customs, and all that makes for conservatism. New social relations occasion new ferments. Modern migrations have a prominent part in modern unrest, agitation, transformation, and revolution.

Recent investigations, especially since the impulse given by Carl Ritter, have greatly developed the study of geography in its relation to human society. History can be understood only in connection with the geography of humanity. The subject is discussed in numerous works on physical geography. F. Ratzel has made a specialty of the relations of geography to man. His *Anthropo-Geographie* gives the application of geography to history, and his work on *Politische Geographie* applies geography to politics. He shows that peoples which are separated by sea, mountain, or desert, differ more than such as are easily accessible to each other. Islanders develop peculiarities on account of their isolation, while people who are in contact become more and more assimilated. The opportunities afforded by nature for the intercourse of peoples are powerful factors as conditions for social life and progress.—*Anthropo-Geographie*, pp. 89-115.

Even in the change from the country to the city a crisis is involved. "Every condition of city life, mental as well as physical, is at the polar extreme from those which prevail in the country. To deny that great modifications in human structure and function may be affected by a change from one

to the other is to gainsay all the facts of natural history.”
—Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, p. 559.

Grote, p. 299, shows that the ancient Greeks had some appreciation of the influence of locality, though the subject has been most fully developed in recent times. “The ancient philosophers and legislators were deeply impressed with the contrast between an inland and a maritime city; in the former, simplicity and uniformity of life, tenacity of ancient habits and dislike of what is new or foreign, great force of exclusive sympathy and narrow range both of objects and ideas; in the latter, variety and novelty of sensations, expansive imagination, toleration, and occasional preference for extraneous customs, greater activity of the individual and corresponding mutability of the State.”

41. Nature, always necessary as the basis of life, changes its relation to man, as shown above, with the progress of humanity. The structure of human life built upon this foundation is committed to man according to the culture attained. All the varieties of human beings and human pursuits are constructed on the same natural basis. So long as man is simply a child of nature, the physical is both means and end, the condition of life, and causative in determining the course of society. With the progress of culture man becomes more self-directive. The mind may elaborate its thoughts without considering nature; but in respect to a livelihood the dependence on the natural resources is absolute. In the advanced stages of culture, however, men become more free in determining how the livelihood shall be obtained and what life itself shall become; to what intellectual, moral, and social purposes the natural resources shall minister. Later we shall see that certain constitutional forces of man are more directly under the control of nature than the cultural or more distinctively human forces. Reason is less dependent on natural conditions than the appetite. The conception of cause is the same at the pole, in the temperate

and the torrid zone, and the demonstration of truth is equally valid in every clime. What is peculiar to man and constitutes his higher nature may receive the stimulus to exercise from the physical conditions; but its development and direction depend chiefly on the mental energy. What is distinctively human is a seed which unfolds according to its inherent quality under the influence of the forces in its surroundings.

We thus find that, on the one hand, society is absolutely dependent on, and limited by, nature, while on the other, in all cases in which intellect is supreme, it chooses its own course. The relation between man and nature is that of action and reaction, the initiatory impulse sometimes coming from one, sometimes from the other.

Even if we consider only the economic conditions afforded by nature, we must admit its fundamental influence on society. While I cannot agree with those who make economics omnipotent in human affairs, it cannot be questioned that throughout history the economic status has been the necessary basis of all social achievement. The kind of occupation demanded and developed by the natural surroundings; the division of labour; the ability to store up a supply for future use, thus enabling man to devote himself to other than economic pursuits; and all the advantages and disadvantages resulting from plenty and want, wealth and poverty, point to the physical condition as their source. The means afforded by nature for communication are factors of vast importance. See O. T. Mason, *Primitive Travel and Transportation*, Smithsonian Institute. On the very first page of the volume, however, a statement occurs which indicates a common tendency to exalt one set of cultural factors at the expense of others. "The complete account of the human species acquiring the resources of nature and dominating and understanding her forces is the history of culture." How about the ideas and systems developed by the mind, the ideals and principles of ethics, and the shaping of

life for their realisation? Can any one imagine the highest culture as produced and limited by understanding and dominating the forces of nature? If that is the case, it is difficult to find a place in culture for men like Plato and Kant, Shakespeare and Beethoven. Nature affects mind, and mind affects nature; but the mind also creates a sphere of its own in which it lives and moves.

Every country and every locality affords various possibilities: what shall be made of these depends on the people. For the human results three factors must be considered; the land, its geographical relations, and the character of the people.

42. While there is a growing dominance of mind over nature in the process of evolution, it is probable that in the early stages of development certain qualities in man became, in the main, stationary, and have since exerted a permanent influence on society. What is called race was fixed during the prehistoric era, perhaps in the midst of primitive conditions, and before there was a considerable intermixture of different peoples. What was long stationary may have become a condition for long continuance. The racial types remain and deeply affect the social character and movements. What is occasional and accidental has less chance of being hereditary than what has been established and uninterruptedly transmitted for thousands of years. Just as nature is the physical background for all human variations, so race is the permanent background for the varieties within the racial limits. It is not forgotten that in races, as in species, evolution may vary the types. We are unable to explain the origin of race and the degree of racial permanence, and it is hazardous to predict the future racial peculiarities from those now existing. There is no proof that the races now in the van of civilisation have always been there, or that those now in the rear will always remain there. To attribute to race what cannot otherwise be explained may be a confession of ignorance, as much as to attribute mysteries in

the individual to instinct or intuition. Only when the power of the environment is exhausted can the force of race or heredity be determined. So far as immediate effect is concerned, the environment is more subject to observation than race and heredity; but it must be remembered that the environment is social as well as natural, and that there is danger of attributing to one what really belongs to the other.

While the origin of race suggested above is only a theory there is much in its favour. A people for thousands of years comparatively isolated and subject to the same influences, both natural and social, would develop and make permanent certain qualities. The same kind of heredity for many generations would tend, it seems, to fix these qualities and make them indelible. When peoples began to wander about, to mingle freely with others, the tendency to variation became too strong to permit of the establishment of those enduring types which we call the characteristics of races. (See Appendix E.)

43. Nature, then, is the home of man. At the same time, he himself builds and adorns his home with the materials which nature furnishes, and determines the function of the home. Whether he be cultivated or uncultivated, whether consciously or unconsciously, he uses the physical conditions as means to attain his ends. These ends may themselves be physical or ideal and spiritual. Nature binds him, and yet he binds nature to his purposes. As the child can develop its physical properties and make them supreme in mature years, or can develop the moral and intellectual and give them the supremacy, so society can unfold its natural propensities to the neglect of the higher mental powers, or so develop the intellect as to give that the control. Real human progress consists in a gradual humanising of nature, society absorbing and directing the natural forces for the accomplishment of its human aims. As society puts its

idea in physical forms it idealises them. Nature becomes the symbol of mind. In a low stage of culture the heart but reflects nature; in a high stage nature becomes the mirror of the heart.

It is thus evident that in social inquiries we are obliged constantly to consider man as subject to natural influences. But it is impossible to tell exactly how much society depends on its physical basis or any particular part of it. What, for instance, in Greek civilisation, was due to racial characteristics, to geography, to soil and climate, to eminent personalities, and to social organisation? The facts that the political organisation consisted of city states; that the leading citizens knew each other and could co-operate; that besides the citizens there was a large body of slaves for manual labour; and that the Greek states excited one another, have been named as highly important factors. Taking into account all the facts, we are justified in making only general statements respecting the influence of the physical condition on the State, on economics, and on society at large. No doubt this condition determines marked characteristics of peoples, though it is impossible to state definitely how far. All history, however, testifies that the place of a people is determined by the manner in which that people uses its mental endowments, its natural resources, and its geographical position.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY

44. Society is the new world which is still waiting for its Columbus. Its discovery and exploration constitute the problem of sociology. Comte, Tarde, de Greef, Spencer, Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Ward, Giddings, and many others have worked at the solution; but long and patient labour will yet be required to make the social consciousness commensurate with the social actuality. An advance is seen in the growing appreciation of the depth and breadth of the problem. Society is evidently a compound; but a compound of what? The solution cannot be expected until the constituent elements are found by analysis. These are necessary to reveal its nature, to differentiate it from all other objects, natural and human, and to make it stand out boldly according to its inherent peculiarity. For the exact meaning of the word and the attainment of its rich content we can resort to the etymology of the term, to the sense ordinarily attached to it, and to the existing societies. While not neglecting any of these inquiries, we look to the last for the most satisfactory results. Comte thought that in his day the time for the analysis of the compound had not come: whether it has now arrived can only be determined by the investigation itself.

45. The etymology reveals the generic conception prevalent at the time the word was introduced. The Latin *societas* is used for fellowship, association, community, partnership, league, alliance,—in short, for all kinds of

human combinations and unions, whatever the purpose. The union is formed by the *socii*, from *socius*, a companion or comrade, an associate, one who shares something with another, or in any way co-operates or acts with him. The ties which form the bonds of union may be coextensive with the interests of humanity. While the *socii* form society, it is not indicated *how*. The questions remaining unanswered are: What constitutes the essence of the union? what new relation of the *socii* toward each other is entered when the union is formed? what is shared? why is the union made? what exists when the society is created which did not exist before? By emphasising the *socii*, it might look as if society were literally a union of individuals. The etymology, however, does not necessarily involve this idea. Since it contains only the generic notion at the time of its introduction, we do not look to the etymology of the word for an exhaustive meaning of the object it stands for, nor can it settle the scientific usage of the term now. Frequently the etymology gives only some prominent feature. The development of a subject, especially if scientific, makes the content richer and more exact. For this reason the deeper meaning of a term must be sought as the result of such development rather than at the time of its first adoption.

The words used for "society" in the languages derived from the Latin have the same origin and fundamental idea as the English word. The German *Gesellschaft* is from *gesellen*, to associate, to be companions to one another—essentially the same sense as the Latin. The Greek *κοινωνία*, from *κοινός*, to make common, to communicate, to impart something, to make one a sharer of anything, is similar. The fundamental sense in the etymology of the various words is, therefore, that something is held in common or shared by a number of individuals. Society, then, is an association, a compound, a connection, formed through persons, by means of which a new

combination is created or a relation instituted which did not exist before the individuals were associated.

46. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the present use of the term. Even sociologists differ. When *a* society is spoken of, the union formed by the individuals is supposed to have a degree of permanency. The term, then, designates a formal organisation. In this sense a crowd or a mob is not a society. On the other hand, society is also used in a more general sense, and this is a recognition of the fact that there is society aside from organisations. In every case, however, the relation of persons must be such as to involve psychical influence. Of what is society an association or union? The most common feature in the ordinary usage of the term is the fact that it is taken to mean a union of individuals. An art society is thought to mean a union of artists; the church, a union of members; a scientific association, a union of scientists; a Bible society, a union of persons to promote the circulation of the Bible—always a union of individuals. This seems to be regarded as so self-evident that the inquiry how individuals can be united, and what their union involves and must result in, has not been instituted. Later this view will be subjected to critical examination.

47. We now turn to actual society for the interpretation. We do not ignore etymology, usage, and the results heretofore obtained by specialists, but subject them to criticism by making the social reality their test. "Society" has changed its meaning with the evolution of the social consciousness. In thus seeking to make society interpret its meaning to us, we are impressed with the manifold diversity in human association. Eliminating all wherein associations differ, the residue is their common identity or that essential element which constitutes society itself. This method proves that individuals are

indispensable. But the kind of individuals, provided they are of a suitable age, is a matter of indifference, whether young or old, white or black, intelligent or ignorant, religious or atheistic. Equally indifferent is the purpose of association. This, then, is the fundamental idea of society: the fact of *association*, or being associated, regardless of time, place, circumstances, aim, and the character of the associates. Our first inquiry, therefore, pertains to the nature of human association, not the nature of the associates.

Every step we take emphasises the necessity of fathoming the meaning of association. Association involves persons, but always persons in a certain relation. The exact nature of this relation of persons is the key to society.

48. Individuals isolated, unrelated to others, cannot constitute society. Nor is this formed by adding persons together, $1 + 1 + 1 + 1$. The problem is to determine what besides the existence and addition or sum of individuals is required. What takes place in individuals in the genesis of society? The creation of society always involves that something before isolated and private be made a common possession of two or more persons. An individual's action is private so long as it concerns and influences himself exclusively. The inspiration of his conduct may come from society; he may plan, think, and work in behalf of others, and hereafter the world be blessed by his efforts; but until his labours somehow affect others than himself they are purely private, not social. Private action becomes social so soon as it in any way exerts an influence on others than the actor. Take any body of men recognised as a society; it will be found that they act and react on one another, they give and take. This mental interaction is the new factor which does not exist when men are isolated. Society, then, is created whenever men pass from isolation to a

relation of co-operation or antagonism, of mutuality and reciprocity; they affect each other as stimuli. The process of socialisation introduces psychological relation and influence. The person remains an individual in society no less than when alone, but in one case he is a *private* individual, in the other he becomes a *social* individual.

Society constituted by the mental interaction of individuals, *that* is the essential idea. Whatever is accessory to this forms a condition for association, but not the essence. Having now society in epitome, such questions as these arise: What elements or factors are included in the interaction? What interacts? How and why does the interaction take place? What results does the interaction produce? Never by physical, but always by psychical relations is society constituted.

“Human beings do not form society because they live in the same neighbourhood, nor because their bodies come in contact. No bond exists in the outer world which can associate them. If men were tied together in bundles, we should have bundles of men, but no societies. Society can be constituted only by bringing the inner worlds of persons into relation with one another. It can be the result only of the reciprocal communication of these inner worlds; for primarily human beings confront each other as bodies whose manifestations must be interpreted in order to learn the contents of the inner worlds.”—R. von Schubert-Soldern, *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, 1899, p. 57.

49. We cannot here consider the numerous reasons for association. They are found in interests and desires, in the necessities and circumstances of life. Every individual is born into human relations, those with the mother being of peculiar intimacy. In the biological connection the mother's psychological and social relation to her child finds its basis. By nature the mother is more to her offspring than any one else can be; hence a corresponding

intimacy in their associated life. In the infant the mental responsiveness involved in association exists only in an embryonic state. The mother is socially active, the child receptive. The child's physical dependence on the parent may long remain the same, while the social action and reaction between the two is a constantly increasing quantity. The grown child, no longer dependent for nourishment on the mother, may be more deeply and richly related to her socially than ever before. They become associates, companions in mind, heart, and purpose.

The surroundings of a human being at birth are made by society, and for the continuance of life the child depends on others. Even if a man eventually withdraws into solitude, what he withdraws is largely a product of social influence. Therefore even in isolation he is still a social creation so far as he has been moulded by society in the past, just as in the night a tree continues to be a product of the sun. It also seems hardly possible that in a world peopled like ours an individual can live in any region which has not in some way been affected by social action.

50. Since the time of Aristotle man has been regarded as by nature a social being. This statement, as shown above, is, however, liable to be taken as an interpretation which does not interpret, as has so often been the case with appeals to human nature, metaphysics, instinct, and intuition. There must, of course, be innate *conditions* for socialisation. Contact with others affects these conditions, offers stimuli to them. Social action, then, seems to result from impulses rather than from conscious volition. We are not warranted in claiming that man starts with more than these conditions or a social potentiality. All the rest is the product of development. Through heredity men no doubt differ, so that their capacities for sociability vary; but we have no reason to believe that they are born with social ideas or with definite social

tendencies. These are the results rather than the precursors of social contact with others. The natural impulse of the infant, say for food, is not social, though its gratification may lead to the development of sociality. We lose nothing by regarding sociality as not a natural endowment, except so far as capacity is concerned, but as a product of culture. Just as there are no sensations until the senses come in contact with objects, so sociability has its birth when men are brought into psychical relations with one another.

51. The very existence of society implies some degree of mental similarity on the part of those who associate. This is involved in the *human* nature found in all human beings, which makes an individual a man and distinguishes him from the rest of the world. The common element of humanity is the basis of the giving and taking involved in society,—of reciprocity and mutuality. The infinite variety found in men rests on identity in respect to all which makes them human. There are degrees of identity, and by these the social relations are deeply affected. But what is peculiarly human and essential to man underlies, and perdures amid, social differences and the differentiations wrought by religion, nationality, and culture. What belongs to man as man is ineradicable or can be destroyed only with man himself. Hence all men have human impulses, needs, and appetences; even the lowest have possibilities of development which may prepare for companionship with the higher. It is thus found that in perception, in feeling, in aspiration and in the various intellectual operations there are elements common to all human beings which make association possible and desirable. An animal may possess qualities which attract the cultured more than the characteristics found among savages; but there is an insurmountable difference between the latent capacity for association on the part of the lowest normal human being with his fellow-men and on the part of man

with brutes. Men can understand each other, or can learn to do so, as brutes cannot understand man. In the study of society, with human individuals and their association perpetually changing, the fact of human identity and the inherent capacity for association are of great moment. The animals below man seem soon to reach the limit of their faculties, while no limit has yet been found to the educability and sociability of man. With all the changes wrought by evolution, so long as man remains man he must have the essential characteristics of human nature and therefore, to some degree, conditions of sociability.

52. What men have in common constitutes the genus *homo*, but does not create society. The distinction is fundamental and far-reaching. Society is not the product of the *being*, but of the *action* of men. Its genesis depends solely on what men *do* to one another and together. As we progress in our study it will become evident how radical a revolution in social thought results from changing the conception of society as a direct relation of human beings to one another to a relation of psychological action on and with each other.

That the social relation of men is one of interaction and its results ought to be axiomatic. It is this relation which outlines society so as to make it distinct from all other objects. The biological relation inheres in physical being; the social in mental action and influence. No matter what men are to each other locally and physically, however much they need each other and have individual conditions for the most intimate association, they remain unsocialised so long as mind fails to communicate with mind. It is only through mental intercourse that an individual possession becomes likewise a possession of others and thus society is made possible.

Society now looms up before us as that great mental life which men constitute through their influence on each

other,—that world of vast extent and incalculable value in which sociology dwells.

That a thought is called social of course cannot mean that any two minds have the identical thought. Each mind always has its own thought, feeling, and purpose, and cannot possess those of another. The content of various minds can, however, be alike in the same sense that the different grains of wheat in a bushel are alike.

53. Men are alike and yet unlike; and what assimilates and differentiates them furnishes the conditions for attracting and associating them. On this ability of attraction and association is based what is called the natural affinity of human beings for each other. Often unlikeness attracts more than likeness, because in that case one can supply what the other lacks. Yet the rule that like seeks like is of general application, though improved by reading: like seeks like with differences. Kind may be attracted to kind not by what all have alike and in superabundance, but through what is peculiar. The attraction is in a communism of thought, feeling, and purpose, which contains great differences. Love, so powerful an associative factor, is based on what complements the personality, as well as on what is similar. Numerous interests can be more effectively promoted by combination than in isolation. Voluntary associations are, in fact, as varied as human concerns and tendencies, and they embody the psychology of humanity in infinite interactions. Thus some degree of sociality is found wherever any degree of responsiveness takes place between human beings, whether that responsiveness be co-operative or antagonistic. A divisive influence of mind on mind or of society on society is often more effective socially than a unitive influence, in that it produces ferment, agitation, and revolution, while the latter may produce a deadening effect.

Here it is only the purpose to make a broad distinction between such associations as have their basis in nature,

being due to locality, to biology, or to inevitable circumstances, and such as are voluntary, being due to choice on the part of the associates. Both factors frequently co-operate, the voluntary combination merely giving effect to what is suggested by nature or circumstances. Society always results either from given conditions or from conditions made by human volition.

In primitive times natural conditions make the society; later, voluntary association becomes more frequent and the reasons for association are more varied. Men learn how they can best attain their aim by combination; how receive and give aid; how love and hate be satisfied; how hopes realised and fears averted; and how some common end in life and thought attained. The consciousness of need which is met by union is a dominant factor in association. Frequently the inherent qualities of men have less power to unite than the desire to antagonise what is averse to them. Nations with little love for each other may be driven together by mutual hatred of a third nation. Prejudice, hatred, and opposition are powerful factors in association.

A society from which all conflict is excluded would be mechanical. Indeed, it cannot be conceived as truly human. Instead of possessing real life, it would be intolerably monotonous. "Without contests no progress," was declared by Carl Marx to be the law heretofore followed by history.

54. The psychic interaction which constitutes society cannot always be direct between an individual and every other member of an association. The citizens of the same state may not know, or ever come in contact with, each other. This applies likewise to churches, to labour organisations, and to social groups generally. Thus we designate as a society any group in which persons are subject to the same social laws and influences. Unity of aim may be the bond. In all such cases the tie is

psychical, though the particular persons from which the psychical influence emanates be unknown. This influence is a general factor in the society rather than directly individual. When the group is small, the influence of mind on mind is more direct and more readily perceptible; but in a large group personal contact is possible to only a limited degree. There is, however, no society unless a common bond of union exists, some mental influences to which all are subject. An Indian in a community of whites is a factor in the community as a society so far as the same laws, the same views, and the same general social characteristics affect him as well as the other members. A group, then, is a society so far only as it has, in some measure, the same mind which is due to an influence to which all are subject. States are political societies because all the inhabitants are subject to the same laws, regulations, and general social influences. They are affected by them and respond to them. In every large organisation the members are bound together by a common aim and move within the sphere of the same social influences. *Persons federated for the same general end* is a good definition of a large number of societies, but does not include all.

It is important to note that social action is not confined to the immediate influence of person on person. Society embodies its views in numerous forms, such as laws, customs, manners, and through these affects individuals within its sphere. Persons forming groups and communities, in which they are subject and respond to the same social influences, are consequently treated as constituting, by means of this interaction, a society.

55. Society itself is never visible. Since its essence consists in the psychic action of individuals on each other this ought to be self-evident; but we are so absorbed and

deceived by mere appearances that the invisibility of society does not merely require statement but likewise emphasis. We can see individuals together; but that is as true in aggregation as in association. When they actually associate, in a meeting, certain words and actions imply association; but every word and every act is by an individual or by individuals, and that which is truly associative, namely, the action of the mind on mind, or the common psychic factor in all, is not visible. Certain results of association are also perceptible, such as a resolution or united action of any kind; but the cause of the united action, namely, the mental agreement, is not visible, but only inferred. We can see and hear a speaker in Congress, and witness his gestures and behold some evidences of the effect he produces; but the social influence itself exerted by him at the time we have no means of seeing directly. Society, then, is not a percept, but a concept; it is never seen, but indications of its existence are, and from these we infer that it exists. We cannot see the relation of men which involves mental interaction, or their common psychical content, but we can think it. The psychology of society which is its essence is as invisible as that of the individual.

The distinction between the essence and the manifestations of society is apt to be overlooked; and the failure to make this distinction seems to have led to the fruitful error that society can be seen and that nothing exists behind its visible manifestations to investigate. What is seen is individuals, and the shallow and hasty inference has been drawn that society is composed of individuals, and that this is all that can be said. By thinking through what is meant by the statement that individuals constitute society only by means of psychic interaction the fact that society is invisible becomes self-evident.

A society does not cease to exist when the members temporarily cease to influence each other and can be

called together again for a meeting. The common bond, though invisible, continues. We distinguish between the meeting of a society and the society itself. Does Congress cease to exist when it adjourns and its members are scattered over all parts of the United States so that no two of them are together? The adjournment of Congress does not mean its abolition. But what can you see of Congress when not in session? What becomes of any society between its periodical meetings? The dissolution of the English Parliament is not the same as its adjournment or prorogation.

When we say, then, that society consists of the interaction of individuals on each other we do not mean that this interaction is constant. That a man has a memory does not imply that he is always exercising it. Certain functions belong to Congress whether or not in session; and in Congress as a society the relation of the members is such that, whenever necessary, they can deliberate and act with respect to these functions. Congress has a sphere occupied by no other society; its functions are peculiar. And these peculiar functions are performed by the meeting, deliberations, and resolutions of the members. Congress is elected for the sake of these deliberations and resolutions; and because this is its purpose we speak of it as a society even when not in session. It is common to designate a society according to its aim, even if the accomplishment of that aim does not require constant meeting and action. Political parties exist even when there is no campaign. The bond of union consists in the same views, the same purpose, and a readiness to act co-operatively whenever necessary. The meeting of the society is a social event, but not the society itself.

The distinction here made between the social essence and its manifestation cannot be viewed as subjective and objective society. Subjective society is my conception of society; but

the objective is society as it really exists. There may be society of which no one is conscious; it has objective but not subjective existence. But the essence of society has validity for all society, whether it be recognised or not. The essence of society and the social phenomena are both realities; both may likewise be known, that is, they may be subjective as well as objective.

56. In an army the psychical bond of union is for the sake, mainly, of the physical effect. The soldiers of an army cannot all act on each other; but ties are formed by sentiment, by patriotism, by purpose, and interest; they are under the same laws and social conditions, and subject to the same commands. The prominence of the social body compared with the social mind in an army does not give the organisation itself an exalted character; this must be sought rather in the ultimate aim of its calling. An army marches, camps, and fights as a unit; and behind these visible phenomena are the real, social bonds which are invisible, psychological, of which the objective and bodily forms are but expressions. In an intellectual, ethical, and spiritual society the inner bonds are more striking and the immediate aim is also more psychical. While, in every instance, both the social mind and body must be taken into account, our emphasis on the social mind as the essence is justified, as has been shown above.

57. A superficial view beholds only an infinite variety of social phenomena. The unity is discovered by penetrating to the social mind. From this the phenomena emanate and of it they are the expression. The content of the social mind varies greatly: in one association it is æsthetic, in another ethical, in a third political. But the content is always formed by the influence of minds on each other. No two minds have exactly the same content, yet there must be points of agreement to hold an

association together. Societies differ in respect to their minds and likewise in the manifestations of the same. When we have found what pertains equally to all society, the fact of psychic interaction, or association, it becomes a problem how to discover what is peculiar to each and differentiates it from all other societies, such as a state, a church, a labour organisation. It is by classifying (which means unifying) the different societies that order emerges from the bewildering social diversity. What, for instance, makes the family, State, and Church alike, and wherein do they differ as societies? In studying the nature of society we try to get the universal substance of all association, the one seed from which all societies with their endless diversity spring.

58. We have seen that society is generally regarded as composed of individuals, and that this is thought to be so self-evident as to require no proof. But have we in this the seed from which all societies grow? Our discussions thus far, especially the distinction between the invisible social essence and the visible social manifestations, throw a doubt on the accepted notion, and make it necessary to inquire whether individuals really are the constituent elements of society. Human individuals can, like cannon-balls, crows, and cattle, be aggregated; but also associated? It has been shown that aggregation, to become association, requires psychical action, the influence of mind on mind, or a common social content on the part of those aggregated. This is involved when sociology is called a psychological discipline. The question we must answer is, whether in the analysis of society the individual is the ultimate factor with which the analysis must stop. If society is constituted by the psychical action of individuals, then this action is ultimate, not individuals. The simple process of drawing an inference thus proves that society is not literally composed of individuals, but of the interaction of their minds. Society

is not an evolution of individuals so as to compound them into an association; it is evolved from individuals by mentally influencing each other or by the unifying power of the same social content. In the genesis of society such a relation of individuals is instituted as involves mental combination.

The conclusion thus reached, that society is not composed of individuals, but of something belonging to them, so completely overturns all the ordinary conceptions as to require the most critical investigation. The old conception will be found so absurd that persons will wonder how they ever could have believed it. A new basis for the scientific conception and interpretation of society is necessary.

Proof is hardly needed for the statement that society is commonly regarded as composed of individuals. When this view is attacked people are astonished; no other view is deemed possible. It is the conception which underlies the common statement that society is an aggregation or a collection of individuals. A few quotations are given of the current view.

In *Social Science and Social Schemes* MacClelland speaks, p. 4, of "the individuals who compose society"; and p. 24 he calls individuals the units or component parts of society. It is common to refer to individuals as the social units or the atoms of society.

Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 6: "A society is a number of like-minded individuals—socii—who know and enjoy their like-mindedness, and are therefore able to work together for common ends." This evidently applies only to formal organisations. Page 11: "The unit of investigation, then, in sociology is the socius—that is to say, the individual who is not only an animal and a conscious mind, but also a companion, a learner, a teacher, and a co-worker. Sociology studies the nature of the socius, his habits and his activities." In *The Province of Sociology*, p. 5, he speaks of individual personalities as the units and elements of association.

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Carroll D. Wright, *Practical Sociology*, p. 3, also regards individuals as "the units which make up the integral members of society." Page 66: "Every organisation in society consists of individual units, and these must be brought into some relationship with each other before the lowest form of the social unit can be created." It is significant that here society is first made to consist of "individual units," and then of "some relationship" of these units with one another.

A picture can be taken of men grouped or aggregated, but not of a society. If the impression is to be made that the group is not a mere aggregation, but a society, it will have to be represented by the attitude or action of the individuals. But the attitude or action introduced as a representative of society is very different from the society itself. Individuals can be photographed, but not the society formed by them.

59. Individuals are composed of body and soul. But what coalition or compounding of bodies and souls can be conceived as taking place in the formation of societies? Can individuals coalesce as hydrogen and oxygen, which are completely absorbed when they unite, and do not exist except in the water they form? So far are individuals from being absorbed by society that their character as individuals is as distinct as in isolation. The so-called member of society thinks, feels, wills, as an individual and cannot do otherwise. Leaving out of account the body, which, of course, cannot coalesce with other bodies, it is not possible for the soul of an individual to unite with the soul of another and thus form a soul-compound. All language which implies it is figurative. Could there be an actual union of individuals, whether as souls and bodies, or as souls or minds only, what kind of society would the product of the union be? It must be a new body and soul, or a new soul. Absurd as this view is, it is promoted by calling society an organism, or speaking of it, a state, for instance, as a personality, and endowing

it with consciousness, mind, feeling, will, and similar attributes. All these terms when applied to society require careful investigation, and it will be shown later that they have no meaning when taken literally. As figures of speech they may, however, be valuable and as such will be used.

Society, as we have seen, is not involved in the mere existence of human beings, but depends on human relation, a relation of action. But what kind of action? The individual can act on himself, as in education; or he can act on nature, as when he cultivates the soil; but in neither of these cases is his action directly social. He can also act on other individuals psychically, mind affecting mind. This is social action. It need not form what we call a society, but it is the kind of action which is typical of all society.

60. Frequently individuals are connected with a score, or even more, associations; but if a man belongs literally to one, how can he, at the same time, belong to another? A dollar can as easily belong to ten men as one man to ten associations. As each individual may have a share in the dollar, so may each association in the individual. If a man *literally belongs* to an economic association, what is left of him for an ethical, religious, or political society? One need but think through the statement that a man belongs to a dozen associations to see how absurd the notion that he belongs literally to any one of them.

Mr. Spencer, in the first chapter of his *Inductions of Sociology*, discusses, What is Society? The discussion is a revelation of the perplexities which arise when the notion is adopted that society is literally composed of individuals. If this is not the case, he sees no other alternative than the conception that "a society is but a collective name for a number of individuals." We shall discover another alternative. He thinks that individuals who

meet temporarily and then separate, as the audience of a lecturer, do not constitute a society; but that they do form a society if their relations are permanent, as in the case of a nation existing for centuries. "A coherent mass broken into fragments ceases to be a thing; while, conversely, the stones, bricks, and wood, previously separate, become the thing called a house if connected in a fixed way." That is, individuals firmly cemented together, as bricks in a house, form a society. But can a brick be a part of twenty separate houses at the same time? If an individual is fixed in a society, as a brick in a house, how is he to be fixed like a brick in a score of other houses widely separated?

This is but one of many examples in literature of the confusion caused by making men literally the constituent social elements.

The old Roman law contains a significant hint on the analysis of the person in determining the relations of individuals. Private Roman law did not apply to the person in his totality, but only to his economic relations in society or only to a particular social force exercised by him. This law was the sum of moral rules which "regulate the economic conditions of human society. It is concerned with the dominion of persons over things or that which has the value of things. Private law is thus identical with the law of property."—Ledlie's translation of *The Institutes of Roman Law*, by R. Sohm, p. 98. On p. 101: "To be a 'person,' within the meaning of private law, means to be capable of holding property, of having claims and liabilities. A person, then, in the sense of private law, is a subject endowed with proprietary capacity." In other respects, likewise, the Roman law regards the relation of persons in society, not according to their totality, but according to a particular quality or force. The same is true of other than the Roman law. That part of a person which enters into relations is essential for understanding the society he helps to form; it is the part of himself which becomes his social factor.

61. So far is the individual from being absorbed by society that many of his affairs remain private. These do not concern the community and are not even known by any one but himself. Whatever influence others exert on him, something is peculiarly his own, such as his intellectual operations, his feelings, faith, conscience, purpose, and volition. The affairs of his personality, as distinct from his sociality, make peculiar demands on him. He must attend to them or they will be neglected, no one else being able to undertake them. There are personal aims and individual vagaries which never become social realities. So selfishly and exclusively can a man devote himself to private affairs that society gets of him only what he cannot withhold. What is a man to a community who isolates himself and spends his life in the vain effort to discover perpetual motion? Society cannot follow his pursuit and gets no result from it. It is thus clear that private individual action can be distinguished from social action. If a man gives eighty per cent. of himself to scheming and working for strictly private matters, society can get only twenty. So long as only a fraction of a man's life enters into social relations we only stultify ourselves by claiming that the *man* belongs to society.

In *Politik*, i., p. 68, von Treitschke says: "The Christian must deny himself if he does not retain for himself something immortal and indestructible, namely, his conscience."

62. The false conception that society is composed of individuals has promoted pernicious theories of the relation of the individual to society. The rights of the individual, the worth, the dignity, and the liberty of the personality, have been denied. This is in keeping with the assertion that there is social but no individual ethics. The man is merged in the mass; he ceases to find a law in himself, because society, with its traditions and cus-

toms and public opinion, is a law unto him; he is robbed of moral responsibility and intellectual initiative. A tool can be worked with, but cannot initiate its work. An extreme communistic socialism can make the community everything only by making the individual an atom in the social mass or a drop in the social sea. Thus individuality is destroyed and society itself becomes degenerate. No logic can save private rights and personal independence if the individual *belongs* to society.

Especially have political despotisms degraded the individual in the name of society. Paternalism in government does not mean that the ruler or State takes the place of the father in the modern and civilised sense, who trains his children lovingly, and wisely prepares them for independence, but in the savage sense, that the father rules with unlimited authority, disposing of his children at pleasure, and ostensibly all for the good of his family! States have frequently encroached on private affairs, even to the destruction of the most sacred rights. Social progress has been along the line of social order and individual freedom; and it is one of the deepest lessons of history that the value of the personality and of society has been evolved simultaneously.

French Jacobinism demanded of the citizen an entire alienation to the State "of all his rights and possessions, each man yielding himself entirely, and without any reserve whatever. Thenceforward nothing that he had or was, is to be any longer his own, and whatever he may have he is to hold by favor of a concession always revocable. His person and powers, no less than his goods, are to be public property." (*The Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1885, p. 423.) "The State was omnipotent for the very purpose of regenerating mankind" (p. 425).

63. That society is not composed of individuals can be mathematically demonstrated. It is an axiom that two things which are equal to the same thing are equal to

each other. Let us suppose that twelve men organise a scientific association; then, for recreation, a whist club. If, now, societies are composed of individuals, then the scientific association and the whist club are both equal to the same twelve men; therefore the scientific association is a whist club. Putting S for the scientific association, W for the whist club, A for the twelve men, we have the formula: $S = A$; $W = A$; therefore $S = W$.

If individuals constitute the society, then by arresting them for personal crimes the society is arrested. If a judge fines the whist club one hundred dollars for gambling, he also fines the scientific association, which is the same thing. If ten members of a society are married, then the society, equal to these ten members, is, of course, married. It has ten wives and perhaps scores of children. There is, in fact, no end to the absurdity involved in making a society consist of individuals.

If a photograph of the twelve men be taken, is it a photograph of the scientific association or of the whist club?

64. From every point of view the common notion that society is composed of individuals is proved false. No one, however, questions that the constituent elements of society are found in them. Society is constituted by what individuals give of themselves to their fellow-men. One man gives much of himself to an association in which he is deeply interested, little to another for which he cares less. Bismarck may join an association of veterans of the war of 1870-71 and pay little attention to it, because absorbed by affairs of State, while a smaller man gives to it much more of himself. Let us call that part of himself which a person gives to society his *social force*. "Force" is an abstract term, but indispensable for clearness and fruitful in application. "Energy" or "power" can be substituted; but whatever word is used, it always means *that* part of the individual which enters society, which exerts a psychical influence on others. Whatever

one does to affect others, *that* is his contribution to society and therefore his social force. In society we have nothing but the social forces of individuals in interaction with each other. In a state the law made by the majority, or the properly constituted authority, is the social force to which each is expected to respond in the way of obedience. A society can, of course, exert social energy as well as the individual. We take force as causative, as something that works and produces an effect. Later a fuller explanation will be given of a force which is, at the same time, individual and social—which is a personal power and yet becomes a social factor.

Society, as stated above, always involves giving and taking, the giving and taking being on the part of individuals or associations. We should have an exact interpretation of social force if it were perfectly known what individuals and societies are to, and receive from, one another.

A chain can be used as a figure for society; but the links are not individuals. If they were, an individual could no more belong to a dozen societies than a link can to a dozen chains. The social forces are the links. The force of an isolated individual is a link by itself; it becomes social by being connected with other links.

Simmel makes individuals the constituent elements of society, but at the same time makes society consist of the interaction of individuals on each other. He says: "Society is found wherever several individuals sustain to each other a relation of interaction (*Wechselwirkung*). For if society is to be a peculiar object, having its own science, it can be only because a new unity arises from the sum of the individuals which constitute society; otherwise all the problems of the social science would only be problems of individual psychology. A unity composed of several elements is, however, nothing but an interaction of these elements, exercising the forces of cohesion, of attraction, perhaps, also, of a certain repulsion."

65. A critical investigation of recent social literature establishes the fact that the conclusion we have reached is really involved in many of the statements made, and is but an inference from them. In the same sentence society is said to consist of the sum of individuals as the units and that it is their relation of interaction which constitutes society. Much of the literature reveals a feeling after the social actuality without really attaining it. The contradictions which thus prevail can be overcome only by the unequivocal and emphatic statement which results from social analysis, that society can never be constituted by a union of individuals, but only by the actual contributions made by and of themselves.

It is significant that the conclusion reached is confirmed by the results of many investigators when what is implied rather than what is explicitly stated is considered. The scholars who investigate society seek to learn what men are to it through their action, not what they are in themselves. The interaction of individuals in the French Revolution is the problem for the historian of that mighty upheaval. Napoleon is one kind of force as a general, but a very different force as a lawgiver. The profound historian analyses rulers and statesmen, in order to learn what various powers they exerted and in what particular directions their social influence was most effective. Historic characters have by no means always been all-round men, but frequently specialists, exerting predominantly a few forces which were peculiarly needed and made very effective. English and American history abounds in illustrations. The pursuits a public man favours most and in which he believes his greatest power to be concentrated may have to be relegated to his private study. Few statesmen are as completely absorbed in their political calling as Metternich and Bismarck; but each had private interests. Gladstone loved his private studies, which ranged from the classics and biblical literature to modern

science and social problems. The same result is obtained when we go directly to men and inquire into their social relations. The true man belongs to himself, and to society so far as it has claims on him or he can be benefited by it. He "joins" a society in order to contribute that part of himself which can be incorporated in the society: a sporting club gets his sporting energy, an artistic association his æsthetic force, an economic organisation his economic force, though much of these particular energies may be reserved for private use. Kant was brilliant in company, but his life was mainly that of a solitary thinker. Physiologically considered, the unknown savage belongs as truly to humanity as Darwin; but from the social point of view Darwin rises incomparably higher. That the social difference consists in what each gives is evident.

Since investigation cannot stop with the individual as the ultimate social factor, but insists on learning what he is to society, why not draw the logical inference that only what the individual gives of himself to society is social? James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii., p. 239, says: "I know that my fellow-man is determined or influenced by my action, as I, in turn, am determined or influenced by his. Society, civilisation, and science itself, are the result of such interaction. The same relation cannot be established between a human being and nature as between man and man." Referring to the experience of the individual in dealing with his physical environment, the author says: "There is here no evidence of *interaction*, such as we have where there is co-operation or conflict of man with his fellows."

66. After the energies of persons interact, what is created that did not exist before? That relation of persons to one another which we call society. The individual can never give himself absolutely in an act or to an association. He has a reserve force which must be reckoned with. The energy he gives to an association is always

his force, backed by the personality from which it emanates, and partaking of its characteristics. Hence the variety of the powers manifested in the same organisation, due to the characters and sentiments and aims of those who exert them. The economic power of two men may be equal, while its social manifestation will differ because one is selfish and the other altruistic.

Plato can only give what is Plato; but to no society does he give the whole of Plato; and something of Plato cannot be given to any society or to all associations. That is, society is not the whole of an individual's being, nor is it the sole sphere in which his energies are exerted.

CHAPTER V

SOCIETY A COMBINATION OF SOCIAL FORCES

67. Society now stands clearly and distinctly before us as such a relation of individuals as constitutes a combination, concentration, or synthesis of social forces, and as itself a force. As a mighty energy compounded of energies it has wrought the wonderful achievements of human association from the beginning of humanity till the present time. Instead of vague and indefinable personalities, we seize those definite forces which they exert on each other, weld them together for united action, and in this compound of energies obtain the essence of society, the substance of history, and the problem of sociology.

At first this reduction of society to its actual, constituent forces seems strange. This will be the case, however, so long only as the meaning is not fully grasped, the reasons establishing it are not apprehended, and the idea itself lacks familiarity. As we proceed it will become increasingly evident that it furnishes the actual interpretation of society. Persons are taken out of a false position and found socially, and every peculiarity in social revelation receives due emphasis. This chapter aims to give a fuller explanation of what this realistic conception of society involves. Throughout it will be manifest that to attain the correct idea it is only necessary to penetrate to rational interpretation, instead of ending investigation with superficial impressions on the senses.

68. The correctness of the conception is confirmed by the fact that it can be applied as a test of current errors

in social discussion. Those who compose a society of persons naturally infer that an association must be like its units or the sum of its individuals. This is thought to be so evident as to require no proof; when in reality a little reflection makes the error so patent that its existence can only be accounted for by the dominance of a false theory.

According to that theory many an association ought to be strong which is weak. Here is a church composed, according to the old notion, of astute business men, of whom each conducts his personal affairs admirably, while the business of the church is sadly neglected. The business efficiency is not equal to that of the sum of its members, the supposed units, but only to the business talent actually given by the members. Another church has members who, together, are worth millions; yet the church is in debt, benevolence lags, the treasury is chronically empty, and the pastor does the fasting as well as the praying. No imagination is vivid enough to conceive that the church *has* the rich men and their millions. Every association furnishes similar illustrations. A society does not consist of the wisdom, the wealth, and the energies of the members combined, but only of so much as they contribute. Perhaps this is a small fraction of the totality.

Discriminating social investigation proves that the *kind* of association, whether compactly or loosely organised, is an important element of strength. But the kind depends on the relations sustained by the persons to each other, on the manner of their co-operation, not on the individuals as the units. Weak persons become strong by a thorough organisation of their energies, and may be more powerful than the same number of strong persons whose forces are indifferently organised. Thus a society invariably depends on the nature and combination of the social energies concentrated in it, not on the sum of the indi-

viduals, of whose energy only a fraction may be contributed. How unmeaning the common appeals to members to become and give more to a needy association, if the association already *has* them!

69. It is absurd to ask whether a society is better or worse than its members, if it is equal to their sum. In that case the character of the society is found by adding together the good and the bad in the members. The question, however, becomes significant when the social forces are apprehended as the actual units. Every association is a certain *kind* and certain *degree* of energy, dependent on the contributions of the members. An organisation for the spread of religion among the heathen cannot expect to concentrate within itself all the religion of its members; they likely have some left for the church, for politics, for their families, and for private affairs. Perhaps a person belongs to an economic association and yet gives ten times as much of his economic force to private business. A society is as its units, these taken as individuals, only so far as it exploits them. The individuals would have to give themselves wholly to it to make it like their sum.

The strength which a horse exerts draws the load: the strength it possesses may be many times greater.

If ten individuals have equal forces we can represent the total of each by x . The association they form will not, however, equal $10x$, but that fraction of each x which enters the association, as $\frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10} + \frac{x}{10}$. No one gives x to any particular society, but he contributes economic force to an industrial association, æsthetic to an art club, intellectual to a school, while much that he possesses is contributed to none.

A selfish act on the part of an individual may work altruistically in society. A man establishes a school from egotistic motives, to gain personal honour, while the effect produced is for the benefit of humanity. Society is not controlled by the

personal motive of the gift, but by the use it makes of the gift itself. Thus from the best personal intentions society may reap evil results, while evil personal intentions are turned into good. While to the pure all things are pure, evil comes to him who evil thinks.

70. Only from its action can we infer the character of an association. The action of societies as the result of deliberation usually means the concentration of the forces to a definite end. It is in this way that what is latent, chaotic, and a mere ferment is organised, objectified, and made effective. This action may be better than some of the members make the standard for themselves, or it may fall below the private standard of others. Men recognise and advocate social standards which are far superior to their private practice. Because social and private actions of men are at variance, so many resolutions of associations are waste paper. Perhaps they give the best of themselves to society and reserve for private life what they dare not do in public. But what they make public may also fail to do justice to their excellences. What is deepest cannot find adequate expression. Besides, an individual's highest intellectuality and noblest aims may fail of appreciation. Especially of the best is it true that their personal character is superior to their social status, while the worst persons try to appear better than they are. Every age has its whited sepulchres; but in cultured eras there are also those who refuse to give what is holy unto the dogs and to cast their pearls before swine.

What is private and what social in the same individual presents a rich but untrodden field of inquiry. He is the same being, yet how different as a private and a social force!

Like society, the individual possesses contradictory qualities. A man may be a criminal and yet, aside from his crime, have noble characteristics. Unfortunately, the art of punishing the criminal in a man with imprisonment

and letting the rest of him go free has not yet been invented. A man bad in private may exert good as well as bad social influence, and sometimes it is hard to tell which predominates. Society cannot judge a man according to what he is; it does not even make what it sees of him the standard; but it judges him according to its *interpretation* of what it sees.

Some men have ethical principles for their families, which do not control their own lives; they keep them for the benefit of their children. A significant distinction between private and social forces!

71. A man's force is his personal wealth—some he hoards, some he uses for self, some for others. What he gives to others is as truly his as what he thinks privately.

Still, the relation of the social forces to the personality requires a word of explanation. A man is social energy plus something besides, a non-social force. All his social energy is, however, truly a giving of himself. Impulses, thoughts, plans, aspirations, good intentions, even inventions, can remain private and die with their possessor. His faith and doubt, hope and fear, can be as solitary in life as the soul in the article of death. But what is absolutely private is not a whit more personal than what he communicates to others so as to become a causative factor in society. No one is divided into private and social forces, separated as different rooms in the same house. The secret thought of one moment can be communicated the next and thus become social. He who speaks to himself becomes a social power unintentionally if heard by others. Whatever else he may be, an individual always gives a revelation of self in what he expresses to others. The rays of the sun have the quality of the sun; yet if we could seize all the rays sent out by it into the universe we should not have the sun itself.

In the *Introduction*, p. 128, individuals are compared with steel magnets, while the magnetic force which proceeds from them is viewed as the social energy exerted by individuals.

72. Certain subjects, as we have seen, can be studied entirely apart from the persons who developed them. We can abstract astronomy, geology, chemistry, and mathematics from astronomers, geologists, chemists, and mathematicians. For a law itself there is not the slightest significance that Copernicus or Newton discovered it. Only in the history of the sciences are the investigators and discoverers connected with them. But it is different with society; it never can be abstracted from the individuals who created it or be treated as an existence independent of them. Although society cannot be a compound of individuals, they make it as truly as men make tools—more truly, in fact, for they make it of something they are.

We do not expect henceforth to be able to dispense with the old terms in speaking of association, namely, that society is composed of individuals; that it consists of members; and that men associate and belong to society. Such expressions are too deeply rooted in our common vocabulary and literature to be dropped. They will continue as a constant witness of the relation of persons to society. But since the interpretation of these expressions has been found, we do not take them literally or as indicative of the essence of society. They pertain, rather, to the phenomena perceived, through which we pass to the causative social energies they embody, but which are invisible.

This dynamic conception of society is too radically different from the old and prevalent one to be mistaken as involving a mere change of phraseology. So real and fundamental is the difference that the individual appears in a new light, society is changed by becoming a force

which is constituted by individual forces concentrated, and a firm basis is established for sociological inquiry.

The real atoms, molecules, and units of all association substitute realistic for mythical interpretations. When a plant gives only nitrogen to the atmosphere, we refuse to deviate from the truth by saying that the atmosphere has absorbed the plant.

Every condition of individuals which subjects them to the same social forces constitutes a social relation. When the relation is fleeting we speak of it as social intercourse; when instituted with a degree of permanence we designate it a society. Society which creates so many institutions can itself be looked upon as the fundamental institution of humanity.

Since by actual analysis the social forces are established as the social essence, just as by actual analysis a chemical compound is reduced to its constituent elements, the above interpretation must not be regarded as a *theory* of society, but as actually giving a *science* of society.

In the *Introduction*, *sociation* was used instead of association, because the latter involved the old notion that individuals themselves are the associated factors, while sociation was defined to mean that in society we have a compounding of forces, not of individuals. Whether henceforth we use association or sociation, the sense will be that indicated by the definition given of sociation.

73. Individuals in society sustain to each other a relation of potential or actual interaction. We might say that the social relation is established with a view to the interchange of personal energies. This interchange is frequently potential, not actual. Persons not members do not sustain this relation, which has interaction in view, and they are not included in the society when it meets.

Sociology deals with individuals only for the sake of

their potential or actual relations to society. If one hundred persons exert a force individually, it is not the same as if exerted socially. A rope tied to a loose rock and pulled by one hundred men in succession has a very different effect from their united strength exerted at the same time. Sociology is concerned with the pulling together, for in that it beholds society. It sees the difference between ten pounds of powder exploded one after another and the ten pounds exploded at once, and demands the reason. It is thus made clear that in society something is accomplished by a combination of thought, feeling, and action, which these cannot possibly do separately. An association of men means that they think, feel, will, act, together, or that these operations in the case of an individual are influenced by the operations of other individuals. A society, therefore, is created by such a relation of human beings as puts them within the sphere of the same social forces and social activities.

The radical difficulty in forming a definite conception of society consists in the fact that it is not to be conceived as a being or substance, such as a man or tree or anything else that appeals to the senses, but as a *relation*. Owing to the relations it involves, society has claims on me and I have claims on it. These claims involve obligation as well as action. The state whose citizen I am has claims on me even when I am outside of its physical boundaries.

In a small and definite organisation the concentration and interaction of forces exerted by persons is evident. There is a clearly defined purpose, and the energies are directed toward its attainment. In unorganised social groups, however, and in large associations, the interaction of the personal forces is not so apparent, yet it can be discovered. Labourers who dwell together in a community hold social intercourse and influence each other, and their mental contents are affected thereby. The influence exerted is not apt to be as definite

and concentrated as in a formal association with a specific purpose, but it is none the less real. In a city or state all the political influence emanates from persons, but it may be complex and intricate. The law has its origin in persons, and is executed by persons, though they may not act individually but as associated. We must not forget that a society acts as a force, but that this force is a compound of individual forces. The force of an association acts on individuals and also on associations. It may be impossible to determine what each gives and takes; but in every social circle, however large, this giving and taking occurs and makes the social forces different from those which operate in any other society. A society, in order to be definitely marked, must have something peculiar which pertains to all the members, but is shared by no others. A church in a city shares much with the citizens in general and with the other churches, particularly those of its own denomination; but it is, nevertheless, a distinct society in that certain social forces are peculiar to it; these peculiar forces make the church itself a peculiar society.

74. A unique and fruitful sphere is given to sociology by this new conception of society. The problem is solved what to do with the individual. The centre of attention is no longer the *socii*, of whom we say that they associate, but their social forces. So from social phenomena we pass to their causes. As an individual a man belongs to the individualistic disciplines, with whose independence and value sociology does not interfere; it concerns itself with him only so far as he is a social factor, exerts or receives social energy, which is the social atom.

Thus the definiteness and simplicity essential for scientific inquiry are obtained. Were we obliged to consider the millions of human beings in a nation, say the United States, in order to understand the nation itself, the task would be hopeless. But the problem becomes very different when the social forces of the millions are made the object of investigation. They can be reduced to a few

classes and their operations traced. The English people can be understood without knowing every inhabitant of England. What Englishmen are *per se* is a different problem from what they are in an associated capacity. The creations of society (such as governments, institutions, language) can be studied by themselves as concentrations of social forces. So the past can be known through its social energies, though we know nothing of the persons who exerted them. From the social products we infer their causes, the agencies which produced them, whatever those who exerted the forces may have been. Of that long era called prehistoric we, of course, have no knowledge of persons; but in many respects we can form some idea of the society, and also of the individuals, from the remains, such as the lake dwellings, the earthenware, the stone, bronze, and iron implements. Even in historic times but a single personality may be known in a period, perhaps not even one; but much can be learned of the society from the ruins and other relics. Mere names often have little meaning in Egyptian hieroglyphics, while the faith, the sacrifices, the funeral rites, the manners, customs, modes of warfare, and many other social arrangements can be known. Sometimes a name stands for a period, and is unduly glorified because it absorbs what belongs equally to others—the natural consequence when individuals are treated as the social essence. Similarly a general in a sheltered place gets credit for the valour of his exposed troops. What we know of ancient Indian, Chinese, and Persian society does not depend on our knowledge of the few names recorded. When Aristotle treats of politics or ethics, he deals with forces as truly as in his studies of nature. History itself is an account of the working of the social forces; persons have historic significance only as the sources of these forces. Aside from these forces, persons are objects of biography, not of history. The members of an association can be

described without giving an idea of the association itself; and through its social forces an idea can be given of society without mentioning a single member.

The erroneous view here combated rests on the notion that our knowledge of the social forces depends on a knowledge of their individual possessors. The person is, indeed, the source of the forces, and in the force he exerts only gives an expression of himself. Our knowledge of the man, however, is not primitive, but derivative. What he does comes first in our knowledge, and from that we infer what he is. Having no means of knowing him directly or intuitively, we can judge the man only from his actions. What he is in private can be no criterion for public judgment; if it were, how could it be private? If, now, we always depend on the social forces exerted by an individual for our knowledge of him, how can we depend on our knowledge of what he is in himself for a knowledge of the society he helps to form? We may guess what an individual is in private, or may infer it from his social conduct; but never can what individuals are *per se* be the first factor in an estimate of their social force, since we know the individual only through this force. Therefore all we need know of persons in order to understand the society they form is the social energies which they exert in that society; and if we know these, which include all that the persons are to society, a knowledge of the individuals who exert them does not aid in the interpretation of the society. We therefore conclude that the fundamental study of sociology is that of the social forces, and of persons only as their possessors.

Through an analysis of the individual we learn how to form a correct estimate of his character so far as this is revealed by his social conduct. To say that a man is a capitalist or labourer is to take but one side of him, his economic force; yet that is a common way of classifying men, as if it expressed all in

them. A single force of the individual is taken for the individual himself. But the capitalist and labourer have a large number of interests and forces besides the economic. Some of the individual's energies may be weak and perverted, others strong and correct; and it would be wrong to judge him by the one or the other alone. Rousseau's treatment of his children is no test of his general social influence, just as his writings are no index of the treatment of his children. Social judgment of individuals is generally wrong, because based on some specific feature, not on all that pertains to the character. What the public sees of a man is but one side of the shield, and it may either be the worse or the better side.

In private a man, left to himself, is likely to give unhindered expression to himself; in public, however, under the influence of others, perhaps of a multitude, he cannot so fully be himself, but must be judged as subjected to the forces acting upon him. A sinner among saints and a saint among sinners would likely both be equally misjudged.

75. The result now reached puts sociology on the same general basis as the special social sciences and also the natural sciences. That part of individuals which is actually involved in the particular social science under consideration is always the object of inquiry. In economics the particular persons engaged in industrial pursuits need not be taken into account, but only their functions, such as that of capitalist, employer, and labourer; for in economics we have simply the working of the economic factor in production, exchange, distribution, and consumption. In politics and social ethics we have no sciences of persons, but of their political and ethical forces, and whatever is established respecting these applies to all persons in political and ethical relations. In natural science the natural forces are the objects of investigation. A description of nature or natural history requires an account of concrete objects; but that is different from natural science. In astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology,

etc., it is the forces at work which constitute the essence of the inquiry, the individual objects being regarded simply as their possessors. To seek causes and their laws means to inquire into forces and their modes of operation. By thus putting sociology on the same basis as the other sciences the hope is inspired that order and system will become possible.

Suppose that we knew all the plans of a government, say of France, and the exact force exerted by the government; the persons would be a matter of indifference so far as the conduct of the government is concerned. The course of events would have been the same if another than Napoleon had exerted exactly the same force. That only Napoleon could have exerted it is true; at the same time it is evident that nothing but his social force concerns us. (Appendix F.)

CHAPTER VI

EXTENT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TERM "SOCIETY"

76. Having found the social essence, we must now fix the limit of the application of the term "society" to human relations. In its most general sense society exists wherever social forces are exerted, that is, wherever individuals exert on each other a psychical influence. When we say that we do not want the society of a man, we mean that we do not want to be in the same social sphere with him, do not desire to interchange psychical energies with him. In society two or more persons live and act together in the same mental world—this is the germinal idea. Perhaps we refuse to affirm that two playmates form a society; yet between them essentially the same influence is exerted which constitutes the pith of all human association. The boy's society is, in fact, his playmate. Sociology cannot consider every form of association; it is enough to give the interpreting cause of all and then to place the stress on such as have most significance for humanity. From the overwhelming mass of social material whose commonplace character makes it scientifically unmeaning, the sociological explorer seeks to differentiate what is meaningful, in order to obtain the interpretations which are of most value.

77. A force in nature is somehow conditioned by every other force with which it comes in contact. Every chemical element exerts a modifying influence and is modified through its combination with other elements. In the movement of a star, or a mote in the sunbeam, there is a

combination of varied and complex co-operating and antagonising influences. In that wonderful social world which has risen definitely before us the action of the energies is similar. An individual's social power never acts alone; therefore its influence must be considered as affected by the energies of all the persons with which it comes in contact. Now there is a harmony which means rest, then co-operation, then conflict, all in endless interaction. This inextricable complexity and co-ordination make the analysis and comprehension of society so difficult. Frequently the final result alone is clear, the processes culminating in it being but partially known. Who can trace all the causes which evolved the Magna Charta in England and the Declaration of Independence in the United States? What goes on in Congress from the time a measure is proposed till the final action? What finds expression in speeches, resolutions, and amendments is insignificant compared with what takes place in the minds of the members. Even what finds expression is exceedingly complicated. The final action, the ripe fruit, is the culmination and summary of processes that seem endless in complexity. That subjective world of what the members think and feel and wish, is private, and therefore beyond investigation; only what they express becomes social and objective and subject to investigation.

What persons think and believe, hope and fear, desire and shrink from, is the germ of their social action, but underground, as it were, hid from others till it rises above the surface. What Moltke thinks and plans is private; it becomes social when he issues his commands to the army.

78. The nature of social action is the same, whether it proceed from an individual or a society. Merely as a doctrine the Emancipation Proclamation of Lincoln is not changed through adoption by the whole people. So soon as he makes it public it is as truly social as when hailed

by the nation as an expression of its sentiments. The resolution of an individual made social may be weaker than that of an organization, but that does not affect its inherent character as social. Bismarck's idea of German unity becomes a social force and the nation adopts it; but it is as truly social, though less extended, when only his colleagues adopt it as when it permeates the whole nation.

The above removes a fundamental error in the way of correctly interpreting social action. When the United States and England, or any two societies, influence each other it is readily recognised as social action; but it is not equally admitted that the action is social when two individuals influence each other, or when a person influences a society. Yet the character is exactly the same. Hamlet's Soliloquy is not social; but the balcony scene in *Romeo and Juliet* is, though but two persons are the actors. It is overlooked that through their speeches Demosthenes and Cicero exert social forces and that on these forces the decision of the Athenians and Romans, as societies, largely depends. The course of large bodies has special significance for history; but to ignore the agency of individuals in impelling them means to abandon the explanation of many of the causes which lead to social action.

While the action of individuals can be as truly social as that of societies, we can distinguish them. The action of societies is clearly distinguished from the social action of individuals by being designated as *associated* action. Social has a broader meaning and includes associated as limited to combinations formed by men.

We can trace the source of the error mentioned. What social means is not determined by its nature, but by its origin. What has a social origin, that is, in society, is pronounced social; but what takes place between two persons, though of the same nature, is regarded as not social, because it has an individual origin. It is over-

looked that nothing is social which has not somehow its origin in individuals.

What makes a problem social? The fact that it pertains to the relations of men to one another, not the fact that it pertains to the interrelation of societies. Men who act on each other solely as individuals may form an agreement, a compact, a contract, called social, of which agreement, compact, contract, a society is the effect, not the cause. There is social action within a society as well as by a society. The social elements, therefore, need not be societies, but may be the factors which constitute societies.

The error has fruitful influence in social literature. The New Testament, for instance, has been pronounced individualistic rather than social, because little attention is supposed to be paid to the action of societies on each other and to the theory of society. But is a precept which teaches a man his relation and duty to every other man individualistic rather than social, such as the Golden Rule? What is lacking to give a social character to the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"?

79. A general idea of what takes place in the interaction of the social forces can be given. Frequently simple communication takes place, one mind imparting to others some thought, some wish, or purpose. It consists of an exchange of views, as in ordinary conversation, of information, such as the press reports, and presents a common feature in instruction. Then, argument can be resorted to for the purpose of winning another to a particular view or promoting some cause. In the pulpit, on the platform, in legislative assemblies, in the councils of nations and even in private intercourse this is a prominent factor. A large part of literature aims to convince and persuade. Consensus, agreement, co-operation, is the aim,—to unite society on some proposition. It is often the essential

factor in deliberative bodies, and has a dominant part in shaping the policy of societies and the course of the world. The palaver of savages and the most momentous discussions of parliaments bear witness to its prevalence. When an agreement has been reached it must be formulated, often a difficult task. In the expressions chosen the consensus is to be put into a form that will embody most perfectly the views of all concerned. The effect on society at large must also be taken into account. A word, a comma, may become of vital importance. The next step is to make the conclusion reached operative, to put the theory into practice. A society wants to maintain and promote what it stands for. This can be accomplished by each member and by the association as a unit, or by special organs, such as committees. This involves that great world of means for the attainment of specific ends. The agencies employed depend on the character of the society, its power, its aim, and the material on which it is to act.

In these processes all societies and all the members are involved. To instruct, to convince and persuade, to unite the forces that have been won for the most effective execution of the purpose resolved on, are the three dominant factors in social life. Each is a sphere of great magnitude and includes infinite details. The three processes are not usually sharply separated. The teacher who instructs may seek to convince and persuade and likewise to lead to definite action; but for general outlines and practical purposes the distinctions are clear enough.

The creations of society can be similarly classified. Public opinion, which cannot be located because it is everywhere, has an influence on all these social factors. The law comes under the third head, the execution of a purpose; but the other two methods are involved in the establishment of the law. Some institutions—scientific, philosophical—are for instruction. Many schools are es-

established less for pure information than for the establishment of some doctrines, particularly ecclesiastical schools. Other institutions are intended to propagate or put into practice what has been accepted as established, such as missionary institutions, the Propaganda Fidei in Rome, and other establishments, by means of which society puts into practical operation its ideas, such as benevolent institutions.

That in all the processes mentioned above action and reaction are constant factors is self-evident. Often an important distinction prevails in individuals and societies in respect to these factors, some being predominantly productive, others chiefly receptive.

80. Usually associations and associated action are too distinctly marked to confound them with what is individual. Voluntary organisations are clearly defined as unions for associative action, such as associations of capitalists, labourers, scientists, or artists. Besides the element of choice, the *co-operative* factor is prominent. In an organisation what is individual can generally be distinguished from the associative elements. A member advocates a view and embodies it in a resolution; but the fact that no one but himself votes for the resolution shows that it is purely individual. Every sentiment adopted by the society is, of course, an expression of the association.

Unless organised for study or contemplation, an organisation means essentially a combination of *wills*, the intellect and feeling being accessories and means to the chosen end. It is instructive to examine how many organisations embody some idea or purpose which is regarded as final. Intellectual petrification rules. But even when the aim is not the conservation or propagation of something regarded as ultimate, the association may be a union of wills. In a scientific association the purpose of

the organisation is the will to pursue certain ends in common. For these reasons we can understand why some social investigators have viewed association as in the main an organisation of will.

An association is a union by means of separation; that is, the volitional, purposive, co-operative organisations separate their members, so far as the specific force exerted is concerned, from the rest of the world. An association becomes distinct by being differentiated from every other kind of human relationship. All concentration of forces involves their withdrawal from every place but the point of concentration.

The will in society is the focus of psychical concentration. Not that all social action, whether individual or associative, can be resolved into conscious volition; but in voluntary association the will to associate and carry out the purpose of association is, of course, dominant. In conscious individual action on other persons the will is the force of the personality through which intellect, desire, aspiration, and resolution are revealed. Perhaps the energy of the will is also the basis of a man's unconscious activity, but the discussion of this subject might involve a consideration of the views of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. There is no doubt that the direction given to the mental power by the will is the essential factor in determining the influence exerted by a man on his fellow-men. The will to communicate, to co-operate, to antagonise, is the will as objectified in voluntary associations. Society has been called "a union of wills." It is a concentration of will-power for the accomplishment of some desired end in proportion as the association is voluntary. Will acts on will, and this action and reaction cultivates the will. Organisation as a concentration of wills or of volitional energy is a suggestive definition of formal association, but not of all society.

In his system of philosophy Wundt holds that the will cannot be regarded as abstracted from social influence; it is developed in interaction with the wills of others in the family, various kinds of voluntary associations, and the State. The aim of this development is to establish a general organism of human wills. On the basis of this organism there is to be the utmost development of mental powers for the production of ideal values. He regards the will as the only object within or without him which the individual can fully consider as his own. The will is pronounced the essence of the mind, as that which is most truly real and valuable and the general basis of all mental activity. Society is a synthesis of wills for a specific end, and as such it is a concentration of the mental powers to the attainment of that end.

81. The society which cannot be included in the family, the Church, the State, and other purely voluntary and formal organisations, is often overlooked. Company is called society; it is not a mere aggregation of human beings, but has actual social intercourse. When we pronounce the society of a place good or bad, cultivated or illiterate, we surely do not mean formal organisations merely. Boston society, aside from its formal organisations, differs from that of New Orleans, the society of Paris from that of London. This usage of the term is significant, explains phenomena otherwise obscure, and enlarges the scope of sociology. Society not formally organised always stands for a relationship of social forces and a particular sphere of their interaction. *Social groups* are thus distinct from regular organisations. Their characteristics are frequently definite, as in a group of labourers or capitalists, of merchants or noblemen.

These groups are the laboratories in which much of the most important social work is done. They create and transmit language, manners, customs, proverbs, and traditions. Folk-lore is the product and possession of the folk. Formal organisations have a share in the task, but

rather as a part of the people in general than as separated from them. Often, in fact, they constitute but a fraction of society and have only a small share in the social products. Organised social action is necessarily limited, but the unorganised is coextensive with humanity. This action involves all human relations and pertains to all human interests.

Sociology, in considering the social groups as well as formal associations, includes in its scope the whole human family so far as it involves social relations. These relations exist wherever human beings come in contact and influence each other. The sociologist thus finds a sphere of investigation wherever the social forces of men interact, a sphere of energies which is all the more interesting and important because it embraces the highest and most effective powers of humanity.

Organisations are definite and stand out so prominently as societies that they are usually meant when society is mentioned. Unorganised social groups are not so definitely outlined, and for that reason are so generally overlooked as an integral part of human society. No social interpretation, however, is complete which neglects any sphere of social operation. Often the most important movements in society are due to unorganised social groups. Thus, certain social influences and tendencies are common among the foreigners of a city who congregate in the same region but have no formal organisations. In New York, Boston, Chicago, and other cities this social influence can be observed among the Germans, Scandinavians, and Irish. In elections they are apt to act as a unit, as much as if they were organised.

There is a sense in which humanity is a society irrespective of the immediate association or formal organisation of its various parts. Humanity is a society in the sense that throughout it the social forces are operative. What sociology, therefore,

establishes as pertaining to society or the interaction of the social forces it establishes respecting men wherever socially related. Humanity is not formally organised, but a great social group, constituted by individuals and societies, in which the human forces ceaselessly interact and produce social results.

The very terms "humanity," "the human race," "the human kingdom," "mankind," indicate that certain bonds are recognised as uniting all men. Expressions like "the human family" and "the brotherhood of man" make this still more evident. The kinship involved is psychical and does not depend on descent from one pair. Only the generic qualities are included in the above terms, all specific determinations being marks of more limited groups. In the essential qualities of humanity we find the conditions for a fellow-feeling; and wherever men meet, the possibility of society is given.

Even if some people are still separated from the rest of mankind, that does not take them out of the sphere of sociological inquiry. When Kane visited a small tribe of Esquimaux in Smith's Sound they are said to have been greatly surprised that they were not the only people on earth. Such instances, however, do not affect the fact that humanity is subject to the same general social principles.

82. Humanity as a society is so large a generalisation as to be peculiarly difficult of apprehension. Visible phenomena do not aid us, as in the case of formal organisations. The significance of the conception, however, becomes evident in the deeper contemplations of sociology. Not only are essentially the same forces at work in mankind, but the parts of humanity are becoming more intimately related. The movement and destiny of man seem to be growing in unity. Thus, there is an increasing importance in investigating whatever pertains to all human beings in their interrelations. We speak of social progress as the progress of humanity, and the social laws are the laws of humanity. The human family contains those

forces which create the great social products that are transmitted from age to age. Everywhere society is the educator of man and the repository of human thought and purpose. Why in this humanity the social differences are so great furnishes some of the most important problems for sociological inquiry.

That sociology somehow involves the whole of humanity is not new; but the explanation of the fact has not always been given. Sociology considers the millions of individuals in mankind only so far as possessors of the social forces. It considers humanity so far as actually associated, and so far as it involves the same social forces.

Comte speaks of humanity as a society. Crabbe defines society as indicating "that which is common to mankind." Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 126: "We may thus consider the race as forming what is called the social organism." The *Staatslexikon*, edited by Dr. A. Bruder, says, under *Gesellschaft*, that society, besides its limited senses, also means "human society, humanity as a totality developing historically according to special laws." Society thus includes, as we have seen, all who are subject to the same social influences. G. A. Lindner, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Gesellschaft*, p. 15, also includes humanity in human society: "Humanity according to its entire extent, as scattered over the world and throughout history, appears to us as a society, though its connection be loose."

In interpreting society by means of the social energies we do not inquire merely what they have already wrought and are now doing, but also into their inherent power; just as the chemist seeks to discover what his elements can do, as well as what they have done. Sociology as the science of the action and organisation of the social energies inquires into their actual working, their results, their potentiality and possibility, what they have realised and what they can realise.

83. The understanding of society requires an explanation of the relation of unorganised to definitely organised

association. As a rule, in unorganised society the same processes take place as in the organised, but more spontaneously, more wilfully. In a regular organisation some specific end is chosen and definite methods are adopted for its attainment. Organisations are forms of specialisation which require some degree of social development and bear the marks of the development attained. Only to a limited extent do the conditions for them exist in the primitive state; but now, with the deposits of past evolution and with present demands, they have become very numerous and important. The very rules and forms for definite organisations require experience and development.

In the unorganised social groups the individuals are more free. They move in an open field, while associations have fences. The individuals in a group count for what a voluntary estimate makes them, while in an association the office determines rank. A social group moves according to inclination and impulse, making a way for itself and using occasions as they arise; but organisations move along the track laid by the constitution and laws, in order to reach the goal fixed. Society unorganised is concerned about the general human interests or such as are uppermost, now one and then the other receiving most attention, while organisations move in grooves. Artists form an association to whose direct aim religious, political, and economic questions are foreign; but in unorganised society every question receives prominence according to the interest it excites, whether it be æsthetic, religious, political, or athletic. Parliament adjourns to attend the Derby, but London society goes without adjourning.

An important process leads from an unorganised condition to organisation. When marked differentiations, division of labour, competition, conflicting interests, appear, organisations spring up as the concentration and specialisation of certain energies. Perhaps a monopoly is the

aim. Organisations dominated by particular interests may seek to dominate these interests. In unorganised society, ferments, reforms, and revolution in sentiment take place without serious disturbance. No explosion is evident, because no limits are fixed which can be burst. With organisations it is different. Explosion shatters long-established bounds. The forms and laws of states are annulled in order to progress to better political institutions. The strain of a forward movement endangers an organisation in proportion as it is severely rigid, traditional, and conservative. Times come when what will not bend must break. That revolutions are not made, but come, means that the transforming energies work imperceptibly, not necessarily under the control of voluntary organisations. That revolutions come from below means that the explosive energy of the people, largely or wholly unorganised, is overthrowing the organisations with their established order.

The interaction between unorganised groups and formal associations is usually powerful, sometimes one and then the other being the more effective. The interaction is marked between organised and unorganised labour, being sometimes co-operative, at others antagonistic. Political parties depend largely on voters belonging to no party; the Church draws its increase from persons not affiliated with any church. In general, organisation means conservatism, certain principles being regarded as settled, and those adhering to them becoming more and more firmly rooted in them; while in free, unorganised society every subject can be more independently estimated and progress more readily promoted. The constant concentration of attention on the aim of the organisation cultivates the mind for that to which it is limited. Often the progressive factors in the unorganised mass are organised into combinations to overthrow the organisations opposed to progress.

Usually there is a marked difference between the products of organised and unorganised societies. The products of organisations are more formal and the result of deliberation, such as the laws of the State, the resolutions of Congress, the decisions and reports of ethical, religious, political, and industrial associations. To unorganised society belong such products of free intercourse as language, manners, proverbs, and the whole field of folk-lore.

Organisations are the sharply outlined hills and mountains which rise above the ordinary level of the social mass.

In general history, as in social groups, the whole personality is involved and gives free expression to its thought, feeling, and volition. For particular phases of society and for a specialisation and concentration of social forces, such as religion, politics, and æsthetics, we go to special classes and associations. This is especially the case in the higher stages of development, in which particular functions are concentrated in states, schools, churches, and other organisations. Sometimes the State undertakes the general management of social affairs, including religion, education, economics, and charities. Still more generally are all human interests concentrated in the family. The guilds of the Middle Ages, at least in their earlier stages, were also concerned about the general interests of the members. Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. i., p. 226, says that the brothers in the guilds were not united for specific purposes, as is the case with associations now, but for all interests, so that what concerned one was made the concern of all. "Brothers are not united for particular ends; their union affects the whole man and touches all parts of life." The bonds seem to have been similar to those of the family. Often, however, some particular occasion led to the union, and that then received special prominence; but the idea prevailed that the union involved all the interests of the members. In the case of these guilds we notice a process of specialisation by means of development, the ordinary course being from what is general to what is particular.

The distinction made above, dividing societies into definite organisations and unorganised social groups, is confirmed by various writers. Some, however, fail to apprehend it and recognise as societies only formally organised associations. As a consequence, they miss some of the deepest movements and most significant results of social action.

Sulzer, in the article already mentioned, frequently refers to unorganised and organised society. Carroll D. Wright, *Practical Sociology*, p. 87, says that society is honeycombed by social organisations and clubs, and refers to societies and clubs in distinction from "society at large."

84. That society is not fully self-conscious has already been intimated. Even with the modern development of its self-consciousness it is largely a mystery to itself. What it means, what it involves, what movements take place within it, what and how it receives, what it gives, and what results are produced thereby are rich in dark problems. It would be more reasonable to claim that all the processes which take place in the individual are familiar to him. Were society fully aware of its nature and operations, sociology could limit its inquiries to the content of the social consciousness; whereas now its mission is no less the development of this consciousness than the discovery of the mysteries of society.

The notion that society is necessarily self-conscious arises from its false limitation to specific organisations with a particular end and definite means, all voluntarily selected for the accomplishment of the chosen purpose. But we have just found that these constitute but a fraction of society. Even these associations, however, have depths of unconscious activity. When we come to such a product of society at large as language, can we imagine that it was developed intentionally and consciously? Of the millions who wrought on this great social product probably few knew what they were doing, and none knew the effect of what they did. The creation of language

required human intercourse, but neither organisation nor a clearly defined purpose. In creating manners, customs, rules, traditions, men in early times acted impulsively, without deliberation, guided by need, desire, and the suggestions of the occasion regardless of the permanent social effect. Primitive man laid foundations without thinking of the structures the ages would build on them. Even when results were planned the products were likely to differ from the intentions. The unintentional logic inherent in human affairs is one of the marvels of the universe. The wisest, even, does not know what he receives from society, and how much, through personal social effort, he contributes to the thoughts, customs, morals, and religion of his fellow-men.

In unorganised society, as intimated above, the unconscious processes are more common than in organisations. But even in social groups processes toward organisation may be at work. Sometimes the products of unorganised society take definite shape immediately. In an evening company certain manners prevail, certain expressions, certain rules, in which spontaneously the mind of the gathering reveals itself. The common spirit of a social group clothes itself with a body suited to its purposes. There are in an unorganised community unconscious processes of assimilation which promote uniformity and unity, so that thoughts, feelings, and purposes tend toward regularity and constancy. These processes manifest themselves in the streets, the homes, the grounds, the movements, and voices of the people. Frequently formal organisations only make more definite and conscious what long ago existed, but failed to receive recognition and specific purposive direction.

Tacitly, if not avowedly, numerous social discussions agree with Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 23: "Whatever else society is, it is a phenomenon of conscious association." The

above, however, shows that but a small part of society is "a phenomenon of conscious association." E. von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious* leaves no doubt that both private and social action falls largely below the level of consciousness. Even if we could measure definitely the initiative in social action, its effect would be wholly beyond our estimate. That in the literal sense society has no consciousness will be shown later.

H. Paul, *Principien der Sprachgeschichte*, 3d ed., p. 23, thinks that probably one of the most significant advances made by the new psychology is the knowledge "that a large part of the psychical activities are performed without clear consciousness, and that everything which was at any time in consciousness continues to be a factor in the unconscious activity."

85. A mental image of society, which is desirable, can be formed only in outline; the wonderful intricacy of the interactions which take place within it can be conceived only according to great types, not according to the endless variety of the social combinations and the phenomena produced by them. There are simple and compound societies, in each of which inestimable ferments and movements and interweaving of thought and feeling and volition occur. A simple society is an association whose social forces emanate directly from individuals, not from other associations. A local Shakespeare or Browning club is an example. In its purpose it is a unit, but in the pursuit of this aim by the members and in the results attained the diversity in the individual minds cannot be calculated. A compound society is composed of simple ones, as when different simple labour organisations in a city form a central labour union in the same city; these form a state association, the state associations a national one, and the different national ones an international association. All these differ respecting their units. In a simple labour association these exist in the members; in the central union of a city the units are the different local

associations; a state association has its units in the central unions; the national association, in the state associations; the international, in the national associations. The compounding increases with the number of associations represented.

Only in simple associations does each member represent himself; in all the rest the members represent the associations which send them. In churches and other organizations the same conditions exist. The United States is a unit of units. A state contains counties as its units; the units of counties are townships; the units of cities are wards. States are also divided into congressional, legislative, and judicial districts. Thus, in a nation we can pass from the simple to compound unions, step by step, until at last the United States, England, Germany, or France, stands distinctly before the mind as a unit of units. The arrangement is definite for political purposes, for electing the officials, for government, for taxation, for judicial and postal affairs. But this gives only one phase of society, the political. The members of a church may live in different townships, wards, counties, and even states. A university gathers its students from different parts of the nation, or even the world. A manufacturing establishment supplies various parts of the country and also other lands. Thus, within the simple and compound political societies, there are other combinations beyond computation, with infinite interactions and interlacings.

It is this complexity, this endless interlapping and overfolding of societies which makes a mental image of the exact social tissues and their intricate processes so difficult. It is a great skein inextricably entangled. Perhaps the best illustration is given by the chemical elements endlessly interworking in a universe which itself seems to us to be endless. Between a few persons whose energies form a simple society, through all the compounding and interacting of societies, including humanity as

found everywhere and at all times, we have a complication of social energies and associations, of which we can form a general conception, but no exhaustive notion.

86. A cosmos emerges to some extent from the chaos of details by means of classification. Taking associated humanity as the largest conception, we can make a general division of societies into organised states, and such tribes and peoples as are not yet organised into states. This division is clearer than into races (a biological rather than social division), because these are not distinctly enough marked, nor is there always direct union between those of the same race. The classification into states and peoples can again be divided into grades of culture, as savage, barbarian, semicivilised, civilised, and enlightened. Another classification of humanity is according to religions. There are also certain physical characteristics, such as continents, which can be made the basis of social divisions, as when we speak of European and American, Asiatic and African civilisations. All these classifications are, however, so general that each includes many varieties of society. In the most enlightened states, for instance, all grades of culture, from the savage up, may be found; and what social varieties exist in every continent! A more satisfactory result will be obtained when neither continent, nor state, nor race, nor any external condition is made the basis of classification, but when the social essence itself, as seen in the social forces, is made the ground of division.

Any city or community can teach us valuable lessons of the intricate and involved nature of society. In a city like New York or London the social groups and formal associations number many thousands; and however definite each may be when taken by itself, the problem baffles solution so soon as we attempt to form an idea of the relation of the societies to each other, of their interaction, and of the real, social energies at work in the totality.

Extend the inquiry to a state and nation, a continent and the world, and the impossibility of grasping the entire social actuality becomes evident.

A church, for instance, may have significance chiefly because it cultivates certain forces in its members. But it is also to be estimated as a social force in the community, acting on different groups and organisations. Every society must be viewed in the same light,—not merely what it is in itself and to its members, but to the total social organism and all its parts. An organisation or social group is always a centre from which the characteristic forces radiate in all directions. Where the societies are numerous the interaction of the social forces becomes so complicated as to make a definite conception extremely difficult, if not impossible.

87. The family and the State are only in part voluntary associations. The first is the fundamental society, the latter the culmination of a long process of development, and in many respects the most valuable form of organisation. In the social relation of husband and wife the voluntary factor varies with the degree of culture; but the children have no choice in the biological relation of the family, which is the basis of the social. States may, in later times, be the result of convention; but persons born into the state become subjects, or citizens, by the mere fact of birth. Much social action in the family and state is unconscious, perhaps as little desired as intended. The connection between the citizens may be chiefly formal; they can war with one another and even with the State. Often a unity of purpose is also lacking in the family, the connection being biological rather than social. To the scholars who have questioned whether the family and State ought to be reckoned as societies we answer: Their psychical interactions or the social factors can be clearly distinguished from the biological, and thus they must be considered as associations. But they are pe-

cular forms of association, involving both voluntary and involuntary elements. Only when society is taken exclusively in the sense of voluntary organisations can they, perhaps, be excluded.

88. Sociology in viewing society as continuous encounters profound problems. A family, a State, a Church, a voluntary association, and social groups have a past and future, as well as a present. An unbroken social nexus from age to age gives continuity to language, literature, folk-lore, and other psychical factors. Without this comprehensive and unifying conception we cannot understand the causative elements in the succession of social events. But the connections are not uniform. Some links are weak, others strong, and numerous foreign influences enter the process of development. Can we speak of German unity to-day as constituting the same state as the unity existing a thousand years ago? German states during these thousand years have been variously united and separated, so that no map and no history can give a full picture of what actually occurred. A society may be the same for ages according to some general principle, and in detail not the same for two successive days. Difficult as it is to grasp a society as a continuity, ever changing and yet ever the same, this conception is essential for social interpretation.

The social products, like the actual world of society which creates them, occupy a sphere of their own. Here I call attention only to the fact that as handed down from generation to generation these products constitute a bond of union altogether different from the biological connection.

89. Sociologists have been puzzled how to explain war as a social factor. So long as society means the union of individuals it cannot be done, for war means a destruction of individuals. In that case war must be classed as anti-

social or extra-social. The difficulty, however, vanishes when society is apprehended as existing wherever the social forces of individuals or societies interact. Then the action is social whether co-operative or antagonistic. It is the mental conflict between peoples which leads to physical conflict. Social antagonism is, in fact, an essential element in evolution and must be reckoned with in discussing social products. Violent conflicts often occur in organisations before a resolution is adopted. Men go to war because they think their principles or interests endangered. Their social forces do not co-operate and are not indifferent, but they clash; and the very antagonism makes the interaction intense. Debate, rivalry, competition, opposition, hatred, are in the same category as war; it may, indeed, be but their culmination. Such terms as "social antagonism," "social conflict," "social war," indicate that antagonistic movements are regarded as elements of society. We have no difficulty, then, in including war as a social factor. Men who exterminate one another are not united; but they may be subject to the same social influences and to the interaction of social forces. The orders of General Meade at Gettysburg reached the commanders of corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, and companies, and the soldiers in the ranks of the Union army. One thought, one desire, one purpose, dominated the whole and controlled the action.

Anti-social is used in various senses. A man may be anti-social because opposed to all society; or he may adhere closely to his family and a few companions, and be anti-social respecting others. There is an extensive realm between egotism and altruism, with endless degrees of social and anti-social characteristics. One may even be anti-social for social reasons, as the man who is at variance with the society of his time because he believes it to be in conflict with the supreme interests of humanity. He who is loyal to his own clique may be anti-social respecting other cliques. Thus, anti-social need not

mean that one is opposed to society itself, but only to certain kinds of society.

90. Let us now gather up some of the results attained, in order to prepare to investigate more fully all involved in human association. In determining the exact relation of individuals to one another in constituting society, we have found the social substance which everywhere underlies the social phenomena. Science as an investigation of causes always penetrates through the individual and visible objects to their inherent and expressed energies. Work is manifest, and it is the aim to discover the worker. Rational inquiry and scientific analysis thus lead from the perception of the senses to actual social interpretation. Sociology follows the course of every true science when it proceeds from the phenomena to the essence, and affirms that society is not seen but thought, a concept and not a percept. Persons continue to exist for our science, just as rocks for geology and plants for botany; but as mere individuals they belong to the individualistic sciences, not to sociology. Having apprehended society as a creation of the social energies of individuals, of their thoughts and feelings, their plans and purposes, we found valuable explanations of the use of the word "society." Society exists wherever the social forces interact, putting persons in the sphere of the same social influences.

Two persons mentally influencing each other can form a society, for instance a partnership, which is a certain kind of association. The most obvious societies are formal organisations with a definite end. But there is also unorganised society, or society in various processes of organisation, of which neither choice nor consciousness is the dominant characteristic. Throughout humanity certain social energies work which everywhere produce society. Thus, humanity is the sphere of sociological inquiry. Even if the peoples are but loosely connected,

yet there is some influence common to all, and it is probable that no people exists wholly outside of the influence of others. The entire discussion results in the general division into unorganised and organised society. Humanity itself comes under the head of unorganised social groups. Besides these groups, we can summarise society as consisting of the family, the State, the Church, and various voluntary organisations. Society is not a compound, but a product, of individuals, as dealing primarily with action, not with being, is not an abstraction in which individuals are eliminated. Society retains its personal elements in the energies which constitute it and have their source in persons. But sociology treats these persons, not as individuals, but as possessors of the social energies. When we speak of men associated or as belonging to society, we simply mean that they are so related that their mental energies interact and create society. Sociology, therefore, deals primarily with the social energies, their nature, their operation, and the product of their interaction, whether the product be harmony or conflict. The science of society is, therefore, the system of the social forces and their manifold activities and results. It seeks to interpret the social world, just as natural science seeks to interpret the natural universe.

91. Professor Fiamingo, of Italy, is unquestionably right in insisting that a social life separated from the biological and individual factors is inconceivable. The social life, as we have seen, is affected by all the physical conditions on which it depends, and by the body it uses in order to express itself and execute its designs. If we want to learn what society is as it makes history and transforms the world, we shall have to consider its essence or psychical factors in connection with all the means it adopts for making effective its aims. The mind of society must, therefore, be viewed in its relation to heredity, to the vital phenomena with which statistics usually deal, to soil and

climate and geography, and to all the agencies into which society puts its thought and feeling and purpose. In this social psychophysics we have the explanation of the marvellous transformations which social action has wrought in nature, subduing its forces and making of them instruments of man's will. The highways on the land and sea, the power of steam and electricity, the great institutions which are the marks and embodiments of civilisation, and all the features which have attended man on his march from savagery to enlightenment, bear witness to the efficiency and the progress of society. This enormous sphere of humanity's activity in all places and all times, including whatever most concerns and interests man on earth, cannot be exhaustively treated by any one science. Sociology, however, by emphasising the social essence, the causative social energies, recognises all that is related to this essence, and uses it, so far as necessary, to interpret society. Again referring to individual union of soul and body as typical of society, we behold in the social as well as the individual mind the directive power, the source of the determinations, movements, and results.

The statement of Fiamingo is found in *Zeitschrift fuer Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung*, vol. v., p. 321.

It is one of the chief problems of sociology to determine what must be added to biology and individual existences in order to create society.

CHAPTER VII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

92. After getting rid of the fiction that the individual is to society what the cell is to the human body, the problem of the relation of the individual to society remains to be solved. Alexander Herzen, the Russian author, pronounced it the most difficult problem of the nineteenth century. It is unsolvable on every theory which regards individuals as the social units; but the hope of solution becomes bright when the social units are found to consist of the social energies.

The difficulty of the question of the relation may be inferred from the diversity in the answers. The depth and breadth it involves are greater than is indicated by the radical conflict between individualism and socialism, anarchism and the State, egotism and altruism. The independence and worth of the personality, as well as the function and value of society, are at stake. What part has each in evolution, in creating language and laws, customs and ethics, religion and politics, art and philosophy? No mathematical equation will ever be found to give what of society is in the individual and what of the individual in society; but much is gained by learning that each is in the other, and therefore the two are inseparable. It is idle to ask whether the reflection of an object from a mirror is due to the object itself or the mirror, since both are necessary; but the function of each in the reflection presents a rational problem. The fact that the individual reflects society and society the individual should at least keep us from giving the sole credit to either.

93. Let us take the individual as an organism. This organism is composed of numerous forces, of which some are private and concern only the organism, while the rest are social and pertain to society. Which of the inestimable number shall be developed and made private or social is a problem which each, under the influence and in consideration of his environment, must solve for himself. The forces, always his own, are so many antennæ with which he touches objects for self solely, or he stretches them out to touch society, to receive impressions from it, to impress it, and help to make and mould it. Where is the Shakespeare club, after all the members have withdrawn their antennæ, or forces, which constituted the society? Society as a compound of forces has a large field which its antennæ can enter, and it must determine what energies shall be exerted, where, and how. An association composed of energies furnished by other societies, as an international labour organisation is composed by national organisations, is likewise a force which can be exerted in various directions. Thus, every association is governed and interpreted by its forces; but in every case the force is a manifestation of individuals. In no organisation is the individual exhaustively exploited as the cell is absorbed by the organism it helps to form.

94. By determining the function of the individual in the social nexus, his life becomes more definite, his personality more distinct and valuable, and his sociality can be made more effective. Where this function is not settled, persons are likely to drift when they should choose their way; they are apt to make undue claims for themselves, or associations arrogate unto themselves undue authority. Growing differentiation augments the complexity but also the importance of the problem. In simple and homogeneous society a man readily finds his place, which is essentially the same as that occupied by his fellows. But with the infinite variety and wealth of modern

life, where and how shall men touch and act on each other, what shall they communicate, what absorb? Now there are a thousand places that can be occupied where formerly one existed; hence it is so hard for a man to find his place, while in primitive times he was born into his calling. With a vast but indefinite social potentiality and possibility, what career shall be chosen, what power specialised? With the great multiplication of private and social interests, which deserves the preference? If there must be a sacrifice, which shall it be? If a conflict arises between the individual and society, who shall decide it? These questions indicate some of the weighty problems of this chapter.

95. Let us first classify the ordinary social relations in modern life. These, of course, differ according to personality, location, and conditions; but a general classification is possible. Under the heads given below, however, the subdivisions may be numerous.

The social relations are determined by:

1. *The Family, including the entire relationship.*
2. *The Neighbourhood.*
3. *The Affections and Passions.*
4. *Race and Rank.*
5. *Occupation and Economic Condition.*
6. *Intellectual and Æsthetic Preferences.*
7. *The State and Political Affiliations.*
8. *Religion and Ethics, the Character.*
9. *Altruistic, Sympathetic, and Charitable Spirit.*
10. *Recreative Purposes.*

The individual is at the centre from which the avenues of life radiate. His personality is the capital with which he starts. How and where shall he invest it? The possibilities seem endless. The difficult problem is to be settled which avenue shall be chosen, where the personality shall be placed and the forces exerted, what life shall be to itself and what energies given to society.

96. The individual is an *individuum*, a being which cannot be divided without destroying its essence. It is an entity which, however it may depend on others for its origin and continuance, has completeness in itself. It is an organism in which every part ministers to the whole and the whole ministers to every part. While the human being consists of body and soul, these can be taken separately only for purposes of intellectual specialisation. In itself the term "individual" involves nothing either social or anti-social; but with his endowments and social surroundings man starts with the conditions for sociability.

In an organism it is not only the character of the parts which must be taken into account, but also their relation to each other. This brings out an important distinction compared with inorganic substances. A piece of gold, for instance, can be divided into parts, each of which is a specimen of the original lump and no less truly gold. But no part can be taken from a human being and regarded as a specimen of the whole. Gold is not like an organism, which depends on the *relation* of parts. In the latter the organs are co-operative, so that when one is affected the whole organism sympathises. It is an entity formed by the co-operative union of parts. No organ can be severed and continue its functions; but every particle of gold is complete in itself and requires no organs to give expression to itself.

An animal has few social cells; its social forces are soon exploited. But man, with his inexhaustible intellectual realm, has an infinite sphere of objects and interests which can be made the nuclei of associations. Thirteen animals will eat together when food is provided, and all problems are solved when the hunger is appeased; but thirteen men, when their hunger is satisfied, will organise an association to determine the result if thirteen sit at the same table. Man has a universe of mental problems; but the animal is limited to a few problems whose solution is simple.

Let us suppose that the volumes of a great library could communicate with one another, each offering its contents to every other: that would give us some idea of the influence which each person in an enlightened community exerts and receives. The amount of influence which comes to each from the past and present is amazing; and what influence each can exert on the present and future is incalculable. Perhaps the influence of a million persons is condensed in a point—a word, a thought, an organisation, an institution, which are a concentration of the results of their labours. But who can conceive or analyse all the processes involved?

97. To retain, to express, and to realise himself most fully is the natural impulse of a human being. The culture of the personality is the only object under his supreme control and the condition for all efficiency. It is astonishing that this culture should ever have been suspected of being necessarily selfish. Among others, Goethe has been named as an example of devotion to self-culture as involving a neglect of the claims of society. There may, of course, be an attention to self which involves social neglect; but this selfishness pertains to other personal affairs more readily than to self-culture. Personal culture can be social as well as private, altruistic as truly as egotistic. The social as well as the selfish personality can be developed. No man is antisocial on account of eminent personal culture, unless this is itself perverted. The correct view makes selfishness the result of a lack of culture or of a false culture, and finds the remedy in the proper and complete development of self. The socialisation of a man involves no neglect or depreciation of the worth of his personality; but it involves the development of self as social energy. A healthy culture takes into account all the existing relations and thus gives the social energies their proper place as fully as the private. It is the highest individualisation which prepares for the most perfect socialisation; and the perfection of a person does

not mean perfection in isolation, but in the totality of his relations.

The education of the individual has been pronounced a modern ideal. What is there but the individual to be educated? The individual can, however, be educated as a private personality, which has been the dominant trend in individualism; or he can be educated as a social personality, which is the trend in modern communism. The true ideal involves the education of the whole man amid and for all his relations, the development of both the private and the social personality.

E. Curtius, *Alterthum und Gegenwart*, p. 159, states that the eminent philosophers of Greece called their science "the love of wisdom," because their philosophy was the result of an irresistible impulse to know, and served no external end. What they learned was to be no exclusive possession of a class; "they imparted it to others, as the sun streams out light, illuminating and warming the receptive minds." The Sophists, on the other hand, used their knowledge as a personal adornment, to serve their vanity, and to be communicated to others for pay.

98. The will to live may involve the will to make the utmost of the individual life. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the individual's utmost means devotion to selfishness. So long as there is no culture to lead a man beyond his selfish interests it is natural for conscious power to emanate from and revolve around a vulgar self. The impulses inherent in nature, immediate and imperative, begin and end with the satisfaction of some organic need. The uncultivated natural propensities do not recognise other persons as having value and deserving consideration. Until this is learned through social discipline the objects of the external and social world are esteemed as ministers to the constitutional impulses. Even affection is then selfish. As a man is, so far as made by nature, only himself, and is always nearest

himself, it seems a necessity of nature to regard his personal interests, theoretically and practically, as of supreme concern in the relations sustained to his fellows. Out of this apparent natural necessity he can be lifted only by wider experience and the culture and dominance of rational and ethical considerations. Social necessity and the affections are probably the first teachers of respect for others. The child, impelled solely by its wants, can have no knowledge of the character of other beings, to say nothing of regard for their claims. Its supposed recklessness and cruelty are due to its ignorance of value and property, and of the sensitiveness of other animate beings. It has no past accumulations and therefore lives and learns by experiment. Left to its own impulses and whims, a child cannot do otherwise than cultivate its selfish and self-regarding tendencies. By nature, the course of life, and ordinary training, a man learns to concern himself so exclusively for personal affairs as to consider others chiefly as sources of pleasure and pain. Under these circumstances it would require a miracle for a man to cherish for others as high a regard as for himself. To train him according to what he is in the totality of his relations means that he must be trained with a view to his social environment, to teach him a knowledge of and regard for society, and to cultivate his conscience for social duties. Every pursuit which makes self the sole end necessarily develops selfishness. In economics the competition for a livelihood or wealth gives dominance to the individualistic theory on the part of the successful ones, while those who fail are opposed to *laissez-faire*. Great popular movements which involve passion are apt to be self-regarding, guided by inclination, not by a full consideration of all the facts.

A man is supposed to understand his interests better than any one else, and for this reason it is held that their manage-

ment should be left to him. Often the supposition is false; but the argument based on it has been used to prevent social, and especially governmental, action with respect to economic affairs, even if these oppress large classes of a community. It is overlooked that many personal concerns involve social as well as private interests. How any one can buy or sell goods or labour without considering others who are involved in the transaction as much as the buyer or seller, can be accounted for only on the supposition of selfishness or of ignorance respecting the social relations. No despotism is more despicable than the tyranny exercised in the name of personal freedom which has no regard for others and is not restrained by custom and law. This lawless or anarchistic stage contains some of the worst phases of savage life, without the dominion of the social custom which restrains the savage.

The claim of the individual to control his affairs really rests on the fact that they concern him most. But if this reasoning is correct, then the management of social affairs must be left to society, because they concern it most. A different statement will bring out the truth. An individual has the supreme control of personal affairs so far as they are strictly private, that is, do not infringe on the rights of society; and society has the supreme control of its affairs so far as strictly social, that is, so far as they do not infringe on private rights. A just law aims to determine the sphere of each and the relation of the two spheres to each other.

99. For a century a tendency toward an extreme individualism has prevailed in the most advanced industrial nations of Europe and America. In economics it has manifested itself in the demand for free competition or *laissez-faire*; and in politics by an insistence on personal rights, without an equal insistence on social duty, and by an anarchism which defies the law or takes it into its own hand. The power of the Government was minimised in order to increase that of the individual. Practically, if not theoretically, society itself has been made subservient to individualistic ends. The aggrandisement on

the part of the individual at the expense of social claims is a marked feature of the history of the nineteenth century. To rob society and cheat the Government, if done without being caught by the law, has been admired as shrewdness, rather than blamed as injustice. There has been a reign of private rights at the expense of social rights. The reciprocity and interdependence of the two has been overlooked. Hence the trend as indicated by such common expressions as, "Each for himself"; "to each his own"; "my rights, my freedom." It has been overlooked that "God and my right" needs supplementing by "and a proper regard for the rights of others."

100. The growing appreciation of the value of the State, social studies, and a reaction against extreme individualism, have produced the opposite extreme, a communistic socialism, which regards society as the chief consideration, and the individual as having significance only as a social being. Whatever theoretical value may be attached to a person, the practical tendency is to absorb him into society. The common or social interests are made the premises from which inferences are drawn respecting the individual, unless his personality is simply ignored. The socialistic spirit extends both theoretically and practically beyond the domain of economics. Sometimes it is affirmed that all a man possesses comes from society, which, therefore, ought to possess him. It is overlooked that the opposite claim is equally valid: that society receives all it has from individuals and therefore belongs to them. Extreme communism forgets that what a person gets from society depends largely on himself, how he receives and elaborates it. He may also receive from nature and from society of the past, so that what he obtains from a particular part of existing society is far from accounting for *all* his possessions. What he owes to society at large is likely much greater than what he owes to any group or association. The family, the Church, the

State, and numerous voluntary associations may present rival claims. A large realm of debatable ground is thus seen to lie between extreme individualism and extreme socialism, which are such characteristic movements of the age.

Condorcet concentrated his attention on the masses, but was not concerned about the individuals who constitute them. He is typical of a large class of thinkers and writers who emphasise what is general and forget the particular factors. Their course is as rational as that of the man who, while anxious to have his whole family highly educated, nevertheless leaves each member in dense ignorance.

Bernheim calls attention to the fact that some sociologists want to get rid of personal peculiarities, trying to show that only what is general and common, belonging to masses of men, has significance for sociology. Typical of this class is Gumpłowicz, whom he quotes as saying: "On the altar of its science sociology sacrifices man; he sinks in sociology to an insignificant cipher . . . even the mightiest statesman is, for the view taken by the sociologist, only a blind tool in the invisible but omnipotent hand of his social group, which again follows only an irresistible social law of nature." Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, 2nd ed., p. 79. Such a sociology is not, however, an interpretation of society, but an arbitrary construction of the science according to a preconceived notion.

101. Men on a common level may be so indistinguishable that no injustice is done by treating them as but part of the same undifferentiated mass. The individual is lost in the herd. This movement in herds tends to maintain the existing level. When differences are developed society can only be the loser if it ignores the peculiarity of superior men. Society dooms itself to the valley if it dooms to solitude the man on the summit. A great personality reveals social possibilities and the

means of their realisation. The sage is a culmination of the past and a prophet of the future. He need not produce something itself new in order to initiate something new compared with his surroundings. Where do the forerunners of eras get their peculiarity? The epoch-makers are not altogether social products, because they offer what society lacks and is not even prepared to appreciate. They are original, creative minds; not that they create out of nothing, but, as artists create, out of the material at hand. Call it creation by combination, by putting old material into new relations, by evolution. Mind thus reveals its energy and supremacy. The creators make their own what others have wrought, infuse and stamp it with the raciness of their personality, develop it beyond preceding culminations, and return it to society in a peculiar and superior form. They think the great systems of philosophy, wrest from nature its laws, give new ideas and forms to art, mould states, establish and reform religions. Great men infuse their own spirit into society, which they lift to their summit, and thus make their personal products social possessions. Is the individual thinker unworthy of consideration who renders explicit what before was only implicit; who grows the flower into fruit; who gathers and constructs into a system the loose material which society leaves scattered and fragmentary? We indignantly reject the theory, lately advocated, that humanity exists for the sake of a few eminent men, and that the millions have their significance in that they, here and there, enable a genius to accomplish a task deemed superhuman. He who is greatest and has most to give is the oasis on which the needy in the desert have peculiar claims. The world's thinkers and scholars are, in one sense, social products, and, in another, social creators. This is as true of poets, musicians, sculptors, painters, and architects as of the scientific investigators in nature and mind. Indeed, the contem-

plation of the supremacy of the intellectual giants almost endangers our estimate of society. They reproduced, but in order to produce; they learned, in order to teach; they completed the past and then planted a new seed; they wrought into beautiful statues the rough blocks of marble lying about in society. Their work was more than an adaptation to their environment; they created a new environment to which society was henceforth to adapt itself. The man of ideas sees them in the environment of his own mind; and as he puts them into an objective form the world's wealth is increased. Besides initiatives and original work in elaboration and construction, there is also heroism which transcends the social level. Men can be unique, which means more than to be mere specimens. They are not lost as threads in a social web, but they spin new threads and weave new social webs.

Fundamental of extensive tendencies is the effort to lose mind in matter, the individual in society, and personal initiative in a social mechanism. Only in the periods of deepest slavery can it be overlooked that society produces men who become creators.

In one of his addresses Rümelin emphasises the power of initiative in individuals, as seen in art, science, and other departments. So far are they from being the creations of society that they are frequently or, in fact, usually, produced despite the prejudices of their contemporaries. It was not the genius of the German people which created Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Mozart, Frederick the Great; but these men, through their works, exalted the German people. His statement, that society can be led as well as be the leader, is one of the lessons of history.

Watt, with his steam-engine, is a good illustration of both the dependence and independence of men of mark, and of their relation to society. The steam-engine was the culmination and concentration of the results of ages of thought and effort, yet Watt was needed for this culmination and concentration. After its production it was necessary for society to

adopt it in order to give it abiding significance. In this and in all inventions we see both the individual and society, and it is robbery to deny the claims of either.

It is only because society is not understood and valued that more is not made of the individual's creative social art. Its material is living society, which is no less real than the canvas or marble on which Raphael and Michael Angelo worked. That no other material equals it in importance is beyond question. It can be wrought into forms as definite as the *Transfiguration* or the *David* in Florence. How little social creation is appreciated is illustrated by the fact that men lay stress on leaving bodily descendants to the world, but never think that ideas and other social factors often have their generations of power and tell for all time on society. These may be the best memorials a man can leave of himself. Perhaps the time is at hand when no other creations will be regarded as equal in grandeur to the social creations.

102. The individual and society are pitted against each other, when they are not even the factors immediately involved. The supposed conflict is removed when it is recognised that the energies which constitute society can, at the same time, be personal and social. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation is personal before it becomes social, and in becoming social it does not lose its personal character. To himself a man belongs in his private affairs and to society in social affairs, though even in exerting his social energies he may determine what they shall be. The person in his relation to society is limited, but so is the relation of society to him: each can set bounds to the sovereignty of the other. Society can command outward conformity, but not that of the mind and heart. There is a sanctuary of the personality which no other person is permitted to enter, and no coercion of the law can reach the conscience and faith. Anarchism is one thing as a private theory, but it concerns others also when expressed in word and deed. A religious faith which

upholds human sacrifices, such as the burning of widows, may be beyond social control, but the sacrifices themselves need not be tolerated. The action and reaction between the individual and society is thus clear. What is personal may strike its root and bear its fruit in society, while what is social may become a dominant factor in the individual life. It is one of the most weighty problems of sociology to determine what is private, what social, and where mutuality prevails.

Frequently the conflict is similar to that between the body and one of its members.

Encroachments between what is private and what social is now the rule; and with the spheres so indefinite it cannot be otherwise. Might is the only arbiter so long as neither in principle nor by law the sphere of each is fixed. It is said that in a despotism one is lord and all others must obey, but that in a republic all are lords, and therefore each lords it over others according to his power.

103. History is a movement of harmony and conflict between individuals, between individuals and society, and between societies. Ages themselves are largely characterised by the sides they take in the movement. Now one society is uppermost, then another; then an individual or a few persons gain the ascendancy. Were society as the sum of its persons we should always find the highest social development simultaneous with the highest individual development. This, however, is not the case. Why does conflict between individuals and society occur? Because the sum of the former is not equal to the latter. Sometimes the social organisation is strong and the individuals are weak, as when the organisation is imposed by a strong government; in periods of individualism the individual is cherished and the organisation neglected or else made individualistic in aim. Weak persons require a strong government, while strong ones may manage their

own affairs. In Russia the Imperial Government and village communities, the *Mir*, regulate many things for the people which in the United States are left to the option of individuals. Modern society has grown in self-consciousness, and this has increased the problems and the chaos. For many individual and social relations the rule has not been found, and this conviction is oppressive. Where a law has not been established questions of right are settled arbitrarily; and where the conquered or governed acquiesce the obedience may be taken as a recognition of rightful authority.

Theoretically, the rule, based on the distinction between private and social forces, may be regarded as final, that private interests shall be left to private control and public interests to public control. The problem is not that of the individual *or* society, but of the individual *and* society. A man is not a drop in the sea called society; nor is he a wave which rises on the surface and then is lost again in the sea. In proportion as his personality unfolds he is *sui generis*, a marked individuality, qualitatively differentiated from his social surroundings by his distinct peculiarity; and only when he is deprived of personal culture can socialisation reduce him to a social machine.

In a perfect society each individual would give of himself what is due to the social organism, and all would consign to each whatever is purely private. Every tree must do its own growing; but this it can do best if other trees do not interfere with its growth. Were the trees human beings they might so unite their forces as to prevent interference, to establish the best conditions for all, and help each other. All the members of an economic association have a share in its welfare; and a member who pits himself against the association must be outside of it or else he is involved in that against which he pits himself. The man who in an act of patriotism dies for his country does not sacrifice himself for something

foreign to him, but for *his* country and for institutions in which he has a part. Compared with his public interests which are involved, his private affairs may seem insignificant; indeed, their value may depend on conserving the public interests. He, therefore, sacrifices himself for his affections, convictions, and relations, and for all involved in them. In such sacrifice the patriot gives himself, not merely a particular force of himself, *for* society, not *to* society.

The social relations are complicated by differences in culture, rank, and social position. So strong is the temptation to domineer over others that it is almost irresistible where the power to do so exists. Coercion is apt to be attempted where persuasion alone is proper. It is the plea of every tyrant that he knows better than his fellow-men what is for their good, and so he attempts to force his views and arrangements on them. If one man has the right to determine the liberty and welfare of others, even of a whole people, he being the judge, why should not every other man, he being the judge, make the same claim? It is a supposition which would set every man against his fellows and make society impossible.

104. The prevalent theory that a man's liberty is curtailed by entering society needs revision. He changes his conditions, his relations, when he abandons his isolation, and therefore he has no right to act as if still isolated. But with his personal freedom and private rights society can interfere only if it denies its own character and trespasses on a realm outside of its sphere. It is to the best interest of society to conserve and develop all true personal freedom and prevent its encroachment on public affairs. The realm of individual freedom is limited to the private forces, and to the social forces so far as private (so far as exercised by the individual himself). Thus, society may solicit the exercise of more social power, but must

leave the exercise itself to the individual. Intimately connected with personal freedom is the development of individuality. Social conformity cannot be made the limit of individual development. Society itself is deeply interested in the culture of individuality and the rights of the personality. This is evident from the fact that the social forces inhere in individuals and their character depends on their possessors. But if the forces of individuals are to be of social value they must be developed and exercised socially. A man of great power using his energies for private and selfish ends is not a social force. But if he use his power socially it is important that it have individuality. In case he possesses only what others have he may add quantity to what already exists in superabundance; but if he possesses what others lack, his peculiarity may contribute something of special value, a new ferment, an impulse to needed variety. Thus the stagnation of a false conservatism may be overcome, a new inspiration and new direction given to thought, and valuable social types created.

Peace may be death; war, creative and constructive. Perhaps the antagonism of the individual to society is fully as frequently demanded in the name of progress as is social conformity. A strong individuality is a protest against the tendency to reduce all persons to a common level and an encouragement to social discrimination and development. What qualitative value is a man to a community who thinks, feels, purposes like his surroundings, who has no distinctive characteristics, no valuable peculiarity? Why care for the stone of a common quarry if a thousand others like it are obtainable? Social vulgarity demands that men be wound up by society and run in social grooves, but the strong man wants a voice as to how he is wound up and in what grooves he shall run. Men are distinguished because they have something *distinct* from the mass.

Lilienfeld, *Die menschliche Gesellschaft*, vol. i., p. 149: "Schelling called life a striving after individualisation. This is perfectly correct, for no body, no organism represents an absolute individuality, but only a less or greater striving after individuality, a striving which reveals itself likewise in human society."

105. It is self-evident that the social force of an individual is independent only so long as its action does not depend on the forces of other persons. Its effect on others depends on their response. All social action is a venture. Even that of a despot is liable to opposition. The most gifted genius and the strongest personality find limitations to their influence in the environment, the community, the Church, the State, and the world. How absolutely alone a man usually stands in his estimate of himself! That estimate is a private affair. What an individual offers to others is one thing, but quite another what the others accept and thus make the offer into a gift. The slight pressure of a seal leaves an impression on wax, but none on a stone.

Many a tragedy in history here finds an explanation. Men are misunderstood, misinterpreted, taken for what they are not; and they actually exert an influence the opposite of that intended. Each man is a mirror, and he judges others as he sees them reflected from this mirror. The social prominence of mediocre men and the obscurity of superior minds present significant rather than difficult problems. The solution is found in the character of those who estimate them.

Both in biography and history it is an interesting question, What determines the private and social life and influence of persons? Often circumstances seem to have more to do with the matter than either character or ability. Some by their very callings are made public characters, while others shrink from the public gaze.

In his *Memoirs* Prince Metternich says: "This narrative

shows that from my earliest youth to the thirty-sixth year of a laborious ministry, when I write these lines, I have not lived an hour to myself." He tried to put his ideas into empires and to shape the destiny of Europe. How different from such a life that of the student, who may, or may not, succeed in influencing society! Some do not even reveal themselves to friends. It is said of the poet Gray, "He never spoke out." A friend pronounced Gray's life a sealed book. "He never would talk of himself, never would allow me to speak to him of his poetry. If I quoted lines of his to him, he kept silence like an obstinate child. I said to him sometimes, 'Will you have the goodness to give me an answer?' But not a word issued from his lips." How much may society have lost by knowing him scarcely at all, except through that creation of genius, *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*? And who can tell whether the world would have been better or worse if Metternich's life had been as private as Gray's?

106. Whatever appeals directly to the senses makes an impression of definiteness and reality which is rarely attained by objects that are merely thought. We have seen how this distinction affects our notion of society. Especially where thought is little developed do we behold a tendency to make society tangible. Where discriminating analysis and rational insight are lacking, society is commonly spoken of as if a thing by itself, with an independent existence. [Society is supposed to be a real substance, because we say that it acts and moves, rejoices and suffers, just as we do of a tree that it grows. But we have seen that it is not a being as a man is, that it is no entity, nothing whose ability of existence is in itself. Society is not a centre of forces which have their origin in society, but their source is in persons. It has no existence until persons create this centre of forces; and if you take away these persons and destroy that relation through which they influence each other, then, of course, the society constituted by this relation also ceases.

Where is the association after the death of the members? Society is no more an independent being than a centre of gravity is, or a focus in which rays of light are concentrated. The focus can as truly exist after the lights whence the rays come are removed, as society can after the persons whose energies constitute it are gone. An association implies a more intimate relation of persons than a mere concourse of people; but an association no more constitutes a new personality or an independent being than does an audience listening to an address. A new mind or new soul is no more created by the psychical contact involved in association than by the physical contact or contiguity in a mere congregation of people.

Perhaps no other conception is more in the way of the comprehension of the true nature of society than the view that it is somehow an independent substance. Numerous expressions, if taken literally, imply that society is an entity. That it consists of a relation of persons, a relation involving an acting on each other or together, is more difficult to grasp, but the only true conception.

W. S. Lilly, in *Chapters on European History*, vol. ii., p. 239, furnishes an illustration of the confusion prevailing on social subjects. He pronounces a nation "a real and organic entity." "It is a body politic, with a life of its own, independent of the lives of the individuals who compose it, vivified by law, which is, in a true sense, its soul, and bearing to its constituent human atoms much the same relation as that which is borne by a man to the fleeting particles in succession vitally united to him. The individuals perish, but the nation lives; endowed, indeed, with a kind of immortality, in which they share." A state composed of individuals, yet independent of their lives! Equally significant is it that Mr. Lilly sees no other alternative to his theory than that of Rousseau: "a fortuitous congeries of unrelated human units mechanically kept together." The latter is equal to Mr. Spencer's "social aggregation,"—as if mere aggregation ever could be social!

CHAPTER VIII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY (*Continued*)

107. The common designation of society as an organism serves admirably, when taken figuratively without straining the figure, to describe valuable social characteristics. But when taken literally, individuals are consciously or unconsciously regarded as social organs, thus wholly subordinating them to society. They can, in a certain sense, be called organs; but neither do they exist wholly for, nor are they controlled by, the organism. They have directive powers of their own and also possess functions totally different from those of social organs. So far as men make society they create the social organism; but they can also represent and express this organism, and in this capacity can be called social organs. Important personal functions, however, not involved in the social organism have already been considered. A man can isolate himself or change his social relations, thus proving that he is not the eye or hand of any associated body. Even as a representative or agent of a society, he is not like a physical organ; his representative capacity always depends on his own conception and volition. As an organ of society he has a mind and will of his own. A representative cannot but represent himself as well as others; he is directed by others, yet self-directive; he is an organ of a peculiar kind and something besides; as a person, not a machine, he cannot be turned as a crank or by a crank; he acts for others, yet his social action is personal action. The whole story is told by

the statement that *he* acts for society.* Instead of permitting an association to act through him as its organ, he can oppose the will of the association. Then, an association can be the organ of an individual as truly as he can be the organ of an association.

It is thus evident that a man who is a person, not a thing, cannot be to an association what a limb is to a tree. When Talleyrand represents France in a diplomatic capacity, Talleyrand is a prominent factor in the representation. Napoleon, the Consul of France, changes France into an empire and makes himself emperor. Thus even in a figurative sense the use of organism for society is limited. Organisms differ and it may be doubtful to what kind the reference is made. It is impossible for a physical organism to interpret society, which is psychical. When a writer affirms that "society is an organism," and then infers that "societies must conform to the general laws which direct the evolution of form, and govern the changes and transformations of every organism," we have a sample of the mistakes made by treating society as literally an organism.

Using "social organism" in a figurative sense in these pages, we indicate thereby the intimate relation of the social forces, their interaction and interdependence. But as a psychical organism society goes to psychology rather than to physics for its interpretations. A direct study of society makes clear what biological analogy often confuses.

More striking evidence will be given later to show that in its working society is in important respects altogether different from an organism. Thought and feeling and volition are neither communicated nor transmitted organically or by a vital process, such as that which takes place in the body. The distinction to be made between an organism and society is the same as that between physical and psychical action.

A reaction has been produced by the absurdities to which the conception of society as an organism has led. The second edition of Schaeffle's *Bau und Leben des socialen Koerpers* abandons many of the analogies used in the first to illustrate society by reference to an organism. The very title, *Structure and Life of the Social Body*, is, however, liable to mislead. Some writers have made themselves and their subject ridiculous by the extent to which they have carried the analogy.

At the International Institute of Sociology, Paris, 1897, the theory of society as an organism was defended by Novicow and Lilienfeld, and opposed by Tarde, C. de Kranz, L. Stein, René Worms, Steinmetz, Starcke, Garofalo, Limousin, Kareiev, and Espinas. See *Annales de l'Institut International de Sociologie*, 1897, published in 1898. Tarde, *Études de Psychologie Sociale*, p. 8, claims that in the thorough discussion of the question, the theory that society is an organism was completely overthrown—"et s'est terminée par la déroute complète de l'organisme social." The recent literature on the subject justifies the inference that the theory is now generally abandoned.

Paul von Lilienfeld, one of the most persistent advocates of the biological method in sociology, really abandons this method in *Zur Vertheidigung der organischen Methode in der Sociologie*, pp. 49-50. Here he states explicitly that society is not an organism, but only in some points analogous to it. The charge is false, he says, that those who insist on treating society as an organism, just as a living body is treated by biology, identify the social organism with the natural organism. "The establishment of an analogy does not imply identification, but only indicates certain degrees of likeness between the social and the natural processes."

Mackenzie, *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, pp. 137-138, says: "It is in general very easy and very useless, the work of analogy. . . . After we have exhausted the likenesses we come upon the unlikenesses; and these are apt to form the larger class of the two. In the case of human society, for instance, while it is easy to see that in many respects it conducts itself like a living thing, it is equally easy to see that in other respects it does not."

For a discussion of "The Social Organism," see a paper on that subject by Henry Jones, in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, edited by Seth and Haldane.

108. The individual is an organism consisting of different parts, atoms, molecules, and cells; why does not the same apply to society? The connection of parts in the individual and society, and the results of the connection, differ. The individual has a consciousness, but society has none. That society cannot literally have a mind, consciousness, conscience, heart, and will ought to be axiomatic; yet, without explanation, these terms are constantly used as if expressive of social realities. It is likewise implied by designating society as an organism. The impression is thus made that in some indefinable, mystical sense, a social mind exists. Congress has no mind. It passes a bill which is called the mind or will of Congress, and therefore Congress must, of course, have a mind! But what are the facts? A bill is brought before Congress by an individual; it is reported by a committee consisting of individuals; it is discussed by individuals; it is passed by a majority composed of individual members; and what is called the *mind* or *will* of Congress is simply the conclusion reached by the votes of the members. A central mind or will composed or compounded of the separate minds and wills of the members is inconceivable; it is only meant that the individual minds have come to an agreement. A corporation has no soul; neither has a church, however many souls are in some way involved. Where is the seat of the soul of a society and how does it act? Has it a brain? This analysis reduces to their real sense the figures, abstractions, and myths, so often taken, perhaps unconsciously, for realities. Society cannot think, feel, or will, which are solely functions of individuals. What we call the social consciousness means the consciousness common to

individuals in society or the consciousness of individuals respecting society. In universities, academies, libraries, laboratories, it is always the individual that studies and investigates, makes discoveries and inventions. The world's thought is nothing but the thought of the persons in the world. Every contribution ever made to language or intellect or feeling or laws had a person or persons as its source. Every initiative in progress comes from individuals. Not, however, as separated, but as united in action. It is in this "united in action," namely, in purpose and will as the executives of thought and feeling, that society exists as a reality distinct from mere individuals. In this united action the concentration of the powers of great numbers takes place; hence the marvellous force of social activity. Think of the might of an Alexander, a Frederick the Great, Napoleon, or Moltke, when backed by all the resources of a people and using the most effective implements of war! Yet in war we have but one of the many phases of social energy. The whole mental and material force of the world is put under contribution to accomplish the purposes of society.

The union of individual energies for social effect is illustrated by the music of an orchestra. There is in this music nothing but the sounds of the various instruments. Not, however, the sound of each instrument by itself, but such a blending of all as to produce unison. If each member of a chorus sings his part while separated from the rest all the sounds are produced, but there is no chorus. The relations of the sounds to each other is essential. Natural forces in combination act differently from the same in isolation. An idea in a single mind does not work in the same way as when in society it interacts with the thoughts of others, ferments, agitates, and compounds the energies of many minds. The thoughts of men blend in associations, and the action taken or the resolution adopted is the result of this blending. It is

like the separate letters of the alphabet which, by proper union, form the whole world of literature. The vote of an individual is his own, but in it are involved the influences exerted by others; and as he votes with others his vote tells on the social result.

Social action, if involving agreement, can be called the consensus of individuals in thought, feeling, volition. Men never think collectively, but individually, though under the influence of others; but by united action the result becomes composite. The resolution of one man is in itself the same as when adopted by millions; but in one case it is backed only by one will and in the other by the wills of millions. That murder shall be punished by death has no social significance if a private resolution; but let a nation adopt it, so that it becomes social, how different!

Sociological literature abounds in illustrations of the confusion occasioned by a literal treatment of society as if it were an individual and engaged in collective thinking. A typical example is given by George W. Walthew in *The Philosophy of Government*, pp. 40-41, where he treats society as an entity. He has no conception of the social forces as the social essence, and so sees in society a sum of individuals. He declares that every grouping of men becomes at once a unity with a soul or intelligence of its own. This is not at all the sum of the souls or intelligence of the individuals composing the group, and yet it partakes of them and is coloured by them. "It is, so to speak, a common soul—a communal soul. . . . A city has a consciousness of its own, so a State, and so a nation. There is, in very truth, a national soul which partakes of and is coloured by the souls of all the individuals composing the nation, but which is yet not merely the sum of those souls. It is, so to speak, an entity, a thing by itself, and has its own necessities, its own desires; it is progressing along the line of its own development and is shaping its own life and seeking its own proper growth." Such language makes it difficult to realise

that a State or nation is a personality only as a legal fiction. A more correct view is given by Lexis, in Elster's *Woerterbuch der Volkswirthschaft*, article "Soziologie," where he says: "Human society is not a real organism in the zoölogical sense, . . . human beings do not act like cells in their relations to each other. The reasons, among others, are such as these: they lack the severe unity which controls *all* the parts, and by means of which these parts constantly stand in intimate relation of interaction, so that every manifestation of life is conditioned by the united action of *every* part and in turn affects every part." The social relations of men differ from the physical, chemical, and physiological forces found in the relation of the cells of an organism, but are, instead, psychological, being manifestations of the intellect, heart, and will, involving problems of need and satisfaction, of pleasure and pain, of love and hatred. Since these factors dominate society, in contrast with those which constitute an organism, one of the chief questions in sociology is: How, with the freedom found in thought, feeling, and action, it is possible to obtain regularity (unity or uniformity) in the social movement of the masses. "If you remove from the social relations the psychological and conscious elements, then sociology loses the very thing which can make it a peculiar and independent science."

"Spiritual content is actual in the consciousness of the individual alone; there are no thoughts which think themselves, no language which has existed except in the speech of the individual, no belief and no science which has shone of itself like a universal sun above the heads of individuals, no constitution which has existed elsewhere than in the consciousness, the will, the feeling of duty or fear, of the particular citizen." —Sigwart, *Logic*, vol. ii., p. 447.

109. Collective thinking, then, is only a figure of speech, and we cannot expect thought anywhere except in the individual mind. There may be forty thinkers who constitute the forty "Immortals" of the French Academy; but besides these forty we look in vain for a thought in the French Academy. Class thinking, class feeling,

class prejudice, are the thinking, feeling, and prejudice of the individuals in the class. They are the characteristics of those who constitute the class. Outside of the persons who constitute the public there is no public opinion or public sentiment. Society, the people, the public, the masses, are continually spoken of as if independent beings or substances whose energy exists in themselves, while they are nothing and can do nothing except through the energy contributed to them by individuals. We call a community enlightened, good, and healthy; but where, aside from the persons in the community, are the enlightenment, the goodness, and the health? We thus learn that all that is thought, felt, and willed in humanity pertains solely to individuals. At the same time the thoughts, feelings, and volitions of the individuals are, by means of communication, so blended and interwoven that in the product all the individuals have a share. Societies are formed by men who are assimilated by their mental contents. It is by the interaction of the mental forces of individuals that those social phenomena are created which fill us with astonishment. It thus becomes clearer how there can be individual action which is not social, including all that the individual does without communicating it; but that there can be no social action which is not at the same time individual.

It has been said truthfully that society, being no independent being or entity, cannot be happy. Its happiness must be sought in its members. General happiness and public welfare are vague abstractions which become definite and concrete when we interpret them to mean the happiness and welfare which are actual possessions of individuals. "Germany and England cannot experience happiness, but only Germans and Englishmen."

Much that H. Paul says in his valuable *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, 3rd ed., bears on the above discussion. "In

the development of language, it seems to me that everything depends on the interaction of individuals on one another." All purely psychical interaction takes place in the soul of the individual. "The communication of souls with each other is only indirect, by the use of physical means." Since there is no direct psychical intercourse, no thought can pass as a thought from mind to mind, but each mind constructs its own thoughts. What one mind expresses in the form of sound, gesture, or in some other physical way, another interprets, and thus it forms its own thought. It might be called reproduction, but every mind must do the work of reproducing for itself. What he says of language applies to social action generally: "Every creation of language is always the sole work of an individual. Several persons can create the same thing; but this does not change the act of creating, nor does it change the product. The great uniformity of all linguistic processes in different individuals is the essential basis for an exact scientific knowledge of these processes." He thinks the following problems peculiar to the science of culture in distinction from natural science: "To show how the interaction between individuals takes place, what the relation of the individual is to the totality, receiving and giving, determined and determining, and how the younger generation becomes the heir of the older." Pp. 7, 12-13.

When we speak of the mind, consciousness, and will of society, it will be understood that these terms are used figuratively.

110. This reduction of social action to individual action is so simple as to be surprising. It seems that there must be something besides to account for society and its wonderful achievements. But no investigation or analysis reveals anything else. This union of the individual energies constitutes the combined force of humanity and is sufficient to account for the results attained by social action. The fear that somehow society will be lost in the individual, or at least suffer loss, is probably the most serious difficulty in the way of the acceptance of this

view. But that fear is groundless. Society as force is the most real and most energetic conception: it meets all the demands and solves problems otherwise unsolvable. By thus relating, combining, compounding, and directing to specific ends the energies actually deposited in humanity, we not only have society in the most realistic and most effective sense, but also conserve the individual and put him into the right relation to his fellow-men.

Wherever there seems to be co-operative or collective thinking by society instead of individuals, the investigator has only to make the proper analysis in order to discover the real facts in the case. From premises given socially and from the results of ages of deliberation the logic of the individual mind must draw the inferences. By a thought or movement which is said to be in the air, we simply mean that it is a common characteristic of many minds. Newton and Leibnitz, Darwin and Wallace, may have the same thought, in different stages of development, at the same time; or a number of persons may elaborate it simultaneously, as in the case of the conservation of energy; or different men lay claim to the same invention. Then the thought or invention exists implicitly in society or in a number of minds, and needs only the individual to evolve it so as to become explicit. On the same social basis this evolution may be undertaken independently by a number of persons. Thus the thinker completes what others began, and the product, as seen above, is his and yet theirs. All humanity is involved in this co-operative work. What is social is individualised, and what is individualised is socialised. It is said of Herder that he wanted to assimilate all knowledge, and that all he assimilated became Herder; yet he was called the apostle of humanity, who desired to make others partakers of all he had assimilated and elaborated.

What is personal is modified when it becomes a social energy, and what is social is modified when appropriated

by the individual. Personal quality tells on the reception. Herbart says that persons who view the same object or hear the same sentence have the same perception, but not the same apperception—each apprehends and judges according to the quality and content of his mind. Socrates apprehended the thought of Athens in his peculiar way, so that it was not the same to any one else. The thought of Plato undergoes endless transformations in passing to his disciples and then, in history, to the enlightened world. Could he have recognised himself in his commentators? The peculiar light of each mind is the light in which all objects are seen. Each thinks the thought of Plato in his own thought. A musician puts his own individuality into the composition of Beethoven which he plays, Can any actor play Hamlet as Shakespeare would have done? A man is made by society and he makes himself; he makes society and society makes itself. He is socialised and society is individualised, yet he never ceases to be an individual, just as society never ceases to be society.

The fact that collective thinking is impossible explains why large bodies are apt to be unwieldy. Usually they assign much of their work to a committee or an individual in order to get it done. Gibbon tells us in the eighth chapter of his history that Artaxerxes, in order to end the dispute of the seventy sects who fought over the meaning of the Zendavesta, called a general council of the Magi of his dominions. On the appointed day eighty thousand appeared. "But as the debates of so tumultuous an assembly could not have been directed by the authority of reason or influenced by the art of policy, the Persian synod was reduced, by successive operations, to forty thousand, to four thousand, to four hundred, to forty, and at last to seven Magi, the most respected for their learning and piety." But even these did not fix the faith of Zoroaster. This was done by one of their number, to whom they administered a soporiferous wine. After a long and profound sleep,

he related his journey to heaven, his conference with Deity, and thus settled all disputes.

III. All influence on society is thus reduced to influence on individuals. To say that a nation is governed by law means that the citizens are thus governed. The influence of nature on society is always on individuals, never on a community as a totality. Nature affects the possibilities, health, occupation, and living of persons, and through them the economic, intellectual, moral, and religious character of the community. A fatal epidemic would be harmless if a *city* took it but every one in the city escaped it. India has no famine except in the case of its starving inhabitants. In this way we pass from common and misleading abstractions to concrete reality. There is no social education except through individuals; but in their case social education may have a valuable meaning. The education of an individual may be selfish, not social. Social education means that persons are educated for society so as to sustain the right social relations and perform social duties.

It is therefore impossible ever to sever society from individuals and to make claims for society in which the individuals have no share. The illustrations are co-extensive with human association. The uprising of a people can only be the uprising of those who constitute the people. It would be impossible to find the piety of a church anywhere but in its members, or the patriotism of a country anywhere but in its citizens, or the valour of an army outside of the soldiers, or the scholarship of a university outside of its teachers and students. All this becomes self-evident when society is apprehended as composed of the energies of individuals, and that by taking away these energies nothing is left that can be called society. It is only by conjuring up a mystical and mythical substance or entity, called society, that individuals and

their energies can be dispensed with in social interpretation.

112. But do not societies act on each other? Yes; but how? The House of Representatives in the United States passes a bill and the Senate approves the same. Have we not in this way a direct action of one society on another? The action of the House expresses the will of the majority, of individuals; when read to the Senate it affects the individual members, no two exactly alike. The approval of the Senate means that the majority adopt it—again the action of individuals. A society that influences millions can never do it otherwise than as individuals. No number of persons can be merged into one literal body or be affected collectively as one soul. A nation of fifty millions is affected in exact proportion as the fifty million persons are influenced, and in no other way. Thus a former conclusion is confirmed,—that all social action is that of individuals on each other, though the individuals may be so related as to agree and act together.

113. We now know what is meant by social psychology. It cannot deal with the social mind as an independent existence, for that is a myth. It must aim at the interpretation of social thought, feeling, and will; but these exist only in the minds of individuals. How persons act in society, each mind under the influence of other minds, how the action is combined and a result attained by associated action, is the problem of social psychology. While this has no mind as the compound of many minds for its subject, it has many minds in the process of interaction to investigate. Social psychology differs from individual psychology in that its subject-matter is the interaction of minds and the products of this interaction. The psychology of a crowd or mob is the psychology of men in a crowd or mob and the resulting action. It is never the individual mind alone that is

considered, but the relation of all minds involved in an action. The action of a crowd depends on the men who exert forces; but as the men and their forces differ, the specific rules which apply to one crowd may not apply to another. National parliaments vary according to the forces concentrated in them. In every instance the psychology of a nation, a parliament, an organisation, a social group means the psychology of the individuals in their interrelation and interaction.

While conserving both the individual and society we are enabled, through the mutuality existing between them, to see and study each in the other. An association is what the members make it, and the members are influenced by the association they form. Action and reaction is thus the relation between a person and his associations, and only in the light of this relation of reciprocity can they be understood. In order, therefore, to understand the psychology of society we must study the psychology of the individual as he is influenced by others, acts on them and is acted on. Through the psychical interaction between individuals we get at the psychology of society, of history, of humanity. Only in society does man become man, and only in society can his highest development be assured.

“What a man is he owes to the union of man with man. The possibility of development and of history depends on the possibility of creating associations which increase the power of contemporaneous human beings, and likewise, in that they survive, individuals unite the past generations with the coming ones.”—Gierke, *l. c.*, vol. i., p. 1.

114. Besides the abstraction of the individual from society and of society from the individual, there is a third abstraction which is apt to be misleading. The products of society, in which it expresses itself and in which alone it can be seen, are so completely abstracted from society that it is no longer seen in them. For cer-

tain intellectual purposes there may be an advantage in this; but a deep and comprehensive view cannot ignore the society whence the products sprang. Language, literature, art, economics, philosophy, natural science, and religion can be discussed without regard to the persons and societies which create them. Even history or evolution can be treated as an abstraction, as if with an independent energy it moved through time, wrought changes, promoted progress, established civilisation, and created institutions, without taking note of society, which accomplishes all. History does not make society, but society makes history, produces evolution, impels to progress, and transforms the world of man and nature.

In this way the personality is restored to its true place; men unite their energies and thus become the causative factors in historic movements; and the society they form by means of this union becomes the great object of investigation for the understanding of human affairs.

115. The correspondence and mutuality existing between the individual and society establish a large sphere in which there is a community of interests and operations. What the individual and society have in common is an important problem. What actual communism prevails between men, between one hundred, a thousand, a million? There may be much in an association, a church, a state, from which an individual dissents; nevertheless, when the society makes a formal decision he feels himself bound by the action because he is a member. Even in associated action, therefore, the associates need not be equally involved. Some find in it a fuller expression of themselves than others do. In general, however, associations, voluntarily organised, are an enlargement of the person, a multiplication of self. The member finds himself, or what is dear to him, in the society, and society finds itself in the member. He gives of himself to the society and takes for himself from society. The purpose of the

association he selects is his own purpose, an embodiment of his thought and aim. Men in their choice of associations are governed by the law of self-preservation and self-manifestation, so that a man is revealed by his associations. We can thus understand how his societies become a large and vital part of him. So far as he is of society he cannot be a man of individuality. In all social life a twofold process is significant: the tendency to absorb the individual in society and, on the other hand, the tendency to conform society to individuals. It is the great law of adaptation, in one case society, and in the other the individual being the standard of conformity. Where socialism prevails it will be the former; where individualism, it will be the latter. A strong Government uses the citizens for its ends; in a republic the strong men are apt to treat the Government as their milch cow. For a healthy and progressive condition the identification of the individual and society, and the rupture between the two, are equally dangerous.

Great occasions and great social interests do not take a man out of himself, but they elevate him above his ordinary sphere and thus he becomes more to society. Extraordinary circumstances may make him aware of neglected powers and interests, and bring his reserve force into action. A crisis tests and changes values. Sometimes a man forgets his old self to become a new and better self.

Barth, *l. c.*, p. 114, regards it as the aim of politics to establish and maintain an agreement between the individual and society, and adds: "The greater the agreement between the interests of the individual and society, the more will the former live the life of the latter. In this way the life of society is augmented. Not only does the individual live the life of society, but society also lives in the individual; thus, the firmest possible union of individuals is brought about."

Social education strengthens society and prevents the need of resorting to coercion. Coercion alienates men and disin-

tegrates society. Among the greatest of problems for the future is the converting of criminal and antisocial factors into valuable social energy by the improvement of society and by social training.

116. Eminent scholars are arrayed against each other in the debate whether the individual or society deserves the credit for the movements of history. From our point of view it seems strange that such a question could have arisen. The credit does not belong to one or the other, but to both. Such is the interdependence of the two that what belongs to one must in some measure pertain to the other also. Since there is an individual but no literal social mind, every initiative must come from some person. It may at times be impossible to determine the originator of a thought, a resolution, or an invention, but its source is unquestionably some individual. But, while the initiative is his, the product is not wholly his creation. He is himself a social being, and what he is and has is largely due to past and present society. The original man originates largely as a social product himself and an embodiment of social achievements. What he produces dies with him unless society takes it up and perpetuates it. Thus, a man attains for himself and his work an earthly immortality through society. On the other hand, the society which conserves what is personal is itself the product of individuals, and by them the conserving process is performed.

The indissoluble connection existing between the individuals and society proves that history is the necessary product of both factors. According to one view, whatever is historic is individual; according to the other, social; whereas what is individual may, at the same time, be social. But each factor, the individual as well as the social, has a specific function, and when this is determined, as is done above, the whole dispute is settled. In

historic studies individualism and socialism are both wrong, yet each contains some truth. The whole truth is found in an individualism which involves socialism, and in a socialism which involves individualism; or in individualistic socialism and socialistic individualism.

To ask whether great men *or* the people make history, is like asking whether hydrogen *or* oxygen makes water. History is always made by individuals, but in such relations as constitute society. Heretofore the individual has been too much studied as if isolated, and the effect is seen in psychology, ethics, religion, economics, and history. Hero-worship has prevailed in government and statesmanship, in warfare and reforms. The process by means of which individuals make society and history has been overlooked.

John Fiske, *Excursions of an Evolutionist*, p. 196, says: "The study of sociology, in short, is primarily concerned with *institutions* rather than with *individuals*. The sociologist does not need to undervalue in any way the efficiency of individual initiative in determining the concrete course of history; but the kind of propositions which he seeks to establish are general propositions, relating to the way in which masses of men act under given conditions."

Institutions and the action of masses of men are important sociological considerations; but they are far from exhausting the interpretation of society. Causative inquiry, essential for science, leads to the social forces and their possessors, in order to account for the institutions. The action of "masses of men" does not depend on "given conditions" merely, but also on the men and their social forces. Different masses, say German and French, act differently in the same conditions. A mass of men can be understood only when its constituent elements are taken into account. That this is not done by Le Bon in his interesting book, *The Crowd*, decreases its value from the sociological point of view. His model seems to be the crowd in France and other Latin countries, and from this

he draws inferences respecting crowds in general. He overlooks the fact that other individuals would make the crowd very different. It is considerations like these which make it so essential for sociology to take account of the relation of the individual to society, if society is to be interpreted.

117. No operation is explained unless all the conditions and causes involved are considered. A new world of problems is entered so soon as we turn from the actor to inquire into the effect of his action on others. If a thousand persons hear the same speaker, the effect on each is no doubt different. From this point of view we cannot take the person who exerts a social force as an abstract being; all that pertains to him or is attached to him by others is a factor in his influence. The family, the possessions, the rank, and the position of a man may give him a power which his own personality does not justify. The mystic power of an editorial may consist more in the weight attached to its anonymity than in its real merit or the significance of its author. A private view is endowed with the efficacy of a public utterance. The pope and the friar may say the same thing, yet it is not the same. When an emperor speaks it is the emperor that is heard rather than his utterance. A millionaire, in himself base and impotent, becomes a Hercules through his possessions. Especially in national affairs does the weight of a statement depend on its backing. The will of a state is estimated according to the ability to make it effective. A powerful standing army is the ablest diplomat. A purpose proclaimed by Bismarck at the beginning of his career had a different political significance from the same purpose announced when at the summit of his power, backed by three successful wars and a united Germany. The social estimates of persons are often wrong because they are based on the adjuncts of persons, not on the persons themselves. The antecedents, the prestige, the

point of view, the trappings, and circumstances absorb the attention and warp the judgment.

118. The difference between what men are and what they stand for becomes especially striking when they appear as representatives of society. However little when they represent themselves only, they assume power and majesty when they represent a state as kings or presidents; or even when representatives of the law, as policemen. The dignity and authority of the nation seem to speak when a German police officer lays his hand on a criminal and says: "In the name of the law I arrest you." An ambassador acts for his king and State, and in him the nation he represents is honoured or insulted. This action of society through an individual, by proxy, involves many social processes and reveals important social conditions. Large societies cannot always be present when their interests are at stake, so they send committees or delegations to act for them. In the city-states of Greece the citizens might assemble to transact the political affairs in person; but in a nation of millions a few represent the people in making and administering the laws. Whenever associations cannot act directly they commit their interests to a select number of persons whose acts are in the name and with the authority of the body they represent.

Men who are insignificant in themselves like to be taken for what they imagine themselves to represent; truly great men like to be taken for what they are. The worthless nobleman basks in the departed glory of his ancestors. The greatest power is attained when to personal ability and worth are added the highest representative functions of a State or some other important association.

The representative is expected to give expression to what he represents rather than to himself. Especially is this evident in international congresses, as that at The Hague in 1899. Even the most eminent scholars, who had definite views of their

own, constantly received the advice of their Governments before important decisions were made; and after the work of the conference was completed nothing was final until the respective States had given their adherence.

How much society consists in the relations and actions of persons is made manifest especially by those who act in a representative capacity. They really act, yet their relation makes the act that of the society they represent.

119. Greater merit attaches to the initiative in a movement than to the adoption of what another has created. Hence the honour conferred on originality in thoughts and systems, discoveries and inventions. The masses may easily see after the prophet has foreseen, and politicians readily follow where statesmen have led the way. Gutenberg will be remembered when millions who have used and improved his invention have been forgotten. The founder of a school of artists, philosophers, scientists, receives greater credit than his pupils and followers. Aristotle is held in high estimation; but who thinks of the many Aristotelians?

Every age, even in primitive times, has its individual leaders and social followers. According to the above estimate a new light is thrown on the achievements of past worthies and societies. Those who wrought in a lower stage may deserve greater credit than their successors, because they laid the foundations and started the evolution which made the future development possible.

The past was great in seeds and germs from which the later perfection is evolved. Pity may be wasted on forefathers who had not our advantages, were perhaps members of a primitive family. Their imperfect initiative may have been the root from which has sprung the tree whose fruit we eat. It is by no means certain that in their situation their work was not as great as ours and equally valuable. The foundation is not the building, but on it the entire structure rests. Their realisations

were not equal to ours; their happiness was different from ours, but it need not have been less; and their labours, taking all the effects throughout the ages into account, may have been peculiarly worthy and fruitful. The first man who extracted iron from the ore, if the process was not an accident, performed a service which has probably not been surpassed since his day, and he certainly made the most important inventions of aftertime possible. We build on the past, and thus the past shares any greatness we attain. From this point of view the lowest and highest stages of progress are brought nearer each other in respect to merit. It confirms the result obtained, that in humanity we have a co-operation of men and societies, an interdependence of forces.

120. The ripe fruit is a seed through which the plant perpetuates itself. The seed itself is so perfect because it is the culmination of what precedes it. The new beginning made by the growing seed is but a continuation of an old process.

Society is the great conservatory of past processes. Whatever the individual can concentrate of power from this vast depository will increase his force in the race of life. That it takes the human being longer to reach maturity than the lower animals has a weighty bearing on the individual and society. Usually animals are but a short time with their parents and then obliged to shift for themselves. Even if they remain longer it is not, as in the case of the human being, for the purpose of imparting to the young the possessions of the old. The physical and mental powers of man develop more slowly to maturity. For years the children are dependent on their parents; and as they gradually develop into independence they are trained and disciplined by the example and instruction of their elders. The long training required for life's calling seems to point to the fact that the calling itself is so important as to require long prepara-

tion. So much at least is certain, that the long tutelage is calculated to assimilate the children to the parents, to make them recipients of the views and purposes of their elders, and thus promote their sociality. The years of training are years of socialisation. So long as there was no writing these years were specially important for transmitting by direct communication the mental possessions from one generation to another. The cultural influence was great, giving the new generation the accumulations of the past as the force of life. The highest powers mature most slowly; and thus the slowness of man's development seems to point to the existence of higher faculties in him, for the protection and unfolding of which the aid of society is more essential than for the lower animals.

121. Another reference to language will enable us to give a condensed summary of some of the main thoughts elaborated in these two chapters. Language is universally regarded as a social agent as well as product; yet there is no real language except in the minds and mouths of individuals. If a million utter the same word, these are a million persons. Every word has been created by individuals, is used by them, from them receives its content, and by them is transmitted from generation to generation. At the same time, language is social; it is the possession of many minds, and this makes it a medium of intercourse. A sound used by one man only is a monopoly which has no social significance. Every change in sound, in syntax, in sense, is made by individuals; it becomes a change in the language itself when adopted by the society which uses the language. That this society is itself a creation of individuals has been shown, but by such as stand in a relation of interaction, language itself being the chief means of the interaction. Thus, in all social processes we finally come to persons, but to persons in a state of psychical exchange.

The creation, the appropriation, the use, and the development of a language bring out strikingly the general relations existing between the individual and society. Language is the product of an effort to create an interchange of psychical factors. A word which only one understands is no constituent part of speech. When the first mother and child understood each other the basis was laid for millions, in the course of time, to communicate with one another in the same way. The meaning given by one person to a word might become social, or it might be lost because the rest of the group adopted a different sense. Little by little, by co-operation, by consensus, by action and reaction, every word and every language was formed and adopted; and in the same way traditions, proverbs, customs, and other products, which were social at the same time that they were individual. The child born into a language learns and appropriates it, just as it appropriates for its use the thoughts, the sayings, the beliefs of the past and its own surroundings. But the inheritance of the past is not the individual's limit. New words can be coined or created, new thoughts added, manners, customs, laws changed. The first man who uses "sociology" or "agnosticism" does it as a private term; but it soon becomes social and an integral part of speech. From one point of view the individual is everything; from another, he is nothing to society unless it receives and adopts his contributions. Nowhere do we find individuals as atoms moving about in a void or in solitude, but always in a social atmosphere, giving and taking, acting and acted upon, creating and created. If nature furnishes no complete analogy to the relation of the human person to human society, it is because only in humanity are such a person and such a society found.

Of the common stock of language, say one hundred thousand words, each takes a share,—a few thousand. Not all have the same words, but many have hundreds as

a common possession. One who has these and others which no one else has, say a Shakespeare, is thereby elevated above the group. The same applies to all other possessions—there is a common stock of intellectual, ethical, æsthetic, religious possessions as a general social content, and, besides this common stock, different minds possess a great variety of mental wealth. Eminent men have treasures which common mortals lack, and the latter may have something which the former lack. Every other man in Athens, no doubt, knew something of which Aristotle was ignorant; but Aristotle knew much which no one else knew, thus making him distinct, giving him private possessions which were not social. The same is true of Dante in Florence, Spinoza in Amsterdam, Kant in Königsberg. All the persons in London know more than the most learned man in London; but he may also know much which all the rest do not know. What is social plus what is private is greater than what is either private alone or social alone. This brings out distinctly the difference between what is private and what is social. There is nothing social which is not individual; it must, in fact, be in a number of individual minds to be social; but much may be individual or private which is not yet social, but can be made such, as altruism in the mind of Comte, agnosticism in that of Huxley, as Newton's law of gravitation, as Darwin's *Origin of Species*.

Much that is mine can also be thine, and much that is thine can be mine; that is, much that is private can be shared and made social. But there is also much that is mine which never can be thine, and much that is thine which can never be mine; that is, there are personal possessions which never can be made social factors. When Goethe died there was an end to much which cannot be found in the vast literature on the times or in the life and works of Goethe, and which no research ever can discover.

CHAPTER IX

THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL FORCES

122. The ultimate atoms of scientists have never been seen or handled, and have never become objects of experience. They are postulated and, so far as actual observation and examination are concerned, absolutely unknowable. Therefore no data are given from which we can infer what kind of a universe these atoms will produce; but from the material objects known to us we infer that atoms must lie at the basis of material existence and have in them the potency from which the universe is evolved.

In its observations, in the weighing and measuring of its objects, in the ability of a thousand investigators to examine the same thing under exactly the same conditions, natural science is incomparably superior to the social science. Who can measure a thought, weigh a feeling, or give statistics of the will-power exerted? But while in observation and measurable results natural science has the advantage, the social science has the advantage of interpretation. We know nothing of the atom of matter, which never becomes an object of experience. But we do know the atoms of society, the social forces, as direct objects of experience. We exert them, we experience their power as we exert them, and we feel their effects as others exert them on us. The mind, in dealing with its own forces, is at home, making the most perfect experiment with itself, and drawing inferences directly from what goes on in its consciousness, while what pertains to

purely physical operations cannot be equally an object of direct experience.

123. That the way to a knowledge of society is through analysis, in order to discover its constituent factors, is confirmed by natural science in postulating the atoms as primitive substances. Chemistry seeks to obtain the mastery of compounds by an analysis which reveals the elements. Anatomy is analysis. Psychology seeks to get the elemental factors in the operations of the mind. That we do not understand an object until we know of what it is composed and how its component parts are united is too self-evident to require more than to call attention to the fact. In our analysis of society we are but complying with an imperative demand of the mind and following the lead of every science which is intent on realism and makes the interpretation of actuality its aim.

It might be objected that society acts as a totality, not exercising now this force by itself, later a different one, and so one after another, each separately, until all are exerted. Society is a unit in which all the forces inhere, and it acts as a unit. Just how this action takes place will be more fully explained later. But the objection has no validity for the investigator who passes beyond superficial phenomena to their total content and causes. The chemist seeks the chemical elements even if they are never found to exist by themselves. The economic force never acts in an abstract form, separated absolutely from all the other forces; yet we have an economic science which separates that force and treats it by itself. The same is true of politics and other sciences. There may be no pure feeling, yet we separate feeling as if it were alone. It is a process of specialisation for the sake of thoroughness.

The individual in his ordinary activities does not think of the psychology of his mental operations or even of the motives which prompt him. The same is true of social

action. Men drawn to each other for personal reasons do not stop to perform an elaborate analysis of their association. An impulse, a feeling, leads to sociality, and without questioning it they follow. All movement toward others might be put under the head of the social impulse, whatever the ultimate source may be. But, at the same time, when we try to interpret this impulse we seek its elements, just as we take the mental life and by means of analysis aim to get psychology.

Many valuable discussions of the psychology of social action are given by J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology*. Chap. xi. discusses "The Social Forces," the individual and society being each regarded as a social force: "The individual is the particularising social force. Society is the generalising social force." P. 452.

124. Much has been made of the power of ideas in history, such as that of humanity, freedom, idealism and realism, rationalism and empiricism. With that love of personification so common to man they have been endowed with a kind of substantial existence, and said to hover over nations, to domineer ages, to inaugurate movements, and to direct the course of history. We have learned, in passing from the generalisations involved in such statements to concrete reality, that an idea can exist nowhere except in the individual mind. If described as a power over nations, ages, movements, history, the meaning is that an idea has become social, being at the same time a possession of many minds, and through these accomplishing the designated effects. In this sense we can profitably discover and follow dominant ideas in humanity, at least during historic times. They are concentrations of great social energies at work in society at particular periods, and throw an interpreting light on humanity. Now the reigning idea is religious, then

political, economic, or æsthetic. Special prominence has in recent times been given to ideas of liberty, nationalism, socialism, religious and moral reform. Often these ideas find embodiment in the literatures, folk-lore, art, and politics of peoples; sometimes they are compressed in philosophy and science. We get at the causes operating in the popular mind by digging to the roots of these subjects. But literature, like history, having a life of only a few thousand years, conserves but an occasional projection of the thought and feeling of humanity. Of longer ages of earnest and fruitful labour the archives contain no records. The world's letters are, consequently, but one of the sources for our knowledge of social causes. For the taproots in social causation we resort to the society now existing and, so far as within reach, to that acting throughout the ages. Fortunately, we have in individuals the psychic factors working at all times in humanity and interpreting society.

“We should have a satisfactory science if we could so determine the forces of individual souls and the laws of their action, that everything could be known to follow of necessity from the nature of the individuals given, and from the relations in which they stand to each other and to the external world,—if we could explain historical phenomena as the collective action of these individuals, as we calculate the direction and velocity of a stream from the nature and interaction of the atoms of water in a certain bed of a certain fall.”—Sigwart, *Logic*, vol. ii., p. 449.

125. For the sake of what follows we need here only state that it is our purpose to obtain those ultimate social atoms, or energies, which are found in the mind and interpret human association. A mental energy is a focus of personal power, the elemental factor by means of which society is constituted. Undoubtedly society, nature, and

many mental activities have wrought for its creation, so that what is final for sociology may still be a problem for psychology.

Schiller and Goethe were for years kept apart by prejudice and misunderstanding, the one in Jena, the other in the neighbouring Weimar. Then they met, understood, inspired, and co-operated with each other till death again separated them. The process which made social the power which was private before is typical of every passage from isolation to socialisation. When the members of a musical association meet they exert on one another an æsthetic force. Each has other forces, economic, political, religious, which are not concentrated in that particular association, but belong to other spheres of action. While the musical bond so relates the members as to form an æsthetic organisation, they are at liberty to form other associative ties, showing that they are something besides musical. Usually the adjective—literary, artistic, scientific, religious—explains the association by designating the specific force concentrated.

Lindner, *Ideen zur Psychologie der Gesellschaft*, p. 35, says: "Two factors enter the idea of society. First, that all the individuals are placed in relations with one another; second, that these relations converge to a common point in which all are united." This applies to organisations, but not to unorganised social groups. An organisation is a relation of persons by means of which they seek to gain some common end. Sociality is larger than organisation. The former includes all social action, the latter only associative action or such as is the result of agreement between persons and directed to some specific object. The tendency to limit society to formal associations was discussed on a preceding page. We must be on our guard against this view which social literature constantly thrusts on our attention. L. Beaurin-Gressier, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, July, 1897, says: "It is the community of ends, of purposes, of interests, which defines

the concept of society." Very true if you add social groups unorganised.

126. As in its forces we seize society itself their significance for sociological inquiry is established. By reducing the endless variety of social phenomena to these forces as their causes, what at first appears inextricably complex becomes simple. A monistic tendency to search for the unit or unity underlying all being, and involving the infinite variety and multiplicity of action, has been pronounced inherent in the mind. But the science of society is on a level with the science of nature in its inability to start with a single element or energy and make that the cause and interpreter of all social manifestations. We are not relieved of perplexities by making the individual the ultimate unit, being the possessor and source of the social energies. No individual is always the same; the forces he exerts vary greatly in kind and degree; no person is a standard by which others can be estimated; the difference exists not only in inherent qualities, but also in respect to environment, to the stimuli received, and the responses to the same. For these reasons the human individual cannot be taken as the social unit in the same sense that a chemical substance is the unit in chemical compounds. Since, however, all the social energies emanate from man, we see the necessity of studying human nature in order to understand their character and operations. Human nature must, of course, be taken under the infinite diversity of influence to which it is subject in the various stages of development. The key to society is not found in the psychology of any particular individual or even association, but in the psychology of humanity. What of a man goes out into society is the problem—man in the myriad characters and powers in which he appears on earth. Even if the endless details in social forms and actions lie beyond our reach, their

ultimate causes, the reasons or motives, may be comprehensible.

The attempt to analyse any particular personality into its social forces reveals our limitations in this respect. In every force exerted the entire personality is somehow involved. The intellectual force is not the same in Newton and Helmholtz, just as the æsthetic is not the same in Dante and Browning. This, however, is no argument against the analysis for intellectual purposes. The fact that the same force is differentiated in each person according to the differentiation of the person only shows that each force must be studied in the light of all the forces with which it is correlated. The analysis of the individual and society into their social forces is as fully justified and as much demanded as a similar analysis undertaken of the mind by psychology and of nature by chemistry. Even if sulphur were never found in a pure state in nature, the chemist would not be content to study it exclusively in its compounds, unless its isolation were impossible. In the case of individuals, of societies, of ages, it is one of the most fruitful studies to determine the leading energy, what its combinations are, and how it operates.

127. Personal action, private or social, is necessarily *self-manifestation*. Only what is in a force can come out. The self-manifestation is, of course, subject to the influence of the conditions under which the person is placed at the time. A *desire* for self-manifestation need not be its source, for to the actor himself the action may be unconscious or at least its purpose obscure. That the personality always expresses itself in its acts does not mean that any deed is exhaustive of the personality. Of the myriad influences exerted upon a man he probably responds to no two alike. Like a chemical element entering endless combinations, he is ever the same, yet always different. But whatever a man manifests must be taken as

an expression of a part of himself as really existent at the time. A man does what he is. Perhaps he expresses a particular mood only once; but then he can express it only because truly *his*.

Here we have one of the inestimable factors which make prevision, even in the case of the individual, impossible. How far the entire life is a full expression of the personality presents an interesting problem. The exposed veins may give no revelation of the contents of a mine. The quality which is dominant in the inner life is, however, that which is most frequently repeated and receives most emphasis in action; it is the focus into which the most marked characteristics of the personality are concentrated. We naturally judge men by their acts because these are self-manifestations; but we err in judgment because no act or series of acts reveals the whole man, or all the reasons or motives involved in his actions.

Action is determined by the centre of interest and focus of attention. With the interest and attention the action changes. Even suicide is self-manifestation—of the insanity, the despair, the remorse, the weariness of life, at the time of the deed. A moment's delay may create a new focus of attention and give a new mission to life.

Reflex action has no conscious motive, but its ultimate ground may be in conscious action which has become habitual. Thus even in the unconscious life responsibility may be involved.

The greatest importance attaches to the tendency to self-manifestation. It is largely the key to society and history. Amid the various influences to which he is subjected a man seeks to give expression to himself, to act himself out, to realise himself. He seeks to give an objective form to his subjective states, and to find what he cherishes in society and history. Life is an art, and art is an expression of the life.

128. All personal activity being self-manifestation, we

see the reason for going to individual psychology for the interpretation of the social forces. Why do men associate? The purpose of association determines what forces shall be exerted. But no analysis of the possible aims in associating will determine what associations are actually formed. These depend on the infinite variety in the relations and circumstances of men. From no individual or social psychology can we infer what societies will be created and what forces they will involve. These can be learned only by the study of society itself. Taking society as it is and has been, we find the multiplicity so great that the reduction of all the social forces to a few fundamental ones seems at first impracticable. In the processes through which humanity passes there is, however, a revelation of certain forces which constantly recur, which produce great and lasting movements, and which are typical of society everywhere and always. These forces, characteristic of human nature, vary in quality and degree in different stages of culture and amid different natural surroundings; yet not in these, whatever their modifying influence, but in man himself, their source is found, being an expression of his needs and desires, and of his efforts to satisfy them.

Since it is the forces of individuals in their social relations and activities we seek, we go to psychology and to society for them. We cannot take a theory of human nature, postulate what it requires, and then infer what forces it will exert—the *a priori* method; but in every instance the results of psychological inquiry must be tested and confirmed by the actual society of the present and the past.

It should be remembered that a social force is more comprehensive than an associative force. A social force may be both associative and dissociative. If it associates a man with republicans it separates him from democrats. So long as a man joins neither the liberal nor the con-

servative party his attitude toward both may be one of indifference; but by joining the one he emphasises his dissent from the other. A social organisation is not only a differentiation from an unorganised state, but also from every other organisation. Every church is an organisation of certain social forces; but a church separates its members from other churches as well as it unites them in itself. Some churches are intimately associated with each other, while others are sharply separated and even antagonistic, as the Catholic and Protestant. It is the failure to recognise the distinction between the social and associative forces that has caused perplexity respecting the treatment of war as a social factor. Social is so broad as to cover all that pertains to the forces at work in society, whether they be co-operative or antagonistic, whether peaceful or warlike.

Social organisation is a social definition giving definiteness to what was formerly chaos. This definition means to distinguish and also to separate. An organisation separates its members from other organisations in proportion as its lines are distinctly and sharply drawn.

129. While no social force can be foreign to man it is not implied that every social force is seen in each society or in an equal degree in every stage of culture. Man himself may have to undergo a process of humanising. Whatever external stimuli are offered, he can respond to them only if there is an inner adaptation to the stimuli. Hence we find physical and geographical conditions, race, heredity, and the social environment powerful factors in determining the character of the forces. Culture in particular is a prominent feature. It cannot be successfully imitated. Certain forces belong to man as man, and they exist, though subject to modifications, in every stage of development. They appear wherever man enters into social relations. Other forces, no less truly a product of

man's nature, require for their manifestation in social life some degree of culture. Until this is reached they are in an embryonic form, existing potentially rather than actually. With good reason German ethnologists call peoples in a low stage of culture *Naturvoelker*, nature-peoples, and those in a higher stage *Culturvoelker*, culture-peoples. No break occurs in the process of development from the former to the latter, but the seeds and germs found in lower stages are unfolded, what is merely involved is evolved and its real character made fully manifest. Nothing existing in man in a state of nature, and essential to him as man, is foreign to society in a state of culture. But its form is changed, it enters new relations and combinations, and what was dominant in a state of nature may later be subordinated to what is higher and more significant.

For the German *Naturvolk* we use "savage" in English. A savage is a man of the woods, a child of nature. The cultured man is out of the woods and in a civilised state.

130. The division of humanity into nature- and culture-peoples commends itself because it marks a real and well-defined distinction, is applicable to all men at all times, and gives an actual basis for a valid classification of the social forces. Some things belong to man in common with other members of the animal creation. He exerts certain energies simply to exist, to continue the species, and to obtain gratification. These can be called basal forces, the product of natural impulses, and involved, apparently, in the very fact of vitality. Other forces are higher and differentiate him from the rest of the animal kingdom, and for this reason can be called more distinctively human.

F. Ratzel, *History of Mankind*, first chapter, defines nature-peoples as those who are more under the dominion of nature than culture-peoples. The difference is psychical rather than

physical, and is revealed in the interests and aspirations, the mental qualities and mode of life, in the historical position and social products. While a man is always dependent on nature for his livelihood, he can obtain this in different ways, can subdue nature instead of being under its dominion, appropriate its treasures for exalted human ends, and study its beauties and use its forces.

131. The classification of mankind, according to the degrees of culture, into savage, barbarian, semi-civilised, civilised, and enlightened peoples admits of endless subdivisions, and for our large purpose is impracticable. There has even been difference of opinion as to what peoples should be designated as primitive or savage. Among the lowest some have made more progress toward the subjection of nature than others. E. B. Tylor classes as savage all who have neither herds nor agriculture, who depend on the immediate products of the earth, chiefly on hunting and fishing, to whom the metals are unknown and whose implements are of wood, stone, and bone. A stage higher are the barbarians who till the soil and possess herds; who perhaps have metal implements; whose houses have, in many cases, a degree of permanence, since agriculture has become a means of support. Civilisation is held to begin with writing, when laws, religion, history, and other products of culture can receive a permanent form and be transmitted definitely from generation to generation. Nature-people, then, would be equal to the prehistoric people, while the civilised or culture-people would be the historic. This is, of course, a very general division; no definition of civilisation is universally accepted. Before writing became a regular art there may have been stages which had various factors of civilisation, while, after writing was introduced, there may have been low stages of culture which remained stationary. The distinction between nature- and culture-people is, however, sufficiently marked for a general division. Writing

is unquestionably the condition for a high degree of permanent culture, and its introduction marks one of the greatest epochs in human history.

We might follow biologists in adopting the distinction between what is *congenital* and what is *acquired*, as applicable to the above division. "The characters which are inherited, and which are present at birth are termed congenital, while those which appear in the body under the influence of external stimuli are termed acquired." (E. D. Cope, *The Primary Factors in Organic Evolution*, p. 399.) Under acquired, when applied to human society, we understand those psychical factors which are the result of evolution.

However low in the scale of culture some primitive peoples may be, none has ever been known which did not possess some human characteristics to distinguish it from the lower creation. All known peoples have essential elements of culture, none being found in an absolutely primitive state. Achelis, *Moderne Völkerkunde*, p. 318, refers to Hörnes as an authority, and says: "Thus far no people has been discovered which was so utterly lacking in culture as to make their life comparable to that of a troop of apes. No tribe exists on the whole wide earth which does not use fire, which is devoid of language more or less rich in words and governed by laws, and which does not possess various kinds of implements and artistically prepared weapons. Illustrations of primitive times which place before our eyes a semi-animal condition of our race cannot be furnished by anthropology."

132. By nature-people we mean primitive folk who are subjected to the forces of nature. The primitive man has neither the mental substance nor the developed mind to control his physical impulses. His body and external nature are the ruling factors in his life. Even the social environment is, like himself, dominated by natural conditions. The savage has the mind of a child in a fully developed body. The mental factor as the ruling power is yet to be superinduced upon the physical nature. The

mind, undeveloped and undisciplined, is incapable of severe and continuous intellectual effort; but the impulses inherent in an uncultivated nature are exercised with the rough vigour of a strong man. The forces exerted in the self-manifestation of the individual are concentrated mainly on self-preservation and the gratification of animal instincts and passions.

His nature is not destroyed, but modified, by developing him into a being of a higher order. Culture, without eliminating a single essential element of the savage, unfolds dormant energies, refines the coarser factors, and evolves humanity from the animal qualities. New combinations are instituted. The cultured man has characteristics which the savage lacks, and these modify the natural impulses. The one is a man psychically as well as physically, while the other is psychically in an embryonic stage. As a man advances in culture the savage thus survives; to eliminate him totally would require the destruction of the man himself. But the savage occupies a different place in a man of culture. Culture does not unmake a man, but it makes him over. The animal is tamed. Whatever height or supremacy culture attains, however, the impulses which inhere in human nature continue to work.

It is the universal, fundamental, humanistic elements that form points of contact between men in all degrees of civilisation. The common factor or basal element in all men must be looked for in the lower qualities or the constitutional impulses. The savage is man in the rudimentary stage. We must consider chiefly the higher mental qualities in order to discover what differentiates men. The savage remains supreme, even in civilised life, wherever the physical force is the controlling factor. Culture attests itself by giving the supremacy to the psychical powers. The social energies which are exerted and the societies which are created by them are self-revelations of

men, and therefore evidences of the degree of culture that has been attained.

133. We have seen that in society the social forces no more act separately than throughout nature the chemical elements. They are so inextricably interwoven that their complete separation is as impossible as that of the primitive rays in a compound colour. Societies act much like personalities; that is, all the human characteristics are found in them. A church is too broadly human to limit itself to what is exclusively spiritual. Who would look for æsthetics abstracted from all other interests in a society of artists? In general, however, an association in which all the forces prevail is distinguished by some dominant energy which subordinates the rest to its aim, without suppressing them. What force of human nature, for instance, is not found in the family and the State? In social groups, too, we have an inextricable interweaving of all the energies in the form of action and reaction. Where definite organisation takes place, the will usually concentrates the energies to the accomplishment of the chosen end. But, even when the aim is fixed, as in economics and politics, it is liable to modification by the other energies.

This blending of the social forces makes it impracticable to take the division of psychology into intellect, feeling, and will as the basis for the division of the social energies. The prevailing characteristics are not always given by this division. A society is not defined by pronouncing it rational, emotional, or practical. The specific direction of reason, emotion, and the will is required. An ethical and an economic association may have an equal amount of thought and feeling, while the distinctive feature consists in the fact that the one is ethical, the other economic. The various psychical factors, besides, cannot be absolutely separated in the mind, and still less in society. An association predominantly scientific may be affected by

religion, ethics, politics, and all the other energies; yet we class it as scientific because that indicates the supreme concern. Still, in spite of this incessant blending of the forces, certain ones are sufficiently distinct in their nature and operations, and sufficiently important, to mark them as peculiar and to justify their separate treatment. Men express themselves definitely through them; these forces make distinct currents in history; they have aims and laws of their own; and they form special associations or become determining factors in social groups. A separate discussion of each force will prepare the way for a synthesis of all, so as to give a true view of society.

In each force a man expresses a particular side or need or desire of his nature. It is an antenna which he puts forth as he feels and works his way through humanity.

In the mind and in society every force acts on, and modifies, every other, and is, in turn, affected by the other forces. In social groups and large communities a dominant force or a few leading energies can easily be discovered; but the effort to grade the various forces according to their relative dominance is likely to lead equally careful investigators to different conclusions.

134. The social energies have their affinities, move in groups, and should be studied in their co-operation. Certain of the forces attract and use each other, they develop together and share a common fate. Important social processes are involved in the fact that forces seem animated with a kind of love or hatred toward one another. The close relation of the political and industrial forces is apparent; hence their interaction throughout history. Religion and morals are also closely allied. The lower energies co-operate with each other more readily than with the higher. An affinity likewise exists between the higher forces. The savage unites in himself the lower, and their union determines the character of his

life. A different group of energies rules the enlightened man. A single idea from a higher realm may introduce forces which will end the savage life.

We, of course, cannot state mathematically what degree of affinity prevails between the forces, and just what power of co-operation and antagonism. But, owing to this affinity, one force may be developed by cultivating its allies. The good may be promoted by beauty and both become instrumental in developing truth. Intellectual light favours genuine religion.

Forces have a concentrating and organising power—they concentrate the attention, they organise for specific ends. Religion may become absorbing and so organise the other forces as to make them its ministers. Allied forces share the dominance; antagonistic forces sustain to each other the relation of supremacy and subordination. Ethics and appetite cannot be equally supreme; while religion, ethics, and æsthetics may be indissolubly united.

135. Here, as throughout our investigation, we aim at what is significant, characteristic, and typical. In our analysis of society we seek for energies which are fountains of great streams in humanity, the causes of numerous and important facts, and necessary for social interpretation. No more in the science of society than in that of nature can we hope to explain every detail. In society, as in history, we inquire into what is meaningful, of real value. While intent on following the great stream of humanity in its onward flow, we cannot pause to investigate every eddy or a momentary flowing sideways or even backwards. Side issues can be considered when the main issue has been settled. This explains the social forces given below. Perhaps they and their combinations will explain the minutest details in social action, but that is not our purpose now. The forces must be definite; they must have distinct spheres of operation; their products

must be separable; and they must be valuable for the understanding of society.

Were our aim psychology instead of sociology we should want to consider many more points than are taken up here. Thus, we might ask whether some of the forces cannot themselves be reduced to more elemental factors. But it is enough for our purpose to take these forces in the form in which they exert the strongest influence in society.

That we go to individual psychology for the social forces will seem strange to such only as do not apprehend the real nature of society. However the social forces are combined and operative in society, their ultimate source is in the individual. In his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, vol. i., p. 41, Dilthey pronounces psychology the basis of all historical and social subjects. The individual must be understood according to the variety of his powers and processes in order to interpret the history he helps to make and the society he forms. To this conclusion the views of those who make a specialty of social science are more and more converging. Tarde in *Les Lois Sociales* lays special stress on passing from the large to the small for interpretation, from the totality to the elements which constitute it. It is the business of science to discover these elements as the primary factors, from the combinations of which all social phenomena proceed. Tarde in this connection refers to individual psychology as the key to society. He holds that some individuals originate, while others (the great mass) merely reproduce and repeat, or, as he says, imitate — the two processes which explain social phenomena in epitome.

136. The fact that millions think alike and do the same thing gives a remarkable degree of uniformity to social life. A fact so significant demands explanation. On many subjects the evidence is unmistakable and the agreement therefore natural. A large body of opinion has come from the past and is, as it were, inherited. The influence

thus exerted on religious and national life is very marked. Besides, those associated with each other, brought up amid the same surroundings, obliged to meet the same conditions amid similar circumstances, naturally move more or less together psychically and in practical life. Taking into account all these facts, we naturally expect a certain degree of similarity. Many hardly know what their mental possessions are and are not at all inclined to explain their origin. They regard their views as final, and thus all inquiry is at an end.

Imitation has been resorted to for an explanation of views called hereditary and generally diffused. It is an important factor in life, but does not interpret what it is introduced to explain. Men who think in groups do not imitate each other. Thought cannot be imitated. It can find expression only in a physical form, which must be interpreted in order to obtain the thought that form is intended to convey. This is true equally of spoken and written language, of gestures, pictures, and everything intended to embody thought. A gesture can be imitated, or a sound; but that is different from getting its meaning. The physical form being interpreted, its idea is reproduced in the mind of the interpreter.

It is for this reason that in all mental affairs mere imitation is out of the question. Some degree of intellectual activity is always required to interpret the expression of a thought by means of which interpretation the thought itself is produced. Mental productions cannot be shoved mechanically from mind to mind. Material objects and physical forms can be imitated; but the least mental object requires mental energy and productivity in order to insure its possession. However slight this active process may be, it is real. The reason for re-creating what others possess is found in the fact that it is so common as to be constantly revealed in the surroundings and thrust on the attention. What is seen and heard everywhere

becomes familiar and is reproduced almost or quite unconsciously.

The process here described as reproduction or recreation, common largely because requiring less intellectual effort than original thinking, is a private, not a social force. It is purely subjective. The conditions or stimuli which lead to it are social; but the act itself takes place solely in the individual mind. The social stimuli which lead to reproduction consist in what multitudes say and do. But the effect of the reproduction may likewise be social. Thus, a tradition held by a community is reproduced in the mind of each member of the rising generation, and then transmitted to the next. This, then, is the interpretation of that large realm of communism in mental life found to be most uniform among peoples in a low stage of culture who do not originate their thoughts but merely reproduce those of others. The response to uniform stimuli results in a remarkable degree of mental uniformity.

137. This reproduction is not limited to any particular department of mind, but is general. It is common in politics, social questions, morals, religion, and art. Even philosophy and science are no exceptions. Certain types or systems prevail and become the style. No specific kind of product is the result of this reproductive activity, but the whole social life is affected. We cannot, therefore, speak of this reproduction as creating a particular kind of association. Reproduction is the result of the productive activity of the individual under the inspiration of others; but it does not work as a specific social force like religion or ethics. You cannot use reproduction, itself an individual function, to influence society; but, as stated, the result of the reproduction can be so used. The religious or political view resulting from reproduction can, for instance, be communicated to other persons.

It is for these reasons that reproduction, or what is

usually called imitation, is not placed among the social forces. Like other private and subjective activity it has great social influence, as will be seen later; but that does not give it a place in our classification of the social energies.

Numerous other than the reproductive forces are at work in society which affect the individual. But these do not concern us. We are concerned with the force he exerts on society. Reproduction, therefore, concerns us so far as the individual through its operation exerts a religious, political, economic force, so that we really have all the social effects of reproduction in the list of social forces given below. Much, however, that takes place in the individual mind does not become a social force. A person may be agitated by emotions; but our problem is how the agitation affects his social relations. The forces which follow are limited to those which individuals exert socially and which societies exert on each other. All that takes place in the individual has significance for us only when it becomes a social energy.

G. Tarde has carefully investigated the important part played by imitation, which so far as thought is concerned I prefer to call reproduction, in human society. See his *Les Lois de l'Imitation*.

All that are called social thoughts and social feelings cannot be regarded as social forces. We limit social forces to such energies as really influence society. When Sully, *The Human Mind*, vol. ii., p. 103, defines social feelings as "love of society, of co-operation, personal attachment," he deals with individual feelings toward society. The point for us is how the individual's thoughts and feelings respecting society are realised in social life. An individual's private thought about society becomes a social force only when it ceases to be private by affecting other persons.

138. Besides the forces which reign in man while in a

state of nature, or the Constitutional forces, and those which prevail in civilisation, or the Cultural forces, there is a third class, namely, the Fundamental. They are the forces which are necessary for the very existence of society, at least in certain stages of development and for the highest welfare. This class, the Fundamental social forces, is treated as preliminary to the rest, and consists of two subdivisions, the Economic and the Political forces. The Constitutional forces are those which spring directly from the constitution of man and therefore exist in full operation among nature-people as well as among the cultured. They might also be called Elemental, because inherent in man, or Organic, because involved in his very organism. They are the *Egotic*, the Appetitive, the Affectional, and the Recreative. The third, or Cultural class, includes the forces inherent in man so far as capacity is concerned; but for their full development and social efficiency they require culture. Under this head we have the *Æsthetic*, the Ethical, the Religious, and the Intellectual. This gives us ten forces, under three general heads, as follows:

THE SOCIAL FORCES

I. FUNDAMENTAL.

1. *The Economic.*
2. *The Political.*

II. CONSTITUTIONAL.

3. *The Egotic.*
4. *The Appetitive.*
5. *The Affectional.*
6. *The Recreative.*

III. CULTURAL.

7. *The Æsthetic.*
8. *The Ethical.*
9. *The Religious.*
10. *The Intellectual.*

CHAPTER X

THE FUNDAMENTAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORCES

139. Forces are fundamental because they are the basis on which society rests, and their exertion is required in order that the exercise of other forces may become possible. Nature is in this sense fundamental because necessary for the very existence of society. But within society itself there are certain forces which are the condition for social being and well-being. Two of the above forces occupy this place of pre-eminence.

Necessity comes before choice and makes choice possible. Whatever is believed to be necessary properly claims precedence. That it is a law unto itself is implied in the saying, "Necessity knows no law." This principle of necessity interprets the dominance of the economic force in private life, in society, and in history, and also the fact that no sacrifice of money and men is deemed too great to preserve the State when believed to be essential for social happiness. Whoever desires life and its blessings also desires the means for their attainment, namely, the conditions of a livelihood and the preservation of the State. After the demands of iron necessity are met the numerous objects subject to choice can be considered. A man must have a lot in order to build a house; the kind of house can be determined after he has secured the lot.

140. The first place belongs to the *Economic Force* because primitive and fundamental for all the others. Whether in isolation or in society, men must possess the

means of a livelihood in order to exist and to perform the functions of life. In its most general sense, as the provider of the necessities of life, it is as essential for the man nearest the brute as for the sage at the climax of civilisation. Its basal character can be ignored only by ignorance or by a false spiritualism which itself depends on economics for existence. Every human being must either earn his bread or else eat the bread earned for him by someone else.

Need and the labour required to supply it are the two most prominent factors in economics. This need includes all the elements of life, and therefore the economic force has significance for the mind as well as the body. Its products are designated *means*, being the condition for life and its effects. Whether this force shall minister solely to man's physical existence and its immediate manifestations, or also to the highest purposes, whether to selfish or altruistic ends, is not determined by the economic factor, but by the character of the person and society. The economic energy has accomplished its purpose when it secures the means of life; it does not determine their use. When made an end in itself it is perverted, which is due to the training and character of a person. A man makes it minister to what he prizes most, and for this reason the way in which he uses his money reveals his character, taste, and inclination.

Like man himself, his condition, conscious needs, and opinions, the economic force has undergone many modifications, which will become more evident when we consider social evolution; but from the first efforts to gather berries and nuts, extract roots, and kill animals for food, to the most perfect modern economics, the need which impelled it and the aim it pursued have been essentially the same. Its universality is determined by the universal needs of men which it seeks to supply.

141. This force does not concern us so far as private,

ministering solely to individual needs. Our interest in it is due to its social function. With A. Wagner, and other economic specialists, we can speak of "social economics," to indicate its social element. Private economics is that of the individual; socialistic economics is that of socialism or of Carl Marx; but social economics treats the economic science as an integral part of the social system. Selfishness cannot be its inspiration if it takes society into account and regards self only so far as a part of the great social totality. It is only in its social aspect that sociology can view the subject.

From the time when men made an effort to secure the coarsest food in the crudest manner the economic force has led to numerous combinations. Unions were formed to capture game and secure booty, to herd cattle, till the soil, and promote industries. From the partnership of the few to large corporations and syndicates this force has been associative. The domestic economy of primitive times developed into national or political economy, which is now working toward a world-economy, including all peoples and the world-market. Later we shall see that the family was, in early times, the most important economic institution, wives and children being prized largely as bread-winners. The political concern of states is always affected by economic interests and often controlled by them. This force led to the institution of slavery and has made manual labourers the largest class in the nations of the world during every stage of culture. Wars have been waged largely for the acquisition of territory, to take captives for food or slavery, to secure a better market, and to levy contributions.

Around no other force do all societies and social agencies, whatever their character, revolve so much as around the economic. Philosophy, science, the Church, poetry, romance, require a material basis on which to rear their logical, spiritual, and ideal structures. But the strength

of this force is not adequately valued if regarded as only the basis of social activity. In our day, as in the past, it is often the chief energy in social movements. Its remarkable dominance, due to modern improvements, gives to our age the most characteristic features. One need but consider its vast extent and all-pervading influence to understand why it has been viewed as *par excellence* the social force, as the key to history, the interpreter of the deepest agitations and most radical transformations of society, and has actually been treated as the subject-matter of sociology. The economic force is to society what the soil is to the plants. The soil is the condition for growth; but the character and fruit of the plants depend on the seeds whence they spring.

Their social value makes the economic laws a fascinating study, which here cannot be entered. So much stress is laid on these laws that it has been proposed to divide the whole development of society into the evolution of the various economic stages. But this would absorb society too much in economic pursuits to the neglect of other factors. But the development of economics from the natural to the cultural stage is of great importance. The economic basis of culture is a rich theme. The securing of a livelihood in a state of nature was often an employment so exacting as to require most of the strength and skill of primitive man. Through the accumulation and preservation of the necessities of life that leisure became possible which was required for the prevalence of other interests. Even when some obtain leisure by the labour of others a low economic condition tends to drag everything to its level. With the women and children virtually slaves, the degraded family life renders a high degree of culture impossible.

Since the impulses which lead to the exertion of the economic force originate in man's needs, it might look as if this energy ought to be placed under the constitutional

forces. But work for a livelihood is forced on man by circumstances, not by constitutional preferences. Indolence appears to be more constitutional than labour. Being basal for the exercise of the other forces, it is better to put the economic energy under the fundamental forces.

The fact that the economic force is equally essential for the individual and society suggests the difficulty of determining what factors in the industries should be left to private control and which to public control. So deeply does what is private affect what is social, and vice versa, that a sharp separation is found, in many cases, to be impossible.

For principles and details I must, of course, refer to works on economics. A. Wagner's *Grundlegung der politischen Oekonomie*, 3 ed., is admirable for its clear discussion of principles, of the relations of economics, and of the psychological basis of the economic force. The author's breadth of view is almost as striking as his eminence as a specialist and his mastery of learned material. The relation of economics to sociology is indicated pp. 65-67.

"Economie sociale," recommended by Say, has been adopted by a number of French writers.

The end to which economics is the means has received but little rational and systematic treatment in English. It is a vast and promising field of research and has material of great value for a system.

142. The *Political Force* includes all that pertains to the functions of the State. It is protective, regulative, authoritative. The State is an organisation for peace within its borders and for protection against external foes. At a certain stage of development it becomes a necessity for the existence and welfare of society on a large scale. Without political institutions anarchism would prevail and every man's hand be raised against his fellow-man. Dealing with the past and present, we

need not here consider whether at some future time an ideal of self-government can be reached which will make the State unnecessary.

This force is entirely social, springing directly from the relations of men to each other. Every political act of a man must, therefore, involve his fellow-men likewise. The force might be placed in the third class, since a considerable degree of culture is required for its operation, and it is one of the most striking proofs of civilisation. Political institutions are, however, so necessary for society in a certain stage of evolution that it must be regarded as fundamental. Recent studies in political science have brought out more clearly the fundamental importance of the State for advanced society. It is the product of culture, but also the condition for future progress. Other organisations have regulative and protective functions similar to those of the State, but they differ in kind and degree, and have not the same authority. Every organisation requires some regulative force, and in its essential features the political force inheres in the very idea of society. In its most developed and most powerful form this force is, however, concentrated in the State, an institution involving manifold interests, respecting all of which it is the ultimate appeal. In a following chapter the character and functions of the State will receive fuller treatment. The practical working of this force is familiar, being a matter of daily observation and experience.

We cannot here consider the numerous problems involved in the State and affecting the political energies. The extent of its authority is a disputed point. The question pertains to the rights of the individual and voluntary organisations, to the inclusion of religion as an affair of the State, to the regulation of economic interests, and legislation respecting the relations and conditions of the various classes. It is the function of the State to

promote the highest general interests of the society within its borders; how this can best be done involves the nature and circumstances of the society. Hence states themselves vary in attempting to adapt themselves to the situation. Besides the permanent form of organisation, a prominent part is played by politics in questions of expediency. Differences in the peoples and their history account for different kinds of states, whether imperial, monarchical, or republican, whether paternalism or individual freedom shall be the rule. It is a fundamental question where the authority of the government is located, whether in an independent ruler, a few citizens, or in the whole body of the people. The State is an embodiment of the authority of the totality, whether the authority is exercised directly by the people, by a select number, or by an individual. The sovereignty of the State, wherever lodged, is frequently viewed as might, as the concentrated will of the totality, and as a supreme personality. Whether the sovereignty be regarded as inherent in the people or as hovering over them, its unconditional authority is viewed as axiomatic—a sovereignty which recognises no appeal outside of and beyond itself. The government is the executive will of the State. The political force may be either personal or representative. It is the former in the case of an absolute monarch and of a citizen who has a voice in political affairs; the latter when the legislative, judicial, and executive functions are committed to delegates. In large free states the political power is mainly representative; and even in the city-states of ancient Greece much of the authority had to be delegated to a few representatives of the totality as an embodiment of the will of the people. The State has not only the power over the life and death of its inhabitants, but can also wage war against other states. Taking into account all the internal and external functions of the State, its importance is so vast that it has been

regarded as the most important or even the only subject-matter of sociological inquiry.

The progress of freedom has transferred the dominion from one or a few to the many, and this immediate concern of the people in the State has increased the appreciation of its significance for individual and social welfare. All societies within the State are affected by its principles and politics, and depend on it for protection and freedom. The influence of the political force is therefore of utmost moment.

However fundamental the political force, compared with the economic, which is primitive, it might be called derivative. Its origin is due to the conditions, created by economics and other social energies, which need regulating through political institutions.

143. We might call the political the state force, meaning that force which constitutes, and is exercised by, the State. Forms of government existed before the State, in the family, in tribes, federations, and other associations. Before states made laws there were customs and enactments which had the force of law. Even before writing was introduced this was the case. But the authoritative or governing force outside of the State is different from what we now call political. Yet in the era preceding the State we can call the governing power pre-political, tentatively political, or political in embryo, whose development led to the creation of the State. It was this governing force which, without a break, appeared as a seed and germ in the family and tribal rule. It is evident that without an understanding or regulation of some kind actual association is out of the question.

Authority and government are such general characteristics of all organised society that, as a rule, they are not distinctive marks of the associations. But in the State that which is incidental to other associations becomes the cardinal feature. Government is its specific function.

This gives the reason for separating the State from all other bodies which govern or are governed. The governing force in humanity ranges from the loosest and simplest to the most compact, most complex, and most authoritative form in the State. The later governmental forms usually differ so little from those whence they were immediately evolved that they cannot be sharply separated. For this reason we treat the evolution of the State as gradual, even imperceptible, perhaps; yet, when the State is once completed it is readily distinguished from all preceding authority. Voluntary action is by no means excluded from the numerous movements which finally culminated in the State; but men adapted themselves to needs as they arose, without considering remote consequences.

It is significant that we have no adjective from state in the English language. What is of the State or pertains to the State is expressed by political, civil, and civic; but these are not definite enough, since they apply to a city as well as the State. A politician need not be concerned about state affairs, still less be a statesman.

144. Under the political, whether in its embryonic form before the State or in the State, we include the *martial* force. From the savage condition to the most advanced political form we find this one of the most prominent social factors. In it the will of a government expresses itself in the most determined and most violent form. It might be designated as *protective*, being exercised for the sake of conserving some great interest. But this is the most favourable light in which it can be viewed. It has also been abused and made the means of aggrandisement, of robbery and slavery, and of every species of wrong of which violence is capable. It has been employed to establish and destroy empires. One of the greatest of the world's organisations, the army, is a direct creation of this force. So prominent is the martial power

in history that it dominates many ages, controls great movements, and affects all the interests and factors of social life. Such a power has militarism become that to-day a large part of the world is a camp. Not only is society in general affected by the officers and soldiers who are withdrawn from other callings to devote themselves to military life, but also by the crushing debt which rests as an incubus on the nations.

This force includes the navy as well as the army. The commerce of the world, the remarkable increase in navigation, colonisation, and the earth-hunger of peoples, have enhanced the importance of the navies. Perhaps more stress will, in the future, be laid on them than on the army. Whether the martial force can ever be dispensed with will depend on the development of the cultural and political forces. The recent increase of armies and navies, and the great wars of the nineteenth century, give little hope of a speedy reign of universal and lasting peace. The sentiment for peace has become more general, but it does not prevent national prejudice, antipathy, and rapacity. The nations most loud in their demands for peace do not hesitate to begin wars of aggrandisement and conquest.

Militarism, part of the executive force of the State, is closely allied to the functions of the police. Sometimes it aids the police in internal affairs, and in external affairs it occupies a place similar to that of the police within the State.

The desolation of wars is apt to blind us to their progressive influence in arousing indolent peoples, in developing their energies to the utmost in devising means of attack and defence, and in the mingling of peoples. The discipline of the army and the navy may be efficient means for personal development and social training. War unifies and separates peoples, it promotes and destroys culture, and can be the defender of right as well as the agent of wrong.

It is probable that undue prominence has been assigned to this force in early times by those who regard primitive man as a ferocious animal, whose natural impulses led to the shedding of blood. But it is by no means established that man was originally cruel and bloodthirsty. Gentler qualities are found among the lowest existing peoples. In case man sprang from a single pair, it is not probable that each turned his hand against his fellow. Kinship was a natural bond of union, and there were no strangers or foreigners to excite antipathy. If different families were at the basis of humanity, they were likely too far apart to interfere with each other. With a thin population and the whole earth before them, with the people of the same kinship contiguous, the conditions for perpetual warfare were absent. Instead of exterminating each other families could separate when hostility arose. The course of Abraham and Lot is probably typical of many cases.

The worst forms of brutality were likely the result of evolution. But whenever the beast in man was developed, passion, hatred, revenge, desire for booty, tribal antipathies, and misunderstanding led to destructive and frequent wars. Human life was esteemed of little value. The warrior became so important as to form a distinct and noble class, and was exalted to the position of a hero, leader, ruler, and even god, of the people. In the older oriental states the armies, their generals, their incursions and devastations in foreign territory, are the most prominent features of history.

145. There is a sharp distinction between the fundamental forces and the constitutional energies, to which we now turn. Through economics and politics the results are obtained by toil; but the constitutional energies are direct manifestations of self, they work themselves out without requiring effort. Necessity, either in the person or in his conditions, makes a man economic and political.

He works, he plans, he organises, because he is under restraint, coercion. So severe may be the strain that he regards it as violence to his nature. But every constitutional force acts naturally, the force expresses itself because it wants to do so. They are, of course, psychical energies, but inspired and dominated by physiological conditions. They are animal in a human form. To the cultural forces their relation is much the same as that of nature to art. Art is not unnatural; we might call it nature under the direction of culture. In sculpture, painting, music, architecture, dancing, we have nature as modified by human labour. Art is nature humanised, idealised, receiving imprints of the mind and revealing mind. The organic forces dominate society in the elementary stage. They may become even stronger in the cultural stage; but then they are subject to the influence, perhaps control, of the higher forces.

146. In the child and the savage the crude ego manifests itself as self-seeking. It is controlled by its impulses; there is, in fact, nothing else to control it, the mind not yet having intellectual power to govern. This self-seeking, being unavoidable and right, is misnamed when called selfishness or egotism, which involve the idea of ignoring the claims of others. This self-seeking is, however, not confined to children and savages, but exists at all times and in all degrees of culture. A large class of activities has its end, as well as its source, in self, and is not only justifiable, but also necessary, while other self-seeking is wrong, because it conflicts with the rights of others.

The word selfish is used for self-seeking at the expense of others. Selfish is used, on the other hand, for self-regard or self-seeking mainly so far as proper. We have no word that includes indifferently all self-seeking whether right or wrong. To supply this defect the word *Egotic* is coined, with the same derivation as egotistic, but without its selfish implications.

Egotic thus designates all the ambitious purposes of life, every effort at self-exaltation, desire for place and influence. It is not like the appetite, a manifestation of self for temporal gratification, but it seeks to assert self in order that the personality may gain esteem or power. It might be called the aim at self-dominance. Personal interest become a passion expresses a large part of this activity. The character of the self-seeking depends on the person. The voluptuary need not be more intent on attaining his desires than the saint, but his personal character determines the nature of his seeking. The education of self, the development of personal strength, the adoption of ethical principles, the demand of justice for self, and all proper revelation of self, are equally demands of reason and conscience. A man has a right to expect some degree of recognition from his fellow-men. His holiest convictions so possess him that their assertion and spread is a kind of self-assertion and self-promotion. Self-aggrandisement is unavoidable in proportion as a man has strength of conviction and force of character. The base man asserts and seeks the base self, the noble man the noble self. The lack of self-assertion is apt to be due to a lack of character. Men do not dare to be themselves because they are not worth being.

The fact that this large and important class of impulses has had no adjective to designate it has resulted in either overlooking or perverting them. All self-seeking is viewed suspiciously, as if it involved selfishness. Yet what but self can a man seek? Can he be impelled or attracted by what is foreign to him? It is not the inevitable self-seeking that is to be deprecated, but the false, wrong, base self. Hence the emphasis is here placed on personal character which determines the quality of the seeking. To seek happiness is a native impulse and right. Heaven is blessedness. But the wrong consists in seeking happiness in what is unworthy and in a

wrong way, by the neglect of duty or at the expense of others.

The fundamental character of the egotic impulse is apparent. There is not a department of private or social life in which it does not manifest itself. Men seek the necessities of life, to preserve themselves, to obtain the highest welfare, to promote what is identified with themselves. The altruistic man furthers altruism and he is the only one who can exert a truly altruistic force. Self-regard, self-esteem, self-interest, may be the demand of truth as well as of nature. Ambition need not be wrong; it may reveal an exalted mind. The love of liberty is no less egotic than the cringing of a base disposition. From the purest self-regard to the most fiendish selfishness we have all shades and degrees of the egotic energy.

In social life this force has great prominence. The savage seeks in various ways to put himself forward and gain power over his fellows. All rivalry, competition, dominion over slaves and empires, come under this head. Ambition in its manifold forms fills a large part of history. Societies are formed to make self-expression and self-seeking more effective. Even if associations are formed for the promotion of some cause, the cause must involve the minds of those who organise. It is this universal individual and social dominance of the self-seeking which justifies us in giving it a prominent place among the social forces, and in using egotic to designate the whole class, whatever the moral quality of the impulse may be.

Perhaps we can find in this force the reason for much social action which is usually attributed to imitation. On numerous occasions the query in respect to social action is: What is customary? On festival occasions in the family and church this is common, as in case of baptisms, weddings, and the like. This tendency to conformity cannot be wholly attributed to unconscious adaptation or imitation. Persons do not want to offend at a funeral,

and therefore so arrange the services as to meet the wishes of all concerned. The proprieties of life are complied with out of respect for the views and feelings of others. A strong motive may be the desire to gain the good-will of society, and thus an element of self-regard enters. To offend through an impropriety, say at an evening gathering, may be as much a violation of self as of the sentiments of society. Social conformity may rest on the same basis as the adaptation of a speaker to his hearers, namely, to please and gain influence over them. Even, therefore, where the egotic force is not the sole factor, it may be very prominent in shaping social affairs. Wherever imitation, reproduction, and conformity are conscious and purposive their interpretation must be found in something else than the mere fact of adaptation.

Much of the power of self-seeking is gained by becoming social, by combining with and using others to attain personal ends. The combinations formed may consist of two persons in the shape of a partnership, or in international unions for the control of a continent or the world. The egotic force can use any other force to attain its ends; and it manifests itself in the most manifold ways and in connection with every other energy.

The reason for putting the egotic among the constitutional forces is patent. It is exerted as much in a state of nature as in civilisation; though its character is not always the same, for the reason that the self varies. Its fundamental nature, its universal prevalence, and its great dominance assign to it the first place in the constitutional forces.

The spirit of self-seeking does not always express itself in words, but sometimes by means of suggestions through attitude and general bearing, through dress and deeds. The savage dude and chief seek to attract attention by tattooing and brilliant garments. The women use similar methods. Vanity, pride, love of personal display and applause, fashion, desire for popularity and fame, all come under this head. Even if it forms no organisations, the egotic force is a prominent factor

in social groups and in all forms of social life. It is the force which aims at the expression, the enlargement, the prevalence, and the realisation of the personality.

147. The *Appetitive Force* includes physical craving and animal passion,—hunger, thirst, and sexual impulse. Gratification is its aim; and this can become brutally selfish when sought at the expense of others. From childhood to old age, from primitive to civilised life, it is a dominant force. The child and savage are not distinguished from cultured society by eating and drinking and obeying their natural impulses, but in that they do not rise into the realm of culture where other forces are at work. Often the appetite acts with an irresistible power akin to the necessity of the laws of nature. Only through rational and moral supremacy can it be brought under control so as to minister to higher purposes. Even in civilised society it is frequently dominant, though usually in a less gross form than in a state of nature, and it is also apt to be modified by other interests. Culture may gloss over, without eliminating, beastliness. The superior power gained by civilisation may be made to minister to the appetite, the grossest sensuality often lurking under a refined exterior. As a drunkard and debauchee, the man in civilised society may sink below the ordinary savage and the brute.

Hunger, thirst, and the sexual passion are necessary for the preservation and propagation of the species. Their proper use is natural, basal for life, and not degrading. They can, however, be treated as if the chief end, can be diseased and abused, in which case they become unnatural and ignoble. Alike over the private and social life the appetite exerts a deep, universal, and permanent influence. It does not distinguish a man from his fellows, nor even from the brute. Abstinence may be a stronger evidence of manhood. With devotion to it and

with some of its operations a feeling of shame is connected in civilised society, perhaps because the animal propensities are deemed in too great contrast with the ideal dignity of man. Hence the exercise of this force is often hidden from public view. Gratification being its aim, the individual may be intent on getting it wherever he can, alone or in company, without regard to permanent organisation. Yet, even in civilised society, it exerts a powerful influence and is a prominent factor in numerous associations. Often the appetite is the chief end in economic combinations. Those who live to eat make the animal supreme in their social influence. The appetitive force is prominent or even dominant in many social gatherings and clubs, is manifest in art, at theatres and banquets, in dress and dances which appeal to the passions, in every form of voluptuousness, in the saloon, and in prostitution. It may develop an egotism which is anti-social; on the other hand, it may find strong stimulants in society and therefore cultivate sociality. When not controlled by cultural forces it is frequently the occasion of crime. The family in the savage state and in the lowest form generally is largely controlled by this force.

We might analyse this force for the sake of considering the sexual passion by itself. An exhaustive treatment would require this; but for our summary view it is not necessary. Not only are hunger, thirst, and the sexual passion closely allied as dominating impulses, but often they are also connected in social life.

148. In many cases the *Affectional Force* is closely allied to the appetitive. It is the product of personal affinity or whatever attracts one person to the heart of another. It embraces all that is included in the term "affection," which is most frequently used for a kindly disposition toward a person, but also includes the opposite. The

“affect” of one person upon another is an archaic use of the noun, but it expresses the idea exactly. Hence this force, in dealing with nothing private, but exclusively with the effect produced by one person on another, is pre-eminently social.

While the appetite is sensuous, the affectional force can be exercised for the highest as well as the lowest reasons. Love is the culmination of its kindly disposition; but it also includes weaker emotions, such as friendliness, kindness, good-will. While appetite and affection are often blended so that a sharp distinction becomes impossible, there may be appetite (for food) without affection, and affection (love between parents and children) without appetite. The appetite is solely self-regarding, so that savage parents sometimes eat their children; but love has regard for the object loved. The appetite involves a craving which may be absent from love. The desire which attends love may be the purest and concern the beloved object more than self; but it may also be selfish and appetitive. Man shares with the lower animals both appetite and affection; but in its higher manifestations the affectional force is distinctively human, and differentiates man from the animal far more than the appetite. We speak of a rational and divine love, as well as of sensuous affection.

The wide range of emotions involved, as well as its attractive and repulsive elements in the relation of man to man, give this force a social influence of great extent and power. In no associative relation of persons can it be wholly absent, and in many connections and movements it is dominant. Frequently it is *the* social force in human relationship, the tie between persons, and the impulse to action. Its strongest and most enduring manifestations are seen in the fundamental institution, the family, though in certain stages of development it shares the bond of the family union with the appetitive and econo-

mic forces. The affections lie at the basis of friendship, and of many associations and groups of a friendly character; it is prominent in sympathy and benevolence; and even in organisations which deal with things rather than persons it is a powerful factor in the bond of union. The Church professes to make love its essence. Indeed, without this force as a prominent factor many associations could not be held together.

Adding the malevolent affections, we find the agency of this force still more widely extended. Unkindness, ill-will, antipathy, hatred, revenge, are deep and powerful factors in society. They are in evidence in daily life, sever families, distract churches and nations, create wars, and often lead to murder and other crimes. The intensity of love may be the measure of possible or actual hatred. The fact that persons and societies are loved may be the standard of the affection toward those who are allied with or opposed to them. We have seen that the bond which unites men to one another also severs them from others.

Affection as here viewed is always a relation of persons; but its quality and degree may be affected by the possessions and adjuncts of persons. Some have reason to fear that they are loved less for their own sake than for their wealth.

A large sphere of thought, teeming with valuable problems, is opened by the question on what the affections of men depend. The mere fact of being together and of associating, of adaptation to, and cultivation for, one another, of custom and habit affecting thought and feeling, has a large share in the matter. Mind and heart are welded to each other until life itself seems to depend on the association. This explains why a child can prefer the companionship of wolves to that of its parents. The consciousness of oneness with others, created by long association and affection, is among the regnant factors in

individual and social life. The soul clings to the object around which it has long twined.

Affection, from being affected, is primarily a passive state, indicating subjection to an impression or emotion. The state of being affected is purely subjective and private; but from that may spring intense social action. Passion in its original sense is suffering or enduring; but how positive and active it becomes at times! Love pursues its object to the utmost. Illustrations are seen in such dramas as *Romeo and Juliet* and *Othello*.

Often the appetitive force gains the ascendancy over the affectional in a state of nature. In *Among Cannibals*, p. 254, Lumholtz tells of an Australian mother who helped to devour her own child. "This was told me as an everyday occurrence and not at all remarkable." P. 192: "The mother is always fond of her children"—but her appetite at times gets the better of her affection. We must remember that savages are subject to moods, and that it would be wrong to judge of their general character by their acts when under a particular mood. Eyre, whom Sir John Lubbock quotes, *The Origin of Civilisation*, p. 72, evidently goes too far in saying of the Australians: "Little real affection exists between husbands and wives: and young men value a wife principally for her services as a slave; in fact, when asked why they are anxious to obtain wives, their usual reply is, that they may get wood, water, and food for them, and carry whatever property they possess." The economic considerations are often supreme, but there is also another side. Lumholtz, who went recently to Australia as a representative of the university of Christiania and made a careful study of the natives, says that the woman sometimes marries the man she loves, "for a black woman can love too." (P. 213.) The women can become very jealous, "often have bitter quarrels about men whom they love and are anxious to marry. . . . It not unfrequently happens that women elope with men whom they love." The children belong to the tribe of the father, but are naturally less fond of him than of the

mother. "The father may also be good to the child, and he frequently carries it, takes it in his lap, pats it . . . plays with it, and makes little boomerangs which he teaches it to throw." (P. 193.) Among other savages there is likewise abundant evidence of the existence of the affectional force. Vierkandt, *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 1900, p. 478, says of nature-people: "Their love of children is generally very strong; the love between husband and wife is by no means always but slightly developed, and especially in the larger family (the tribe) the older generation receives much love and respect."

Janet, *The Theory of Morals*, book iii., chap. iv., gives numerous evidences of affection among savages from Mungo Park, Livingstone, and other travellers.

149. The *Recreative Force* fails to receive deserved prominence on the part of those who have not made a specialty of the energies at work in society. Probably this is due to the fact that the social energies are usually estimated by and according to their products, which necessarily gives recreation an inferior place. By going directly to society, however, we find the desire for recreation one of the mightiest impulses of human nature from childhood to old age and in all stages of culture. It includes the numerous sportive propensities of man, the disposition for relaxation, fun, and play, the craving for amusement and games. It is perhaps best defined as the play element in human nature; the impulse to let one's self go and give free and full expression, in the most agreeable manner, to the feelings. Recreation is the spontaneous exercise of self for the sake of the exercise. Play is in striking contrast with labour; it has its end in itself, while the end of labour is in its products. There may be a specific aim in play, to reach a goal or gain the victory over another; but the aim is not a useful result, as in labour, but chosen to heighten the sport, to add zest to the exercise, to give buoyancy to the spirits. In all

athletic contests the self-regarding factor is powerful; while labour is intent on the thing to be wrought out. Play is an effervescence of the spirit, while labour comes as a demand made on the workman. Play is freedom, its exercise voluntary and hearty; but labour is a necessity and toil a burden.

If the energy revealed in this pleasurable activity, which means a free expression of self, has not been instrumental in establishing as many associations as some other forces, the reason may be found in the fact that it does not depend on them. Its very spontaneity seizes occasions for sport as they arise, and it might be impatient if obliged to wait for others to make its exercise possible. It has, however, created associations, and in many organisations for serious purposes the recreative element is prominent. It has a place in the family and school, in the Church and political and industrial associations. This factor is dominant, or at least prominent, in all entertainments. There are regions where the love of amusement is so strong that the economic force is largely valued for the sake of ministering to its exercise. In England, especially, such is the passion for sport that many work for the sake of play, while others play, but do not work. Social gatherings are mainly recreative.

The recreative force occupies an extensive sphere and includes a large variety of exercises. Often these are rude, mainly physical, and hardly rising above brute force. But the play element also uses strength developed to the utmost skill. Among savages this force is sometimes closely allied to the appetitive, as when the sexual element is made prominent in dancing. This energy may reveal itself in higher forms of entertainment in civilised life, as in music and other arts, in wit and humour and various forms of literature. Entertainment may even be an element in religious services. Recreation is, in the case of many earnest workers, respite from the severer

pursuits of life, and the means for recuperation and better work. Associations for recreative purposes have, in modern times, become numerous, such as athletic and sporting clubs, organisations for pleasure at home and in the field, for checkers and chess, cards and dominoes, lawn-tennis and cricket, base- and foot-ball, golf and polo. The Greeks, appreciating the intimate connection of soul and body, valued athletic sport as an important factor in education. Honourable rivalry was deemed valuable for the development of character. The Olympic games excited a national interest, and had an international influence in forming a bond of union between the Greek states.

Perhaps the prevalence of this force becomes most manifest as it bursts forth spontaneously, regardless of organisation, in the family, in the social circle, at the meeting of friends, during travel, at summer and winter resorts, among the rich and poor, young and old, in legal contests and in the midst of the most serious legislative discussions, in the army and navy.

The spontaneity of this force and its association with many other energies puts it beyond an exact estimate of its social significance. Investigators who want serious and definite results are inclined to depreciate its importance. Social study has given greater prominence to this force and its value is being better appreciated. Sometimes it is closely connected with work and then work approaches play, as when study, music, art, or any pursuit, at first laborious, becomes easy and a pleasure. Talent toils where genius plays; and the work in the play may make genius the hardest of workers.

That in play the pleasure is in the activity itself, distinguishes it from work. Playing the piano may be a study as well as an entertainment. Games pursued for purposes of gambling become economic factors rather than sport. Foot-ball may be the hardest kind of work, instead of the spontaneous exercise of power. Its inspiration, in that case, is derived from the

rivalry, the enthusiastic spectators, the reports in the press, the fame of victory, and the gate-money.

Some have regarded play as a spontaneous exercise of surplus energy. This is an important factor, and explains why those who exhaust their energies in labour have so little play. Sometimes, however, the play-element appears on the part of labourers in the exercise of forces not exhausted by toil. Excessive labour always becomes an evil when it leaves a disposition only for the exercise of the lowest forces, such as the appetite.

Another important factor in play is the feeling of freedom in the player. He is not impelled by force, but the initiative of the action is in himself. In the spontaneity of play there is a direct and free expression of the inherent nature.

E. Curtius has an interesting address on "Arbeit und Musse," in *Alterthum und Gegenwart*. He says that a man's culture is estimated by the way in which he spends his leisure. His business or profession may be a necessity, but in leisure he gives free play to his inclinations.

150. While there is nothing distinctively human in the constitutional forces, their exercise in man may differ from that in animals. To what higher end could they be subordinated in the elephant or monkey? The animal provides food, defends itself, forms a kind of organisation, as in the case of ants and bees, and exerts the appetitive, affectional, and recreative powers. Were man limited to these energies, like the brute, he would never become a civilised being. The cultural forces give him distinction. They necessarily have a physical basis, but their essence is psychical. They can subordinate the body to their purposes, or in some respects may even be used for the constitutional impulses. They are cultural in a twofold sense: they require culture for their full manifestation and are the means of culture. Being inherent in man as a potential factor, their development is but a fulfilment of what in the child and savage appears only as a prophecy

or possibility. Later we shall see that the differences in the various stages of evolution do not arise from the elimination of any force, but from a change in the degree of development attained by the energies and in their relative dominance. Thus the reign of reason may supersede the reign of the appetite.

CHAPTER XI

THE CULTURAL FORCES

151. The *Æsthetic Force* naturally follows the energies which have just been considered. The very suggestiveness of nature solicits its activity. Its sphere is beauty wherever found, but, so far as it is productive, art is the realm in which it moves. Beauty makes direct appeals to the emotion, just as food and drink to the appetite; but this does not interfere with rational contemplation. The pleasure afforded by æsthetics is the occasion for easily correlating it with the appetite, the affections, and recreation. It is not accidental that "taste" applies equally to the appetite and æsthetics; in each case it stands for an impression whose immediate pleasure or displeasure is the basis of the judgment pronounced. So direct is the impression made by beauty that it seems ultimate or intuitional, and for this reason defies analysis and is so difficult of interpretation. Beauty pleases without obtruding on us the reason for the pleasure. In respect to spontaneity the æsthetic is similar to the recreative force; painful effort interferes with the operation of both. The relation of æsthetics to the useful is like that of play to work—one of contrast; but as work and play can be affiliated, so beauty may be affiliated with the useful arts and heighten their value through the pleasure they afford. Many persons make some kind of art the means of recreation—beauty is play and pleasure in a higher form. Art is thoroughly human—a human product and valued for its human influence. It appeals to

the imagination and excites emotions. No other end is required to determine its value. Art serves the saint in his devotions, the debauchee in his passions, and therefore finds a place in the religious sanctuary and in the haunts of vice. Money has value for what it purchases for man, art for what it produces in man.

Art is the language of the soul. In its artistic creations the spirit objectifies itself in a physical form. Every other force can be closely allied to it; and the energy which rules and finds expression in art reveals the dominant spirit. Art may be reduced to a means for economics, and then indicates the reign of the industrial trend. The State uses it for architecture, statuary, painting, and music; it glorifies political events and heroes. Family portraits and galleries prove its alliance with the affections. Its relation to the sexual passion has already been indicated. So far as it promotes self-expression or self-interest it reveals the egotic force. Past ages often express themselves most effectively through their art.

It is therefore not a problem whether art exalts or debases, since it may do either. Its influence depends on the place assigned it in education and public life, on the kind of art, and on the ethical character of the artist and the spectator. The æsthetic element is often a prominent factor in literature, even in history, as is seen in the historical works of Schiller, Gibbon, Macaulay, and Carlyle. This justifies the distinction between art for the sake of art, and art as an attachment to other forces to heighten their power.

Man is on the way to culture so soon as he frees himself sufficiently from the sensuous gratification afforded by nature to the contemplation of natural objects in the light of æsthetics. The apprehension of beauty has a liberating effect. It puts a mental and truly human quality in place of the slavish dominion of the appetite.

152. The æsthetic impulse manifests itself early among primitive peoples. At no time is the imagination wholly absent, and its creative energy can be exercised in connection with all forms of thought and life. Its first manifestations are necessarily crude, as when a natural object is slightly modified to represent some physical being or mental image—a stick rudely carved or painted so as to represent the eyes, nose, and mouth of the human face. Recent researches give greater prominence to the æsthetic faculty among savages than was formerly thought to be the case. Although often an adjunct to the animal passions, proof also exists that it was early employed to create art not allied with the appetite.

It is significant that this force is among primitive peoples most intimately connected with the person, much stress being laid on it in the adornment of the body. In general it is concerned more with animate than with inanimate nature. It is especially the forms and motions of life which attract the savage mind. Personal ornamentation gives distinction, ministers to vanity, has a sexual influence, perhaps is also used as a mark of rank. The body is tattooed, decorated with feathers, beads, shells, and bright garments for ornament rather than protection. Where the senses reign objects must be sensational, striking, in order to be effective. But, besides the body, the home and its utensils, the implements for the chase and for war, are also decorated. In Australian caves extensive and elaborate drawings were recently discovered, intended to represent various scenes from the occupations of natives. The aim seems to have been to copy life; but in doing this the imagination played a prominent part. There is no doubt that even among savages the æsthetic faculty may be very active and attain a considerable degree of development. This is established by the relics which have come down to us from the stone period, as well as by the art among exist-

ing savages. It is natural that in a low stage art should be chiefly decorative.

With the advance of culture the æsthetic faculty is still intent on beautifying what is useful (all excavations of ancient ruins furnish illustrations), but it also creates a sphere for itself, a world distinctively artistic. It becomes an adjunct and promoter of culture. It continues to copy, but it also creates symbols of the religious and intellectual life. Objects embalmed in art are different from ideas and ideals objectified in art. Greece gives life and thought in art no less than Egypt and Phœnicia; but the life and thought are different and the ideas more prominent. Beauty from the time of Greece till the present is appreciated as beauty, it becomes a dominant social factor, and associations for its specific culture are formed. Æsthetics is studied in the schools, finds a place in the home, promotes grace of person and movement, is revealed in speech and dress, creates the theatre, museum, and galleries, develops painting, sculpture, architecture, music, rhetoric, and in gardening turns nature into art. Through appeals to the emotions it often instructs and refines persons whom philosophy and science cannot elevate.

The interweaving of the other social forces with æsthetics, co-operating or antagonising, presents interesting problems. Persons of taste want everything in the most pleasing and most perfect shape. Art gives an attractive form to a substance. Our power of attention being limited, other interests often absorb so much attention as to leave little for æsthetics. This becomes a luxury which gives place to the necessities. Purely intellectual activity in inductive scientific investigation is as little favourable to the culture of the imagination as intense application to practical pursuits. Darwin's autobiography, and manufacturing centres, furnish the proof. This helps to explain the fact that in recent times the fine arts have

not flourished as much as in some former periods, particularly in Athens and Florence. American cities often reveal a lamentable lack of æsthetic culture. Art has been superseded by economics, natural science, and politics. Even wealth is often too vulgar to appreciate the spirit which in former ages made the refined art of the home an expression of the culture of the occupants. The most prominent art is now music, with Germany as the chief centre for its classical development.

The æsthetic force frequently acts unconsciously as well as spontaneously, and this is, perhaps, a reason why its educational value and social power are not duly appreciated. It is often treated as merely a play element, whereas it can be systematically developed and effectively harnessed.

The prominent parts played by æsthetics in social life entitles it to much consideration from sociology. Beauty is, however, usually left to be its own interpreter, and for this reason may receive less scholarly attention than it deserves. Its appeal to the mind is as direct as that of light to the eye and sound to the ear, awakening a responsive chord without reflection or analysis. Kant and other thinkers regarded it as an essential factor in the æsthetic faculty that it acts disinterestedly. Beauty affects us because it is beauty, not because it is useful. The possession of a work of art does not enhance the appreciation of its beauty. *The Transfiguration*, in the Vatican, is to me as beautiful as if it were my property. It is significant that the appeal in æsthetics is chiefly, if not wholly, to our higher senses, sight and hearing. In this respect it differs from the appetite. The æsthetic faculty is, in a peculiar sense, the sphere of the imagination, which reveals its creative power in symbolism, in representation, and in suggestions. (Appendix G.)

153. The transition from the æsthetical to the *Ethical Force* is the passage from pleasure to duty, from the im-

agination to the conscience. The energy concentrated in conscience is imperative; it commands, and its commands are absolute. It creates no tangible and visible objects like æsthetics, and its direct appeals are not to the eye and ear, but to the inner sense of right. With right and justice as its ruling ideas, it makes the *ought* ultimate. Being directive and authoritative, it does not concentrate its imperatives on any particular mental operation, but includes the whole range of human activity. Rightness of being, relation, and conduct is as rigid a demand of ethics as truth is of logic, as beauty of æsthetics. It therefore belongs to those human sciences which move in the realm of ideals.

In ethics we have pre-eminently a social energy. In solitude or among animals there is no hope that the individual will pass beyond rudimentary ethical conceptions and relations. These are developed amid the social activities. The child under the influence of its seniors soon learns that something ought to be; perhaps for it what *is* becomes the ought. The savage is dominated by traditional and customary notions of right.

In every normal human being the conditions for the development of conscience must exist. This is a necessity, though whether it implies a special faculty is another matter. Just what is innate, what acquired, is difficult to determine, if not impossible. What is deemed right results from education and reflection, and must be distinguished from the impulse to do what is recognised as right. The theory that conscience is a distinct innate faculty with an intuition of what is right, and from the beginning tending toward the right, is no more established than the theory that it is wholly created by the environment and experience. The notion of right is complex and difficult, and cannot exist and work before the mind has formed ideas. Conscience does not intuitively direct the child or savage to what ought to be; all

that can be claimed is that it impels to what is recognised as right. Even this impulse is created, or at least deeply affected, by training. It is not the same in the materialist and the theist, in determinism and freedom. Some peoples regard as right what others denounce as wrong, both respecting persons and property. At one time the same people may regard as right what at another is pronounced wrong. Ethical sentiment is liable to great changes, as in respect to duels and wars. Conscientiousness is a subjective rule of conduct, but no more an objective standard of right than of truth. Conscience moves predominantly in the realm of the relation of persons, and its judgment depends on the perception of this relation. Its judgments involve the total intellectual development. It is a standard of right only so far as the training of the entire personality is perfect.

Logic deals with conceptions and their relations; æsthetics, with form and its relation to the substance, whether that substance be a physical object, a historical theme, or an ideal; social ethics makes persons and the associations they form its objects, treating as its essence their relations to one another.

154. That there are intuitive conditions of conscience does not conflict with the statement that experience is required in order to bring it into full exercise. The same applies to reason, the will, and every mental factor. What is intuitive is co-operative with experience, and to this co-operation the result, a developed conscience, is due. Reasons for the notions of right not being intuitive, they can easily be found, after conscience has become a social force, in traditions and customs, in proverbs and institutions, and especially in the training given by parents to children. How the idea of right first appeared in society is merely a matter of speculation. While, in isolation, the individual could not be expected to rise

above his animal propensities, in associating with his fellows he moved in a higher sphere and was obliged to adapt himself to them and them to himself. Every need of, and desire for, them, all co-operation and conflict with them, every advantage of association and every lesson of social experience, proved the necessity of taking the views and actions of others into account and of establishing conformity by means of mutual adaptation. What was regarded as socially useful was deemed socially necessary. Often conformity to social utility was enforced. Special power, of course, belonged to persons or classes respected above others. Men, even in the lowest stage, could not long be together without learning to regard certain things as proper, and adopting certain manners and customs that sprang from expediency or necessity, which engendered habits and became, consciously or unconsciously, a code of propriety and morals. What was pleasant, expedient, useful, seems to have been the primitive standard of right. "What is good for me" naturally made the first and deepest impression. Until ideas were more fully developed no other standard was possible than the commands of religion or the will of a superior. Only as a much later development was the conception of what is right in general, abstracted from self and existing personal relations, possible. Even now, right as an ideal seems to be rare, even in the most advanced nations. With the development of society the ethical force became more definite, more exalted, and of wider application. Perhaps originally it was too much interwoven with the appetitive, affectional, and recreative forces to be distinguished from them. Afterwards it not only grew in distinctness, but might even antagonise them.

Powerful as this force is in early society in the form of custom, associations for its specific culture came much later. Its power has been exercised chiefly in influencing the other forces, subduing and directing some, developing

and exalting others. While the notion of right can be developed and the impulse to do right cultivated, the application of ethics always involves some specific sphere of conduct. In other words, nothing is purely ethical, but every kind of conduct may be ethical. The sphere of the application of ethics has been peculiarly powerful in politics, the law being essentially the ethical will of the State; and the ethical factor has also been prominent in religion. But aside from these spheres and its influence in general society, in enlightened lands special societies have been formed for ethical culture. Their aim can be the promotion of ethical principles and studies, or the application of ethics to the various departments of life.

Altruism, one of the chief factors in social ethics, is the opposite of selfishness. It is, however, dependent on culture, while selfishness is constitutional. Altruism as an ethical principle inculcates duty to one's fellow-men and, in connection with the affectional force, it involves all the benevolent feelings towards others. Its regard for the welfare of others extends beyond the range of kinship and nationality, and includes the whole human family.

The imperative will in ethics differentiates this force from the appetite, the affections, play, and æsthetics, in which the emotional element predominates. Feeling and ethics may be antagonistic and thus a man divided against himself. In feeling we have an existent state, something that is; but in ethics the consideration is what ought to be. Especially important is a contrast between the essential factors in æsthetics and ethics. Æsthetics is appreciative, ethics, authoritative and regulative; æsthetics solicits the taste, ethics, the conscience; æsthetics appeals to the emotion and pleases, ethics puts the will under compulsion, whatever the inclination may be. Conscience is a stern divinity. It insists that duty, not pleasure, is ultimate, and that enjoyment through duty is the true life. Genius is free to create in æsthetics;

but in ethics we are bound because we are free. Hence responsibility, accountability, remorse. In beauty the supremacy of æsthetics is beyond dispute; but ethics ascends the throne whenever the purpose of art, aside from beauty, is under consideration. Thus, in its moral relations, æsthetics is amenable to ethics. In questions purely economic ethics has no voice; but in the ethical relations of economics the decision rests with ethics. Sociology, taking into account the entire social system and the correlation of all the social energies, cannot sanction in art or the industries anything which is in conflict with right, whatever its conformity to æsthetic and economic rules.

In the individual the ethical factor is distinctly marked as the will to do right and promote the good. The will to do good is the essence of personal ethics; the execution, however, may depend too much on external conditions to be subject to the will of the individual. The conscious and perhaps laborious purpose in the direction of what is right distinguishes ethics from mere constitutional impulse. The subjective factor in ethics receives emphasis; the character, the aim. Moral judgment applies to motive, to conscience. Hence its liability to error when others are judged. In ethics we have a personal quality which can never fully objectify itself. There are great ethical personalities whose principles are embodied in conduct, but whose lives, nevertheless, come short of the ideal. We have seen that ethical life has no specific sphere for the concentration of ethics, a sphere purely ethical, as we have definite æsthetic objects. But ethics is seen in every phase of conduct. No human relation or act is wholly outside of the ethical sphere. In the family relation this force can be exercised, in organisations of every kind also, in economic and political affairs, likewise in æsthetics. The character of a religion determines its ethics; indeed, a religion must largely be judged by the relations it establishes between men. Judaism and Christianity have distinct moral codes. Modern religious

advance has to a great extent been in the line of ethical Christianity. The religions of Buddha and Confucius are predominantly ethical. Usually the ethical energy has heretofore attained its chief significance when religion stamped it as authoritative and final. In this way, especially, when likewise embodied in the law of the land, ethical principles have been made the imperative to which the other forces were subordinated.

So general is the application of ethics to society that the ethical might be called the universal social force. This will become more evident in the third division. The dominance of ethics where reason and conscience reign makes it strange that the ethical factor has not received greater prominence in sociology.

The extreme socialism of the Marx school is in danger of overlooking the subjective and individual character of ethics, because it concentrates the attention too exclusively on the external conditions of society. Ethics penetrates to the innermost parts of man. There is a rightness of being from which the rightness of relation springs. The intellect must be true in order to discover the truth; and the personality must be right in order to discover the right in the social relations. A pure conscience and a moral character do not lose their significance in an age of one-sided empiricism and communism. There is no ethical conduct, whatever the world may say of a man, unless its source is in an ethical disposition. We can say, with Kant, that in all the universe there is nothing good but a good will.

155. In the body of rules controlling its intercourse society deposits many of its ethical notions. Etiquette establishes what is believed to be becoming, demanded by the persons and the occasion. Especially when manners and customs have the sanction of antiquity are they apt to be regarded as peculiarly authoritative. They form a tie with the ancestors and may be deemed essential for recognition in a family or clan. Rules may be

self-protective, to prevent the intrusion of unseemly persons. A prescribed mode of attire and rigidly regulated forms are characteristic of court circles and aristocracies. They are marks of rank and propriety. What at first had a good reason for existence may, of course, lose its right, degenerate to a mere form, and promote a dead formality and prevent progress. Hence the inane survivals of former times when different notions and conditions prevailed.

The rigid adherence to established customs among primitive peoples is, in part, due to their reverence for ancestors. Then, the crude state of culture made it necessary to create forms in which the individual was to move. Probably those in authority established rules to protect and promote their own honour, dignity, and supremacy. The lack of individualism favoured communism respecting social regulations, leaving as little as possible to individual arbitrariness. While all were children they preferred to have settled for them what a strong man insists on settling for himself.

Ethics embodied in social rules is an important theme. Not that ethics was the sole consideration in their adoption. Religious notions, the taste, and ambition, no doubt had a share in their establishment. A ruler made unapproachable, or approachable only according to fixed regulations, seemed exalted above ordinary mortals and allied to Deity.

156. The recognition of the *Religious Force* in society has nothing to do with the abstract question of theological truth or with the relative value of different creeds. The testimony respecting the universality of religion varies. This is, in part, due to a lack of consensus respecting what is meant by religion. We take its essence to consist in the recognition of, and subjection to, a power or powers behind visible objects, whose dominion over man

is believed to be direct, or else through other beings, or through nature. The subjection may be obscure, largely unconscious, an undefined feeling, a dark dread of something, rather than a clear conception; or it may have the definiteness of the most fully developed monotheism. Closely connected with, or a part of, the religious notions of primitive peoples is the belief in demons, ghosts, and witchcraft, in the numerous forms of sorcery, in the efficacy of sacrifices, and in a life after death. Religion impels a man to seek refuge and help outside of himself and the ordinary manifestations of nature. When coupled with ignorance it opens an endless realm to superstition. The worship involved in religion aims to appease or gain the favour of some demon or divinity, or to give expression to the feeling of devotion and reverence. The inwardness of religion has made it difficult, if not impossible, for travellers passing through savage regions, whose languages were unknown to them, to judge of the religious character of the people. These were probably inclined to hide their religious beliefs from strangers. Sometimes later travellers found traces of religion where the earlier ones discovered none. Careful investigators claim that no people have ever been known to exist without some kind of religion. Whatever the final conclusion on this subject may be, we can affirm that the religious force, so far as we know, has always manifested itself whenever a certain stage of development was attained.

The problem of religion has been complicated by the claim that the religious force is innate in man. So far as definite manifestations are concerned we must again emphasise that no higher or cultural force is innate; all we are entitled to start human life with in respect to reason, æsthetics, morals, and religion is a certain power or capacity that assumes a definite shape and energy under the influence of stimuli which exercise and develop this power. We are born with the condition for religion,

just as with the condition for the development of reason, will, æsthetic taste, and conscience. These are, in many persons, present throughout life in the form of potentiality rather than actuality. In a lower stage of development, just as in the case of the infant, the religious energy may be a mere possibility, without arguing against the universality of religion when a higher stage of evolution is attained, and without interfering with the power of the religious force in humanity. In respect to original endowment religion thus has a place in the human family similar to that of beauty and truth. Heathenism may be, socially, as effective as Christianity. The devotees of fetishism no less than of monotheism regard religion as the chief concern of this life and the sole hope of a life beyond. Sometimes its dominion is calm and deep, at others characterised by wild fanaticism and demoniac fury.

Religion influences the individual's relations, controls social groups, and produces countless associations. Its altars, sacred groves, synagogues, mosques, temples, and churches cover the earth and have been centres of mightiest power. History itself is largely an account of religion. This force has organised, unified, and ruptured states, and some of the world's greatest wars have been religious. Not only has it been a missionary force, but it has deeply affected intellect in all its manifestations, often subordinating thought and life to its own peculiar ends. Its energy is thus felt in other than specifically religious associations. Religion has founded and directed empires, shaped civilisation, and moulded schools, literature, art, and life.

In religion, as well as in ethics, the subjective element sharply separates the private from the social force. We cannot here consider how greatly individual faith may fail of expression in public life. Neither can we, in dealing solely with religion as a social factor, consider its origin in the human family. This must be left to the

numerous works on the history and philosophy of religion. Various theories prevail, and it is clear that the problem is not within reach of scientific solution. With man's emotions and imagination in a world of mystery and inspiring awe, there were numerous occasions and possibilities for the origin of the religious sentiment. Particular dreams may have been a less potent factor than the fact that the whole life was a kind of dream. Sickness and privation, and foes and death, and the horrors of the unknown, gave impulses to seek relief in something beyond natural and human agency. The rise of religion seems to have been inevitable; but we have no data to determine which of the many possibilities became the actual course pursued. Our concern is with the social actuality of religion, with its faith and love, and hate and fear, with its vows and sacrifices, its reverence and worship, so far as they effect human relation and social action.

The one factor peculiar to religion, and giving it a force different from all other psychological agencies, is the fact that it makes its ultimate appeals to what is supernatural and superhuman. The superhuman element in faith may sever the individual's social bonds. God is brought in as a new factor, which may become so absorbing as to withdraw the individual from society. The power of monasticism is revealed both in ancient and modern religions. Even in Christianity the asceticism of the hermit's life has been exalted above the family and other social relations, and made the supreme condition of devotion. The intensely personal character of religion has given emphasis to individual ethics, while social ethics has been a far less prominent feature in religion. It could not be otherwise so long as individual salvation was the chief concentration of the religious energy. On the other hand, religion has also been intensely social. In this respect it has rivalled or even surpassed the affectional and political forces. It

has put men into the most intimate relations, and its very associative force separated them from all others. Religious hatred has been the parallel of religious love; and in both respects the social results have been mighty. Savages and barbarians are indissolubly united by belief, and made deadly foes by different faiths.

Religion generally means a passionate fanaticism in proportion as it is abstracted from the other forces, especially from the intellectual. It has exalted, but also degraded, society; has promoted error as well as truth, and ministered alike to slavery and to freedom; has inspired and promoted the highest conceptions of philosophy and the best personal and social culture, and also checked the course of progress and perpetuated effete traditions and gross superstitions. Often the personal relation supposed to be established with divinity has produced an impudent dogmatism and a supercilious conceit, which not only dispensed with, but bitterly opposed, research and the development of science. A feeling of blessedness claimed, through alliance with Deity, to possess the universe, while the free exercise of reason was regarded as dangerous to this blessedness. Reason and faith have been proclaimed antagonistic, and rationalism has been declared the foe of spirituality. We are dealing with facts as found in heathenism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, but do not profess to criticise them. No one can, however, question that religion has, at times, been abused to the injury of society.

Among savages the religious force frequently ministers to the appetite; but it may also be used to restrain and regulate it. Rigorous sexual relations have prevailed among them which were thought to have had their origin in an ancestor who was believed to be divine or endowed with divine authority. Priests, medicine-men, and soothsayers were supposed to sustain special relations to the Deity, and this gave them almost unlimited power. In

many instances the ministers of religion were either themselves rulers or became the advisers of rulers, the directors of public affairs, and the educators of the people. Between religion and art the relation has been intimate, as in drawing, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and oratory. The first three, besides dancing, have a religious significance even among savages. But while religion has deeply affected the other social forces these have also had great influence on its character and movements. As a phase of culture it is specially affected by the other cultural forces and, in a large measure, shares their fate. The philosophy of the Middle Ages exerted a controlling influence over theology, and in modern times both philosophy and science have permeated religious thought. Religion has, for ages, shaped political action, but the State has also treated religion as one of its functions, and tried to determine the faith and worship of its people.

Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, vol. i., p. 168, pronounces mythical Lubbock's theory that atheism was passed through by all ancient peoples, and Spencer's view that the impressions associated with death gave rise to religion.

We should have to leave the scientific domain of sociology and enter that of theology in order to discuss the question of the supernatural element in religion. The social influence of religion presents a problem which is totally different from that of the truth of a particular religion. This latter problem sociology leaves entirely to theology, just as it leaves metaphysical problems to metaphysics.

157. Their psychical character does not make the social forces intellectual. Some are predominantly emotional, others volitional. The intellect, as distinct from sensibility and will, is, however, to some degree involved in all these forces, but frequently to so slight an extent as not to be conspicuous. In not one of them is the intellect *per se* dominant. If it were, there would be no reason for

making the *Intellectual Force* an object of specialisation. In their higher stages of development intellect becomes influential in economics, politics, æsthetics, ethics, and religion; but the question remains, whether it is properly estimated when regarded as merely an attachment to these social energies. Does it not, aside from such specific aims, at times become dominant and make their intellectuality the most striking characteristic of social movements? The answer must be in the affirmative. Reason may assert its supremacy and become the arbiter of the value, the relation, and the course of thought. It even sets itself up as the standard of ethics and religion. Socrates makes knowledge the essence of morality, and Kant attempts to subject all objects to rational criticism. The dominance of the intellectual factor is seen in the prominence given to noëtics or the theory of knowledge, to the scientific method, and to science. There are individuals, associations, and pursuits, whose intellectuality is the supreme consideration. We hear of scholars who value knowledge, as they do truth, for its own sake. Teachers are exhorted to train thinkers rather than to make the imparting of information the ultimate aim.

This force creates and promotes schools for general as well as for specific culture, founds lectureships and libraries, organises philosophical associations, and establishes great scientific academies for the progress of the highest forms of valid knowledge. Intellectualism and rationalism have been largely confined to the schools; but they have also exerted a powerful influence in general society. The social trend has often been dominated by the intellect of the universities and literatures. Certain periods in Greece, Italy, Germany, France, and England have been specially marked by their intellectual energy. No other force has required so long a time to develop into dominance, and its greatest influence seems to be reserved for the future.

Men of great intellect form a class by themselves. They leave the impress of their intellectuality on all they investigate. Their intellect is really supreme, just as in others the political, the literary, the artistic, the ethical, or the religious factors. When Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel touch literature and art, the supremacy of the intellect is manifest. Men of this character, especially when eminent as philosophers and scientists, leave their mark on whole ages, as the era inaugurated by Socrates in Greece, with Aristotle as the most intellectual representative; the time of the schoolmen in the Middle Ages; the philosophical era in Germany from Kant to Hegel; and the modern scientific era participated in by all enlightened nations.

The reign of intellectualism is seen in various tendencies, sometimes even in a one-sided form. Knowledge is pronounced power, and universal enlightenment is a cherished ideal. The age of universal criticism has been inaugurated. Reason has been heralded as man's chief prerogative. There is not a department of thought which has not felt the transforming, or even undermining, influence of the critical and the scientific spirit. Philosophy and science are to be made universally applicable. One of the striking proofs is seen in historiography. History has often been written to promote religious, ethical, or political theory; but Niebuhr, Ranke, and other leaders in historic research declared that history has nothing to do with such theory, being concerned solely with a knowledge of the truth.

In the scholarly movements of society the intellectual force claims a place similar to that occupied by logic in the domain of thought. Indeed, logic is one of its chief agents.

158. The classification of the social energies, according to the relative dominance of intellect, feeling, and will, opens a much larger field of investigation than we can

here enter. Often these three psychical factors are inextricably blended; and, at times, one and then another reigns supreme in the same sphere. Every social theme can be considered theoretically, or apprehended with the feelings, or made the object of practical application by the will. Persons, occasions, the need of the times, thus determine which faculty shall be dominant.

In the constitutional forces feeling reigns supreme, feeling closely related to the physical organism. As impulse, often blind, it powerfully affects the will. In æsthetics feeling is also strong, frequently dominant, but allied with imagination. Every effort to give an objective form to an æsthetic ideal, of course, involves the energy of the will. The keenest intellect may likewise be exercised in artistic creation. Feeling is generally powerful in religion, often dominant, though intellect may dispute its supremacy, while the will is exerted in the practical application of religion and may gain the supremacy. Superstition has the impulses and activities of fanaticism. Theology naturally appeals, first of all, to the intellect. In ethics and politics we have the supremacy of the will, but with much occasion for the use of the highest rational powers. Ethical and political problems are among the most profound with which the human mind can grapple, and the intensest feeling is also at times involved. In the statesman the political supremacy belongs, theoretically at least, to the most powerful intellect, and surely it is much needed. In economics, especially in such advanced stages as the world now presents, a union of the intellectual and volitional energies is necessary. Economic theory requires profound investigation of principles, while the will to apply the theory is not demanded. In practical life, with the economic will supreme, the victory is often secured by the prominence of the intellect as the directive force. Ordinary business, however, is will moving along evident lines established by custom.

In separating the intellectual from the other forces for special treatment, the intellect is considered in cases where it is dominant, not in cases where it is merely an adjunct to other forces. Intellect promoting æsthetics differs from intellect when dealing with the ultimate rational problems of the universe, as in the case of philosophy.

159. Another vast and important field, of whose border only a few hints can here be given, is the relation of these forces to physical means. The forces are treated as psychical; they involve, as we have just seen, certain thoughts, emotions, and volitions. But so long as these are purely individual they are private. In order to become social they must somehow pass from the individual mind to others and thus affect society. How, now, do the psychic forces become social? All use physical means, as we have seen; but not all the same or in the same degree.

The eminent thinkers in economics make their theories known in lectures and books; these theories reach multitudes, as in the case of Adam Smith and Carl Marx, and thus deeply affect society. But the ultimate purpose is to subordinate nature to man's physical needs. In the application of the theory the aim is to transform nature into wealth. Hence the practical materialism so often involved in economic pursuits. Speculation on the exchange which has no solid basis deals not with realities, but with fictions. In agriculture, mining, manufacturing, in stores, in commerce, in what we eat and wear and dwell in, the physical factor is at once evident.

The application of political science involves the relations of persons, the territory of the State, finances, the property of the citizens, buildings for numerous purposes, and the vast physical appliances for carrying on the affairs of the Government, of which the post-office, the army, and the navy are only prominent examples. No other

organisation equals the State in the physical means used for executing its purposes.

The egotic impulse can resort to all kinds of physical means to express itself and gain its selfish or altruistic ends. The appetite resorts to nature for gratification. Affection makes the world minister to love. Recreation is both mental and physical; but so far as bodily exercise is concerned it is, of course, the latter. In proportion as the recreation is pure and simple the mind lets itself go and yields to whatever play the occasion affords. That this force does not wholly depend on physical factors is shown by the fact that a change of mental occupation is often the best recreation.

Æsthetics puts mind into matter and celebrates the triumph of the idea over physical substance. From the tent and hut to the palace and cathedral we have thought clothing itself in a material form. So thought realises itself on canvas and in statuary. Music and rhetoric deal with a less palpable material, but no less physical, whether manifested in composition or sound. No other force so completely unites the psychical and physical factors as the æsthetic.

Ethics deals less directly with substance than art, but more with relations. So far as social it has ideals of relations which it seeks to realise in the connection of human beings. It attains objective reality in establishing right relations, and for that reason law is one of its most important agencies. It also finds an embodiment in ethical institutions, which aim to establish justice and righteousness. In benevolent institutions the ethical factor is prominent, being an expression of duty toward the needy and suffering. The family, the school, the State, are apt to be ethical in proportion to the culture attained. If ethics could be as directly embodied in institutions or physical substances as æsthetics is in art, the popular effect, so largely dependent on the senses, would be greater.

Religion is subjective and personal; but its physical manifestations are numerous and striking. The attitude in devotion; singing, preaching, the services at the altar; temples, synagogues, mosques, churches, and numerous religious institutions, testify to the ability of religion to objectify and symbolise itself in physical forms. To these belong all religious services which are social.

The intellectual force is active in all the cases named where thought embodies itself in form or sound. Philosophy and science use speech and writing, numerous instruments and institutions, such as schools and laboratories. But these are to be classed as scientific means rather than as an embodiment of science itself. The inventions which result from science are manifestations of the principles discovered and elaborated. But whatever is purely intellectual can find full expression only in language. It uses symbols, but, aside from language, no symbol can be an adequate revelation of intellect itself.

It would be interesting to take up the subjects taught in schools and determine the relation of the forces, which have been considered, to them. This is comparatively easy when a particular force is dominant, as in economics, political science, ethics, religion, æsthetics. But it becomes more difficult when different forces are blended. In language and history all the forces are active. In general literature all the forces are likewise brought into play, sometimes under the guidance of the æsthetic or the intellectual force. In theology the religious or the intellectual force may be dominant. Sociology not only includes all the forces, but also their relations to each other.

160. The epitome of the social forces here given affords a summary view of the processes at work in the marvellous social organism of humanity. It is only a bird's-eye view at a great distance, with outlines, but not filled with content. Each force has a place in society sufficiently distinct to enable us to specialise on it; but, as we have

seen, it can no more be wholly abstracted from the rest than a thought of the mind can be made to stand out in perfect isolation. There are no breaks in the mental cosmos. But a force may be so dominant that it outranks all the rest and subordinates them to its purposes. Taking the whole of society from the beginning, we find that the ten forces form the stream of human history, but so blended are they that we cannot determine just where one force ends and another begins. Now one force and then another forms a distinct current in the centre of the movement; at other times the stream flows on so smoothly that it is impossible to tell which force dominates. The social energies are interwoven as the tissues of the body. From their interaction they naturally produce totally different results from the operation of an energy by itself. For this reason the isolation of a force for scientific specialisation, as in economics and political science, does not give a view of the actual working of that force amid all the influences to which it is subject. In actual society every energy is liable to endless modifications; and the combinations of the forces also take place in an infinite variety of forms. Hence the bewildering diversity in society. All the forces are exercised in social groups, and for that reason it may be impossible to tell which energies predominate; but this difficulty vanishes in the case of organisations with a specific purpose.

In every life, in every society, while some force is apt to be dominant, there is an interaction of all the forces. For this reason the history of any period includes all the energies described. In such a work as Gibbon's each factor, now pre-eminent, then inextricably interwoven with others, can be traced. For a full understanding of these energies it is a valuable exercise to take a life, an association, a period of development, a work of history, a piece of literature, and examine the working and interacting of the various forces.

161. A difference prevails, as intimated, in the organising power of the energies. Some are strongly associative and seek to accomplish their ends by means of formal associations, while others act in society at large but do not so uniformly create organisations. With the exception of the political force, which requires the State, every one can act independently of associations. The egotic force in its self-seeking may be private or social, without being associative; but perhaps the value, the influence, the opinion, the creed, and the welfare of self can best be promoted in combination with others. Whether men be brutal or ethical they make organisations the means of self-embodiment and self-projection. Men would hardly form an association unless they expected self to have a prominent place in it. In a charitable association the egotic force expresses itself in the form of sympathy and benevolence. The appetitive, one of the strongest forces, is least inclined to permanent associations on a large scale. Its egotism and tyranny are in the way of combination, unless gratification can be made mutual. It may, however, be a strong impulse to economic organisation in order to gain its end. Formal organisation with appetite as the sole consideration is animal rather than human, and possible only in low stages of culture. The affectional force is unitive, exerts a powerful social influence, but, aside from the family and friendly groups, does not usually organise. The recreative force, closely allied to the appetitive in its search for pleasure, forms many organisations now, but its most extensive influence is often seen in general society and in spontaneous activity. The economic force is both unitive and divisive, according as it can best attain its purposes. All of the cultural forces form organisations, particularly the religious energy; but each is also a powerful factor in general society. The affinity created in cultural stages by similarity of views and pursuits furnishes a strong motive

for organisation, aside from all personal advantages. "Birds of a feather flock together."

Largely by its dominant energy or energies is the character of the society of an age interpreted. But around the ruling force the other forces should be grouped according to their influence in order to understand a period. The economic force may of necessity be the most energetic; then the age will be interpreted by the ultimate aim in the exercise of this force. An aim which is dominant may not affect equally all the members of society. Industrialism and militarism may be the leading trend, while in large circles the cultural forces are more effective. The Church, the schools, the ethical and æsthetic societies may strive to make the industrial and military forces subservient to their purposes.

The dominance and interaction of the social forces is liable to great changes. Usually the process is gradual and perhaps unobserved: in revolutions, however, it may be very sudden. Appearances are apt to be deceitful respecting the real power of the respective energies. What is most effective and most permanent may be hidden because so deep. The acme of a power may be the beginning of its decay. The causes at work are of far more importance for social interpretations than the most striking phenomena. A political party at the summit of its power and confident of the future has, perhaps, already been defeated.

SECOND DIVISION
SOCIAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER XII

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

162. An adequate discussion of the general theory of evolution would require a history of the subject from the time of the Greeks, and a review of the most prominent scientific and philosophical literature of the nineteenth century, especially that which centres around Darwinism. So far is the subject from being closed that it teems with profound problems which must, for many ages yet, enlist the energies of thinkers and investigators. The following are among these problems: the nature of evolution; the factors involved; the causes of the various processes, and the results produced. There has evidently been too much haste to establish some general formula which was thought to explain every kind of development, without waiting to obtain, analyse, and compare the requisite data, and without discriminating between the inherent differences in the objects evolved. Elaborate discussion has shown that the same laws cannot apply uniformly to the development of totally different things. Under the general idea of evolution we now have physical evolution, as in the nebular hypothesis in astronomy; chemical and geological evolution; biological, which has received most attention since the impulses given by the researches and theories of Darwin, Wallace, and Spencer; and in the higher forms of life we have psychological and sociological evolution. Whatever general laws may be universally applicable, each kind of evolution has peculiarities according to the nature of its objects. For exact results the

peculiar character of the object subject to development will have to be considered. Social evolution, which concerns us, concentrates the attention on the changes which society has undergone in its movement from the beginning till its most advanced stage in the present.

The remarkable effect produced by the theory of evolution in all departments of science can be learned by comparing the researches since 1860 with those which preceded. Things before regarded as stationary were henceforth to be viewed as in perpetual flux. The wealth of ideas involved, as well as the light evolution throws on the past and present, and even into the future, commended it to thinkers. Cause and effect, dynamic forces, process, development, being and becoming, permanence and change, are among these ideas. The theory was also directly applicable to the interpretation of the infinite variety produced successively throughout the universe. A peculiar interest attaches to social evolution, because the products pertain to man himself and his highest interests.

163. It is thus clear that in this second division our view of society is entirely different from the first. We have studied the *nature* of society in its constituent elements and the relation of these elements to each other. Social analysis revealed those factors which exist wherever society is found. But these factors are themselves subject to endless variations, appearing at different times in different degrees of development and in various forms of interaction. While determining what society *is* in itself, we must also consider that it has life and movement; that its elements, in one sense ever the same, are extremely variable, and that processes of development take place. This development of society involves the transformation of the social energies, and the changes in their relation and products. In the evolution of society we deal with the dynamic factors, the causes of social change, and the results produced by the social ferment.

The dynamic power is mental, and we must look to man himself as the chief force in evolution. Social evolution results from the conscious or unconscious use which man makes of his physical environment and geographical position. Nature furnishes the marble, but man is the sculptor. Besides the marble, nature, of course, also furnishes stimuli for human activity; but the effect of the stimuli depends on man. Man and nature are co-operative in social evolution. At first nature takes the lead in the co-operation, and then man gains the ascendancy and uses nature as his tool.

164. Evolution means the unfolding of an object, making actual and manifest the inherent powers and qualities which, in the beginning, are latent and undeveloped. Growth or development is thus the essential factor in the process. Something infolded is unfolded; the involved is evolved; the implicit made explicit. A genesis takes place by means of which what exists originally in a potential form is actualised. In Hegelian terminology evolution makes real what an object is in idea; it is a method of self-realisation. Thus, if freedom and rationality belong to the idea of man, development should make all men free and rational. The deep truth that man should become what he *is* dates back to Greek philosophy. He may begin as the companion of brutes, but is to unfold the humanity concealed in his being. Culture in its generic sense is likewise used for the development of something inherent or possible in an object, as when we speak of horticulture or sheep-culture. The purpose of such culture is to bring out what is regarded as best.

While these views serve to elucidate the general sense of evolution, we must be careful not to confound the process which actually takes place with ethical evolution or the development of what ought to be. Among the best general types of evolution in living objects are the

seed which grows into a plant and the child which develops into a man.

To this primitive sense must, however, be added another kind of change which now is also called evolution, namely, the results produced by combining different substances through external additions. Under this head we have the Kant-Laplace theory of the formation of planets and stars from nebulous matter. According to cosmical evolution the universe is evolved by uniting the atoms scattered through space. This kind of evolution is, of course, very different from that of a chicken from the egg or a plant from the seed, and we must guard against postulating analogies where none exist. Both processes are at work in society. The energies inherent in a society are unfolded, but there are also external additions, by means of immigration, the union of separated peoples, or an addition to the membership of an organisation from outsiders. The notion of descent from a common ancestor does not, therefore, exhaust the notion of evolution. Numerous forces with different origins may become united in the same evolutionary process.

All evolution is change, but all change is not evolution. The space relation of objects can be altered without evolving them. Devolution also takes place, as after the development of the human powers the faculties decay in old age or return to a stage of childhood. Trees grow and decay. In society we also find devolution as well as evolution. Strictly speaking, evolution is a continual becoming, *ein ewiges Werden*.

We live in a universe of relations and connections, with a complex interchange of forces, so that the development of an object may depend on many other factors besides its inherent energy. A living object dies if left to itself. The seed unfolds only in its proper environment—soil, air, sunlight, and moisture. Only in connection with its

body can the social mind develop. Since both are necessary and constantly interact, it may be impossible to tell what is due to inherent energy and what to the surroundings.

In order to understand a society we must take into account the external increment it receives, as well as what it evolves of its inherent power. This is one of many instances which prove that a specific society can only be understood in connection with all the societies to which it is related. In the United States we have not merely the growth resulting from the development of the original thirteen colonies, but also numerous additions from other peoples. Forces from many countries are added to the native forces to constitute the society of the United States.

Interesting problems arise from this union of external factors with the native forces of a society. The external increment may strengthen and develop the original trend or divert it into different channels. Emigrants may imbibe and promote the American spirit, or introduce a foreign spirit, with foreign ideas, manners, customs, and tendencies. It is a serious problem whether the United States will be able to Americanise its foreign elements, or whether they will foreignise American institutions, especially in the large cities with many foreigners. The common rule is that a foreign element is assimilated to the native element to which it is added, but that the native characteristics are likewise changed by the foreign admixture.

165. Society is necessarily the product of man under the influence of the forces of the universe which act upon him and to whose stimuli he responds. The nature of these forces and their effects on human beings and their associations are subjects of interminable investigation. All that can be claimed is that every possible social variation during evolution must exist potentially in the social energies of individuals in connection with the energies which environ them. Dealing with beings as they are, not with the question of their origin, we are obliged to

affirm that only what is preformed—in the elements at least—can be performed, and that every step in evolution but fulfils the prophecy in the preceding step.

These statements lay no claim to a science of evolution ; but the problem of evolution is brought before the mind more clearly by an apprehension of the presuppositions involved. Actual but scattered forces are so concentrated as to co-operate for the production of a new result, which is an advance on the preceding stage. This second division seeks to interpret the metamorphosis of society under the influence of the existing energies.

Evolution, a movement from cause to effect, implies that the content of the effect is involved in the cause. That the present is the product of the entire past, that what exists in any period is the resultant of all that preceded it in the direct line of descent, will be accepted as a correct inference from the doctrine of evolution.

That a thing is something and then becomes something else has, for thousands of years, been one of the profoundest problems of the human mind. Is it still the same thing after the change? If so, why the difference? The transformations in mind and society are not less marked than in chemistry and biology. In all we have composition and decomposition in endless variety. Could the chemist determine exactly what each element is, to what modifications it is liable, what combinations it can enter, and what products must result, he might construct a chemistry of the universe which would explain all possible chemical action and combination. So if the sociologist understood perfectly the social forces, the influences to which they will be subject, their combinations, the resulting social contents and their manifestations, the social structures being included in these manifestations, he would have the key to all social possibilities.

These reflections simply make evident what the idea of evolution involves.

166. Evolution confronts us in the processes of history and in the movements of the present. We need but watch our own minds to observe its workings. The genesis of every thought, the construction of every system, and every experiment we make involves the idea. The great evolutionary problems, as well as their solution, must be learned from the process itself. However it may apply to other departments, we can do nothing in sociology with the dictum, "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion." What matter is integrated and what motion dissipated in constructing the idea of cause, progress, goodness, and beauty? Nor are we aided when Mr. Spencer informs us that matter, force, and motion are absolutely unknowable. Actual interpretation is limited to the realm of the knowable. To make cosmical, chemical, or biological evolution the law for social evolution ends inquiry by means of an unwarranted assumption. First, let it be established that the characteristics of social are the same as of cosmical, chemical, and biological evolution. How the evolution of society can be explained while ignoring what is *sui generis* in it is not apparent. We must not forget that its psychological essence distinguishes human society even from the animal associations.

As, in the first division, we were obliged to go directly to society to learn its nature, so, in the second, we go directly to it for a knowledge of the transformations to which it is subject. From the phenomena of social evolution we proceed to the causes, laws, and principles, just as from the facts of geology we learn the evolution of the earth. That our purpose, however, is not merely a history of social evolution has been made evident by preceding discussions.

J. M. Baldwin, *l. c.*, p. 455, recognises the continuous operation of the laws of biology and heredity in society, but

thinks them subject to social modification. While these laws work, "it is equally plain that in human society certain other influences, springing from intelligent and social life, come to modify the outcome. We may simply say, therefore, that biological laws do hold all through human life, but that we sometimes find reason for saying that they are interfered with by other devices or laws."

167. Mistakes similar to those respecting the nature of society lie at the basis of prevalent theories of social evolution. A false conception of society necessarily vitiates the evolution based on it. Especially must we completely eradicate every notion of society as a separate entity, a unit independent of other objects and complete in itself, an organism like an individual human being. You can call it a compound, or even an organism, produced by the social forces; but these forces, however compounded, never attain an independent existence, never can be abstracted from their individual sources so as to grow or work by themselves. Take away either Frederick the Great or Voltaire, and you take away the society they formed in Potsdam. The social energies do not create an organism which has in itself life and the conditions of development. This peculiarity of society as not an independent being, but a compound of forces which can exist only in individuals, makes social evolution wholly different from what is known as organic evolution, and greatly complicates its problems.

Not only is the evolution of society essentially psychological, but we also know that the mind actually evolved and the forces which are exerted exist only in the individual. Could we postulate a social mind which develops through the ages, the process would become more simple. But such a social mind, as we have seen, exists only in a figurative sense. The individuals change, they pass away, and others take their place. Society does not, therefore, present the continuity found in an organism or

an individual mind. The dominance of the psychological factors makes it evident that processes among primitive peoples, close to nature and the animal world, cannot be like those in a high stage of culture. Hence evolution which confines itself to early conditions fails to give a full view of the total development of humanity.

In an orchestra with one hundred instruments, how does the performance of a piece of music, say a symphony by Beethoven, take place? No note is evolved from another, still less are all the notes of one moment evolved from those of the preceding. Each performer plays his instrument so as properly to relate its sound with those produced by the other instruments. The two processes which take place in the case of each performer are: a mental conception of the notes and the expression of this conception through his instrument. The various sounds are so related as to produce the music of the symphony.

The performance of the orchestra throws light on the evolution of society. Society is produced by the social forces, as the music by the orchestra. How is the music changed? It is done if the performers in any way change the sounds or their blending. If a single one reads the notes differently, or changes the sound expressing the notes, the entire performance is changed. In the evolution of the symphony, just as in the evolution of society, no substantial entity is evolved or changed; but the sounds and their relations are altered in the music, just as in social evolution the forces and their relations are changed.

168. From the seed which develops into the manifold variety of a plant and from similar processes it is inferred that all evolution involves a change from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Usually the differentiation effected is marked. Undue emphasis on this differentiation has, however, resulted in ignoring the fact that in social evolution a development from heterogeneity to homogeneity likewise takes place. Society does not start as a unit but with a differentiation, with the forces of

different individuals; and in the genesis of society the unification of the forces is among the most important problems. The individual develops and his powers are differentiated, heterogeneity being evolved from homogeneity. But society in the best sense is possible only if it possesses unity as the basis of co-operation. Society is, in fact, homogeneity created from individual heterogeneity. Every organisation which emerges from a previous unorganised state furnishes the proof.

The evolution of society must accordingly be regarded as a twofold process, that of unification and differentiation, a development of heterogeneity and likewise of homogeneity. These do not exclude each other. As the social forces grow in diversity they can, at the same time, be assimilated and unified, better adapted to each other, and therefore made more completely co-operative. Men think their own thoughts and go their own ways while isolated; but in society they learn to think and act together. Social conflict is largely a process by means of which unity is attained. A class, for years under the same teacher, is differentiated, the minds expand, the thoughts unfold, differences increase; the pupils, however, appropriate his thoughts, learn the same lessons, and their homogeneity grows with their heterogeneity. Students of nature, with the greatest differentiation involved in the expansion of knowledge, also have innumerable bonds of union. The members of an academy of science have more scientific bonds to unite them than any one of them can have with a person who has no science. An association of philosophers has greater heterogeneity than a horde of savages; but their homogeneity is likewise greater. What an agreement in thought and purpose and method and system, of which the horde knows nothing!

It is strange that a principle so universal in history has not received greater prominence. The foreigner who

comes to a country adds to its heterogeneity; but he is assimilated, nationalised, and thus increases the homogeneity. The development of differentiation is specially marked in language—a few roots at first and then a constantly increasing variety. But another process in connection with this is overlooked. Each individual at first has his own sounds and expressions which no one else understands—heterogeneity without homogeneity; but the growth of language involves growth in unity—all adopt the same sounds and words, and the original heterogeneity is lost in homogeneity. As society develops it expresses its increasing homogeneity in maxims and proverbs, in customs and laws. Why are laws created where formerly none existed? A nation once consisting of freemen and slaves has only freemen in later ages. Castes and ranks disappear and all citizens stand on a common level. Schools of thought arise which develop systems and promote heterogeneity; but the very development of thought also reveals homogeneous elements formerly hidden. The strong modern tendency to monism in the midst of the utmost heterogeneity of thought is significant. And what shall we say of the unifying process of Christianity in creating, in the most diverse nations and races, a great fund of homogeneous thought and feeling and volition?

It requires a very one-sided method of thought to overlook the homogeneous factors which are developed with the heterogeneous. The diversity may be most striking, and for that reason the underlying oneness more difficult of apprehension. Hence, schools and religions are so apt to magnify their differences and overlook their agreement. The antagonism of capital and labour are emphasised, but the bonds of union and reasons for co-operation ignored. One ground of difference outweighs a score of urgent reasons for union. The time may come when these reasons shall be discovered and thus homogeneity

emphasised. The fact is that chaos and anarchism would be the result of social evolution if the unifying process were not involved as well as the differentiating. Not only is the unsocial difference between individuals to be overcome by evolution, but the differentiations developed are to be tested and their basis of union discovered. As under the diverse forms of nature certain fundamental elements of unity are found, binding all together so as to form one cosmos; so, as social development proceeds, homogeneous elements are found to underlie the heterogeneity. The mind evolves unity from diversity. Many an organisation at first loose and incoherent grows in homogeneity and compactness. Is it not the same process as that which makes bosom friends of total strangers? What has been called imitation and proclaimed one of the most potent factors in society surely does not promote heterogeneity. The same is true of the growth of public opinion. How is the marvellous increase of nationalism in Europe to be accounted for if there is differentiation only? Somehow it has been adopted as an axiom that evolution is a development from homogeneity to heterogeneity, and therefore it will be difficult to lead to an investigation of the facts which prove social evolution likewise a development through differentiation to unification, and through heterogeneity to homogeneity.

The error here combated has its source in the theory that social development is but a phase of biological evolution. The psychical peculiarities of man, which lie at the basis of society, are overlooked—the part played by consciousness and volition, reason and conscience; the fact that the mind can both err and correct its errors; that the content of one person can become that of many persons and thus make their sociability possible; that the social forces of individuals can be correlated, can interact, and thus grow in adaptation and co-operation; and that in the development of thought under rational scrutiny its unities as well as differences are revealed.

As an instance of social differentiation it is said that from a primitive condition, in which all men are alike, a king is evolved, revealing a striking contrast between himself and his subjects. But by following the development farther a condition may arise in which the heterogeneity yields to homogeneity, all persons being equally sovereign and equally subject. Sometimes either the unification or the differentiation may be most vigorous; but the developed mind aims to correct the mistakes thus made.

The conclusion reached leads us into that astounding social actuality which is the product of evolution. Society is in a large measure the master of its unity and diversity. Were it but the sum of the individuals who are said to belong to it, then it would, of course, be subject to all their differentiations. But we have seen that much which is individual is not social; but in society we have a unification from individual differentiations. Indeed, heterogeneity is often a characteristic of individuals when compared with each other, while their homogeneous elements furnish the basis of association.

Strong evidences appear that an emphasis is now being placed on heretofore neglected factors of homogeneity. Unity is discovered where formerly diversity absorbed the attention. Competition evolves trusts, individualism prepares the way for socialism. Churches divergent since the days of the Reformation are becoming aware of their homogeneous contents, and a convergence toward union is observable. Parallel with an intensification of nationalism which brings into prominence national differences, we behold an evolution of internationalism which gives prominence to the homogeneity of nations.

In *Lectures on Slavonic Law*, by Feodor Sigel, numerous instances of the evolution of heterogeneity into homogeneity and of differentiation into unity are given. See especially pages 28, 29, 70, 72, 85, 86, 91, 100, 116, 117.

169. We are justified, therefore, in concluding that much which applies to the development of an organism is not applicable to social evolution. This would be evident if the psychical character of society were appre-

hended. The social factor in human movement is as clearly distinguished from all material substances as in the individual the psychology is from the physiology. But we are not yet as familiar with the distinction. We find it difficult to apprehend and remember what is most patent: that in society we deal with the relations of persons, never with a single substance, and that a change in these relations involves a change in society, as illustrated above in the case of musicians. This necessity of constantly moving amid these relations to follow society greatly complicates the subject, but it also furnishes us with the only possible interpretation of society.

Permanent factors are, however, connected with society which constitute a permanent basis and background amid the variability of social evolution. These consist of what I have called the body of society, all the instruments it uses and all the objective forms into which it puts its thought. Numerous institutions endure for generations; they are permanent forms which society creates for its actions, grooves in which it moves. But with all the abiding social forms we must regard society itself as consisting of the relations of persons, relations in which their forces interact and which, like the forces themselves, are subject to change. The same routine continues for years in a school, while the classes subjected to it come and go.

Much in Comte's *Positive Philosophy* and in Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy* is seen to be inadequate in proportion as we give prominence to the peculiarities of man and to his highest development. Many current views on social evolution can be accepted only when human action has been reduced to mechanical laws, when psychology has become physiology, and sociology biology.

Under "Biology," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, ninth edition, we read: "Development, then, is a process of differentiation by

which the primitively similar parts of a living body become more and more unlike one another." That this cannot apply to social evolution has already been shown. Perhaps the statement needs revision even when applied to a living body. All that can really be affirmed is that the primitive parts *appear* to be similar. That we have not the power of discovering dissimilarity does not warrant the assertion that it does not exist. When seeds which look alike produce dissimilar objects, must not the cause lie in the seeds themselves? This is implied by Huxley, "Evolution," the same work: "Development is merely the expansion of a potential organism of original preformation according to fixed laws." Social evolution is not the unfolding of a germ, and therefore the following, in the same article, cannot be applied to it: "In all cases, the process of evolution consists in a succession of changes of the form, structure, and functions of the germ, by which it passes, step by step, from an extreme simplicity, or relative homogeneity, of visible structure, to a greater or less degree of complexity or heterogeneity; and the cause of progressive differentiation is usually accomplished by growth, which is affected by insusception."

Under the same heading in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, James Sully discusses philosophical as distinct from scientific evolution.

170. Social evolution remains vague until the various factors which undergo change are considered. Evolution affects the whole of society, but sometimes one of its factors more powerfully than the rest. A society is changed by introducing music where formerly there was none; but the change is chiefly of an æsthetic nature. We have already seen that we cannot attain that ideal of evolution which would result from taking as primary and fundamental a particular social force and, as the germ, evolve from it the rest. The temptation has been strongest to treat the economic force or the struggle for existence as such a germ; but it is impossible to evolve from this the æsthetic, the ethical, and the religious forces, though

the struggle for existence may be the occasion for their development. Not from one another are the social forces evolved, but from the mind in which they inhere. With their maternal mind they are developed, and from it they radiate in different directions, according to the character of the mind and of the societies which solicit and concentrate them. We have seen that the mind itself cannot be regarded as a definite seed from which society grows. It does not in all societies act as the same unit. As a possessor of forces it now exerts the economic, then the æsthetic, then the religious, then some other force.

Steinmetz, *L'Année Sociologique*, 1898-9, p. 139 *et seq.*, divides evolution into ten periods, according to the economic conditions attained. But this exclusive prominence of economics not only ignores the other social forces, but also fails to give a correct view of social evolution. What a variety of thought, feeling, and movement is possible within the same economic stage of development!

171. The first and most fundamental change in evolution pertains to the essence of society, the forces which constitute it. Their development is possible only in connection with that of the personality from which they emanate. The thoughts and aspirations of the boy are changed in the growth to manhood, and with them his social energies. The change is twofold: the strength of the forces changes and likewise their relative dominance. The appetitive and recreative forces may yield to the æsthetic or the intellectual, or the economic energy only latent in the boy may become absorbing. A change in the relative dominance of the forces is among the most significant transformations, both in societies and individuals. In the same life epochs are made by a change in the supremacy of the forces, as when economics reigns where once sport ruled, or when the life once given to

appetite becomes ethical. The evolution of society shows marked changes in the sovereignty of particular forces. What a change in the essential characteristics of a people in passing from the reign of the constitutional to that of the cultural forces! A nation cannot be the same with its strength given to war as when solely intent on economics. Rome, under the emperors and under the popes, brings out the difference in the dominance of the social forces. In social evolution, therefore, stress must be laid on the development of the forces themselves and on their relative supremacy.

Every social energy is capable of development from the weakest germ to the utmost strength, also of an endless variety of correlations and degrees of sovereignty. Small as is the number of the social energies, the differences indicated make the possible variations of society infinite.

172. From the change in the strength and relative dominance of the social energies we pass to their interaction in society. The relation of men changes and this involves a change in the operation of their social forces. The means of communication are improved and increased, and this augments the power of men in their social relations. As they developed in society men learned to know each other better; and both by experience and observation the efficiency of their intercourse increased. This includes all the means for conveying thought, feeling, and purpose, for social ends. The chief instrument in this phase of evolution is language, which now we consider not in respect to what it is in itself, but as the means of social intercourse. Other means of communication were used, such as sounds expressive of feeling, pictures, looks, gestures; but language was first in importance. All the means for making the individual forces social were developed from a crude and elementary stage to higher degrees of perfection. Inarticulate sounds gave place to language, and figurative language gave way to plain

speech with ideas more definite, more direct, and more forcible. Writing in the form of pictures and doubtful symbols was followed by phonetic writing. In order to appreciate this factor of communication in social evolution we need but compare a savage tribe in Africa with a civilised city. With the means of communication thus developed the social forces were themselves unfolded and made more effective. The power of socialisation and co-operation was vastly augmented, and this meant an improvement in all that pertains to society. The change is similar to that of a stranger in a foreign land virtually cut off from communication with his environment, who then learns the language and enters the mind and heart of the people. As he thus learns to give and take, all his social relations are developed.

A. Featherman, *Thoughts and Reflections on Modern Society*, Introduction, speaking of early man, says: "He had no organic language, he had no conception of abstract ideas, and he was still wanting in clearly defined religious notions. . . . His communications with his companions and kindred were all by signs and gestures, which, in his extreme urgency of making himself understood, were occasionally accompanied by an emotional cry, by an uncouth, unearthly utterance of monosyllabic sounds, which were gradually adopted as the signification of things. Animals were pointed out by imitating their characteristic calls. The lowing of the bull, the bark of the dog, the grunt of the elephant, the roar of the lion, the growl of the tiger, the neighing of the horse, the bleating of the sheep, the braying of the ass, the hiss of the snake, the buzz of the fly, the scream of the eagle, the carol of the lark, the cooing of the dove, the warble of the nightingale, the crowing of the cock, the croaking of the frog, the chirp of the grasshopper, and the humming of the bee became words of designation for things. The purling of the water and the whistling of the wind were root-germs of language. Such was the original source of all systems of verbal utterance, from which the most

polished of the modern tongues have been developed." With such a vocabulary social intercourse was extremely difficult and limited. Mental development and the means of communication were evolved together, and with them society progressed.

173. The third change takes place in the social content, the mental possessions of society, commonly called the social mind or social consciousness. Primitive people who live in constant contact with nature and depend on it slavishly are limited in their views to their immediate surroundings and the products of their fancies. New conceptions come with an enlarged vision and accumulated experience. Ghosts, demons, and a multitude of gods are succeeded by a few divinities or by a single deity and a multitude of natural processes. The change in the æsthetic content can be seen by comparing the crude art of the Australians and Bushmen with the ideals of beauty in Greece, Rome, and Florence. Savages repeat the same silly stories, chatter about animal needs and supplies, probably count three or four, meditate on war and slavery, and move in the ruts made by their ancestors. How different the content of modern civilisation as revealed in the press, the literature, the schools, the State and Church, the economics and life. Usually a decided change in social content requires a long process of development, such as that in Europe from barbarism to civilisation; sometimes, however, it is sudden, as in crises and revolutions, when new interests, new inventions, new discoveries, and epochs of thought and life arrest the attention. A great personality, a popular author, a new idea or system may have an effect similar to the discovery of a new world. What interests one age fails to impress another which has different interests. Thus great movements even pass from consciousness to be embodied in letters only, and from life into history.

Now war is the leading topic, then a peace conference; now a trust agitates the public mind, then a political campaign. This ever-changing social content leaves its impress on all the relations and movements of society.

174. The fourth change wrought by social evolution consists of the permanent deposits made by the social mind. The social content of a period expresses itself in symbols which continue to exist after the society which created them has departed. Language has already been mentioned, but only as means of personal communication. Here we consider it as having an abstract existence, as a permanent symbol of the contents of the social mind. As ideas are evolved they crystallise in definite forms or symbols and as such are transmitted. Thus, with the social content language grows. The stock of words used by a child and a man, by a primitive and a civilised people, differs. A great change occurred when the word which merely passed from mouth to mouth was petrified in a written form. From words we pass to sentences and systems. The changes in literature, philosophy, science, art, tradition, law, interest, are all marked by changes in the symbols by means of which they are expressed. The deepest thought of an age is apt to find embodiment in its philosophy. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Hegel, Comte, are representatives as well as moulders of their ages. When history was introduced and became a permanent repository of what men thought and did, a sharp separation from prehistoric times was made. These objective crystallisations of the social content give permanence to the thoughts and pursuits of an age, and furnish the means for their study in after times. We still see Greece in its art and literature. Society also puts its mental content into institutions, such as the caste systems of oriental peoples and the feudalism of the Middle Ages.

The symbols transmitted by an age cannot give a complete idea of its society. Perhaps the literature, art, and

institutions of a period represent the court or a small circle rather than society at large. The Elizabethan era had only one Bacon and one Shakespeare. The fifty years from Kant's great *Kritik* to the death of Hegel produced the richest and deepest philosophical literature of Germany; but the first-class philosophers can be counted on the fingers of one hand. An age called scientific usually has few real scientists. Perhaps the permanent symbols of an age are the product of a single individual. Society may be rich in symbols of thought and yet intellectually impoverished, the symbols remaining uninterpreted and their real contents unappropriated. Whole ages have failed to take possession of the treasures buried in the Greek language; and how much of London society appropriates the vast treasures deposited in the form of symbols in the British Museum? An age's greatness may consist in what it has inherited rather than in what it appropriates or produces. Some ages are nothing but pigmies on the shoulders of giants. Vast accumulations need not involve either personal worth or social grandeur.

When von Sybel, the historian, affirms that "it was persons and not institutions which made history," we find it more correct to say that it was persons, indeed, but largely through the institutions which they founded.

Jewish, Christian, Mohammedan, and heathen festivals are abiding memorials of events and thoughts deemed specially worthy of remembrance. Statues, buildings, and other works of art often have a similar significance. Institutions are memorials of those whose names they bear. An age may be best known by the permanent objects on which it has engraved its ideas and feelings and purposes.

175. The fifth change wrought by means of social evolution affects the social structure. The interaction of the social forces of individuals may change without affecting

the formal organisation of society. Without such organisation men may learn to understand each other better, to improve their language, and adapt their thoughts to one another. Children taken to a foreign country soon adapt themselves to their strange surroundings. But the structure of society may also be changed amid the other changes. This is seen as we pass from the primitive family, loosely united and sensuous, often brutal, organised for economic reasons, and the means of slavery, to the present monogamous family. Structural changes also take place in the State. New organs are required as new functions arise. The entire structure is affected when a State passes from despotism to freedom, or from a military to an industrial and cultural stage; when schools, teachers, and eleemosynary institutions supplant the police and prisons; and when the genius of a people establishes national welfare by the prevention, rather than the punishment, of crime. Churches and voluntary organisations also have structural evolutions. Social efficiency may be greatly augmented by organisation. Military history illustrates the effect wrought by a change in the organisation of the army. Structural changes are seen in economics in the evolution of combinations of capital and labour. The present problems of industrialism pertain largely to social structure. Both in social structure and content civilisation differs from barbarism.

The social content may determine the form of organisation, as when a people, conscious of their rights, overthrow despotism and establish a republic. On the other hand, the content is affected by the structure, as when a free people is politically trained by the exercise of the franchise. The exact place of social organisation and its relation to unorganised groups are important problems. In labour movements these sometimes become burning questions. New combinations are most numerous when new ideas, new needs, and new interests

concentrate the attention and demand united action. Much in them which seems self-evident when familiar may be the result of a long and laborious process of development. The efficiency of an organisation depends on its adaptation to the ends for which it was instituted.

176. The analysis and history of any society will prove that the above are really the factors which undergo change in the process of evolution. A knowledge of them not only aids us in interpreting the social processes, but also in giving direction to their course. Thus, a society can increase its forces by developing the strength of its members or bringing in new ones; the interaction of the forces can be improved, as when the means of communication are made more direct, more definite, and more forcible; the social content can be evolved, as when a scientific association increases its data by investigation; this social content can be embodied in a permanent form, such as the publication of reports, proceedings, and elaborate works; and the social structure can be evolved by being made more compact and better adapted to the purposes of the organisation.

Here we have in epitome the processes which have always and everywhere been active, sometimes one element being more prominent, then others, but the change in one factor to some degree affecting the whole evolutionary course. Schools evolve chiefly the social forces, the mental content, and the means of communication; churches evolve the social content in the form of creeds and theologies, but also their structure in order to develop their efficiency—the comparison between Protestantism and Catholicism being instructive in this respect; in states all five factors are liable to change, but that which takes place in structure, in passing from one form of government to another, often has especial significance. It is, however, evident that these changes merely pertain to the social forces and their relations and products—the

means of communication, the social content, the permanent social symbols, and the social structure being but products and means of these forces.

Sometimes it is found that one factor requires particular culture in order to insure the efficiency of an association. If the personal forces are weak there will be a lack even with the best means of communication; but a dozen savants who cannot understand one another will make a poor society. Isolated thinkers require an organisation in order to make their thought co-operative. A weak social structure may hinder the effective operation and growth of all the other factors. What is held in common must be put in some permanent form, such as records, in order to promote continuity and to serve for future reference. And if the social content is not developed there will be the routine which is the mark of intellectual stagnation. How one factor may help another is illustrated by organisation. Weak forces efficiently organised may be stronger than more powerful ones poorly organised—as when organised labour dictates to capitalists, or a small army with superior organisation defeats a large one poorly organised.

We are dealing with the essential factors in social evolution, not with the numerous means used to accomplish their ends. Concomitant with the factors named others are likewise developed, such as nature and the body. The improvements in the material means of communication are themselves revelations of a distinct process of evolution. Roads have been constructed in the wilderness, mountains tunnelled, railways built, and we have the post, telegraph, telephone, and the steamship, giving the society of our age an enormous advantage over the past. Discoveries and inventions have kept pace with the progress of science, and nature has become the friend and helpmeet of man. But we have differentiated the psychical from the physical forces, treating the former as the social essence. The changes wrought by man's agency in

nature are, however, among the chief instrumentalities for society in the accomplishment of its purposes.

177. As we penetrate to the fundamental meaning of social evolution we thus discover that its essence consists in the development of individuals and of their relation to one another. Social evolution actually takes place; but it is a development of society through individuals. The first relation of human beings, chiefly physical, gives prominence to their bodies, while their minds are too poorly furnished to become conspicuous in the relationship. From physical contact with its mother and a supply of its physical needs the child grows into social relationship, exchanging affection and thought. This is typical of large and important spheres of human development. The psychical evolution of individuals and the consequent growth of psychical relations between them is, in reality, a process from biological and organic connection into sociality. This development, as will become clearer later, transforms the physical increasingly into means for mental relationship between men. In other words, much of social evolution is expressed by the statement that in the relations men sustain to each other the development proceeds from nature as the *end* to nature as *means* for social ends. Man becomes truly man through evolution, his relation to his fellows becomes more human, and society is progressively humanised.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CAUSES WHICH EVOLVE THE SOCIAL FORCES

178. At the outset we eliminate from the causes of social evolution *time*. It is not a thing, not a force, and cannot work. When we attribute any efficiency whatever to time, it is always the energies which work in time that are the active agents. Mere duration effects nothing; but whatever works during the duration effects all the changes wrought. What we attribute, in our speech, to the agency of time is purely figurative. Every energy which acts in time is in the present. The force which acted yesterday has no significance for to-day unless it has somehow left its impress on to-day and still continues to act. It is only, then, as present forces that the past has significance for the working of to-day. Feudalism has meaning for us so far as it still exerts an influence or is a subject of our contemplations. We say that we transfer ourselves in intellect to the distant past and behold its operations in India and Egypt; but in reality we behold the past only in the present, and all our contemplations of history are only in the moment they are before the mind. It is in the eternal *now* that every force has actuality, puts forth its efforts, and accomplishes its work.

Space, like time, is not an energy, but it contains the material forces. All the forces, whether physical or mental, must be brought into contact in order to act on each other. The study of social evolution is largely an investigation of the way in which the social forces are

brought together in space and in time, and how they interact and co-operate because they intermingle.

179. In the case of society, as with every object which undergoes evolution, two factors are of fundamental importance: the object itself and its environment. What is inherent in an object, to what tendencies this gives rise, and how it responds to external stimuli present the first consideration; the second pertains to the influences to which it is subject from its surroundings. Every society has a certain character which determines its inherent energy and its responsiveness to stimuli; and, on the other hand, the surroundings differ and are themselves liable to change.

Since every society must be studied in its natural and social environment in order that we may be able to understand the variations to which it is liable, it is important here to recall what was said with respect to the physical basis of society, the influence of soil and climate, of the flora and fauna, and of the geographical situation. While a warm climate, where nature, without laborious effort, afforded a livelihood, was essential for the beginning of human evolution, later the colder regions became more favourable, because they required and developed energy, skill, and providence. The road to civilisation is made by labour, which works its way up to, produces, and uses culture. Consequently, where man can live without labour, or is obliged to spend his strength to obtain a bare subsistence, no high degree of culture can be expected. The most favourable conditions for progress exist where energy and skill are required to wrest food from nature, but are sufficiently rewarded to leave time for other than economic pursuits. The geographical position grows in importance with the rise of commerce and the increase of the interdependence of peoples. Germany and England, Scandinavia and Finland, are north of the old zone of civilisation; but they could rise from

barbarism by appropriating and developing the culture of the past, wherever produced; and through commerce they can receive the products of different nations while developing their own resources. This shows that in different ages the environment may have a different signification. What is an advantage to a primitive people may prove a disadvantage to a civilised one.

180. Evolution as a dynamic process points to the social energies as the causative factors in the development of society. Each individual is viewed as a centre of social forces, and this enables us to understand how these forces are evolved and society is developed. Let us suppose that at first one class of energies is exercised and thus developed. Later another class is used and unfolded. Step by step the powers of the human personality are drawn out, first the lowest, then higher ones, and the highest. We cannot expect society to stimulate and develop all the powers of the individual equally and harmoniously; but now one side of human nature is solicited and then another. Culture grows and its products are transmitted from age to age. They become stimuli—like tends to produce like. There are, of course, limits to the products of the social energies, but their tendency is to become cumulative. Traditions, customs, the useful and fine arts, literature and science, are illustrations. Cultural heredity or the endowment with which an individual starts must be put under the head of the products of society. A child born of civilised parents in civilisation has an enormous advantage in endowment and environment over the child of a savage. The person, viewed as a centre of social energies, is naturally developed according to the stimuli which come from the surroundings—a savage community trains savages. Through their relations, the interaction of their social forces, persons stimulate each other, and the development is along the line of the stimulation.

The whole of social evolution is thus put under the head of the exercise, development, and products of the social forces. What is permanent is not the individuals, but the result of their energies, and this result becomes a factor in producing new evolution. The view given of the social forces accounts for the evolution of these forces, of the individuals who possess them, and of the society constituted by them. Aristotle was, by endowment, training, and environment, different from Plato. Hence he could not be expected merely to continue the doctrine of his teacher. After Aristotle philosophy could never again be what Plato had made it.

The many-sidedness, the great possibility and potentiality, the educability of the personality, must be considered in accounting for social evolution. This evolution is not explained by what is inherent in the individual, not by what he does for himself privately, but by what he is and does socially.

Thought grows in power in proportion as it impresses itself on objects and thus appeals to the mind. In civilisation all the works of art contain and solicit thought. Human products are calculated to awaken human sentiments. The houses, institutions, roads, the very animals used by man, all the creations of civilisation appeal to and stimulate thought in the direction of the mind embodied in them. It needs but the interpreting mind to make the rule apply universally that like produces like. Hence what has itself been evolved by man and made objective becomes an energy in further evolution.

181. So manifold and intricate are the causes of the numerous and complex operations in social evolution that there is hope of mastering them only by a reduction to a few fundamental and all-pervading ones. Not only are the constant and incalculable changes in individuals, society, and nature involved, but likewise the modifications produced by the interaction of these factors. Even when the social phenomena are evident enough, their possible

explanations and hidden causes may be in dispute. Not only does the personal factor present difficulties such as are not found in the operation of natural law, but the persons act on each other through their social forces and thus complicate the process. Who can explain the personal motives, how the energies affect each other, and what the share of each in the influence exerted? Persons are liable to change and to put forth different parts of their nature, so that the same judgment will not apply to their entire conduct. Perhaps all the facts are not within reach when all are necessary for a correct judgment. Even a strike of labourers is liable to opposite estimates, and the same is true of nearly all social acts. Where motive is involved the condition for conflicting judgments is given.

182. Our task would be less difficult if an impulse to progress inherent in man determined the direction taken by his development. Formerly such an impulse was taken for granted and made the interpreter of many social phenomena; but more recent investigations do not support the theory that an urgency toward self-development and social progress is involved in the very constitution of man, operates as a directive force from the beginning of humanity, and determines the course of the ages. The tendency to self-manifestation in the child and primitive man is but the working-out or expression of the being, and cannot be interpreted as a conscious, or even instinctive, effort in the line of progress. The evolution resulting therefrom is due to exercise, and incidental rather than intentional.

The savage reveals no intuitive progressiveness. He has no conception of the worth of the personality, knows nothing of its capacity for development, cannot conceive what culture is, and still less appreciate its value, has no ideals of human exaltation, no ideas of products of evolution deserving effort. Nor does a long series of ancestors

on a low plane furnish the conditions for a heredity which creates a progressive impulse. The capacity for progress must be postulated, but an innate urgency toward it is a fiction. The savage eats and drinks, exercises his affections and gratifies his passions, plays when he can and works when he must, but sleeps and idles away the rest of his time. The improvement of self and of society is foreign to his aim. The progressive impulse when found is due to culture rather than to an innate impulse toward culture. That man wants to better his external condition must not be confounded with a desire for personal or social progress.

For the first evolution of the individual and society we must therefore look to the efforts required for a livelihood and to the demands made by the natural and social environment. Man's necessities in meeting the various needs of his being are the prime conditions of his evolution. This is not the product of man alone, nor of his surroundings alone, but of the co-operation of both. When, however, the cultural forces gain the ascendancy and affect the heredity; when the environment arouses inspiration; when ideals are presented and something beyond present attainments inspires ambition, an impulse toward improvement may exist. But even in the most advanced stages of culture the desire for progress, personal or social, is the prerogative of exceptional natures.

Were there an innate impulse to progress, how could we explain the long savage and barbarian condition of many peoples? There is no evidence that they are younger than the most advanced nations. Some of them have made little or no improvement for thousands of years. The theory that they have degenerated from a higher stage argues equally against the existence of an innate progressive impulse. Their *vis inertiae*, in fact, presents an almost invincible barrier to progress. If left to themselves, with a tolerable adaptation to their

surroundings, it is not apparent how they could overcome their apathy and make great advances. The ordinary superstitions prevent, rather than promote, development. The occasion for the display of energy is usually limited to hunger and thirst, to the desire for animal gratification and sport, to rivalry and danger.

The absence of the progressive impulse is, however, still more significant in the centres of civilisation. Vast numbers in the midst of enlightenment do not rise above the savage in aspiration toward progress. Evident as this is in the slums, it is also true of palaces. Stagnant degradation may be less repulsive when gilded than when in rags, but it is no less real and certainly more astonishing. Even in the highest educational institutions inquiry soon dispels the notion that an appreciation of progress beyond past attainments is general, or that an earnest effort is common to ennoble the personality, to add real value to life in distinction from personal gratification, and to exalt society to a higher level. Many leave the first universities who have been intent on preparing for the ordinary struggles of life, while an enthusiasm involved in a passion for the progress of humanity is so exceptional as to confer distinction. Every university has reason to lament that the highest ideals are lost sight of in the absorbing pursuit of what in German universities is called *Brodstudium* or bread-and-butter study.

Even the idea of progress as an element in human life is not old. For its development see Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 88-100.

Dietzel, *Die Volkswirthschaft in ihrem Verhältniss zu Gesellschaft und Staat*, p. 76, says that "the endless capacity for development in man depends, first of all, on his endless capacity for need." Men are impelled to action by their needs and to constitute society in order to supply these needs.

Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, p. 211: "Any progress is extremely rare. As a rule a stationary state is by far the most

frequent condition of man, as far as history describes that condition; the progressive state is only a rare and occasional exception."

Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, i., pp. 3-4, says: "As for historical considerations, we can point to races which have remained the same for thousands of years, and have changed their place, their speech, their physical appearance, their mode of life not at all, their religion and their knowledge only superficially. Herodotus tells us about a race of Troglodytes, who dwelt near the Garamantes, the inhabitants of the modern Fezzan. They were active and swift-footed, and spoke a language almost unknown beyond their own boundaries. Here we have Nachtigal's Tebus, or Tedas, who to this day inhabit the natural caverns in their rocks, are renowned far and wide for activity and fleetness of foot, and speak a language which has hardly extended itself beyond the walls of their rocky fortress. Thus, for two thousand years at least, and for all we know much longer, they have lived in just the same way. They are to-day no poorer, no richer, no wiser, no more ignorant, than they have been these thousands of years. They have acquired nothing in addition to what they possessed then."

On this subject of an innate impulse to progress in human nature there has been a tendency to anticipate instead of interpreting facts by postulating principles which ought to be accepted only when inferred as an induction from phenomena. H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, p. 50, states that Aristotle held that there exists in nature an "internal perfecting tendency." In the English edition of his *Studies in the History of Descent*, Aug. Weismann speaks of a whole series of attempts to introduce into science some unknown power which acted as a kind of developmental force. It was called by some "the perfecting principle," or "the fixed direction of variation"; others called it "the law of creation," or "the law of organic development," or "the universal principle of organic nature." The book aims to test the existence of a special "developmental force." Darwin wrote a preface to the volume, in which he says: "At the present time there is hardly any question in biology of more importance than this of the

nature and causes of variability, and the reader will find in the present work an able discussion of the whole subject, which will probably lead him to pause before he admits the existence of an innate tendency to perfectibility."

183. Why some peoples have progressed while others remain in a primitive state presents a difficult problem. Some explanations will be given by the causes now under consideration. Frequently communities seem to become stationary because too much isolated to receive powerful impulses from others. Let us suppose that a people develops within its territory until its adaptation to the environment is complete. What stimuli does this condition afford the savage for development? Without foreign influence the same situation is likely to be perpetuated indefinitely. A mechanical routine controls the thought, the feelings, the life, and the social relations. Everything tends to a conformity which means stagnation. All this time the heredity is in the line of the powers constantly exercised, while other energies are not unfolded. Thus everything tends to the creation and perpetuation of a state of petrification.

Not only does this account for the stationary condition of certain savages, but also for the fact that contact with more enlightened peoples leads to their decay. So hardened are they to their fixed mode of life that no power of adaptability is left. Consequently, what cannot bend must break. A process similar to that which probably fixed permanently the characteristics of the different races seems to have taken place. What has for a long time been unaltered becomes a stable heredity. Peoples who have not been accustomed for so long a time to an unvarying rigidity are not tethered to the same hereditary routine, but can adapt themselves to changes and make progress. The pliable and adaptable peoples are consequently the progressive ones.

Agitation, ferment, stimuli, variety, are indispensable for progress. Satisfaction, ease, and indolence make it impossible. Even when advances have been made we see that a people which rests in its attainments or gives itself to luxury is apt to become effeminate and to degenerate. The progress of a society depends largely on external stimuli, particularly in a low stage of culture. It was an advantage to Greece that its states stimulated each other, caused rivalries and aspiration. Each impelled the other to develop its energies. No wonder that there the idea was cherished that what is in a man ought to be freely, healthfully, developed to the utmost by vigorous exercise. For the exertion of effort strong influences were also received from Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The effects of isolation even in the midst of civilisation are strikingly exhibited by dwellers in the mountainous regions of Kentucky and Tennessee. The rapid progress of a century seems to have left some of them physically and mentally almost untouched.

A. C. Haddon, *The Study of Man*, Introduction, says: "In a general survey of mankind we find that there are peoples in all stages of culture, and we also notice that there is an intense conservatism in all matters of social or religious importance. When a people is isolated, it is believed that changes take place with extreme slowness; indeed, it is probable that a mingling of peoples, whether by commerce, migration, or war, is almost a necessary condition for change and progress. If, then, we examine a people that has for a long time remained isolated from contact with other peoples, we shall find that in most instances it is a backward people, and often what we call a savage one."

184. Many other conditions must also be reckoned with in order to understand the difficulties primitive peoples encountered in their way to progress. The reverence,

or even worship, of ancestors tended to keep them strictly in the old ways. Their adherence to tradition and enslavement by custom turned their faces to the past. A strong individuality was lacking and no encouragement given to independence. Reproduction became the chief intellectual exercise and the controlling motive in social life. Religion sanctioned, where it did not enforce, a strict conservatism. Deviation from the rule of the founder of the family was deemed a breach of faith and a violation of the peculiar sanctity of the family, and was sufficient ground for exclusion from the kinship or for death. A strong communistic spirit, coupled with actual communism, united in the same fate the present generation and imposed on it the decrees of the past. Inventions and extraordinary achievements were attributed to some god, and this depreciation of human effort paralysed both individual and social energy. Haphazard ruled too much to permit any stress on continuous development. The deities which presided over the occupations and affairs of life were believed to be concerned about the most trifling things and to manage them for the people. The human initiative toward progress, therefore, seemed like an assumption of the prerogatives of divinity on man's part. Instead of an impulse toward development, therefore, we meet in primitive man with inertia and direct opposition to progress.

185. We must consider the degeneracy of peoples no less than the progressive movements and stationary conditions. Why should advantages once enjoyed be abandoned or lost? Augustan eras in literature and art are generally followed by periods of decline. Few generations seem able to bear the strain required to continue on the summits of culture; perhaps they cannot even be raised to the height of preceding eras. War may intervene and control the energies, or economic pursuits become absorbing. Spain was enervated by the interests

developed by its extensive possessions and unrivalled power. While the retention of a high degree of culture requires great effort and exceptional powers, innumerable tendencies in human nature and in external influences promote the easy descent to the reign of the constitutional energies.

“Retrogressive” evolution may fail to explain all the phenomena involved. The process may include more than a gradual backward movement. Perhaps the elimination of prominent factors, leaving the rest as they are, is the true interpretation. The removal of a great statesman affects the whole people, though all the other factors remain the same or actually advance. The death of a chief or king or warrior, or a change in the dynasty, may result in what is viewed as retrogression. A great force is gone, though no backward movement can be established. A school taken from a community may end the specific development it promoted; a manufacturing establishment leaves a town, which becomes so much the poorer in consequence, though all the other economic interests continue to flourish. What we call a retrogressive movement may, therefore, not involve actual retrogression. What seems to be retrogression when an Alexander, a Napoleon, a Bismarck is removed, simply means the withdrawal of a strong progressive force from a particular line of development.

186. Many other causes may check or divert processes of evolution or introduce new ones. Conditions and persons arise which inaugurate new movements. We cannot foretell what forces will arise or disappear, and therefore do not know how far continuous culture in a particular line can be postulated. Threads are followed, then dropped, others are taken up to be dropped again. Hence that infinite variety in the history of the same and of different nations. Old requirements and interests die and new ones are born. Peoples decay, the peculiar

developments they promoted end, and their place is taken by others who lack some of the old qualities and contribute new ones. That history is so kaleidoscopic is due to the fact that the millions of evolutionary forces constantly change, and this effects changes in their operations and results.

Social evolution, accordingly, cannot be described as a continuous ascent; nor is it spiral. It seems rather to include all kinds of movements (but none of them without interruptions), deviations, increase and decrease of power. The movement is forward, backward also, and sideways, with an elimination or augmentation of forces, with an addition of new energies which change the course, with a transfer of functions from one society to another, or with the cessation of a past process and the inauguration of a new one.

A psychical tendency which fails to express itself in writing or some other lasting objective form is, of course, more likely to be without succession than one which embodies itself in an abiding manner. What is embodied in a permanent form also has more chance of promoting evolution than what is perishable. How much that was a content of the Greek mind is lost! how much even of its philosophy, literature, and history committed to writing! Many of its ideals have come down to us through the arts which were less perishable than the writings.

The American mound-builders disappeared and left no successors. We have relics, but no continuous development, of the old civilisations of Mexico and Peru. The destruction of a people by war, by disease, famine, or other causes not only ends their peculiar development, but also takes a certain amount of force from humanity.

Lilienfeld, *Die menschliche Gesellschaft*, vol. i., p. 303: "In historic times many races and nationalities have disappeared, the Phenicians, for instance; others vanish before our eyes, such

as the savages of Polynesia, the American Indians, and various branches of the Turanian race in Siberia. Humboldt found in South America a parrot which still repeated words of a language spoken by a tribe which had died out." Some of the primitive peoples of Europe seem to have been extinguished.

187. Another presupposition bearing on the cause of social evolution will have to be rejected. Some of the races have been regarded as specially endowed, and this has been made a prominent factor in explaining their progress. If this special endowment as the ultimate fact in evolution were well established, the necessity of accounting for the greater advances made by certain races would be removed. Perhaps, however, the superior endowments of some peoples are not original, but the result of development or heredity, and therefore present important problems. The Aryan peoples have been distinguished for their culture. If this is due to an original endowment their origin must be different from that of the less favoured races; but for this we have no proof. Their advantages were probably the product of evolution, and in earlier times other peoples, such as the Mongolians, may have surpassed them. The earliest civilisations were not confined to the Aryans. If their advantages are a later product, to what are they due? Heredity may account for much, but it does not solve the whole problem.

The question behind heredity is, how the transmitted qualities were acquired. Besides, heredity itself, while unquestionably a powerful factor in evolution, has, as shown above, not been sufficiently mastered to make it exact enough for scientific treatment. Every consideration forces on us the conviction that no presupposition respecting inherent qualities of man or of particular peoples enables us to dispense with the necessity of an empirical investigation of the causes of evolution. It is no

more true that a people evolves itself than that it is evolved; but it cannot be determined scientifically what belongs to the internal and what to the external factors.

188. With whatever endowment, and however acquired, man starts on his evolutionary career, we must regard it as ultimate for our inquiry. We may imagine, without being able to explain, its origin. Even what the endowment itself was can be inferred only from the results. Primitive man must have possessed a human capacity and human needs; this is implied in the very conception of his being. He was man only in the rough, as uncultivated as the nature to whose influence he was subjected. The tendency to self-manifestation is the primary fact to which every human act is reducible. The problem of evolution is: how this self-manifestation takes place under the influence of nature and society, and what development results therefrom. The forces in man subject to the strongest stimuli, whether from within or from without, will be most exercised and therefore most fully developed. *Development through exercise* is a law of universal application in every stage of evolution. A power unexercised remains dormant and undeveloped, and liable even to lose its original strength. To normal exercise we consequently look for the evolution of the social energies, while abnormal exercise may produce a reaction or weaken the forces. The dominance must belong to the forces duly exercised and thereby developed cumulatively. The power exerted concentrates on itself the energy of the individual and society and thus gains the ascendancy.

The fruitfulness of this view is made evident by an examination of man and society in primitive and civilised conditions. Man projects himself into his deeds and becomes what he projects. This law is illustrated by education, in the formation of habit and character, and in every phase of evolution. The

effect of the surroundings is also mirrored in this law; that is developed which these draw out.

189. We have seen that it is an unwarranted and most improbable assumption that sociability is a part of man's original endowment. His associations prove him a sociable being; but this is more reasonably explained from contact with his fellows than as an inherent quality. That he develops sociality through contact with others is ultimate for us. From the beginning he is placed in such relations as to demand sociability. Born into a family, dependent on his mother, he grows into social relationship even if she is his only companion. His capacity, his needs, his surroundings, are factors in his social evolution. He cannot start with ideas, with notions of what others can be to him, and into what relations he can enter with them. Instead of postulating as inherent any positive tendencies or definite dispositions, unless it be in a rudimentary form, these seem to be rather the product of inner needs and the efforts to supply them, and of stimuli from external objects. With essentially the same human nature, the same needs, and the same natural surroundings, it is not surprising that the same general results should be attained, that is, that in respect to what is fundamental men should move along similar lines. Starting without freedom, rationality, æsthetics, ethics, and religion, but with a capacity which makes their achievement possible, we regard him, as we do a child, as mentally an undeveloped mass of potentiality. To turn this into actuality involves his energies, his condition, and his environment.

190. We must determine where we want to climb before we know where to place the ladder. But can we climb where we desire after the ladder has been placed? We must reckon with the unforeseeable and the inevitable. The incalculable factors may lead in a direction the op-

posite of what was calculated. Some things, however, are characteristic of certain stages of evolution and therefore can be estimated. A definite action being given, we look for the reaction. We do not in a primitive era look for the development of forces whose exercise depends on solicitations which proceed from culture.

In estimating the causes of social evolution we must regard man as originally in all respects, endowment excepted, essentially an animal. Being animal in needs and impulses, his surroundings appeal to and cultivate the animal in him. He moves long on the plane of his constitutional wants before necessity, inclination, and society push him up the steep and high mount of culture. With the constant exercise of his animal propensities, the difficult ascent would seem impossible, were it not that the effort to gratify these inclinations exercises and cultivates his whole being. His mental powers unfold in trying to secure a livelihood and ward off foes. Call it affinity, sympathy, or by some other name: man is an organism in which the effort to cultivate one power likewise cultivates others incidentally and unintentionally.

The causes of social evolution are the more obscure because culture is so often unconscious and unintentional. What is higher may be wholly unknown and therefore not aimed at. Perhaps it is evolved when the sole aim is gratification. The mind is cultivated in the chase, in agriculture, in war, in seeking to win affection and gratify ambition, and in search of the means of pleasure. Thus, through the very necessities of life the intellect grows until strong enough to become an independent factor, which is exercised for its own sake and assumes the direction of affairs. Often this development is checked, as seen above, because an adaptation to the environment is reached which promotes ease and fails to stimulate to further intellectual exertion. But the general rule holds, that the external stimulus, which in the animal cultivates

only animal propensities, exercises other powers in man and therefore develops also human qualities.

Whatever theory is most plausible, scientific proof is lacking equally for the view that man started near the brute, and for that which puts him originally much higher in the scale of being. Hearn, *The Aryan Household*, p. 278, says: "A distinguished writer on physical science remarks that Shakespeare and Newton were the descendants of savages. . . . I venture to allege that, so far as any trustworthy evidence on the subject is at present known to exist, savages were not the acknowledged progenitors of these great men. The ultimate fact, in the present state of knowledge upon this subject, is the condition of the Aryans. We cannot connect these Aryans with any other race, nor can we go behind the evidence which their language and their institutions afford. It may be positively asserted that the men who spoke that language, and possessed these institutions, were not in any reasonable sense of the term savages. It is only by the aid of comparative philology that we are enabled to form some definite conception of the material condition of our archaic forefathers. There is nothing in the conclusions of that science to suggest the low moral state, the wandering and precarious existence, the berries and the acorns, of the noble savage. The Aryans knew the arts of ploughing, of making roads, of weaving, and of sewing. They built substantial houses, they used cooked food and fermented drinks. They counted as far at least as a thousand. They were familiar with many useful plants and their properties. They had domesticated the animals most useful to man—the cow, the horse, the sheep, and the dog. They had property, and they knew the meaning of wealth."

Since we cannot go behind this in the way of scientific knowledge, we have no reason to draw any inference from the teaching of comparative philology either respecting the original savage state of the Aryan ancestors or the contrary. So much is certain, however: whatever the ultimate facts of the origin of the human race, since there are savages still and have been in the past, no complete view of evolution is possible without

beginning with the lowest stage of human existence. The legitimacy of this method is not interfered with by the fact that some peoples may not have passed through every phase of evolution from the beginning. In discussing the principles of evolution we, of course, are not expected to furnish the history of evolution, for which the data are lacking.

191. In the case of primitive man, with reason undeveloped, without ideals, without reflection, with no inspiring inheritance from the past, we can reduce the influences exerted on him to impressions through the senses, to which his responses were immediate. We cannot yet reckon with an inner mental world containing intellectual accumulations from which impulses proceeded. Remote consequences were not considered; questions of truth and error, of right and wrong, did not arise. The effectiveness in an impression consisted in the fact that it was agreeable or disagreeable, producing pleasure or pain. These qualities determined the character of the responsiveness, the agreeable impressions being accepted, the disagreeable ones opposed. What he accepts from his social and natural environment develops man in the line of his native aptitudes; but what he resists may have been still more important in that it developed valuable powers otherwise neglected. Throughout his evolution the attractive and repulsive influences exerted on him are significant. What he likes solicits and unfolds his energies for its attainment, while he seeks to avoid and ward off what he dislikes. Love and hate, greed and warfare, are manifestations of this twofold activity. It was around these poles that evolution revolved in primitive times and all ages. Had he been left to his own choice, man would have developed altogether according to his natural aptitudes, these being unfolded both by what he accepts and rejects. But another factor enters and becomes powerful or even dominant in evolu-

tion, namely, necessity. Both in contact with nature and his fellow-men he is forced to do what he does not desire and to refrain from acting out his inclinations. The energy developed by conflict is important; necessary restraint is valuable; the effort to adapt himself to his environment supersedes the unhindered exercise of his animal propensities; and thus the hidden and higher powers of his being are drawn out. Human society, as we have seen, is the product both of choice and necessity; and the place of each factor and the co-operation of the two are among the most suggestive considerations in connection with social evolution.

192. Man and woman, both necessary for the preservation of the race, have been pronounced the primitive social unit. If for "social" we put "biological" the statement is correct; the social family being evolved from the biological, but we know that the two are not synonymous. The sexual relation has, however, a most essential function in social evolution. It leads beyond the self-preservation involved in the struggle for existence to the perpetuation of the species. The individual seeks sexual gratification, which is followed by the conservation of the species—a type of numerous activities whose consequences are not limited by the intention. Here the reign of necessity is illustrated. The tendency to self-gratification involved in the sexual instinct is a prime factor in developing the social relations. Even if the wife was regarded as a slave, her status differed from the woman who was nothing but a slave. The father was affected by the relation of the children to their mother, and the affection for the child would in some degree be extended from one parent to the other. Even if a man paid for the woman he chose, he might be obliged to win her and her kin; and in various ways the woman would try to gain the object of her affection and interest her kin in him. Thus, however near the human race might be to the brute, we

have, in the sexual relation and the impulses and sentiments it involved, the condition for the exercise of all the human powers and for the establishment of numerous social relations. There was not a social force which could not find a sphere for its development in the family. The most marked evolution of affection in primitive life no doubt took place in the relation of the mother and her children. The mother was the houseband. The union between her and her child was most intimate and is probably the principal tie which kept early mankind together. The man might neglect his home and roam about, but the mother and children were indissolubly connected. The training in the family was a process of constant social adaptation. Every consideration leads to the conclusion that the family was the primitive social union.

193. Even if the social life was confined to the family, we find the conditions given to exercise the egotic, the appetitive, the affectional, and the recreative forces. To meet the cravings of the appetite and all the essentials of life, it was necessary to develop economics. Great weight is to be attached to the efforts thus required and the energies developed. Man is always guided by the rule of utility, that is, he seeks to attain with least effort the desired result. Not that he had a definite idea of such a rule or made it a conscious guide in his actions; it is rather a law of his nature to avoid unnecessary effort. The desire to avoid painful labour impelled him to seek means to lessen toil, and this has been one of the chief elements of progress. Innumerable improvements are due to the desire to secure the same result with less labour, or greater results from the same effort. The lessons of actual utility were among the greatest benefits of the struggle for existence. Experience taught the nature of the means and developed skill in using them. Man's dependence on nature taught him its value and most profitable use. Whether he obtained food from berries,

nuts, roots, by hunting or fishing, cannibalism, pastoral or agricultural pursuits, he cultivated strength, skill, and knowledge in the line of his effort. This law of utility eventually also developed providence, so that he laid up food for future use. In associating with others in order to meet his needs he developed sociability and the culture it involves.

The struggle for existence would soon develop a taste for a peculiar kind of existence, and thus a specific direction be given to the energies. The individual, through his relation to his fellow-men, was soon led to consider other interests than mere existence, such as a regard for his associates, ambition for power and supremacy, and a desire for all the advantages which spring from association.

The mere struggle for existence allies man to the brute, and with no higher aim he could not claim attributes peculiarly human. But with and by means of this struggle the specific aims of human existence are evolved. It is consequently not correct to treat the struggle for existence as the sole factor in evolution, but it deserves great prominence. Ought it, for instance, to be regarded as dominant when exerted for the sake of attaining some specific object of existence, such as religion, art, intellect, fame? The economic energy, however fundamental and powerful, is subordinated when made the means to some purpose which gives value to life and even to economic effort itself.

194. Need and supply furnished the earliest bond of union between man and nature. Man's necessities led to his co-operation with nature to secure his welfare. He lets nature do the work for him until his needs transcend its spontaneous efforts. But the natural and social world is the occasion of antagonism as well as of co-operation. Men combined to fight human foes and wild beasts, and not merely for economic purposes. Reasons for

association were also given by the increasing family and the tribal relations.

The associations, which grew up naturally, required some form of government. This no doubt developed unconsciously in part and was exercised with little machinery, but it served for the cohesion and co-operation of the parts. Gradually, with the development of sociality, we thus have an evolution of the essential factors of government, these being most evident in the exercise of the martial force and in the management of family and tribal affairs. The organisation of the protective force, as distinct from the economic, became a prominent factor in evolution.

We have seen that no sufficient reason exists for the theory that primitive man was pre-eminently warlike. But as population grew and hunting, pastoral, and agricultural lands were in demand, tribes unknown to each other would come in contact and occasion hostility. Especially through rivalry, and desire for booty and land, would conflicts arise where no kinship was recognised. Even between related peoples conflicts were likewise possible.

War has undoubtedly been one of the most vigorous factors in the development of peoples, particularly in early times. By it savages were aroused from their lethargy, and the demand for self-preservation developed their energies to the utmost. Whether the motive was superstition, hatred and revenge, slavery, cannibalism, conquest of territory or booty, or to ward off an attack, it served more than anything else to develop strength and skill. Knowledge of any kind was valuable, and war was an efficient training-school. It taught the need of co-operation; and the necessity of defending their persons, their families, their possessions, and all their interests, served to make society more fully conscious of their value. But it also brought into contact peoples with dif-

ferent views and customs, and thus enabled them to learn from one another. Whatever took them out of their narrow grooves and ruts was calculated to create new impulses and give larger views of life. Not only was skill acquired in warfare, but there was also a demand for the most effective weapons. This led to the manufacture of clubs, of bone and stone implements, of bows and arrows, spears, shields, and finally to the use of bronze and iron, for offensive and defensive warfare. As the exercise of the economic force taught man to become a tool-making animal, so the exercise of the martial force obliged him to become a manufacturer of implements of war. Whatever advantage was gained in manufacture for the chase, for tilling the soil, or for war, was so much skill for all the departments of life and might promote the general social welfare.

195. The germs of government found in primitive conditions were developed with the complexity of social relations. Government had its origin in the family. The parents outranked the children in authority, and in childhood or even later had the absolute disposal of them. The question of authority was solved in the main by strength. The supremacy of the father was general. Sometimes, however, the dominance among savages now belongs to the wife and mother, since the tribal and economic relations are decided by the maternal connection, the children and possessions belonging to the kinship or tribe of the mother.

But whether the supremacy in the relationship belonged to the father or the mother, we have here the beginning of rank and the basis of authority, the source whence all the governmental functions could be developed. In other than the family relations the rank and authority were also largely decided by strength, unless determined by the blood-tie. Pre-eminence belonged to the man who could manipulate or subdue others. He became the

natural leader in war; the safety of the community required that others should follow him. Skill in the manufacture and use of weapons was also an important factor; likewise wealth, a peculiar ornament, or anything which distinguished a man.

Numerous terms in different languages indicate that age conferred honour and also gave official position. Frequently the "elders" appear as the representatives and rulers of peoples. In the family the parents were the elders, the idea still preserved in German by the name *Eltern* for parents. Age involved experience, perhaps wisdom, and respect for it was cultivated by the relation of children to their parents. The worship of ancestors gave distinction to those nearest them, namely, the aged, to those in the direct line of descent, and to such as had forefathers of highest renown. Racial distinctions also caused difference in rank, some being of purer blood than others. Conquerors formed an aristocracy, while the conquered, unless killed and eaten, were reduced to slavery.

For a village, a group, a tribe, a leader or chief was required, which marks a considerable degree of evolution in the line of the governmental force. When the chieftainship became hereditary it established a permanent rank, distinction being conferred on the family and near kin of the ruler. Certain callings were also especially honoured besides warriors, such as the priesthood, the medicine-man, the sorcerer, and the soothsayer. It is thus apparent that in a low stage of culture numerous occasions would arise for the creation of rank and the exercise of authority, and for the evolution of tendencies which eventually made the state a necessity and actually evolved the state.

196. Previous chapters throw so much light on the development of the cultural forces that here only a brief consideration of the causes is required. The beginnings

of culture are most difficult; after it has started, numerous occasions and causes for its development arise. Perhaps these are cumulative. Whatever frees man from his sensuality and from slavish subjection to physical conditions prepares the way for culture. The upward course is entered as soon as he becomes his own master and the master of nature, and makes the mind his guide. This mental guidance began as soon as his own thought became the source of feeling and action.

The birth of æsthetics reveals an interest which rises above mere sensual gratification. Beauty affords a joy superior to animal pleasure. Society cultivated taste; distinction was conferred on the man who possessed and displayed it in a superior degree. Art became one of the means of communication. The most artistic communications by means of language, gesture, or representation of any kind were most effective. A drawing, however crude, sent to a man conveyed the intention of the sender—a method of intercourse still found among the Australians and other savages. The pictures in which men thought led to pictorial representations, either because men like to embody their mental states in an objective form, or for the sake of imparting them to their fellow-men. Artistic skill might confer pecuniary advantages as well as distinction.

Art uses nature; but the mind exercised in art is cultivated by the art. Decorative art, prevalent among primitive people, receives much social encouragement. It heightens the attraction of the individual and adds value to objects which confer honour and power on their maker and possessor.

In *Sociologia artistica*, the Italian author, Fausto Squillace, undertakes the important task of determining the sociological bearings of art. In the first part he discusses the social conception of æsthetics, in the second, art as a social phenomenon.

Guyan has also discussed art from the sociological point of view—*L'Art au point de vue sociologique*.

197. All kinds of social exercises and gatherings were calculated to bring into action the ethical force. In the associations of men desires and wills clash, feeling is excited, and conflicts occur. Social friction would tend eventually to establish a consensus of opinion and create manners, customs, traditions, authority, and conformity, or else produce a war in which the victor makes the law. By means of social intercourse the worst as well as the best feelings are excited, and enmity and outbreaks were inevitable. Some understanding or agreement became necessary for the very existence of society, no matter whether effected by peaceable or warlike means. What could not be thought out was rubbed out, being established by virtue of necessity. Rules of an ethical character, even if founded solely on expediency, are evolved by the ordinary intercourse of men. At an early stage right as an abstract principle or an ideal cannot be expected; but specific, concrete rights are established among men by living together and social intercourse, by the need of co-operation in securing common interests, and by the disagreeable and disastrous consequences of hostility, conflict, and warfare. Choice may have little to do with what is finally recognised as right; important agencies are the necessities arising from social intercourse, the views, habits, and customs, formed unconsciously, and the example and command of a person of power.

Man in a state of nature being controlled by the necessities of nature, freedom and choice, like rationality, had yet to be evolved. His associations were not the result of deliberation and selection, or of an estimate of the advantages (of which he probably knew little) to be gained, but of instinct and impulse, locality, circumstances, and family connection. He, indeed, could not be wholly

negative in relation to ethical requirements; but they seem to have been less the direct product of his conscience than of the necessities involved in the contact of man with man. He had to be evolved ethically before he could himself become an ethical factor and determine for himself what is right. By a force of nature he imitated himself and others, and established customs which took the place of right as well as of law. The useful, as we have seen, appeared to be the right. There was too much ignorance and haphazard to make the associations compact organisations with a definite end. Least of all could he be expected to make ethical considerations supreme at a time when what is useful and agreeable is the chief consideration.

We must not look for the evolution of ethics as a totality or in a systematic manner. Whatever interest dominated the relations of men developed its peculiar kind of manners and customs. Thus, in economic relations business ethics was developed, while war evolved martial customs, and by means of ordinary intercourse the common morality was unfolded. This will help us to understand why the rules for certain occupations and pursuits are developed more elaborately in some places than in others. Even in the most advanced society few can be expected to have an abstract system of ethics and make it the law of conduct. Most persons learn some practical rules and apply them as the occasion demands. It has been shown before that there is no conduct which is solely ethical; but it is always some particular word or deed—economic, political, religious—to which we ascribe an ethical character. Hence morality must be sought in connection with the interests and occupations of people.

198. For the awakening and earliest objective manifestation of the religious force we must look to the entire personality of primitive man moving in a world of mysteries. Instincts, feelings, dark impressions, imagination,

must have been powerful factors. Through his own efforts he became conscious of power and will. The observation of other persons confirmed him in the belief that an active agent behind phenomena is their source. Personification is produced by the imagination of the savage, which readily attributes to objects of nature what he observes in himself, in this way endowing them with a subjective state similar to his own. To him movement, action, and life seemed to involve a moving, acting, living agent. Sleep and dreams might foster the notion that this agent was separable from the body, could move about, and work upon and through various objects. Death must have made a startling impression; with the breath the hidden agent seemed to depart. Whatever name was given to the invisible but real and potent object, it easily suggested wandering spirits, ghosts, and demons. There are savages which take health and life and well-being as a matter of course, while disease, death, and calamity suggest some special agency as the producing cause. This would lead to the recognition and worship of evil spirits. Amid all these dark impressions fancy became a dogmatist and created the forms around which superstition hovers. These creations served for the solution of the mystery of being, which everywhere pressed heavily on the awakening mind—from within, from personal and social experiences, from nature, the air, and the heavens—and for which no other solution was found. Neither then nor long afterwards was a sharp distinction made between a subjective notion and objective reality. The unknown was a realm in which the heart and fancy had an unlimited and unhindered sphere of activity. Conscience may also have had a share in peopling this realm.

Many occasions would promote the evolution of the religious force when once aroused, as when a great desire seemed beyond personal realisation, when help was

needed against disease, an enemy, or some threatening aspect of nature, when fear or hope became intense. Cunning men could use superstition for their own purposes, and soothsayers, medicine-men, priests, chiefs, and all who claimed special relation to a deity, would promote its development. When family, tribal, and national gods appeared their worship became a social bond and duty. Reverence for ancestors deified them and they may have been among the first objects of worship. In the course of time numerous customs and institutions were established for religious purposes, and particular persons set apart to serve the gods and mediate between them and the people. Between homage to a chief and a divinity there often seemed an affinity. The nature and influence of religion and the fact that its objects were beyond the ordinary tests of knowledge served to make it an object around which the power of tradition was especially concentrated. Hence it eventually worked in society like an inexorable and final law. With the ignorance and helplessness of primitive man, superstition acquired an almost limitless power and was continually resorted to in emergencies.

The modification of religion has resulted chiefly from the growth of knowledge and from the influence of religious heroes. The realm of faith was diminished as science advanced, and superstitions were gradually eliminated. Whatever changes may take place in religion and theology, there will always be problems enough left which must be relegated to faith, because beyond the reach of science. While formerly the questions with which faith was concerned pertained largely to particular forces of nature and man, religion now centres around the ultimate problems, such as the source of being and the character of the Power governing the universe, the problem of spiritualism and materialism, of idealism and naturalism. Faith and atheism are irreconcilable; but faith and agnosticism need not be. The fact that the ultimate problems

lie beyond the realm of knowledge, especially beyond what is recognised as scientific demonstration, does not imply that they lie outside of the sphere of a valid faith.

199. The intellectual force, the only remaining one, has been sufficiently discussed already. Only after a long preparatory stage, during which abstract ideas were developed in the mind and found expression in language, could it gain prominence. During the reign of sense, impulse, and mental reproductions institutions for its special culture could not be established. The intellect was, however, exercised in the chase and in war, in making and using implements, in the social relations, and in every effort to better the lot of man. Certain classes in civilisation, however, have this kind of mental exercise and yet remain on a low intellectual level. The ambition to excel or gain place was probably among the chief impulses to development. In counsel and in conflict the supremacy naturally belonged to those whose wisdom inspired confidence. The inquisitive mind had yet to be developed, but occasion for questioning and wonder would arise and stimulate inquiry.

The striking apathy of many savages confirms the conviction that only the powers required by conscious need and subject to external stimuli are developed. Thought is weak in primitive man, while the senses are strong and keen. The mind subject to constant control by external phenomena cannot bear protracted concentration of attention. An intellectual pre-eminence might, however, characterise a few individuals, who would thereby become leaders of thought. But from a subordinate to a dominant place the intellect passes only when the cultural stage is reached—and even then slowly. Art, ethics, enlightened religion, and politics are less bound by nature than the organic forces are. The mind is their realm, the intellect is active in their culture, and is cultivated by them.

One of the best tests of the degree of development attained is found in the relation of the intellectual energy to the other forces. With all the achievements of the past and the glory of the present, the supremacy of the intellect belongs to the future, perhaps the distant future. In intellectual crises, in times of criticism, in eras when great problems test the rational powers to the utmost, and during the reign of philosophy and science, this energy receives special emphasis, at least among the most advanced.

200. In the origin and early evolution of the social forces we deal with the roots of all future development. We cannot follow the cultural forces through the historic era in which they attain their most perfect forms—the attempt to do so would require a summary of the principles found in the history of art, ethics, religion, and intellect. There is, however, one causative factor which may be regarded as a general principle in all the higher development of the cultural forces and ought not to be omitted here: man himself is the standard in the evolution. This means that, when the cultural forces have become prominent in human life, the law of their development is no longer in external influences, but in man himself, in his needs, his ideas, and his ideals. This can be illustrated by the higher evolution of religion. The test of religion ceases to be a superstitious naturalism or an equally superstitious traditionalism, but is found in the needs of the human personality. That religion is an objectification of the highest demands of man is true; but this no more argues against the validity of religion than it argues against truth and right that man sees in them a reflection of, and response to, his own nature. He cannot but believe in the united demands of his heart, conscience, reason, and will. The total personality makes certain requirements imperative and final. A man's religion is determined by what he is in his greatest need

and at his best, and what is revealed by the light in which he moves. His religion grows with his character, his experience, his knowledge, and his entire personality. It is no more true that he adapts himself to his religion, than it is that he adapts his religion to himself. In proportion as it becomes absorbing, religion is his conscience, his heart, his faith, his reason; and all these objectify themselves in his religion.

This law is followed by all the cultural forces in their higher development. They are an embodiment and a reflection of man himself. In him, not outside of him, they have their standard. Where but in man can the ideal of æsthetics, ethics, religion, and intellect be found? To say that faith seizes an object beyond humanity does not put the standard outside of man—it is still his faith that is his guide. What the imagination, the conscience, the heart, the reason, the will demand thus becomes the guide in evolution. Man ever seeks to express himself, and with his person the expression grows. Social evolution, then, is a progressive process of self-realisation on the part of man, both as an individual and a member of society.

CHAPTER XIV

CAUSES WHICH EVOLVE THE INTERACTION AND THE PRODUCTS OF THE SOCIAL FORCES

201. Thus far the social forces have been considered separately. But no force is an organism which works or grows by itself independently of the other forces. It is like a colour in the rainbow, distinct in itself and yet inseparably connected with the other colours. And as all these colours in their union form the rainbow, so all these forces in their union constitute society. This makes it necessary to pass from these individual forces to their actual operation in human association.

We have found that besides the separate forces four other factors are to be considered in investigating the causes of social evolution, namely, the interaction of these forces with one another or the means of communication; the social content or the possession of the social mind; the embodiment of this content in a permanent and transmissible form; and the social structure or organisation. Each has a specific function in the evolution, and we now proceed to investigate the causes of their development. It will thus become clearer how the forces of individuals are socialised and how by this means society is developed. Why individuals unite their forces so as to form society and then develop the unions formed will lead to the consideration of some of the most interesting movements in humanity. The reasons for association not only socialise the individual and unfold his social energies, but also increase the power and skill in the interaction of these

energies, develop the possessions of the social mind, give an abiding objective form to these possessions, and perfect social organisation.

202. *Causes which evolve the means of communication.*—

If the universe, according to the law of the conservation of energy, always consists of the same amount of energy, how is evolution possible? Only by changing the relation of the energies to each other, combining some that are separated, separating some that are united. Later we shall have occasion to refer to the process again. When a grain of wheat is taken from a mummy and deposited in fruitful soil, the forces are changed only in their relation to one another. The whole universe is the product of a change in the relation of the chemical elements. Isolated individuals unite their forces and produce society; and all the modifications in society are due to changes in the relations of the forces.

Mind acting on mind is the problem; impelling and being impelled, changing and being changed through the impulses given. As the minds and their energies change, so is the society created by these energies changed. Persons are related through their intercourse with one another; and a change in the intercourse effects a change in their relation. The means of communication, so deeply affecting personal and social relations, are significant for two persons who converse, for nations trying to understand each other, for international congresses, and for every species of sociality. All mental reciprocity is involved, a vast sphere which includes the social use of the psychical content, the methods of self-expression and of impressing others. The individual aims at the manifestation and multiplication of his consciousness, reduplicating himself in others and thus giving enlargement to what he stands for.

The first mental interaction must have been of the most elementary character. Men were bodies rather

than minds, so that their relation was predominantly physical. The very effort at self-expression evolved the mind and with it psychical interaction between men, and thus real social intercourse emerged from the physical relationship. There was little to communicate; that little pertained chiefly to physiological and physical conditions; and it could only be darkly hinted at by touch, by look, sound, and sign. The expression of the rude, uncultivated self had a personal rather than a social significance, referring to a need or desire of the individual. The relation of children who grow up together without a teacher and somehow learn to understand and adapt themselves to each other presents an apt illustration of the process by means of which vague impressions on vague minds grow in clearness and definiteness. The communication of animals gives a hint of the beginnings of human intercourse. Play was given to instinct, fancy, and feeling. Joy and sorrow found direct expression through the tone in exclamations. Touch would be more resorted to than in civilisation, also attraction and repulsion expressed by gesture and by movement toward or from an object. The life was absorbed by sensations and feelings and the action prompted by these. The feeling expresses itself spontaneously and awakens directly in others an impression of what occurs in the mind of the actor. Children readily make themselves understood in respect to appetite, pain, the affections, and play, whose manifestation seems instinctive. The life of primitive man is external; the mental life was largely a reflection of outer phenomena and could the more easily find expression in the pictures drawn from the external world. Nothing was mentally elaborated, nothing required elaborated means of expression.

It was at this stage that the mental process of reproducing what others communicated came nearest mechanical imitation. Mimicry, so common among savages,

must have been conspicuous in early times. The imitated man sees himself in the imitation and thus an understanding becomes possible. Those who use the same sounds for the same things have a common basis for intercourse. The man who sees another act like himself interprets him by himself. Repetition becomes familiar and interpretable in proportion as it expresses in sound and deed objects themselves familiar. Some sounds and signs were constantly repeated and thus became the usual means of intercourse. What was often used for a particular object, thought, feeling, or purpose, became its fixed and recognised sign. Perhaps the signs employed by the deaf and dumb give valuable hints. The evolution of language, one of the most marvellous achievements of the human mind, must have been extremely difficult, laborious, and slow.

The causes which developed the means of communication were found in the intercourse itself. Strangers with not a word in common could not live together long without creating some kind of language. As in primitive times individuals developed and became better acquainted, they had more to communicate, were better able to adapt themselves to one another, and they increased and improved the symbols used. Every social impulse promoted the exercise and interaction of the social forces. As by intercourse a child learns a language, so by intercourse, through infinite processes of communication, all the expressions in the most evolved vocabulary were formed. The old rule applies: practice makes perfect.

Reason and language develop simultaneously. The reason evolved seeks to embody itself in language; and the reason thus embodied can be understood only by reason. In the case of persons living alone or only with animals, it has been found that both reason and language remained undeveloped. Man becomes man truly, fully, only in association with man.

At no time could the power of expression lag far behind the mental attainments. What could not express itself in definite terms was likely to perish for want of exercise and adequate embodiment.

203. Self-expression is closely allied to self-preservation. Only so far as he objectifies and expresses himself to himself and others is a man truly a thinking, acting being. To the world he must always be according to his self-revelation. As energy he is self-assertive, and his self-assertion is a prominent factor in developing the means of communication. The egotic force impels to a revelation of self. While it requires selfishness in order to appropriate solely for self all that is within reach, the imparting of what constitutes the real self, the mind and heart, can involve the noblest altruism. This is also a genuine enlargement of self, for in the reproductions of himself in others a man beholds himself reduplicated. His work is a photograph of himself. Here, then, is a mighty impulse to improve the means of intercourse or of self-extension. Especially what is strongly felt asserts itself and seeks to become contagious. Thoughts and beliefs and purposes objectify themselves and thus cultivate the means of making what is expressed effective. The constant expression of self cultivates the signs used, making them more definite, better adapted to the end of communication, and adding to their ease of use, their strength and polish. The power of persuasive speech is too great not to receive attention. As men multiplied, as their interests increased, as divisions of labour occurred and associations grew, new stimuli were given to the mind to assert itself both in respect to assent and dissent.

While at first self-expression would be as immediate as the impression to which it responded, contact with other individuals made a regard for them necessary, required consideration of their feelings, their station, and their

power, and thus became the means of cultivating reflection. Questions of expediency and propriety would arise, checking unbridled impulsiveness and making conversation more considerate. The speech was thereby no less affected than the mental possessions. An enlarged vocabulary was required by new observation and experience, by a development of reflection, feeling, and purpose. Each occupation and calling had special objects and interests, and the words developed by them were added to the common stock. Eventually generalisations became necessary and were perhaps evolved unconsciously. Language as a social product has its own laws of evolution, independent of the whims of an individual. Only those words lasted into which society put its mind. But the very communism prevalent in speech might retard its evolution. When the language was adapted to the usual aims of expression its development was apt to cease. Further progress could be promoted only by new mental stimuli and growth.

Savages sometimes speak a language which is superior to their present status, showing that they must have degenerated. All that affected men in their relations during this long period of formation and development must have told on the speech—it made deposits there. Thus language became a repository of the observation, the experience, the occupations, thoughts, feelings, and purposes of the race. When peoples migrated their speech bore traces of the migration; when peoples mingled, the speech of one was amalgamated with that of the other, or a substitution of one in place of the other occurred, and the substitution always involved transformation. Language changed with the people, with their relations, their pursuits, and their minds.

In language and what it embodies we have the best revelation of society, a social psychology which is without a parallel. In its speech we read a nation as we do an

author in his works. The most striking monument of Greece is the Greek language. For the isolated individual language also has significance. It gives definiteness to his ideas, and he speaks to himself intelligently because his language is intelligible. He may coin and use, as children sometimes do, words for his own purpose which afterwards receive social recognition. The social survival in a language can, however, be but a small fraction of the sounds and words actually used in the course of the ages. Sociology is concerned with the social function of language, with the fact that by means of it the peculiarity of one mind becomes the common possession of many minds. The keen observation of one person is adopted by the people as a proverb and becomes the maxim of millions and the wisdom of the ages.

When language is called an organism which grows according to fixed laws, its own logic determining the character of its development, we must not be misled by the figurative expressions. In language abstracted from persons there is no inherent energy or impulse, and it is not literally an organism. Whether spoken or written, language has significance only so far as it embodies or symbolises the content of the mind. The evolution of language is effected solely by the thought in individual minds and interaction of these minds with one another.

In early times language could not have the same significance as at present. Other means were used for communication. Music is a kind of universal expression of thought and feeling, though less definite than language. Symbolical dances are common among savages, as the war dances of the American Indians. The music accompanying them is also symbolical. It seems that music was early associated with labour. Its sounds and rhythm attracted attention from the toil and promoted unison in the efforts of the toilers. In the family and in all forms of social life, music, both vocal and instrumental, had a prominent part. It gives a direct expression to feeling such as phonetic language cannot do, appeals to and cultivates

feeling, and was therefore peculiarly adapted to the primitive stage. The very indefiniteness of music makes it a vehicle for feeling, and the hearer can endow it with the mood and the emotions of his heart. Through the feelings an appeal was also made to the intellect. Masks, colours, pictures, and other forms of art could likewise be used for communication. Any ethnological museum will illustrate the power of art as a means of intercourse in the early stages of human life.

We must recall what was said above, that real language is always in individuals. A lexicon with signs which no one understands contains no language for any one, or it is language too literally dead to be language any longer.

204. *Causes of the evolution of the social content.*—The evolution of the social content is affected by all the social activities, and it, in turn, affects them. Intimately connected with it is the development of the social forces and their interaction. This content includes all held in common by an association or social group, that which constitutes what is called the social mind. In a political party it is the platform or the consensus respecting questions of principle and policy; in a church it is the faith and hope and purpose shared by the members. The social content of nations differs no less than that of churches. This is revealed by the press of the United States, England, France, Germany, and Russia, so far as expressive of the national consciousness. A city can be divided into groups according to their respective contents, the psychical possessions of some being low and meagre, of others rich and exalted. An academy of science has a social content different from a club of market-women. The differences in this respect pertain to intellect, to feeling and purpose, to religion, art, and politics, to estimates of right and wrong and of life itself, and to all that affects the treasures of the soul. In a savage community the content is the product of the lower forms of life, and in these finds its limits. It can grow only with the content

of the individual minds, having no real existence anywhere else. Hence it develops with the psychical possessions of individuals and their communication. Every new thought, feeling, or purpose, imparted by the individual to society, is an addition to the social content. This indicates the social value of the development of the individual and of the means of communication. Even the wisest are subject to severe limitations when obliged to converse by means of signs. Language is evolved by, and evolves, the content. Where the mind itself has no substantial content to impel it forward, and where the social content is stagnant, as in savage communities, we look for the development of the psychical possessions to some kind of external impulse or necessity, such as a change of locality involving new objects of attention and fresh solicitations to effort; to a change in the method of securing a livelihood, as when the chase is exchanged for a pastoral life, and this for agriculture; when new methods of warfare, of tilling the soil, and of travel and commerce are introduced; and when contact with strangers unsettles traditions and customs, introduces new views and creates fresh interests, gives another direction to life, demands other adaptations, and excites greater energy. The growth is by means of ferment and of the communication of foreign material. It is not surprising that the old civilisations were located in centres of contact and intercourse, of trade and commerce, where various nationalities displayed their peculiarities in co-operation and conflict, where their association meant variety of stimuli, where strange theories and faiths overthrew the stagnant conservatism, and where competition in the struggle for existence developed mental as well as physical energy. Agitation, unless so violent as to paralyse effort, destroy vigour, and prevent accumulation, evolves the social content. Every disturbance presented the alternative of a forward movement to better adaptation or of

falling behind in the race. Those seem in the right who see the conditions of progress, not in the inherent qualities of a particular race, but in the mixture of races, the infusion of fresh blood in an old people, the influence of new stimuli, and the introduction of agitating variety into monotonous stagnation.

Again the great law that a change in relations is the mother of all social changes!

Every new study changes the mental content of a class in college. Emigrants who come in groups to the United States find that their social content is changed by the new scenes, interests, and occupations. The union of Italy and of Germany changed the social minds of those countries.

A writer in *Die Gegenwart*, December 22, 1900, p. 390, discusses the value of the mixture of races in the process of culture. He says: "No race has ever been able to create culture without a mixture of foreign blood. All cultures which the world has heretofore seen have been the product of mixing the blood of different peoples, of fructifying a race by means of another." This the writer illustrates in the case of ancient Greece and Rome and modern European nations. To this mixture of blood must, of course, be added the influence exerted by the contact of the minds of different peoples. Cities have cultural advantages over the country on account of the means of contact and communication and the variety of stimuli afforded.

A foreign element if inferior may check progressive evolution; or if strong, but not inferior, may turn it into a different direction. The effects of such elements can be studied to advantage in the incursions of the barbarians into the Roman Empire.

205. When an individual, Charles Darwin, for instance, changes the content of his mind and then, by communication, changes the social content, the process is the same as that which has taken place many million times since

the beginning of human intercourse. No one becomes a second Darwin, but each person who receives the Darwinian content adapts it to his old views or adapts these to the new possession. The effect is revealed in the social conceptions of science, philosophy, history, theology, and life. The social mind receives a Darwinian colouring, and this will continue so long as his views prevail.

Besides this influence of individuals, other causes affect the social content, such as public opinion, the interests of a community, the daily affairs of life, the economic concerns, the recreations, health and disease, the schools and churches, politics, the phenomena of nature, everything, in fact, which arrests general attention. The social content is uniform while a low level, which all easily attain, prevails. When progress takes place all the people do not rise at the same time, in an equal degree, or in the same direction. London, Paris, Berlin, New York, beginning with the children and illiterates and ending with the ripest scholars, may have all the grades of social content from primitive man to the enlightened sage.

The groups with different kinds of content are subject to constant change, due partly to inherent causes, partly to the interaction of persons and groups. One man in a group feels needs, seizes opportunities, and elaborates ideas, which give him a peculiar mental content and make him solitary; he communicates it to his group, changes its content, and thus sets in motion agencies which change society in general. At first a few make the new views their own, then more; but there may be many whom it only partially influences, others who remain untouched. In many instances this process can be distinctly traced in philosophy (Hegel), in science (Darwin), in religion (Luther), in art (Raphael), in politics (Napoleon). Gifted and energetic individuals effect changes in the general social content, but not equally in all groups. Each group takes according to receptivity and reproductivity.

Hence the differences in communities both respecting the character and degree of social content, each rank, class, and occupation having peculiar views and interests. As the content becomes definite and crystallises, as it becomes marked and intense, it unites and separates men, forming cliques and parties, alliances and organisations. Other things being equal, an affinity is created between men with possessions which are similar or supplement each other.

It is interesting to trace the process of ideas from individual thinkers and schools to the masses. Formerly the results of scholarship were confined to a few privileged ones; but since the introduction of printing this monopoly has decreased. From the schools and learned works thoughts are now communicated through popular volumes, the platform, the pulpit, and journals, resulting in a marvellous diffusion of the results of research. Scholarly works, such as those on economics and socialism, which have significance for the people, quickly reach the masses. Usually, of course, the public do not get an entire system, but only some of its fragmentary thoughts. This diffusion of the results of learning exalts and enriches the general social content, so that a boy knows more about some things than the most learned of former days. But this coming of the public into the secrets of the schools affects the schools themselves. The tendency to the popularisation of instruction is marked, and even scholarly subjects are made more practical. The effect may be felt by scholarship itself, so that it will seek adaptation to the people rather than search for profound principles and general laws.

The rapid change of the social content of a particular class is strikingly illustrated by the influence of Marx's socialism on the labourers of Europe, especially those in Germany.

206. A pyramid can be used to illustrate the social content of a community, a state, or the world. In a low stage of culture all the people are at the base and possess

the general content peculiar to that stage. But even when the higher stages are reached it is found that those who occupy them have something in common with those on the lower planes, namely, the organic forces and the content they create. To the sage no less than to the savage the appetite is indispensable; but it constitutes the life of the latter, while the sage makes the lower forces the basis for his higher activities. As we ascend above the base of the pyramid to a smaller plane, the appetite loses its exclusive dominance and more prominence is given to affection. Another upward step places us on a still smaller surface. The organic forces of the lower planes are retained, all the higher energies rest on them; but the cultural forces now appear and use the organic as the plant the soil—to grow above it. The society becomes smaller the higher we ascend, and few persons are found on the summit with the most perfectly developed cultural forces and the most valuable content. While those on the top rest on all the planes below and possess the essential features of their content, they also have peculiar contents which are shared by no lower grade. The higher you ascend, the richer, more varied, and more perfect the content, but the smaller the number of its possessors. By drawing a line from the top to the bottom, the planes increase in size every step downward. The extent of the plane is the measure of the number of persons it contains; but the content is poor in proportion as the number of persons is large.

Other differences exist which cannot be indicated by this pyramid. Different degrees of culture prevail among those on the same plane. Each force as it evolves produces contents of various grades in the same group. An association of artists may be dominated by æsthetics, while no two are alike in respect to artistic appreciation and power. The same applies to every force. If we classify persons according to the average of their culture,

some will be found to excel in one respect, others in a different one. But whatever energy dominates the society on a particular plane, the higher plane may act as a ferment on all the lower ones and thus affect the character of the whole society.

Sometimes one force is especially active in evolution, then another, the explanation of which will be more fully considered later. The kind of content which prevails at a particular time depends on the stage of evolution, on physical needs, on the natural and social surroundings, on the occupations, the vigour of the imagination, the emotional nature, the character of the intellect, and the dominance of particular forces.

Besides the pyramid indicating the general stages of culture, each force might also be represented by a pyramid. The æsthetic force has a low plane on which may be found the majority in a community, while every step upward in æsthetics contains fewer persons. A city of millions has a vast multitude on the lower planes of intellectuality, while the philosophers and scientists are few, with perhaps not a single one of the first rank. Even in the most enlightened community the average intelligence generally falls far below the usual estimates. The pyramid can also be used for the illustration of morals and religion. This arrangement of the grades of culture enables us to understand why speakers and authors of a lower plane are often popular, while those on the summit address only a few or are ignored.

The economic condition of a community is usually most distinctly marked—paupers and those who barely live on their income; those who live comfortably; those who save; those who have a superfluity. A similar classification might be made respecting all the social forces and their respective contents.

207. *The preservation of the social content in a permanent, transmissible form.*—By the expression of its social content an age or nation gives a revelation of itself. But how little of the social content of a people expresses itself

so as to be communicable to all times! The volume containing this invaluable treasure of human thought, feeling, and purpose is most fascinating, but its records are not complete. Only in epitome, such as titles of volumes and headings of a few chapters, have the social possessions come down to our age from primitive times. Through intercourse with one another men communicate their thoughts and desires; but only as an exception are such communications transmitted from generation to generation. Even of the sayings of eminent men the records are meagre. When we go to prehistoric eras we find but few mutilated relics as the revelations of the social mind. Hence for long periods the evolution of the mind of society, on which sociology lays so much stress, cannot be traced at all, or but obscurely. Even of historic times we have records only of what seemed to contemporaries most striking, while what was really best in thought and feeling might be lost.

For our knowledge of the social content in the past we depend on its objective and permanent manifestation. This manifestation and the causes of its evolution we now consider. Much bearing on the subject has already been given in the preceding pages. All social action is a revelation of the social content; but this content is especially seen in two forms: in the symbols it uses and in the institutions it establishes. Since all objective social products are an expression of the social content, the structure or organisation of society would be included. But the social structure is inseparable from society itself, and therefore different from social symbols and institutions with a kind of independent existence. Besides, the social structure is so important as to require separate treatment.

208. Sounds, discordant or harmonious, with only a fleeting existence in the minds that used them, at last become the permanent symbols of society. Language, ever fluid when only spoken, congeals into an abiding

objective form in writing. The existing languages contain relics of the earliest speech, but the survivals are untraceable. Sounds which had acquired a definite meaning were used permanently and became transmissible. The very language formed was an enduring embodiment of social thought, feeling, and purpose. But this content was also expressed and conserved in traditions, which were a deposit of the beliefs and experiences of past generations. The manners and customs and maxims and songs were social crystallisations. All the institutions of society were but so many bodies which contained the social soul, which lived in and acted through them. Thus in various ways the social mind was embodied in an objective and permanent form and survived from generation to generation. Even if permanent institutions were not created, society itself was the depository of the results of the processes through which it had passed, and in its own character it conserved the effects of these processes. The children inherited and could develop the possessions of their fathers. Evolution thus became cumulative, the past was conserved for the future, and the future added its contributions to the past. During short intervals the increment might be imperceptible, but in long periods the changes were marked. By means of this cumulative process the development of human society has in respect to progress an incomparable advantage over the lower animals. This brings out the importance of the factor we are now considering,—the embodiment of the social content in a permanent form. It is in this way that an age works for all coming ages and helps to give unity to human activity.

No proof is required to show that the permanent manifestation of the social content does not keep pace with the content itself. The psychical changes cannot at once become objective. The language of one age may not be sufficient for the content of the next; yet there is no

other in which to express itself. Hence mental growth requires a development of language. But this social tool may also become a social limit, as when language becomes stationary. All the institutions and products of the past can be made grooves in which society moves, in which it is trained and disciplined, whose thought it thinks, and whose life it lives. What the past establishes has the right of way, while the new is obliged to make a way for itself. How often conservatism becomes the grave of what it conserves, and the past the chain of coming generations! When existing institutions and traditions are outstripped by new ideas, ferments, impulses, and aspirations the new factors may not be able to find adequate lasting expression.

How little of the social mind even the newspapers can express! How much less could find expression in Egypt, India, China, or even Greece and Rome!

209. Might is the authority which determines the character of the records, renders decisions, and passes and executes the final sentence. According to this rule many of the permanent forms of the social content must be estimated. The judgment of a corrupt court and a subservient public becomes historic, while the condemned prophet, reformer, and philosopher are silent in history. The family must conform to the arrangements of the clan, the county is subject to the laws of the state, the state to those of the empire—numbers, size, might, rule, not principle, truth, justice. Votes are counted, not weighed. How far a small group can give permanent expression to itself often depends on the will of a larger organisation. A small group which concentrates the highest culture cannot annul the decrees of an inferior but dominant power. Ideals have no rights where brute force rules. Many plausible arguments might be adduced by a pessimist who claims that what becomes historic bears the seal of its own condemnation.

The interference with social expression and its permanence produces important results. The majority or the constituted authority are usually conservative; they want to continue the conditions which give them the dominance. A party in power is not apt to abdicate voluntarily. History and reason agree that it is natural for social ferment and agitation to begin with individuals and small groups, or with such as have been oppressed and suppressed. Perhaps they can become the majority or attain well-being only by reversing the existing order and supplanting those in authority. For many important changes in history, in the development and permanent manifestation of the social content, both in the form of reformation and revolution, we must look for the initiative to the exceptional ones who keenly realise needs and the inadequacy of existing means of supply, who are energetic, ambitious, and determined, perhaps downtrodden and near despair. Valuable lessons are taught in this respect by the social problem of the day.

The present dominion of a party or institution no more guarantees its continuance than life is an insurance against death. Innumerable factors may change the social content and with it the reigning authority. Party rule, often misgovernment and despotism in the most despicable form, is sure to work its own destruction. Posing as the social content, the fact that it is a *party* proves it but a *part* of that content. One of the strongest claims for a hereditary monarchy rests on the assertion that it is superior to parties, and can, without partisan bias, consider the rights and claims of all factions and do justice to all. The iniquitous partisan rule in republics has destroyed much of the enthusiasm with which Europe greeted their appearance at the close of the eighteenth century. A realistic age cares less for brilliant theories than practical results.

Anarchism may be a vampire, but it sucks much of its life-blood from the heart of history.

210. Aside from the destruction caused by the vicissitudes of time, a bright light is thrown on history by the fact that the transmission of an age is according to its appreciation. In vast realms of Indian, Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and Christian literature we have no stars, but only nebular light. The classic culture was ignored for ages and required the Renaissance in order to become a living power again. The survival of the fittest often means in human affairs the survival of what the powers that be deem fittest. Profound thinkers are solitary in an age of shallow empiricism, and perhaps prefer the quiet burial of their thoughts to a vain crying in the wilderness. Yet the hope of the future may be in what only one man thinks, though ages be required to make it an extensive social content. Many an error gains a temporal popular victory through prejudice or selfishness.

The final victory is another question. How much of human energy is wasted or worse than wasted no one can tell; it is not even an object of serious reflection. Much that is individual is not social; much that is social is extremely limited,—is not for society at large, perhaps against its best interests; and much that constitutes the social content of an age is a hindrance to the evolution of the content that will one day supersede it.

There is reason for giving historic prominence to a party which gains the victory in a conflict. Whatever else it lacks, it has the might which conquers the right of way and determines the course of development in the immediate future, while the party crushed may have no future and be unable to promote a continuous evolution. The principles of the ruling powers may be despised, but the powers themselves must be reckoned with. Those who investigate history know that victory and truth are not always allies. Over many a recent triumphal march humanity has reason to drape itself in mourning. The popular, and sometimes even the historical, estimate of

victories seems based on the old superstition that the appeal to a duel is an appeal to divine judgment, and that the result is the record of the divine will. The importance of conferring might on right is made evident by the fact that the existing might often determines victories, even if right is sacrificed.

211. The most important method of giving permanence to the social content was, of course, by means of writing. This was itself developed gradually, probably from pictures, which in the course of time came to stand for an object or an idea. All this was prehistoric, for before history could be written writing must have made considerable progress. The great change introduced by means of written records passes our power of comprehension. What was preserved before that time was in the form of relics whose original intention might be clear, but which gave only the most general idea of the social conditions. What was most delicate and perhaps most characteristic could not survive the ravages of time. Thought could be transmitted directly only by word of mouth. Even the traditions and beliefs were liable to change by this mode of transmission. But when writing was introduced, thought could receive a definite and permanent embodiment in language, records were kept, valuable documents prepared and preserved, and history was written. On papyrus, on boards, on rocks, on cloth and parchment, the records were made for future generations. From this time the ages became more closely united, the social content more significant because more lasting, and while the treasures of the past were conserved for the enriching of coming ages, each age could add its quota to them. It was this great advance which made culture and civilisation and states possible. The process of development, now being cumulative, assured to each generation the means of studying the past in its history and literature. It is through writing that each one

now becomes the heir of the vast accumulations of what has been thought, experienced, purposed, and accomplished by humanity during the historic era. True, it is not intellect itself which is thus communicated, but its symbols whose interpretation are made possible. Each age thus has incalculable wealth, even if it adds nothing to the treasure. But the proper use of what is handed down furnishes the strongest stimulus to transcend past achievements and to make the archives of the future richer than those inherited from the past.

Animals leave hardly any traces of themselves, except their skeletons; primitive man leaves some implements with his skeleton; in more advanced stages permanent institutions become monuments of bygone ages. Valuable records of time immemorial have been excavated with the buildings and statuary of buried cities. But the great epoch made by the introduction of historic writing differs from the prehistoric era in that it gives a continuous account of the thoughts, the spirit, the aspirations, the movements, and achievements of individuals and society. With the historic record before it a generation was closely linked to the past, and in making history it was referred to the future.

The educational value of history was especially emphasised in the nineteenth century, when the archives of Europe were opened, when historiography was greatly advanced, when historic studies received a new impulse, and when every subject was viewed in the light of evolution. On the other hand, it has been claimed that the study of history may interfere with progress. This study, it is said, leads into the past and concentrates attention on things as they were, and thus attracts the mind from the present and prevents adaptation to existing needs. History is thought to cultivate a conservatism which unfits for existing realities, for original inquiries, and for progressive movements. These voices are worth

heeding; but there is no question that the proper use of history offers one of the most effective means of social evolution.

212. Numerous institutions are evolved as an expression and embodiment of the social content, and every period seeks to give them the stamp of its peculiarity. After their establishment their relation to society is that of reciprocity. The society which adapts them to its aim may, in turn, be adapted and moulded by them. The people who adopt a constitution and form a state fix the rule by which they and their successors are to be governed. The citizens bind themselves; the laws are final and mark the limits of freedom. The same principle applies to all organisations; they make the grooves in which the societies are to move. The creed, the polity, the ritual of a church are regulations to which conformity is demanded. Hence the power of institutions for the future as well as at the time of their establishment; they lay the track for the social course. This reveals the influence of the makers of constitutions, of the founders and reformers of states and associations, and of all who embody and organise the social content in an enduring form. They give a synthesis of thought and experience, and make it dominant in the government of men. However perfect for the time being, their work may not prove an unconditional blessing. What they establish perhaps forestalls something better, and thus becomes a barrier in the way of progress. Despotisms, those ugly survivals, have their reason for existence in the theory that what has been, and is, must be. Innovation is dreaded; men know the effect of habit and custom, but are ignorant of the blessing or curse involved in the institution of a new order of things. What is established by the health and vigour of a society may eventually become its disease and weakness. A progressive society cannot abide by antiquated institutions and effete forms. As in the estab-

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lishments of an age we see the age itself, so in their transformation we have a picture of the movement of society.

Generally four eras are marked in the history of institutions: their origin, to meet some existing need; their development; their change, so as to meet the demand for new adaptations; and their decay. Their origin usually indicates the rise of a new interest and is a sign of progress. Perhaps an institution only concentrates and organises what long existed but failed to obtain proper expression. After its establishment there is generally conformity with its requirements and a development of the institution and society with it, followed by indifference, rising opposition, efforts at changes and renewals, a struggle between the conservative and progressive factors, and finally revolution, peaceful or violent. Crises come to promote revision and transformation. Many organisations are too rigid for modification and adaptation, so nothing is left but to overthrow them and make room for others which correctly express the new social content. The necessity of revolution can only be overcome by making the principle of development an organic part of the institution, so that constant adaptation becomes possible with the changes of society.

States, churches, all organisations, in fact, illustrate the process described. What is stationary is adapted only to a stationary condition. Churches are liable to constant changes in some respects, in order to meet the changes in their environment as well as within their borders.

Organisations and institutions are usually established to perpetuate particular views and methods; and even if changes are provided for, the conservative tendencies may be too strong for them. Certain principles are generally regarded as unchangeable, and when they are superseded the organisation based on them is revolutionised.

Unfortunately, the term "institution" is used so vaguely

that it is hard to define what it includes. All that society institutes is an institution. The notion of permanency is involved. Usually the term is limited to the more important establishments, such as forms of government, laws, churches, asylums, and the like. We might divide the institutions, according to the forces concentrated in them, into economic, political, æsthetic, ethical, religious, intellectual, making the family, the concentration of the affectional force, the basal one. In numerous institutions, such as the benevolent ones, we have a concentration of various forces.

The progressive, stationary, and retrogressive tendencies in institutions present important problems. In proportion to the compactness and strength of an establishment is it impervious to impressions from without, so that the chief hope of reformation is from within.

Professor Weismann emphasises the power of an organism to determine the effect of the influences which are exerted on it. What he says about organisms applies in part also to social organisations. See his *Romanes Lecture*, also his *Studies in the Theory of Descent*. In the latter, p. 676, he says: "I have for many years insisted that the first, and perhaps most important, or in any case the most indispensable, factor in every transformation is *the physical nature of the organism itself*." In applying this to society, put *psychical* for *physical*, and the thought is that the effect of external influences is determined in the main by the character of the social mind.

Aristotle's system is one of many illustrations how what was originally progressive becomes a hindrance to progress. Henry Morley says in his introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*: "Thus the most energetic and wide-reaching man of science that the world has known, a man himself eager for advance by the way of experiment, by his very strength was made at last into a source of weakness, and advance of science in the sixteenth century had to begin by attack upon a dull idolatry of the man by whom, beyond all other men, the advance of science had

been most desired and aided. One of the most 'go-ahead' men who ever lived had been transformed, by those who could only swear in the words of a master, into a representative of intellectual stagnation."

Similar examples are found in quite recent times, even in our own day, where men have no authority for their faith, their philosophy, or their science but the word of a master whose spirit and doctrine they have failed to apprehend.

Schmoller says: "The great messages of human deliverance were all directed against the injustice of institutions which had outlived their usefulness. Through more righteous and better institutions men are trained to higher forms of existence." He does not question that coming institutions will be more just than the present.

In his great work on *China*, vol. ii., p. 3, Baron von Richt-hofen speaks of the severe rules of authority and piety which have long regulated all the social relations and made the institutions and the life so stationary. China, with its many excellencies, is a marvel of uniformity; the regularity works like a mechanism which hinders freedom and initiative. "If we view Chinese culture in its totality, as it has continued through all the historical changes, it presents to us, in spite of its evident weaknesses, the picture of a grand achievement of the human intellect." The Chinese themselves regard it as the acme of progress. But the rigidity of the institutions prevents their adaptation to new demands; and so soon as they are brought into contact with the progressive nations these institutions are seen to be effete survivals of the distant past and fit only for a people kept on their antiquated level.

213. The last of the five factors to be considered consists of *the causes of the evolution of the social structure*. It makes a specialty of the form which the relation of men assumes. So far as this relation involves formal association the subject has already been sufficiently discussed in what precedes. An organisation learns its structural needs from the method of its operations, and its experiences furnish wisdom for future guidance. But

aside from formal associations there is a social structure in unorganised society, but it lacks the conscious definiteness and the legal regulation of organisations.

In a social group or an evening gathering the relation of the individuals indicates the social structure, but it is not fixed by a written constitution. The apprehension of this structure is difficult, but important, because in it the society gives a revelation of itself. The relations existing in a savage group differ from those in a civilised group, but each group reveals itself in the relations the members sustain to each other. The form which these relations take is determined by the customs, the notions of propriety, and the status of the culture. The subject deserves special attention because unorganised society is more free than the organised, and this freedom enables it to give progressive impulses, while formal organisations are bound by constitutions and programs.

214. Every social change, especially in the content of society, somehow affects the social structure. When the social mind recognises the rights of man as man, serfdom and slavery are doomed. The place of woman in society in different ages has been attended by marked changes in social structure. Whether a slave or free, man's subordinate or his equal, her position has told on the character of the family and on all the social relations. Great influence is also due to rank, privilege, class distinctions generally, and the estimates of wealth and labour. The freedom of American society reveals a totally different structure from that of England with its powerful nobility, to say nothing of other European countries. Where the caste system prevails, as in India, the structure and functions of society are thereby determined. A stranger introduced into a social group immediately affects its structural arrangement; everything must be adapted to the newcomer. Hence a society is apt to be exclusive in proportion as its rules are fixed and rigid and take a form

approaching that of a written constitution. A stranger in a home is more reticent and restrained than in a hotel.

The structural changes in organisations are more likely to be purposive than in the case of unorganised social groups. Organisations are definite, and thus their needs become evident. Their purposive changes are usually in the line of better adaptations. Where there is no definite organisation the social forces act more spontaneously, more at random, and their effects may be unintentional. The changes in structure are, therefore, due in the main to unconscious agencies. Slowly and imperceptibly the social relations have changed with the views and interests of men. The increase of organisation in our day is a proof of the growing appreciation of social structure. Every great interest is made the nucleus of an association. Socialism and communism aim to put combinations in place of individualism. Where personal independence was formerly advocated in economics, we now have trusts and syndicates and labour unions. Anarchism demands a structure different from that of communism, though an anarchistic communism has been advocated. The structure as the body of society contains the soul and changes with the soul, just as the soul changes, likewise, with the body. It is probable that the study of sociology and an increased knowledge of the relations of men will effect great changes in social structure.

The social structure indicates how the intellect, the feeling, and the will of individuals are united and made co-operative. Between persons separated and the most compact organisation the degrees of combination are infinite. One need but understand how by means of the organisation the wills are co-ordinated, in order to learn how the structure affects the strength of a society, and governs the concentration and direction of its energies. Politicians, labour leaders, generals of armies, understand

this. Atomism means disintegration, while organism means perfect unity and co-operation.

The difficulty of understanding the actual structure in groups not formally organised accounts for the fact that sociology has so generally ignored them. But their function in humanity, especially in evolution, is of great importance. Men misapprehend their age because they fail to appreciate the forces and tendencies in this society. Its structure rests on an unwritten law, on preference and inclination, on spontaneity and free choice, and this makes it different from associations which move within the lines drawn by a constitution.

215. Primitive society, like its functions and primitive man himself, was extremely simple. The German calls a savage the *wild* man, not being restrained by reason. The structural arrangement was not a thing to be handled, and the difficulty of its apprehension long kept it from becoming an object of reflection; it was left to settle itself or to be settled by circumstances. It received consideration in proportion as conscious and purposive action took the place of native and blind impulses. The social structure could not become an object of reflection and volition so long as things continued to happen without being planned, and grew without being cultivated. Even in modern times the changes in structure have been due largely to circumstances or to crises which made changes necessary. The purposive changes have been chiefly economical and political, and these are now attracting most attention. The school of Carl Marx demands a revolution which shall bring about a complete structural change of society.

As the functions of society increased with the evolution of diversity the structure was likewise affected. While the old impulses continued new demands arose which had to be met. There was economic, religious, and intellectual growth, for which the simple arrangements of primi-

tive life no longer sufficed. As the state passes through the martial and industrial stages to the cultural stage it requires schools, libraries, museums, and learned institutions, as well as an army, a police, penal establishments, and commercial agencies. These changes involve a modification of structure. Organs change and new organs are created. A radical structural revolution occurs when a chief or monarch ceases to be the maker and interpreter of the law as well as the executive, and the people become the rulers. Thus a new organism is established and the functions of the people require new organs. There is likewise a structural change when the primitive condition, in which all men become soldiers on occasion, yields to a situation in which some are soldiers, others attend to commerce, and still others to agriculture.

We shall see more fully later how the structure of society changed in the course of evolution. With the increase of number and interests it became more complex. In early society a single family might be taken as the type of all families. Associations were simply specimens of each other. Even in semi-civilised countries this is largely the case. Structure is greatly modified by the development of individuality. A court circle, a nobility, an aristocracy, each governed by the rules of its order, tends to suppress individuality and make tradition the arbiter. An organisation which is compact and yet gives individuality its legitimate sphere is more perfect than one whose severe mechanism and dull routine repress originality and peculiarity.

216. All the changes indicated have their source in the mind. Independent of the mind, as stated above, no psychical product has any developmental energy. A word spoken ceases to exist when the sound dies away; its impression on the mind of the hearer may occasion development, but in itself it has no ability to unfold. Only by the intellect which possesses it can a thought be

developed. You can put an idea into a sentence; but that sentence remains inert unless some mind receives it and gives it vital force. The ideas in a book do not unfold; indeed, a book has no ideas, but only their symbols. Nowhere in the universe are there ideas except in minds, and only in and by those which possess them can they be evolved. The intellect reads the thoughts into the symbols of a book, and until that is done there are no thoughts. We speak of language, of ideas, of the social content, of institutions, and organisations as if they were living things, organisms, which have in themselves life and the power of further development. We speak of social affairs as pushing on, as if endowed with an inherent energy. States and churches and associations are said to grow, and sometimes it is claimed that they need but be let alone to work out their destiny. As well claim that art and religion, philosophy and science, need but be let alone to solve the problems of beauty and goodness and truth.

Social progress then has its life and energy in the mind, and aside from this it has no reality. As age after age the social inheritance increases, it is due to the minds of individuals whose products are made the possession of society—and this possession of society is nowhere but in the minds of the members of society, though its symbols and manifestations may appear in manifold objective forms.

Since all intellectual life is in the mind, there are outside of the mind only physical embodiments, objectifications, symbolisations of intellect. Wherever outward manifestations of social progress occur it is proof that mind has been at work.

Paul, *Principien der Sprachgeschichte*, 3rd ed., p. 25, states that the word which has been spoken vanishes. The effect it produces is psychical, and all development is in the realm of

mind, of the speaker and hearer. The word as a sound ceases with the sound, and as sound has no further existence. The spoken word is not like clay which can be moulded into a particular form and then put into another, an improved form—it dies with the sound. That its content, of which it is the symbol, remains in the mind is another matter. In the psychical organism “remains the trace of all that happens, and by means of this trace further development is possible; only in the psychical organism are the conditions for historical development given.”

217. While digging for roots we cannot be absorbed by the beauty and variety of the plant. Our inquiry into the causes of social evolution has led us from the richness of detail found in history and the life of society to its source. The further discussion will explain more fully how and why societies change. We do not deal with dead substances, but with living and variable material. In considering the causes which change the social forces themselves, their interaction, the content they create, the permanent manifestation of this content, and the structure of society, the attention has been concentrated on what actually takes place in association and affects its inherent character. A large sphere in which the social operations are powerfully felt has not been entered. The world of nature is changed by society and reacts by changing the social world. The reciprocal influence between society and nature is similar to that between individuals, though of very different character. Everywhere the culture of nature keeps pace with and promotes civilisation. Think of the America Columbus discovered and the America of to-day!

The natural causes must, therefore, be added to the social causes in order to obtain a complete view of evolution. A former chapter has made this sufficiently evident. So far, however, as nature affects social evolution it does so through the mind, and for this reason the

natural influence is virtually included in considering the social forces and the changes they undergo.

218. Large bodies are said to move slowly. In proportion to the number of persons to be affected social changes must be expected to be less rapid than in the case of an individual, though there may be occasions when a cause simultaneously influences large masses. What makes a specially observant, sensitive, or gifted individual peculiar may take long to leaven a society composed of all kinds of persons. When all the facts are considered it is not strange that social evolution has been so slow. The inertness of human nature, the obstacles in the way of progress, and the enormous task of rising from a lower to a higher level must be taken into account. We have seen that the forces which wrought for change might have the whole weight of the past against them, instead of aiding society to move forward.

In some cases, however, social changes are rapid. Often the beginnings only are slow, the turning-point from the old to the new. When a mass has fairly received a ferment the change may proceed in geometrical progression, each part affected affecting others at an ever-increasing rate. Movements become epidemic, as if by contagion or hypnotic suggestion. Sometimes a long process of hidden fermentation culminates in a sudden and general outbreak, or explosion. A word is the match to the gunpowder. Every social condition which is an insult to human nature is secure against such an explosion only so long as society is not fully conscious of itself. Could we but see the energies actually at work no mystery would exist in those times of decision, or crises, when the inadequacy of the old is painfully patent and hope of relief inspired, when a turbulent demand for a new order of things arises, and when men, divine or demoniac through despair, rise in revolt, regardless of consequences. The decision is not that of a solitary thinker logically

evolving a problem, but of a multitude, swayed by feeling, furiously inciting and impelling one another. Men in masses, inflamed by passion, move in the similitude of flood and storm.

All great, sudden uprisings are illustrations, such as that of the heavy, stolid German peasants in 1525, and of labourers in our day. A bold leader or single example makes the madness complete. One man turns a meeting into a mob; and when the mass becomes infuriated men do what is foreign to their character and what they would never think of doing alone or deliberately. Such mass movements may prevail more in a low than a high stage of culture, such as migrations of whole peoples in the past. But enlightenment also makes sensitive and aspiring men resolute, breaking shackles which ignorance and apathy readily bear. Great social changes may also be sudden when they depend on one man, as when the Czar of Russia frees the serfs and Lincoln signs the Emancipation Proclamation. A change for which the preparation was not adequate is apt to be followed by a partial reversion to former conditions. The freed serfs of Russia bear the marks of their serfdom still. More than a revolution was required to make subjected Frenchmen truly free and self-governing citizens; and no emancipation proclamation could fit the freed negroes for intelligent citizenship. Whatever through long ages strikes its roots into the depth has, other things being equal, better prospect of survival and efficient energy than what springs up suddenly and strikes root only on the surface. The old must be eradicated, the new planted and cultivated.

CHAPTER XV

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

219. The nature and causes of social evolution have brought definitely before us the problem of our second division. It is a problem of the dynamic processes of the social mind, though the social body undergoes corresponding transformations. For the most perfect physical development civilisation may be required ; but in general the passage from savagery to enlightenment has been characterised by psychical rather than bodily changes.

Social evolution is a development of culture. Civilisation and culture are often used as synonyms, yet they are not the same. Culture implies mental development, intellectual possessions of value, and refinement, while civilisation is more the outward form which culture assumes. Civil society has an ordered system of government, though its culture may be low. The post, telegraph, railroads are marks of civilisation, and a certain degree of culture was necessary for their production. But these and civil government and other evidences of civilisation may be enjoyed by persons whose culture is low. Culture is, therefore, more personal, an inner characteristic, while civilisation represents rather the outer products and conditions of culture.

Social evolution develops both the inner and outer marks of progress, though they are not always parallel. Wisdom and folly may not be designated by the apparel worn. Culture produces civilisation, but civilisation need not produce culture. For good reasons the stress has

been laid on culture as the creative factor. What primitive man does instinctively, unconsciously, through automatic or reflex action, by physiological rather than psychical effort, is to become purposive, conscious, and rational activity. He becomes elective and self-directive, instead of being knocked about and determined by natural causes and the circumstances of his being. The ship receives its own engine and thus ceases to depend on the external wind as the propelling agent. Man is to evolve the treasures of culture and live in and by them, thus becoming in the truest sense a cultural being. Social evolution, therefore, is a psychical process, elevating, enlightening, transforming, producing a change in man himself through heredity, through his mastery over nature, through the society he forms, through the wealth transmitted from the past, and through his own energy under the influence of his inner impulses and his surroundings.

Good suggestions on these subjects are given in the introduction of H. Schurtz's *Urgeschichte der Kultur*. He states that man's progressive activity consists in the development of culture. He defines culture as "the inheritance of the labour of the preceding generations, so far as this inheritance is embodied in the endowments, the consciousness, the labours, and the results of the living heirs." Whatever culture produces is always a manifestation of mental activity. In nature the effects of evolution are physical. Even in animals this is the case, though there must also be mental effects. In the case of man, however, the evolution is mental, and through the mind the body and nature are affected. Schurtz says that the body of the Australian and Patagonian differs only in a few non-essentials from that of the Aryan or Chinese, and the skeletons of the distant past lead us to infer that physically our ancestors did not differ materially from their descendants.

"There are manifold variations in the different races in respect to the size of the body, the colour of the skin, the hair,

and the eyes, the form of the skull, and the expression of the face which is a mirror of the mental life; but in respect to the parts of the body which are used for movement and work, which are employed in developing the external effects of culture, there is no essential difference among the peoples in structure and use." He thinks that in future evolution we must look for mental, but not for physical changes, or for physical changes, say in the brain, so far only as they are promotive of culture. The fact that man resorts to tools makes it less necessary for him than for the animal to develop physically. Not only is the mind evolved on the way to civilisation, but the objects worthy of its attention increase. The author regards the inheritance of each generation as a part of the memory of humanity. Little is committed to the memory of a generation by the past in a low stage of culture, but how vast a treasure is deposited at present in the storehouse of the mind! The memorials of the entire past are the content of the memory of our age.

220. The preceding pages have brought out some general characteristics of social evolution; others of importance, however, remain to be considered. They pertain to society at large, but are most striking in particular stages. Certain principles prevail to such an extent that society seems to be dominated by them, though we may hesitate to call them social laws. Even the discovery of these *rules*, as we can designate them, is difficult. The great Broadway along which humanity has moved in all directions in such vast spatial and temporal dimensions since its origin—a few persons coming into actual contact, some jostling each other, many moving together, others going in opposite directions—presents so confusing a spectacle that valid general inferences should be drawn with greatest caution. Yet while the details defy the power of human comprehension, the sociologist cannot rest until he has found some general courses which are usually followed in social affairs. While we move tenta-

tively in our investigations, it may be possible to refute some errors, to make some outlines clearer, and to concentrate attention on what is typical.

221. That a great mass of inertia is pushed as so much dead matter from age to age is a patent fact. It is not only stationary, but actually clogs the wheel of progress. Much necessarily requires the attention of every age in order to preserve and perpetuate the race. We can call it the preservative, in distinction from the evolutionary factor. While it does not directly promote development, it is the condition for all evolution. Different from this, however, is the stationary factor which actually hinders development. It consists of a large sphere of activity which has more meaning for the past than for the present and future. In accounting for this we explain a large part of human conduct which, from the evolutionary standpoint, seems so strange.

It is a rule of deep and broad application, which almost works with the regularity of a social law, that *whatever is vigorously and absorbingly pursued for a length of time tends to become an end*. The end in view at the start of a career is lost sight of, but the habit formed by the pursuit becomes permanent and directs the course of life. Thus what was seized originally as mere means is still cherished when the end has been secured and the means are no longer necessary. Soldiers always adapt themselves to fighting, though the end of war may be lost sight of. War cultivates them for war, increases their adaptation to war, and makes war itself an end. They become blood-thirsty in long wars and slaughter for the sake of slaughter rather than for the sake of conquering a peace. Even in civilisation habit becomes slavery, and survives when it has become an absurdity. War is resorted to hastily because it has the sanction of the past. Armies and navies burden nations when peace is desirable and arbitration for the settlement of disputes possible. Wanton wars are

common among savages; the warriors want employment and the excitement incident to war, and they seek glory.

That men become what they do, while losing sight of the end of the doing, holds in other affairs and is a prominent factor in human society. Men seek money for a living or some specific end in life, and so cultivate themselves for securing the means of living that they forget the real life and accumulate for the sake of accumulating. This species of insanity defeats the very aim of life. It, however, illustrates a common rule which affects every department of life and social evolution, especially in that low stage of culture when the course is determined rather by the constitutional forces and the environment than by a rational, conscious aim and a resolute purpose.

The rule has an important bearing on associations. Organisations established for a particular purpose become so self-centred that they lose sight of the purpose and exist for their own sake. Schools founded for the search of truth abandon the search and continue to exist for a system once adopted and no longer subjected to criticism. Perhaps a church exists for its own sake as a sect rather than for religion. Etiquette that once had meaning continues after its meaning is gone. Thus in all ages, especially the less cultivated, conduct becomes the cause of conduct, habit and custom rule the will, the end and reason for acts are lost sight of, and society does not so much evolve itself as it is evolved by the very conditions in which it lives. The mere fact of the pursuit of a course of conduct becomes the strongest reason for its existence and continuance.

The paragraph explains that conservatism in low stages of culture which has been referred to repeatedly. To continue a course once adopted has, among other reasons in its favour, the advantage of moving along the line of least resistance. The *vis inertiae* keeps things where they are. Wherever it

prevails we have the reign of nature over mind. The force of the gravitation is determined by the size of the existing mass.

222. As now we turn to what actually changes we inquire: Wherein consists the variation involved in evolution? How something new comes out of the old may contain problems which are unsolvable; but everything that throws light on the process itself will aid us in our inquiries. The following six methods of procedure are fundamental:

1. Something exists in the form of a seed or germ, and its inherent energy need but be unfolded in order to produce a higher stage of development. All the social forces are subject to this kind of evolution by exercise and through influences which act on them as stimuli. There are seed-thoughts which the intellect unfolds logically so as to evolve their latent contents. Every age contains germs which need but be developed to lead to a higher stage of culture. The thinker unfolds ideas and systems which the thoughtless take as finished products. What one individual or an age sows often requires many generations of development before the ripened harvest appears. This unfolding of living seeds and germs is among the most interesting and instructive processes throughout evolution.

2. There is an increase in numbers by birth, by the shifting of population from one society to another, and by emigration, as already mentioned. The individuals added to an existing society increase the social forces and perhaps change their character and course. This process of accretion is seen in tribes, peoples, and nations; it affects economic, political, and religious conditions, and tends to give the dominance to the strongest affiliations.

3. The third process produces variation by analysing into its component parts what was formerly known only as a compound. This is familiar in chemical analysis.

Thoughts, feelings, and volitions can often be reduced to simpler elements and thus made clearer. The concept "society" can be resolved into its constituent elements, hope can be analysed into expectation and desire, and covetousness may be found to consist of the determination to get wealth in order to live well, to gain power, and become famous. What in early times was an indiscriminated mass, an undifferentiated communism, had to be separated into its elements in order to be understood and properly used. A decided advance took place when the functions of the state, instead of being lodged in a single despot, were analysed into the legislative, judiciary, and executive departments.

4. Variations likewise occur by compounding what formerly was known only as existing separately. Here chemistry again furnishes illustrations. Bonds of union are discovered and organisations formed where none existed before. Labourers compound their forces for mutual protection, states unite against a common foe, and churches are federated to promote their interests. Co-operation thus takes the place of atomism and antagonism. The numerous trusts afford striking examples. The same movement is seen in united Italy and Germany, in Pan-Slavism, and in the growth of nationalism. What is thus beheld in great affairs applies also to more minute ones in social evolution. Thoughts and purposes are united, and new factors result from the union. When men pass from isolation to association they compound their social energies.

5. All the movements thus produced can be subjected to criticism for the purpose of testing, purifying, and rectifying them. Criticism as a conscious and purposive method, of course, belongs to an advanced stage of evolution; but as a factor in human development criticism must belong to every period in which judgment is at all active. Errors are common and false methods are pursued which

vitiating the course taken and hinder progress. Sometimes the antidote grows with the evils, and correctives may be developed in the same ages when error and wrong appear. But these also flourish in long eras, and then a period of criticism comes to correct them. Perhaps a movement is one-sided, and critical investigation is required to put it on a right basis. Kant, through his critical philosophy, inaugurated an era of criticism whose effects still tell powerfully on philosophy and science, on theology and history.

6. Criticism in order to produce the best results for evolution must lead to construction. The overthrow of accumulated wrongs is destructive. In order that there may be real development what remains must be unfolded and new truths sought. Destruction must, therefore, be followed by construction. A new foundation may be laid on which a more permanent structure can be reared than in the past. Where the criticism is radical, it deals with and tests causes. Usually the new constructions require greater intellectual power than mere criticism. The work belongs to the thinkers who go deepest, who discover and elaborate principles. The constructive work is synthetic and may result in great systems which become standards of thought. Sometimes the critic is also a constructor. An Aristotle searches for causes where, before, phenomena or mere theories had engaged the attention; he carefully sifts his material, and aims at its interpretation and synthesis. He examines thought, conduct, and states, and creates logic, ethics, and political science. The advance of thought was such as to make an epoch. Construction on a smaller, even imperceptible and unconscious scale has been going on in all ages, and the systems which now prevail in every department of social thought and life are the product.

The processes indicated are seen in every mind that does what is recognised as original work. What is thus recognised

in the individual mind also takes place in the progressive movements of society. What exists is unfolded; an increment is added to it from without; it is analysed into its component parts; it is compounded with something else; it is subjected to criticism; and what has stood the test appropriates new truth and is constructed into a system. This constructive process with the permanent result (system) it produces will be considered more fully in the next chapter, in order to bring out important factors in evolution which are apt to be overlooked.

There are probably other, more subtle processes of evolving the new from the old; but the above gives an epitome of the most essential factors in social evolution. Sometimes men seem almost intuitively to advance beyond past attainments, feeling their way forward by a kind of instinct, and unable to give a clear account of the operation to themselves. History has its unconscious, as well as its unrecognised, prophets and creators, the seers who are not aware that they foresee.

223. We have seen that no mental faculty acts to the exclusion of the others. In general it can, however, be affirmed that intellect is subordinate and feeling strong in proportion as culture is low. But even in the most enlightened era feeling is a powerful factor, being associated with the higher as well as the lower operations of the intellect. Therefore at all times much of the social activity is impulsive and not directed toward a rational end.

In the transmission of a psychical factor from age to age the intellect is, however, supreme. Feeling and will may be embodied in an institution as well as thought; but even in that case their perception is an intellectual act. I must know the mercy enshrined in a hospital before I can feel it. Language is the symbol of thought, but communicates feeling less directly; the very descriptions of feeling appeal first to the intellect. A description of love, like that of Romeo and Juliet, is an intellectual production from which the love must be inferred. Every act

of sympathy is related in terms of intellectual apprehension. A fact must be perceived before the pathos or tragedy it involves is experienced. In narrative, in biography, in history, in the novel, and poetry we thus have direct appeals first of all to the intellect. This determines the character of the records transmitted from age to age. A feeling may not be directly transmissible, not even by the symbols of music. It is doubtful whether the feeling which the artist intended can be excited by music or any other art. Each person is apt to put his own feeling into an artistic production. Intellect and the language expressing it are more definite. Thus generation after generation accumulates vast deposits of intellectual symbols and these the active mind seeks to interpret and develop. But is there an equal inheritance of feeling from the past? In direct intercourse the emotional element can be expressed by the look, the tone of voice, the emphasis, and gesture; but these are either not transmissible or can be only imperfectly indicated. Hence, amid the permanent accumulations of the ages there is a growing predominance of the intellectual factor. The feeling that vibrates through an age, like the passion of the Crusades, may strike no chord in the future; but intellect becomes cumulative by preserving its attainments for all time.

The growth of culture, therefore, means essentially an intellectual growth. This process increases in proportion as definite language with general concepts takes the place of thinking in pictures, as science develops, and history records past achievements. The thought that grows in the intellectual soil which the ages deposit takes the place of instinctive, intuitive, reflex, and impulsive action. Reason is organised, and as embodied in maxims and laws takes the place of feeling as guide.

Feeling is too personal to be abstracted from the individual, while an idea can be put into an abstract form and

have meaning for all. Besides, an idea can be embodied in definite language, while emotion cannot be made equally definite. A description of joy and sorrow awakens emotions various in kind or degree according to the experience of the hearers.

That even a feeling must be put into the form of a description or an idea in order to be transmissible is certainly significant. Churches can transmit creeds, but no creed can embody or transmit love. Feeling is best communicated from person to person by witnessing it, by sounds springing from actual emotion, or by description which suggests it. A tragedy acted on the stage appeals first to the perception and through that to the feeling. That in every instance perception precedes the feeling is shown by the fact that persons who misinterpret a description or an act may laugh where the intention is to make them weep.

The intransmissible character of feeling throws light on the fact that hundreds of millions in an age leave no permanent impression of themselves. Their intensity of feeling is likely private rather than social; even if it becomes social it may not result in an enduring product. Perhaps the impulses connected with their constitutional forces are retrogressive rather than progressive. If millions, however deeply they feel, live on a low intellectual plane, what distinguishes the feeling, what value would a record of it have? Impulse and all feeling concentrated on self, as in the case of an animal, are not expected to produce abiding social results. Emotion has value in evolution in proportion as it embodies and develops rational considerations and impels the will to create some permanent expression of the psychical content. Much feeling is, however, consumptive rather than productive.

224. Do the emotions decrease as intellect grows? They decrease relatively, perhaps not absolutely. The feelings themselves are modified with the thoughts which excite them. An enlightened age, moving in a larger mental realm than a primitive one, may have as much

feeling as the latter, or even more, though mostly different in kind. The enlarged personality may have more room for feeling as well as for intellect. No limit can be set either to the emotional or the intellectual achievements in æsthetics, religion, and morals. The changes in the intellectual and emotional elements of society likewise affect the direction given to the will. Instead of passing immediately from impression to action, the developed mind reflects, deliberates, and hesitates; questions are weighed first, then answered, and both thought and feeling are tested. Often the degree of intellectual culture can be measured by the way intellect is posited between the impulse and feeling, on the one hand, and the will or action, on the other. The savage rushes to seize an object of desire, where the philosopher reasons, exercises restraint, and follows the rules of propriety. Next to the ability to labour, the power to sacrifice is one of the most valuable means of progress.

A radical difference is seen in social life between the dominance of feeling and of intellect. The world will be transformed when war based on passion yields to deliberation and rational attempts to settle or arbitrate disputes. In various departments the growing dominance of intellect is evident. Where once alms were bestowed indiscriminately to relieve poverty, society has now learned to discriminate between the deserving and undeserving poor, and investigates whether charity does not make paupers, and whether the poor are not helped best by enabling them to help themselves. The growing influence of intellect is evident in religion. Religious emotion is tested to determine the validity of its basis, so as to substitute genuine faith for superstition. Zeal for the truth supplants zeal without knowledge.

Sometimes a reaction against thoughtless feeling ignores the claims of the emotions and degenerates to a cold intellectualism and formal rationalism. This trend, it is

feared, will lead to the decline of poetry and the emotional element in general literature. The fact that music flourishes in a scientific era and during the reign of facts may, however, prove that human nature demands the exercise of its feelings. A "culture-hunger" is ascribed to our age; but this hunger is a feeling, an impulse. The emotional factor is too deeply rooted in our being to be eradicated and asserts itself in spite of temporary one-sided intellectualism. It even demands its rights by bursting forth at times with explosive fury. A healthy condition requires the interaction and co-operation of intellect, feeling, and will, each responding to the other and performing its specific part in the work of evolution.

In proportion as culture refines men, and makes them more sensitive and more nervous, there is likely to be an increase of feeling. Owing to the close relation of the emotions to the physiological state it is probable that the excessive use of the nerves and the neglect of muscular exertion—to which certain forms of culture are peculiarly liable—will lead to an abnormal development of feeling. The nervous strain of city life, the common use of narcotics, the requirements made by education, and the increase of insanity are significant symptoms. Ours has been called the "nervous" age. So far as alcoholism is to blame for this, a strong counteracting influence has arisen in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, France, and other countries, in the form of a scientific total-abstinence movement.

The emotional changes in the development of humanity present important sociological problems. Feeling is more volatile, spontaneous, and erratic than intellect, which moves more steadily along the line of logic. Changes in feeling, often accompanying intellectual changes, are at times striking, as in modern times respecting slavery and labour. Ages may be characterised by the dominance of particular emotions. Much that inspired the Middle

Ages with enthusiasm is a foreign element to us, while the modern aspiration for liberty did not animate them. A Greek tragedy cannot move us as it did the Athenians.

Although by means of personal contact one generation can transmit its feelings to another, especially from parent to child, modifications are apt to occur even during the life of the new generation. This has an important bearing on feeling as a motive power in evolution. Personal and party prejudice and passion cannot be perpetuated, while the logic of the intellect remains the same. For this reason history judges more impartially than the actors or their contemporaries.

Schurtz, *Geschichte der Kultur*, pp. 15-16, holds that the psychology of masses usually has to deal with the communication of feeling and disposition, rather than of thought. Thought is not apt to affect all alike, but in feeling there is something contagious. This, however, applies to direct intercourse, not to what is handed down in writing. There is no question that the masses are much more inclined to feel together than to think together, and therefore by means of direct communication the cultivation of feeling will not be neglected. But to some degree men must think together in order to feel together.

No matter what stage of enlightenment may be attained, every human being passes through a stage which is dominated by feeling before the supremacy of the intellect becomes possible.

225. The inheritance of a society is not the measure of its culture. Many ages inherited the Greek language, literature, and art, without becoming Greek. To its inheritance a generation can sustain a threefold relation: it can neglect the same and thus miss the treasure involved; it can appropriate and diffuse the inheritance and make its possession general, as the teachings of Christianity; or

what has been transmitted can be further developed and thus progress made beyond past attainments. All cannot be transmitted, not even all of value. Often the three processes indicated take place in the same generation: some fail to appropriate what is offered; some make it their actual possession; others transform it into an energy for further advance, as the creators in science and art. Hence the varieties of culture in the same generation, from the lowest to the highest, all sharing the same civilisation as an external factor. In spite of this heterogeneity, we distinguish ages by the stages of evolution attained. In other words, ages are judged by their summits. The lower regions, common to all ages, require no special mention, while a new development, a characteristic movement, an unusual elevation, arrest the attention of the historian. The most advanced persons are also the most powerful, unless the dominion belongs to brute force or to unappreciative masses. The culture attributed to an age is neither universal nor even the average, but refers to the cultured classes, such as formerly gathered at courts. Large masses may be degraded and in slums, while the products of the schools, churches, states, literatures, arts, are made the standards of judgment for the entire age.

Usually a degree of uniformity prevails in these cultural factors which may be taken as characteristic of the advanced life. Just as certain things are common to childhood, youth, manhood, and old age, so we find an average of attainments characteristic of savages, civilised and semi-civilised peoples, though manifold variations occur in every average. Millions in an age may believe in witchcraft and ghosts without making this faith characteristic, since it has really been superseded by a more enlightened view on the part of the cultured. A high degree of intellectual development powerfully affects or even dominates all the other social forces.

How striking the difference of culture in the same people, or even city, in the most enlightened ages! The fact that this is true of those who belong to the same race suggests that other than racial peculiarities explain the differences. Considering the influence of conditions, environment, and experience, whatever the native endowment, who can tell what the Esquimo would become in the tropics of Africa or the African in Greenland?

As the attainments of the most advanced in a community are the goal of the aspiring but less advanced, so among nations the leaders in culture are the guides and teachers of others. Nations learn from each other by diffusion; and as the most advanced take another step forward they get more to diffuse. Those that are similar can be classified together and certain types taken as characteristic of an entire evolutionary era. In the stone, the bronze, and iron periods, we look for similarities in all continents and races, and the relics justify our expectations. Since peoples are types of one another, many can be studied in one. The analogy must, of course, not be pressed; for with all the characteristic similarities the differences are striking.

226. One must belong to the cultured, in appreciation at least, in order to admit that the cultured of an age or a people ought to have the pre-eminence. Only through a vulgar impudence can the commonplaces of which an age has a superfluity thrust themselves into the highest places of trust and responsibility. The constitutional forces constitute the unchanging ballast of the ship which carries the world's progress from shore to shore. Their place is at the bottom of the ship and they should be kept there. In valuable evolution those objects only have significance which either cause or undergo development and possess inherent worth. These we find in what is evolved beyond the commonplace and contains the potency of further progress. As seen above, the few who advance are the leaders of the many. Progress must be

regarded as largely a process of individualising from the generality or the mass. The distinction involved in individualisation, a kind of specialisation, is a prominent factor in evolution, particularly in primitive times. Physical distinctness need not involve mental individuality. In a forward movement, where culture is real and the personality strong, the individual is individualised and thus unfolds peculiarities which add variety to the existing social content and its manifestation.

The specialisation which produces a strong individuality must not be identified with another kind of specialisation, which separates a subject for the purpose of developing it to the utmost. This can be done by a few or by many, as when economics, politics, or religion becomes the subject of absorbing interest. In one case the individual is developed, in the other something in or by the individual.

Eras without either kind of specialisation or evolution are stagnant. The mass cannot evolve in a body, but only the individuals which create the mass are developed. As each evolves he can impart his attainments to others, and thus the mass be elevated by elevating its members. Especially in the beginning of social evolution is this process difficult. The mass being regarded as of most importance, all are expected to move with it. Distinction is a crime rather than an advantage. A human being, then, is not a free personality, but merely a specimen of his community.

As life increased in variety a division of labour became necessary, the specialisation resulting therefrom developed skill and efficiency, thus making evolution more vigorous. All were benefited by the peculiar fitness of each for a particular sphere of labour. Instead of one group in which each family does everything, different groups arise and all co-operate for the general welfare. The social units increase; that is, where formerly but one general group existed numerous groups arise, each with peculiari-

ties and excellences of its own. Whether there are separate organisations or not, these groups reveal differentiation and promote it, and occasions arise for competition between individuals and groups. The variation in a community is a test of its degree of individualisation, but need not indicate the highest degree of socialisation. The diversity produced by individualisation may be a disintegrating individualism. In order to promote socialisation the specialisation should be supplemented by a tendency to unity and co-operation. Two peoples, with the same diversity in other respects, may differ in regard to their combinations, some being more socialised than others. After long separation bonds of union may be discovered in the case of churches, economic and political associations, which produce co-operation in place of antagonism. Even when their differences remain as great as ever, men may become more tolerant and realise the advantages of combination.

A social unit is here regarded as an association or social group which acts as a unit. A musical club is a unit so far as it finds a bond of union in the musical culture and taste of its members, while in all other respects diversity may prevail. For this reason the total society and the total social manifestations of an age must be known in order to understand the age. Every society stands by itself as a unit, with its own individuality, and therefore more or less distinct from every other society. A study of social units is a study of social individualities. It makes much difference in the character of a community whether its social units are isolated or interactive.

The deeper study of society furnishes a progressive revelation of unity in diversity. Difference arrests attention, while what is alike escapes observation. This in part explains national and race antipathies. Sociology makes discoveries similar to those in morphology. Huxley, "Evolution," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, says: "Morphology exhibits a continual advance towards the demonstration of a fundamental unity

among the seeming diversities of living structure." Herder was much impressed by the unity underlying the differences in biological forms.

227. There are dead seeds and unproductive soils. Some themes which have no productiveness absorb ages; and some peoples are barren soil to the best seeds. How fruitless many of the themes to which strong men of the Middle Ages devoted themselves, and how stagnant the Turk with all the intellectual wealth of Europe at his door! Just when these two essential conditions of culture, living seed and productive soil, will meet we cannot tell. Why Augustan eras of literature are followed by a period of intellectual dearth is still a problem. The forces change in every generation with the persons, and different forces gain dominance in different eras. Few can emancipate themselves from the leading energies which determine the general character and course of an age. Men usually move along lines, instead of developing all their powers unitedly and consecutively. Narrow specialisation is characteristic of organisations and communities, even of nations and ages. Societies and times have their fads, fashions, and manias, and men are consecrated to them as if the craze were destined to last for ever. These absorbing and wasteful interests have their day in manners, art, literature, religion, even in philosophy and science, then vanish, never to return. Schools of thought are often as one-sided as mannerism is in art. Ages have their passions which become the energies of groups and associations, until only ashes remain after the fire.

Many historical phenomena illustrate the above statements—such as the Flagellants of the Middle Ages, certain spiritualistic theories, and favourite psychical methods of healing. These temporary movements often develop much energy without leaving any permanent results in

the line of their direct activity. Not the energy of an age, but the evolutionary energy is the test of the development produced.

228. The rise and evolutionary effect of many of these movements can be traced. We must remember that the entire personality does not exert all its forces uniformly, but concentrates its energies according to inner impulse and external solicitations. Numerous occasions arise for the exercise and development of a particular force at the expense of the rest, thus insuring its supremacy. Some emergency appears, and in order to meet it the total energy is concentrated in a particular direction. In case of war the attention of a nation is apt to be absorbed by the conflict and every nerve strained to gain the victory. A similar result may be produced by a financial crisis, a famine, an epidemic, a religious upheaval, a political revolution. Moral crises occur when an evil has grown to overwhelming proportions and becomes intolerable. In a great religious epoch the establishment, promulgation, and defence of a faith overshadow all other interests. Any cause secures the dominion which seems at the time to be of supreme importance, whether or not it deserves the acquired prominence. The reign of opinion, which limits the vision to what absorbs the attention, explains the fact that what a society or an age deems most significant may later be found to be subordinate in value, while what was worth most failed to receive recognition. Phantoms are pursued and what is of most concern is missed, as an army defends a post in no danger, while the real point of attack is left exposed. Hence the value of an individual or society which revives or introduces a neglected factor and gives it due prominence. Men with an outlook beyond the present, who can rise into companionship with the eternity of truth and right, seers and epoch-makers, are then the need. Their value and greatness consist in introducing new energies which lift

men above the popular trend. They can be dispensed with when they have given the impulse to a needed course of thought and action and others have enlisted to make the higher movement victorious.

There are other reasons for the changes in tendency which are so prominent in history. What was once dominant may lose its influence because its energies are exhausted, while what is new, with a better adaptation to existing needs, has freshness and receives a hearty welcome. In the reactions of social history, one extreme exciting another, the truth often lies between the extremes and requires many ages before it gains the ascendancy.

Those absorbed by their age, narrow, one-sided, no larger than the age itself, may be adapted to the grooves in which the times move. Their very limitation may make them intensely practical. Perhaps they are so peculiar an embodiment of the characteristics of their times that their age can be studied in them. They may have but little significance outside of their age because they lack that prophetic element which leads to further evolution. A future investigator who studies them in the advanced development of his own age is apt to discover what qualities they lack and how greatly they were overestimated in their day.

The saying that men are children of their age does not apply equally to all. Some fall behind their age, others are on the level of its average attainments, while a few transcend the age and are prophets.

229. In the social world the war of opinion rages,—opinion with various degrees of validity and permanence. The warriors perish and give place to others, but the opinions survive the conflict. Social strength has an evolutionary effect, not according to its amount, but according to the object to which it is devoted. All the energy devoted to a cause has value and endurance only so far as the cause itself has worth and permanence.

This leads us to one of the most effective of all the agencies working in society. The psychical activities of men are determined by what *seems* to be, whether it really is or not. A mere notion rules men and blinds them to the actuality. The mental realm in which society lives is subject to all kinds of whims and aberrations. Hence the light which guides society is so often an *ignis fatuus*. Get at what most powerfully affects the minds of a period and you get at the forces of history. What a man thinks, feels, wills, is real to him, while in the real world outside of him it may be false. The realm of the social world—ideas and ideals, hopes and fears, plans and purposes—is the psychic sphere in which experiments are constantly made with the world of reality. The agent is not nature with its blind and necessary laws, but intellect, that sees and may be mistaken, and will, that chooses an end but often reaches the opposite goal.

The psychical energies in evolution, therefore, have all the masterful advantages of mind and all the liability of mind to err. Nature, always logical, makes no mistakes; but the human mind works its way into syllogism through many painful errors. Even after the individual has here and there learned to follow a logical course, the social mind still pursues phantoms. What society deems a necessity may be a fiction, while what it believes free to choice is fixed by fate. Men think they go forward when they but move in a circle. The effect is marvellous. We can now understand why mind has by some been so minimised as to be reduced almost to impotence in human affairs. Every social force is differentiated from the necessary laws of nature, has a specific end in view, and chooses the means believed to be adapted to the attainment of that end; but every force, without exception, may fail to attain its aim—the economic lead to poverty, the political to the ruin of the state, the egotic to the negation of self, the affectional to hate, and so with every other. What

seems to be *is* the potent reality for the guidance of a social force; and we must come to the interpretation of the movements of society with this undisputed sovereignty of what seems to be as the sole law of social action so far as this is voluntary. Few principles give us so effective a hold on society as this one, namely, the control of the social mind by what seems to be. Often the estimate which society makes is, of course, correct; but in many cases fiction is taken for fact. Phantoms govern individuals, associations, states, and whole ages. Hence the men who have come to themselves feel no mightier impulse than that which seeks truth at any cost.

The savage eats a fruit which kills him, his guide being his faith, not the reality. A battle planned with the utmost confidence is lost. Men hunt asses and find a kingdom, but are more likely to find asses while they imagine themselves on the way to a kingdom. Striking problems in social evolution are presented by the strange freaks which opinion plays with men. Human history cannot be other than an objective process under subjective guidance, so far as man is concerned, however remote that subjective guidance may be from truth and reality.

A desire to gain popular dominance must appeal to the people, fitting into their beliefs, wishes, and purposes. Where the people are ignorant a mountebank may possess the most favourable conditions for success.

230. The concentration of the attention is to the direction of a movement what the aim is to the course of a bullet. The consciousness follows the direction of the attention, and with it likewise go all the personal energies. A fixed idea in the social mind, similar to a fixed idea in individual insanity, beholds everything in the light of this idea. If it arouses deep emotion it is apt to engender fanaticism. Marvels are performed by this ability to fix the attention and carry with it the total social energy. It

explains the contagious influence of a multitude. The man in a crowd who succeeds in concentrating the attention on himself may play with the audience, perhaps occasioning revolt. The action of numbers is hypnotic. The man in the midst of them sees and hears them only; he can attend to nothing else, and therefore the sights and sounds gain a controlling influence over him. His attention is fixed, his consciousness overwhelmed, there is nothing to counteract the effect, and almost resistlessly is he carried along by the crowd. Even men ordinarily deliberate usually become part of the mass and move with it when the same stimuli come from all directions and shut out everything else. The impressions are so numerous, so constant, so absorbing, that the mind has no opportunity for reflection, and reason cannot assert its supremacy. It presents a case of complete subjection to outside influence without inner mental guidance. Men become too much a part of their surroundings to come to themselves. Hence the frenzy of a mob, the horrors of lynching, the terrors of revolution. A popular craze is possible in proportion to the ignorance, prejudice, and passion of a people. Mobs are more easily created among the volatile Latin peoples of Southern Europe than among nations of a colder clime. External influences always have weight in an inverse ratio to the inner balance. Men beside themselves rush heedlessly into danger and foolishly sacrifice their lives. The hypnotism under which they act loses its charm whenever the attention receives a new direction. The fury of a mob may be checked by the appearance of police or soldiers, by the suggestion of danger, or anything which diverts the attention and breaks the spell of the fixed idea. Time fights against riots and revolutions by affording reason an opportunity to criticise the passion, by letting the fire burn out, and by giving a chance for other considerations to enter the mind.

This explanation interprets many signal phases of history, such as great uprisings, and the movements of masses like avalanches. Especially in military operations is the principle enunciated effective. Soldiers drilled together for years, obeying the same commands, always moving in unison, and trained to consider only what is given them to do at the moment, are thoroughly disciplined to march solidly into battle. Completely absorbed by the matter in hand, intent solely on moving with his regiment, the soldier has no room for any thought but that of getting at and conquering the enemy. In the battle, as for years past, he is a part of the mass, and his habit, or second nature, impels him to move with it. The thought of danger naturally comes at the beginning of the action when the action itself is less absorbing, while later the excitement of the battle and intensity of the activity control the mind. The philosophy of military training and life throws light on the great corporate and mass movements of history.

Each one in a mob helps every other person to limit the attention to a specific object. So strong may the absorbing purpose be that every effort to divert the attention and fix it on another object is violently thwarted.

Since the person goes with the attention we can see the value of foreign travel or a change of location and occupation in case of affliction. A new interest may mean a new life with fresh vigour. Education consists in fixing the attention on a subject, cultivating the faculties and a taste for it, and absorbing the energies in its pursuit. Training is a process of evolution which means progressive adaptation. Specialisation is a limiting of the attention. Individuals differ in that some resolutely fix the attention and thus determine the course of life, while others, without motive, purpose, or will, are the sport of the circumstances which environ them.

231. As the intellect is governed by what seems to be, and the feeling by what interests, so whatever arrests,

absorbs, and fixes the attention controls the energy of the will. Whatever absorbs the mind and impels the volitional powers is, consequently, of first moment in the interpretation of social evolution. Abstract notions, philosophical theory, and scientific demonstrations, have their part in determining the direction of the will; but ultimate, as a rule, for choosing a course, are the convictions, the faith, the hopes, and the desires which fix the goal. All through evolution we find that the focus of attention is the magnet which arrests, retrogrades, or develops humanity. Society is mesmerised by looking steadily at a bright point and excluding all other objects. It is moulded by the mere presentation, contemplation, and familiarity of things; they have an assimilative and directive influence over the social mind.

Important light is thrown on this subject by the study of associations and the popular mind. The mere repetition of an advertisement impresses it with power on the consciousness. The party, the platform, the candidates, are kept before the public in a political campaign, and this is a prominent element of success. Facts rule, and their reign proves with how little reason the world can be governed. Much history is a product of the senses, determined by examples, an echo of echoes. The attention is arrested, fixed, no matter what the reason or whether there be reason at all, and the course is determined.

This personal and social influence, exerted by the mere fact of controlling the attention, explains many statements in the preceding pages. People, like children, do what they see done. Facts are both the logic and ethics of large masses. The constant presentation of optimism and pessimism, idealism and realism, insures their prevalence. Just as in dress, fashions are created in literature and art by making a trend public. Publicity is the rationality. A religious revival concentrates the attention day after day on the same theme—hence its power.

Now the bulls gain the attention on the stock exchange, then the bears; and the stocks go up or down accordingly. Millions of dollars change hands with a change of faith, though the actuality is not in the least affected. Often the ear and interest of the public are more essential for public control than the most cogent reasoning.

These facts, always weighty in social evolution, have not lost their force through the publicity of modern life. The press manufactures public opinion by the persistent discussion of a particular subject. The cultivation of sentimental and sensational factors is, however, liable to produce satiety and sudden reactions. An opinion dependent on outside influence, not on mental elaboration, lacks substance; it is a weathercock that changes with the wind. Hence the fickleness of public opinion, the rapid succession of fads and fashions, and, finally, indifference and apathy. Action and reaction follow each other with equal reason or unreason; a neglected cause asserts itself and demands recognition; a course pursued with enthusiasm fails to meet expectations and its opposite becomes popular. In this kaleidoscope of evolution we meet all kinds of symmetries and contrarities, a world of endless co-operation and conflicts. There is construction, destruction, reconstruction. One age compensates for the neglect of a preceding one and rebuilds places made waste by former excesses. Every age is guided by its notions, but its real work must always be on the given basis of solid reality, which is not subject to human whims.

An epoch emerges with the victory of a new idea or interest. A new purpose absorbs the attention, is developed one-sidedly to the neglect of other subjects, then is found not to be the whole truth for which it was taken; a crisis comes in which the old, which was new at the beginning of the epoch, is seen to be inadequate, but the supplementary truth needed is not yet discovered, so that a period of doubt, uncertainty, and tentative ex-

pectancy intervenes. This transition era of investigation and criticism, of chaos and anarchism, may be followed by another epoch, which, in its turn, is also followed by a period in which a new principle is evolved. These might be called periods of specialisation in history, when particular principles or interests or causes absorb the social mind and are subject to application and development. Frequently the thoughts which dominate an age are not so faulty because false, as because severed from their connections and therefore abnormally developed; just because so absorbing they are endowed with a completeness, with a depth and breadth of application, which they really lack, and so with further experience are found to be inadequate. The ages thus supplement, augment, and correct each other.

Let us recall what was stated before: the mental products have in themselves no energy to work any changes—all the energy is in the mind. A theory, a principle, an idea, a law, a system has, aside from the mind, no power of growth. When a new principle is adopted it remains stationary. But the mind grows and may outgrow it. A dogma cannot unfold itself; with the death of Darwin Darwinism is finished. Another mind may take up Darwinism and unfold it, but it is no longer the Darwinism of Darwin. But while principles and dogmas and systems remain stationary, the developing mind moves on, sees new truths, discovers faults in the old theories, and proceeds to lay a new basis for future movement. Men outgrow their conditions and demand new ones.

The tyranny of a dominant tendency is one of its worst features. A stagnant system becomes the tether of the unfolding mind. It suppresses freedom of movement and puts beyond criticism what needs criticism. The force of majorities or traditionalism is substituted for the force of truth. Custom becomes the law of the mind, whereas the mind should really be the law of custom.

CHAPTER XVI

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION— (*Continued*)

232. Social specialisation, by means of which some principle, idea, or interest is separated from the total organism of thought and life in order to be developed by itself, must be supplemented by social generalisation. This introduces us to one of the most significant processes in the entire course of social evolution. Our insistence on the peculiarity of man and his social relations does not question the similarity between certain evolutionary processes of nature and those of the individual and society. Perhaps the most common mistake consists in inferring that the substances must be alike because some processes are similar. We do not see how the mind can comprehend chemical and biological action unless there is some degree of similarity between the mind and the objects it contemplates. The social evolution depends on psychical forces and, therefore, to it the same analogy is applicable. The fact that nature, man, and society belong to the same cosmos leads us to infer that the evolution of each corresponds in some degree to that of the other two. To biological evolution must be added the energy of the human mind as a new factor when social evolution is considered. As in biology, so in society the indefinite becomes definite, the general specific, the formless is formed, and order evolved from chaos. As out of the latent and potential the actual and real are developed, the product must in some measure retain what had been

attained by the object from which it has been evolved. Heredity promotes variation, but also permanence. The variations terminate in an enduring variation, a distinct species, the culmination of a long series of changes. This species is itself liable to variation, but that quality which makes it a definite type perhaps endures for countless ages amid all the diversities that arise. Evolution is not endless repetition, nor a variation that must, itself, vary constantly. The new thing it produces may be sufficiently permanent to become a nucleus for fresh development within an abiding type. Every generation is the conservatory of the action of the past forces which have wrought for its production—a cumulative concentration of past processes, which is a starting-point for new movements. Every step taken is the condition for the next step. Growth is the conservation of the past in the form of a new product. But the new product may, in some respects at least, be final and lasting.

The definition of species is difficult and no agreement has been reached. The variability of species is evident, though the degree of the variation has not been determined. The conception of a species, however, implies that there inheres in it a basis with a certain degree of permanency, a basis which constitutes the characteristics of the species and on which the ordinary variations occur. All the individuals have general characteristics which are marks of the species, but each individual also has peculiarities which give it distinctness. A change in the permanent basis involves a change in the species.

233. Something analogous to this biological process takes place in the evolution of the individual mind. There must be contrasts in order that there may be thought. What is at first general, homogeneous, alike, is differentiated, separated into specific, concrete factors, into contrasts; the confused is made definite by bringing out marked differences; the development is in the direction

of distinctness and clearness. The evolution of the mental powers means that they grow in definiteness and can be discriminated. They are organised from the incoherent intellectual mass and prepared for their functional exercise. All the powers may grow with the individual himself; but frequently some faculty is developed more than others. It is worthy of note that in intellectual development the movement is step by step, perhaps unconsciously, toward one definite conclusion after another. A question is settled and that ends the process leading up to the conclusion. The unfolding of the child's mind is a process of determining or settling questions. Every conclusion reached fixes a point; what is once settled need not be gone over again, but a vantage-ground is gained as a basis for future progress. What is settled becomes a standard for future judgment. Primitive man, in search for food, consumes a berry which produces injurious effects every time he eats it. When this conclusion is once reached he always avoids that berry. But a certain nut appeases hunger and produces no evil effect, and that settles the question of its value.

This method, with various modifications, is endlessly repeated and a figure of all mental evolution. The mind proceeds from induction to deduction; by trying a number of objects a result is obtained which serves as a rule for future guidance without repeating the experiment. This granite is hard, that granite is hard, all granite tried is hard, and so once for all time the inference is drawn that granite is hard. As soon, then, as I see granite I know that it is a hard stone. The experience of years is condensed into a sentence and becomes a rule for the future. When once the law of gravitation is established the whole universe can be tested by its action.

Thus we see that, as in biology permanent species or types are evolved, so the mind establishes permanent types for the judgment. It proceeds from particulars to

generals; we might say that it organises the particulars, the details, into general conclusions and puts them into the form of rules, laws, and principles. The awakened mind is inquisitive, and this leads it to seek the solution of problems; but it makes the solution found a guide for the future; that is, the inquisitive mind becomes regulative, directive, normative. As in a biological species the results of past evolution are conserved,—as a product it conserves in some form whatever wrought for its production,—so in a law formulated by the mind are retained the experience and investigation which led to it and of which it is the fruit. The statement that an oak grows from an acorn embodies the knowledge obtained from all oaks seen to have been thus produced.

This process of condensing knowledge and preserving it in its condensed form is a mental necessity. The scholar who conducts experiments in a laboratory for years does not need, and cannot remember, the details, but only the results and the inferences from them. What progress could he make if every time he wanted to apply the results attained he had to go through the same experiments? The condensation mentioned is a method of shortening the work of the intellect; it retains the entire result of the past in the most available form. The empty mind has room for details; but the philosopher and scientist must draw the extract from the details and conserve this extract in the form of laws and principles, the comprehensive and inclusive types which correspond with the biological types. The real growth of the mind consists in an increase of information and in the norms of thought inferred therefrom.

The child and the untutored mind are absorbed by facts. But suppose that they had nothing but facts, how soon the mind would be so crowded as to leave room for nothing besides! As the mind grows it develops its facts into their

essences and conserves these. Facts lose their isolation; things are seen in their connections; something common to all objects of the same kind is observed, and with these concepts or general notions the mind operates. When I say, "A living tree is green," it includes all living trees and means more than that this or that tree is green. Instead of isolated facts, laws are eventually discovered, laws which bind together facts under one head or a single rule. Thus a fact ceases to stand alone; it becomes one of a multitude of like facts, and what pertains to it pertains to the whole multitude; it stands as the type of an entire class and interprets the class. What do we mean by a knowledge of the universe, or cosmos, but that we have the essence of its facts and their relations in the brief form of principles and laws?

234. Is there in social evolution anything analogous to this biological and mental process? We have reason to infer it from the fact that individual psychology is the determining factor in social psychology. When social evolution begins, nothing is settled, but all fluid, tentative, experimental. The evolution itself is a process of organising knowledge, making the vague definite, settling what is unsettled, moving from induction to deduction, and forming a cosmos out of nebulæ. Society proceeds from the particular to the general, its generalisations being culminations of past development and beginnings of a new course of evolution. As a season's growth culminates in the fruit, so social development culminates in a social law, a maxim, a rule of conduct, a principle of ethics, which conserve the sum and substance of all that entered into the evolution. This applies to every part of social life, and history contains a record of the conclusions reached. The frequent repetition of haphazard action terminates in fixed custom, just as individual action forms habit. Tradition is the conservatory of what the past has established. Institutions and systems are similar culminations of social evolution. Not that these are

aimed at, not that reflection is the guide in the beginning; an unconscious routine is more likely to take the place of plan and purpose. How can men aim at results of which they are ignorant? But the unconscious logic in human affairs acts similarly to the unconscious law in nature. Social evolution is a progressive establishment of norms of social thought, standards of faith and feeling, and rules of action. Taking law in the most general sense, social evolution institutes laws in all the relations of life.

Wherever we examine history we find this fruitful thought illustrated. Whim, caprice, haphazard, disintegration, yield to social rules which act with the force of law. Socialisation, in fact, means the social regulation of what was formerly left to the pleasure of the individual. "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," simply regulate socially the relation of the individual to property and to the person. Social development settles the principle of the sociality of individuals. It evolves dogmas and gives them the stamp of social authority. In familiar sayings and proverbs we have an interesting method of conserving evolutionary culminations. They are the congealed common sense evolved by the development of the past, and as such they enshrine the thought and feeling and faith of the people, and pass from mouth to mouth, from generation to generation, and from land to land. There is thus a tendency to make each age the depository of the wit and wisdom of the past.

Social evolution, then, does not merely increase knowledge, but it puts it into a different form; and in doing so accomplishes wonders. Everywhere, as we trace the steps of human development, we see what is at first doubtful and variable gradually becoming fixed and permanent. That man is mortal, that a cut hurts, that poison kills, had to be wrought into a creed by experience and observation. The order which slowly emerges from primitive chaos is, of course, often arbitrary and

liable to change; nevertheless, we behold in it the general trend to create axioms and definite institutions out of the confusion. The family develops into a regular institution; passion and brute force yield to social enactments; custom determines where a husband and wife shall be obtained, what functions belong to each, what relations they sustain to each other, to their children, and to property. From the family connection that of the kinship is determined, and various other relations are settled. Leadership may at first depend on circumstances, but, in the course of time, a fixed rule determines the choice of a chief. Evolution is thus a great organising process.

Myths, dogmas, philosophemes, scientific data, are such culminations. A moral code is the product of moral evolution. That the earth is round, that the sun is the centre of our system, that planets move in an ellipse, when once established, become guides in all future investigations. Thus, what is once done need not be done over again, but the achievement is a gain for humanity and for all time.

The increase of the deductive factors as society develops is significant. The laborious investigations leading to a final result terminate in a milestone which becomes the starting-point for a new move forward. Progress is promoted by standing on the firm foundation gained and making further conquests. What is settled in philosophy and science is so much capital to be used for new work and acquiring more capital. On the solid deposit of one age the next builds, just as the geological strata are deposited on each other.

A thought in a fluid state or process of development toward a final culmination, when it becomes fixed, is like the preparation for making an instrument. When the sword, the knife, the hammer is completed it becomes a tool. The tool may be improved, the pattern changed, but it is henceforth a permanent instrument for man's

use. This is the figure of a constant process in the psychical and social world. Thoughts are in an evolutionary stage, then culminate and assume a degree of finality, and henceforth, though still subject to some degree of development, are intellectual instruments by means of which other thoughts are moulded.

Such culminations eventually become self-evident, a kind of second nature, and act as if intuitive or instinctive. Thus evolution turns the highest products of culture into constitutional forces, as it were. We instinctively rush to save human life, which primitive man, the cannibal, wantonly slew for the sake of getting food.

Let us suppose that one age says A, another B, a third C, and so on. The process continues until an age appears which comes to Z, thus completing the logic and fixing the law. The letter of the alphabet which an age has reached indicates its place in a series of processes tending toward a particular end.

235. This organising and settling process can be observed in our own day. The numerous problems which agitate the minds of thinkers and the public indicate in respect to what questions finality is sought. They are known as "burning questions." Among these problems some are as old as philosophical thinking, while others are more modern. The conflicts between theism, pantheism, agnosticism, and atheism reveal the earnestness of the inquiries respecting the ultimate problems. Other subjects not ripe for final settlement in the social mind are the following: idealism, realism, naturalism; empiricism and rationalism; free-will and determinism; science and religion; faith and reason; and in the sphere of economics such questions as pertain to private property and social control, capital and labour, the relation of the individual and society to the soil, the mines, and the tools of labour. Some of these questions may never be

finally settled, except as matters of faith, while on others a general consensus may be attained. A study of the living questions gives an insight into the great laboratory of humanity, in which, age after age, all kinds of problems have been investigated and settled, or transmitted unsolved to the future.

236. The labour of the humanity of the past has thus produced the wealth which will circulate among future generations and make them rich. There are two tests by which an individual, a society, an age, may be measured: what solutions have been found which can serve as guides for the future, and what problems remain which require the labour of coming generations. This can be put in another form: let it be determined what has been established, instituted, organised, and what still remains chaotic. Great variations are found in the operation of these two factors, the unsettled and the settled. The most evolved society may have many things unsettled which a much less evolved one regarded as absolutely settled. The value and permanence of what is settled of course depend on its character and how it was settled. Despotism fixes in an unevolved society much that is not ripe for settlement, and conservatism solves by tradition problems which the future pronounces still unsolved. The philosopher finds questions where the savage sees none. The discovery of problems must be put among the profoundest achievements of intellect. Many men are known by what they cling to; a few cling to what they know. Rational intelligence evolves the regularity and system which, in enlightened eras, supersede primitive thoughtlessness and arbitrariness. The state, for instance, as a culmination of past evolution, marks an epoch. Government integrates disintegrated elements; laws fix under definite rules what was formerly loose, or supplant the tradition and custom from which they probably arose; and, in general, civilisation, in its way through friction to con-

sensus and conformity, means the establishment of the great essentials on which advanced society rests.

Since, however, men are governed by what seems to be, we find that even in civilisation the movement from irregularity to regularity, from constant fluctuations to fixed methods and permanent types, under which the past is subsumed and in which that past is concentrated into a focus, does not always end in a result which is final.

The evolution may be more conscious than formerly, more reflective, more rational, better guided by foresight and a wiser purpose ; still, error is common and correction in constant demand. While there is more choice and less routine, we need, and expect the energy of criticism. Analysis and synthesis are at work to separate what has been falsely united, and to unite what has been falsely separated. With the growth of investigation new and enlarged views are attained and greater demands arise. These break through the monotony of the established mechanism, destroy the worn-out fetishism, and modify or supplant traditional achievements. Society can be estimated largely by its power of self-control as distinguished from the nets of the past in which it is entangled, the principles in the self-control of course being an important factor. Even in the higher stages, however, we find a disposition to evolve objects according to a slavish mechanism. Men boast of their freedom while clanking their chains. We need but look at militarism and the formalistic trend it promotes, the dull mechanism of official life, the inane rigidity of the etiquette at court and among some of the aristocracy, the Philistinism of fashion, the adamantine reign of prejudice, and the tyranny of public opinion. Even in the schools of philosophy, science, and literature conformity is often demanded at the expense of freedom, individuality, and genius. A society rests in social survivals because it is

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itself a survival, and therefore fails to see what is effete. The tendency toward stationary social conditions is apt to be counteracted by radicalism, which may be as unreasoning as conservatism. When antiquated establishments become fixed and adapt to themselves the social life, the appeal to reason may be an appeal to revolution, in order to make a new start possible.

In proportion as the social content increases in mass and variety will evolution be under the guidance of the mental factors. The psychical variability gains in significance over the natural variability and becomes the chief consideration in selection. Natural conditions may gain a certain stability, while the mental factors are still developed and differentiated. Ancient Greece and Rome, and modern civilisation, are marked by psychical changes more than physical ones. Indeed, society must be freed, in a measure from the necessity of constant adaptations to external changes in order to be able to devote more attention to the evolution of those inner human qualities which constitute the essence of true social progress. The growth of mind while nature remains essentially the same insures the encroachment of mental selection on natural selection. Rational selection has already, in many instances, gained the mastery and has the guarantee of victory in the future.

It may be difficult to determine whether the freedom of savage or of civilised life is greater. The factors involved perhaps differ in so many respects as to be incomparable. Advanced life is so much richer than that of the savage that in some points it may be more free, while in others it is less so. Owing to the restraints of tradition, custom, and communal regulations, the life of the savage, usually spoken of as wild, unrestrained, and an unbridled libertinism, is frequently more bound than that of the enlightened. Many things determined for the former by social inheritance are left for self-determination

in civilisation. On the other hand, the law settles much for the civilised man which remains unsettled in savagery. The wide range in which the civilised man moves affords larger freedom than the savage enjoys, but in it he also meets with restraints which are foreign to primitive man. The civilised man, of course, has a great advantage in that he is more truly self-determinate than the savage, who is controlled by sense-impressions, circumstances, blind impulses, and passions.

Either a stagnant system adapts to itself and enslaves the mind, or else the living mind evolves the system into conformity with its own principles and demands.

The achievements and establishments of an age are not the only tests of its character. An important factor is the light in which it regards them. If it deems final what has been established, the immobility of the caste systems of India may be the result. When a problem is thought to have been solved the solution can be made a dogma or it can be regarded as still open to revision. One age rests content with eating the fruit of the past; another plants the seed which the fruit contains, cultivates it, and thus develops a new harvest. A vigorous and progressive society on a low plane of culture has more elements of inherent excellence than a society in civilisation whose sole excellence consists in the inheritance derived from the past.

Ratzel states that the development among primitive peoples which culminated in a permanent and powerful caste of priests became stagnant. The priests used their monopoly of education to subserve their own ends. Change without progress often becomes the rule even among civilised peoples. The endless repetition of an old content or of movement within a prescribed sphere makes chronology, but not history.

237. Certain lines of evolution, therefore, end, because, having reached their limit, they can go no farther. This overthrows the common notion that everything is in a

flux. Axioms, laws, principles innumerable, are established, and this ends the evolution which culminates in them. How much has been finally settled in the vast field of mathematics, and in respect to relations in space and time! That every change must have a cause will be true as long as the human mind reasons. Natural and mental laws have been evolved and made final. The principles of logic are invariable. Ideas in other departments also attain a degree of perfection which seems final, though not scientifically demonstrable, as in philosophy, ethics, theology, and art. Systems are constructed which, whether final or not, long remain without a rival. Some literary productions attain a finish which renders them a model. Hence certain passages are continually quoted, especially from Shakespeare and Goethe. In some forms of art, too, the ideal seems attained, especially in Greek statuary. Persons who appear to be an embodiment of great excellencies are themselves regarded either as ideal personalities or an approach to the same. They become standards of excellence.

When a high stage of perfection is attained two facts are to be considered: further development is difficult in proportion to the perfection reached, and the higher the perfection the more difficult to preserve it. Men are not born on the summits of culture, but in the valley. Perhaps the whole life is required to reach the summit, and few make the effort. It is quite a problem to bring the people up to a high existing standard, to say nothing of further progress. We have seen that what is low appeals to all; perhaps none care for what is highest, or the few that do can hardly conserve it. Society conserves what it appreciates: if the highest is not appreciated how shall it be conserved? What is best is the common content of exceptional persons, as a kind of monopoly or luxury, while what is necessary for life pertains to all. Heredity may tend to produce a higher order of men and thus

make the progress more easy. But the difficulty of conserving the highest culture gained and of developing a generation up to it—starting, as it necessarily does, at the beginning—reveals the obstacles in the way of further advances after great progress. With a vast inheritance to be utilised, it may be possible to reach great excellence only in a single department by means of specialisation.

The highest culture creates products which are peculiarly subject to the ravages of time. In flood and earthquake, in fire and war, persons are intent on saving themselves and the necessities of life, while the products of culture are apt to be classed among the superfluities. The general rule is that all which pertains to the protection and support of life comes first, and whatever ministers to the refinement of life is treated as secondary. What treasures of art and literature have been swept away by the besom of destruction! An invading army cannot turn back the Nile and prevent its annual fertilisation, but it can destroy vast intellectual accumulations of ancient Egypt. The burning of the Alexandrian library and the ruin of ancient cities destroyed valuable records which can never be replaced. The loss of Greek and Roman manuscripts has left in doubt many important points in ancient history, philosophy, literature, and religion; and the objects of art saved from the wreck, mostly in a mutilated state, make us realise the more fully what an irreparable loss has been sustained by the destruction of the rest. What has been saved is due mainly to the conserving power of mother-earth, to which so many of the treasures were consigned. A reign of barbarians followed the destruction of some of the ancient civilisations. It took Germany a century or more to recover from the effects of the 'Thirty Years' War. Nations are exhausted at the end of great catastrophes, their resources are gone, the provision for a bare existence absorbs the energies, little time and perhaps less

inclination exist for the exercise and development of the cultural forces, and the very foundations of civilisation must again be laid. Only when order is established and material resources are collected can special attention be devoted to culture. Some lands, after great devastations, such as Greece, Italy, Germany, look largely to other countries for new impulses and means of development, instead of continuing their normal process of evolution.

238. The evolutionary effect of a high stage of development, whether general or in a special department, involves weighty considerations. Does the high degree attained impel to still greater perfection? Or has it qualities which tend to stagnation or even retrogression? The effect on the mind is naturally the problem, no mental product having, as already shown, in itself progressive or dynamic energy. It certainly makes us pause when we consider the periods of degeneracy which followed the Augustan eras in Greece, Rome, Florence, France, England, Germany, and New England, in art, literature, and philosophy. The creators and thinkers are followed by elaborators, commentators, reproducers. No more did Aristotle and Hegel have successors than the literature or art of the ages of Pericles, Augustus, and Elizabeth.

A productive age evolves the energy it exerts, and its cumulative energy is seen in its cumulative creations. An age that follows as the heir does not, in the process of absorbing the inheritance, equally develop the creative energy. Perhaps the mind is overwhelmed by the wealth to be appropriated and despairs of making advances. If the total excellencies of a preceding period are thought to be unsurpassable, nothing appears to be left but to follow one of the many lines marked out and leave other courses to other specialists. Where the reproduction of excellencies seems the highest calling originality is neither encouraged nor developed. Deep needs are spurs to

effort, while superior achievements may tempt to satisfaction with the attained results. The poor man strives for wealth, while the heir of riches lacks the impulse of need and may rest content with his possessions. To take is more easy than to create; and it is a fatal tendency of the inertness of human nature to be intent on getting rather than to be scrupulous about the method of the acquisition.

Is a kind of satiety produced by the feast of good things? Does the apparent superabundance leave the impression of cheapness? Youth, in the presence of the excellencies of a golden age, may despair of equalling them, and therefore turn to other pursuits. Silence is golden when it is believed that the last word has been said, as some enthusiastic disciples claimed, for instance, for the philosophy of Hegel.

Science, philosophy, literature, history, and art, have really grown beyond the comprehension of any mind. A single department, as science, requires a number of specialists to master and elaborate the results attained. There is in educational institutions a strong temptation to make acquisition so dominant as to neglect further evolution or even to train students for independent investigation and original work. The difficulty of originality and discovery naturally increases with the advances made and the completeness with which the field of knowledge has been explored. Besides, constant training in mere acquisition fails to train investigators. A miracle is required to make a reproductive education productive and progressive. You can draw from a cistern only the water pumped or run into it. When the mind of society becomes a sponge instead of living energy, it finds and leaves the inheritances from the past as dead as the excavations of Pompeii.

No wonder, therefore, that eagerly, and even anxiously, the question is asked, whether, in the midst of the vast

accumulations of the ages, the creative energy is not decadent?

239. Past experience teaches that there is a limit to all things human or, as the German proverb puts it, care is taken not to permit the trees to grow into the heavens. Many things conspire to fix the limit. What is established requires time for appreciation, appropriation, and application, to say nothing of the need of testing it and proving its value. Darwinism is still subjected to these processes. Helmholtz would have to live and grow for centuries to continue to develop together all the sciences in his mind. But, instead of this uniform and cumulative process, we find that a new generation has to be developed merely to grasp the new ideas; and, when once grasped, the mind and the universe may have to be adapted to them. What a change from former times was required to learn to view the whole cosmos in the light of evolution! All the theories of heat and its action are affected when heat itself is proved a mode of motion.

Thus, instead of continuing an old process, new starts are made in development. With the religion of Jesus a new and marvellous social evolution begins. What new adjustments it required is seen by its working as a leaven in the Roman Empire. Great progress can be made by the mere application of what has been established, as in the case of a moral law or in the execution of a civil law. To make it effective may be as important as the discovery; indeed, the value of a discovery may be in its effectiveness. Generalisations may be led higher and higher, becoming more comprehensive in foundation, therefore more valid, as when inferences are at first drawn from a few cases, then from national history, then from the history of the entire human family; or when, at first, inferences respecting man's religious nature are drawn from a single religion, and then from comparative religion or the total religious consciousness. So laws of plants and animals

are discovered and included in botany and zoölogy; but from these we proceed to laws of a still more general character, those of biology including both the other departments. A similar process develops the general and abstract terms of language. The larger generalisations are often so imperceptible that the evolution involved is not apparent.

The latest need not be the best system of thought, any more than the last work of literature or art surpasses its predecessors. Perhaps an earlier system is better because the brain that evolved it was superior. The last system would, of course, be the best if it were a synthesis of all that preceded and then transcended them. Frequently a later evolution is not such a synthesis, but moves along a particular line which it develops out of due proportion. Many results of social inheritance are due to this process. In voluntary individual action any point can be chosen for a new start, whether it be true or false, whether a synthesis of past results or a partial view of such results, whether at the summit of what has been attained by evolution or low down in the scale. Religious society often remains on a low plane because controlled by tradition. Homer, at the beginning of Greek history, is a proof that conditions of excellence may exist at the inauguration of a period which vanish later. The supposition that a later stage of evolution is necessarily superior to an earlier stage cannot be maintained. All the art of the Middle Ages does not equal that of a much earlier time in the little country of Greece. It would be different if progress depended on a self-developing impulse in the products of culture instead of the mind. In that case the highest cultural creations would, of themselves, push on to something still higher.

It is not so much the discovery as the operation of a new invention which is apt to strike the public mind. The real in-

ventor may be forgotten, while he who finally markets it arrests the attention. In the evolution of an invention some who deserve great credit are apt to be forgotten. Who remembers Richard Trevithick who ran the first locomotive in England, December 24, 1801, and afterwards? Others developed the locomotive and live in the memory of the public; but Trevithick died poor in 1833, was buried in a pauper's grave, and is forgotten.

240. The conclusion reached shows that the society of a period can be studied advantageously according to its fixed types, which are culminations of the past, and its still unsettled and unorganised factors. The question is: What has congealed and what is still fluid? The answer furnishes the problems on whose solution the energies should be concentrated. History itself may be fruitful in proportion as it determines what has been established and what remains to be settled. Even what is instituted may teem with unsolved problems. The monogamy of the family may be deemed final, while the authority of the man, the position of the woman, and the place of the children are disputed points. The determination of the general character of the Church leaves many open questions respecting creed, polity, and practice. The constitution and laws of a state indicate what is established; the large sphere of politics includes the unsettled questions. Every association has a settled policy, but likewise a sphere of problems in which expediency reigns. Even in unorganised groups some things are determined by consensus and custom: others are free. The determined and the undetermined factors are the two poles of social action. In the realm of freedom spontaneity and originality prevail and progress becomes possible. Where all is fixed there can be no progressive movement; where all is unsettled the mind is probably too distracted for permanent construction and lacks the guiding principles for favourable development.

Both factors, well-established principles and freedom of movement, are consequently necessary for the evolution of society.

Social evolution, so far as a forward movement, is a progressive conservatism and a conservative radicalism, a union of the old, so far as it has conditions of survival, with the new that springs from the altered situation and the intellectual advance. The negative and positive, the destructive and constructive, factors rarely balance each other. An extreme sometimes seems a necessity for the exposure and removal of another extreme.

Other tests than what is instituted can of course be applied to the stages of evolution. An age may be judged by what are regarded as absolute standards of truth and right, and these are frequently applied by historians and others. Greece and Rome, for instance, came far short of the moral ideas of Christianity. But an age can also be judged according to the causes which have produced it, or the light which its evolution has given or made possible for it. A tribe of cannibals would seem horribly savage if set down in a modern slum; but it might stand higher than the slum if both were judged according to their antecedents and environments.

241. Science has nothing to do with social optimism and pessimism, except to investigate them and determine their validity. The present condition may justify pessimism for the immediate future, while the ultimate results, so far as can be judged, favour optimism. The problem is worthy of profoundest inquiry whether social evolution will eventually establish truth and justice. The specific method of science cannot determine whether some great principle or aim does not lie behind the entire process of evolution and direct its course, so that the very constitution of things involves a predetermination of its final result. Aside from this, however, from what is known of the nature and development of society an

inference can be drawn respecting the tendency of evolution toward truth and social justice. Whim and caprice play a prominent part in evolution; how, then, can there be regularity, law, or a specific tendency?

Human arbitrariness and passion, like error, may control the mind and direct its course, but cannot affect the nature of things and determine their action. The will everywhere finds limits in an adamant necessity whose processes it cannot regulate. It must also be considered that individual arbitrariness comes in conflict with the same arbitrariness in others. Individual whim, therefore, is not the final arbiter. The conflict of mind with mind must be settled between them. The antagonism and co-operation of the social forces act as restraining, coercive, impulsive, and educational influences. Adjustments become necessary; and if men are not to exterminate each other there must be accommodation, adaptation, and compromise. Sometimes might is resorted to, the strong compelling the acquiescence of the weak. By experience both parties learn to know each other and what is required to secure a common basis for peaceful action as the condition of individual and social welfare.

It soon becomes evident that social existence requires a certain community of thought, feeling, interest, and volition, and evolution tends to establish this community. The man who agrees only with himself may be a social ferment, but is unfit for co-operation. Without a common bond there can be no social bond. The injustice of man to man destroys this bond and is always oppressive; it conflicts with that permanent factor, human nature, both in the oppressor and the sufferer; it creates opposition and arouses efforts to overthrow or destroy the oppressor. An entire class is sometimes subjected by force, custom, or a supposed divine decree; but evolution develops the higher elements of human nature and makes oppression possible only while the subjected are in dark-

ness and weakness. No one willingly gives up a recognised right or interest, and he will do so only so long as it is inevitable. Social injustice always conflicts with the rights of some members, who, under normal conditions, will rebel and put society at war with itself. What is wrong need only be experienced as injustice in order to meet with condemnation from a part, if not the whole, of society.

An evil once instituted would have greater chance of permanence did not the mind develop it and thus make patent and more effective its inherent but latent wrongs. An evil originally disguised as a blessing may eventually become enormous and intolerable. The tares grow as well as the wheat.

242. It is one of the deepest convictions of the human mind that truth and right will eventually prevail; but the ground for the conviction requires inquiry. We might resort to the theory that the innate adaptation of the mind to truth and right, and the native conflict with error and wrong, settle the matter. Yet, to call this conviction an intuition and base it on an affinity of the mind for truth and right, looks like begging the question. The mind must, however, become false to itself to tolerate what is known to be false; and injustice is no less false than error—it is a falsehood in respect to relation and action. Some such view seems to lie at the basis of the teaching of Socrates, that justice and virtue need but be known to be practised. Even when wrong is deliberately chosen, a man attempts to justify the act to himself and others, just as every error must wear the mask of truth to receive currency. What reason and conscience stamp as false has not the condition of permanence; it is branded as unfit to survive. Every thinker is convinced that attachment to error is consecration to what is doomed to perish.

The personality or mind demands harmony; hence the

effort to establish unity between the intellect, the heart, and the will—an equilibrium of the powers. A conflict between reason and faith is torture. Remorse is self-division and conflict between the divided factors. There may be forefeeling where reason cannot penetrate, but it is not demonstrative; but what reason demonstrates is final, and to this the feeling and volition must in the end adapt themselves. No theory of man or the universe is deemed final which fails to satisfy the entire personality in its highest development. Rightly understood, the theory of the ancient Sophists, that man is the measure of all things, is absolute. He can have no other standard than the requirements of his being, as was shown before.

As nature works by law, but unconsciously, toward specific ends, so there are unconscious processes of the mind and society which tend toward specific ends. The body, even during sleep, carries on digestion, heals wounds, cures diseases; in fact, most of the functions of life are performed without consciousness. Much mental movement is on a similar basis. All the normal psychical functions tend in the direction of truth and right. Perversions are not only possible, but even common, just as diseases are; they, however, retard social evolution and are overcome in proportion as development continues and progress is made. Truth and right are guaranteed by the survival of what is fittest for the intellect and conscience and the total personality. Whatever conflicts with human nature in society contains the elements of self-destruction.

243. As scientific evolution promotes science, so social evolution promotes society. This means the gradual elimination of all that is against society, such as social error and social wrong. Social evolution is a method of socialisation, which does not merely mean that men are brought together, but also that whatever interferes with socialisation is removed. Every social truth and right is

promoted by socialisation, and every social error and wrong unsocialises and aids social retrogression, degeneracy, and disintegration. A false social force is unsocial and sure of destruction in proportion as society itself is evolved. Truth and right are realities, their opposites are in conflict with realities; they are harmony, their opposites are disharmony; and with the knowledge of social reality and harmony these will be promoted, while the unreal and the inharmonious will be dropped.

244. It is a law of the individual and the social mind that the hope of survival pertains only to what cannot be successfully contradicted. The uncontradicted might reigns supreme. Every error involves a contradiction; when this is discovered the error is known and the contradiction becomes its doom. Truth and right involve no contradiction; their harmony becomes more evident with the advance of knowledge, and this increases their might. Progress establishes systems; but error, on account of the contradictions it involves, cannot be evolved and harmonised with a system—it unsystematises a system. A system of truth is uncontradicted might, while error in a system contradicts itself. A despotic government is an uncontradicted might only so long as the people can be crushed. A class falsely dominating society is uncontradicted might only so long as the dominion is not properly understood. No social form can endure if it involves a conflict or contradiction. A contradiction is as intolerable to the mind as a vacuum to nature. It may take a long while, but the line of logic will eventually be discovered and followed.

Sorcery, for instance, has influence so long only as its conflict with natural law is not discovered. Society ceases to resort to it whenever the contradiction is seen. Every truth that is discovered becomes a test for determining the truth; no error can stand the test. An error unmasked reveals as erroneous all that depends on it.

What has been said applies also to all one-sided development—it may have a chance in a particular age, but cannot claim the future when knowledge becomes deeper and broader. Social evolution not only promotes the development but also the proper correlation of the social forces. An undue dominance of the economic force cannot be sure of the future. There is a tendency to make the forces balance each other, so as to produce harmonious co-operation.

Professor Simmel suggests that the truth is sure of the final victory because it is one, while errors on a subject may be many. These errors reappear in the course of investigation and their fallacy eventually becomes evident, while the one truth meets all the requirements of the mind.

245. That the progressive mind cannot rest permanently in error and wrong leads to the inference that only at their elimination and the development of truth and right to the utmost can social evolution be expected to cease. But such perfection does not seem to be within reach. We know that uninterrupted progress cannot be looked for. Old interests vanish, new ones arise, and therefore no generation continues exactly the work of the preceding. Problems solved produce new problems; and every age, living under new conditions, has its own peculiar problems to solve and new adjustments to make. With the progress of evolution the social variety becomes infinite; and, while adaptation and adjustment continually take place, factors enough will always be left to require adjustment. With increasing differentiation the demand for new adaptations will also increase. There seems to be no end to the development of mental products, so that something new for application to life and its relations may constantly be expected. What is once settled may be modified and occasion new development, while what is still unsettled also grows. Every stage of evolution is but

a milestone in an endless process. Certain tendencies culminate and yield to others, thus making a succession of epochs each of which begins new evolutionary movements. In its content and form and environment society will ever be liable to change. Even, therefore, if social evolution tends toward perfection, its absolute attainment seems beyond reach.

The course of evolution would be very different if each generation could begin where the preceding left off and uninterruptedly continue the forward movement. But besides the labour of securing a living, we must remember that every generation begins at the beginning its intellectual, æsthetic, ethical, and religious work, amid the peculiar environment in which it is placed. Instead of beginning where the preceding generation ended, the new one may contain but few who possess the disposition, the ability, and the means to undertake the appropriation of the culture attained by the last, to say nothing of going beyond.

246. Much more space would be required to give a complete account of the general characteristics. Only an epitome could be attempted. A brief review will recall and summarise some of the most general features of social evolution.

Throughout we have man and nature, freedom and necessity, the individual and society, constantly interacting and producing changes in each other. While man never becomes mere nature, nor nature human, we find that the individual and society so mould each other that there is a constant tendency to assimilation between them. It is more than reciprocity; it is a mutuality which tends to transform each into the likeness of the other. Social, like individual evolution, springs from human needs and desires, and forms combinations to meet them. The natural environment solicits and promotes social activity, often determines its direction, but may

also limit the operations of society. This evolution draws out the social forces, regulates their interaction, develops the social content and its permanent manifestations, and forms social structures with their organs and functions. The unfolding of the social needs and germs is a progressive revelation of their character. Frequently progress can be discovered only by comparing periods far apart. But low, one-sided, and false forces are also developed, and there are periods of stagnation and retrogression. Error and wrong can be developed even when progress is most vigorous; but they lack the conditions of perpetuity. They need but be known to be rejected. Logic, conscience, the frictions of society, the desire for harmony, are against their continuance. They antagonise the laws of human nature and socialisation, and therefore the law of the survival of the fittest dooms them. This law is not the same in human affairs as in nature, since in man it is, in a measure, subject to intelligence and choice. Natural selection becomes social, intelligent, ideal selection, and this means the endurance and final dominance of the most valuable forces, their best combinations and most precious products. There is a difference in the kind, the degree, and relative dominance of the energies in different eras. First, the lower are exercised, and the higher gradually evolved. The more perfect stages differ from the lower in subordinating the appetite, in purifying the affectional, and curbing the recreative forces, in making economics minister to man's higher aims, in developing predominantly æsthetics, ethics, religion, the intellect, and politics, and organising them into a system of genuine culture. Reproduction and imitation prevail in all stages, especially the lower; but in the domain of intellect direct imitation is out of the question. The symbols of thought used by another must be interpreted by the individual in order to get their content, requiring a degree of personal elaboration not found in simple imi-

tation. It is reproduction, assimilation, and appropriation, rather than imitation. Even in the effort at mental assimilation the same result is not always obtained. Different views prevail respecting the same traditions, creeds, and laws, which lead to investigation and impel to development. Whatever dynamic forces are at work in a society, frequently the most powerful impetus to development comes from other societies through example, through new views and the demands they create, through war, by means of subjection, and whatever requires new adaptations. Evolution, then, involves more than a mere unfolding from within. The external increments and influences must also be considered. The mind originates, the mind develops: its products, in the form of language, institutions, systems, creeds, governments, have no inherent energy for further development. The mind infuses into them whatever energy they possess. Society having a mind only figuratively, we must go to individuals for social initiatives. Great men are great evolutionary forces. Their creations are diffused and made social possessions. They step forward and society follows them. Progress is not in a mass, but by persons. What different persons develop can be united, organised into a system. What is organised or constructed may, however, be on a false basis and require deorganisation in order to make further progress possible. But the constructive process, which ends a course of development by forming a permanent type, is one of the most important. What is fluid congeals, the unsettled is settled, atoms and molecules are wrought into organisms, chaos becomes system, induction ends in deduction; hence the embodiment and conservation of past culminations in tradition, custom, constitutions, laws, proverbs, rules of etiquette, principles, faiths, dogmas, institutions, rigid methods of social procedure, all the ripe fruit of long, cumulative growth. Abstractions are formed which include, im-

plicity, the entire development of which they are the product and also the objects from which they are abstracted. As evolution proceeds, the details become so numerous that the only escape from endless distraction is in generalisations which are the essences extracted from the details. Generalisations are the titles of volumes and the headings of chapters which contain our modern knowledge. Socialisation is a process of organisation from individual anarchism. The increasing diversity produced by evolution, however, increases the unorganised as well as the organised material, thus leaving enough work of organisation for future ages. We have found the theory that evolution is a development from homogeneity to heterogeneity incomplete. The intellect may discover that greater perfection can be attained by developing heterogeneity into homogeneity. False theories of evolution are largely due to the fact that society itself is not studied, but interpreted by natural or biological processes, or the investigation of society is confined to its lower stages of development. Another fruitful source of error in respect to social evolution arises from the fact that society is regarded as an entity, an organism formed by compounding individuals, instead of a relation of individuals and a product of the social forces or of the energies of individuals. They create society by means of what they actually give to one another and hold in common. In the social forces we discover social continuity, while the individuals themselves pass away.

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